



ORIGINAL LETTERS  
FROM INDIA  
1837-1850



# ORIGINAL LETTERS FROM INDIA

(1770-1815)

Mrs. ELIZA FAY

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND SUPPLEMENT

BY

L. M. FORSTER

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Engraved by J. H. St. John

A. W. Devis

The Author dressed in the Egyptian costume

## INTRODUCTORY NOTES

ELIZA FAY is a work of art. But she was also a historical character, who wielded and resumed a pen, and from that point of view some brief notes may be acceptable, the reader can be trusted to forget them as soon as he enters her tremendous presence and gazes upon her prepotent form. (See Frontispiece)

### MANUSCRIPT OF THE LETTERS

She died in Calcutta, in 1816, and her MSS. were probably destroyed there after her death. As arranged for publication, they consisted of (1) twenty-three letters to her family, covering the period from April 1779 to February 1783. (11) Letters composed at Blackheath, at the instance of a certain Mrs. L. Mrs. L. may be only a literary device, for these letters are really an autobiography. They continue her story from 1783, and doubtless carried it down to 1815, the date at which she was writing. Unfortunately the administrator of her estate did not consider the letters to Mrs. L. sufficiently interesting to print in their entirety, and the reminiscences end in September 1797 in consequence, the last twenty years of her life are almost unknown to us.

### EDITIONS OF THE LETTERS

(1) In the *Calcutta Gazette* (May 9, 1816) Mrs. Fay "respectfully gives notice that the Narrative . . . is now

in the Press, and will be completed with all possible despatch"; subscriptions are invited. She died the following September, intestate and insolvent, and the book was published in an unfinished state, with a tepid 'advertisement' by the administrator, who hopes it will benefit the creditors (p. 272). This is the original edition (1817). The Library of the India Office possesses a copy; I know of none other in England.

(ii.) The book brought in a profit of Rs.220 in four years,<sup>1</sup> and was reprinted in 1821, also at Calcutta. This reprint is identical with the 1817 edition, except that the title page is reset and the 'advertisement' omitted. The British Museum possesses two copies of it.

(iii.) In 1908 a new edition was published by Messrs. Thacker, Spink & Co. of Calcutta, under the auspices of the Calcutta Historical Society, edited by the Rev. W. K. Firminger (now an Archdeacon), who further contributed an introduction and notes. I am grateful to this volume, for it was here I met Eliza first, and the notes contain much valuable local matter. Nevertheless it is an indifferent piece of work. There are numerous slips and—what is worse—the text has been tinkered and repunctuated unpardonably. Believing Mrs. Fay's English style to be inferior to his own, the Archdeacon has made on an average one alteration in every line she wrote—alterations which always lead us away from her spirit, and occasionally from her meaning.

The present edition—the first to be published outside India—makes no claim to scholarship but it does restore the original text. A few obvious printer's errors have been corrected, full names have often been substituted for initials when my knowledge permits, and in one place (p. 221) I have

<sup>1</sup> India Office Records Bengal Inventories, 1821, vol. 3

ventured an emendation. Elsewhere Mrs. Fay speaks for herself, as was indeed her constant custom while alive. "this story must be told in my own way, or not at all."

In preparing the notes, I have been under much obligation to Sir William Foster, C.I.E., who has not only allowed me access to the India Office records, but has given me the benefit of his great experience and knowledge. It is entirely through him that I am able to present a few additional facts about Mrs. Fay. There are still some problems awaiting solution. e.g. What was her maiden name? What was the date and the fate of the portrait of her by A. W. Devis?

### MRS. FAY'S CAREER

There is little to relate, beyond what she herself tells us.

She was born in 1756, perhaps at Blackheath. Perhaps her father was a sailor, for she refers to his familiarity with the wind's eye, and to her own resemblance to him when disguised in a pair of striped trousers. He died in 1794. There was a mother—dead by 1783. There were two sisters, one of whom apparently married a Mr. Thomas W. Preston. The initial letter of Mrs. Fay's maiden name was apparently C. And that is all we know of her origins. So obscure were the C family that a very few years have sufficed to conceal them from the historian.

Nor will her education detain us more than it did her. Something vaguely commercial is indicated—perhaps connected with dressmaking and France. She could splash about in French, also pick up and drop Italian, Portuguese, shorthand and Hindustani. In music she loved a Nicolai Sonata, and she was capable of backgammon and cards, though rapidly fatigued by either, and invariably worsted at chess. On one of her voyages a pair of globes accompanied

her, but geography could never have been her strong point, for she thought that the Alps were only one mountain thick, and the Malabar Hills the third highest range in the world. Writing she adored—never happier than when the pen is in the hand—but her grammar was most personally her own, and Archdeacon Firminger observes with concern that “she frequently arranges her words in such an order that she is bound to get into trouble with her relative pronouns.” She does. Indeed her mental equipment was that of an intelligent lady’s maid or courier, who has read Mrs. Radcliffe, Pope, and *Nubia in Search of a Husband*, and can allude at a pinch to Queen Christina of Sweden. Her religious instruction was that of the Established Church of England: pious without enthusiasm, she censures the bigotry of Rome and deplores without attempting to correct them the errors of the heathen. She thought that the Mohammedans worship Mohammed. She believed in Nature. She detested indelicacy.

When we meet her (spring of 1779) she is twenty-three years old, confused and vigorous, and recently married to Anthony Fay. Nothing is known about Fay either. He was Irish by extraction, and the only son of a “Francis Fay, gentleman, late of Rotherhithe, Surrey.”<sup>1</sup> He had recently been called to the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn, and was now going out to practise as an Advocate at the Supreme Court of Calcutta. At this point Mrs. Fay’s letters to her family start. The first fourteen of them—the most brilliant she ever penned—describe the journey out. The ride across France, the adventures in Egypt, the voyage down the Red Sea, all lead up with unintentional art to the stupendous tragi-comedy of Calicut, where the East hit her, bang, and

<sup>1</sup> Lincoln’s Inn Admission Registers, July 3, 1778

incidentally revealed to her both her husband's character and her own. The enormous letter recounting their imprisonment by Hyder Ali ranks among the more remarkable documents of Anglo-India, intensity, passion, venom, humour conscious and unconscious, are sustained page after page, and the pæan of deliverance that follows adds a grotesque yet genuine touch of beauty. Nothing as exciting as Calicut happened to her again. It is her high-water mark of sensation. In time the Fays reached Calcutta, he was admitted an advocate (June 16, 1780) and began to practise, but their married life did not last. They were both of them underbred and quarrelsome and he was a fool to boot. In less than two years he had run into debt, alienated their professional friends, and produced an illegitimate child, and his wife had to leave him. He went back to England, in connection with a big political intrigue, and we hear no more of him (dead by 1815). She went back to England herself in 1782, *via* St Helena, chastened but indomitable.

Her second voyage. Off to Calcutta again in 1784. Humbler social outlook, thought of starting a seminary for young ladies but resumed mantua-making instead bankrupt in 1788: returned to England in 1794 and acquired a financial interest in a boat called the *Minerva*, which promptly burst into flames owing to the explosion of a bottle of aqua fortis, and had to be scuttled.

Third voyage. Off to Calcutta in the repaired *Minerva*. Arrived in 1796 but only stopped six months. Another boat is acquired, the *Rosalia*, and is laded with costly muslins with which she hopes to make her fortune in the United States. Before she can reach the mouth of the Hoogli, the *Rosalia* fills with water and the muslins are ruined. New York is attained by other agencies on September 3, 1797.



At this point the administrator lost enthusiasm and stopped publishing the MS., so that our next glimpse of the wanderer is in 1815 at Blackheath, where she probably sponges on her sister, Mrs. Preston. She writes her reminiscences for Mrs. L—older and more formal now, but still cattish. Her last movements can be pieced together from various sources.<sup>1</sup> Next spring she sails for Calcutta for the last time, 'on the *Sir Stephen Lushington*, to die there on September 9, 1816, aged sixty.<sup>2</sup> Since she left no will, her estate was administered by the Registrar of the Supreme Court. Her Indian creditors got eight annas in the rupee. Mrs. Preston, of Point Cottage, Blackheath Hill, was owed £300 and got £61 : 1 : 0. The *Sir Stephen Lushington* was owed Rs.800 for passage money and got Rs 400. Her effects were put up for sale by her old enemy, the auctioneer Tulloh.<sup>3</sup> Prices did not run high. A book entitled *Thoughts and Remarks on Establishing an Institution for the Support and Education of Unfortunate respectable females* only fetched one rupee fourteen annas, while *Thoughts and Remarks on a Protestant Nunnery* went for even less. Scott, Mrs. Barbauld, Hannah More, Lady Morgan and introductions to chess also occur on the list, also oddments of household furniture and millinery, also a Welch wig, two pianos and a gold watch—perhaps the very one into which she had stuck pins at Calicut, so many years before: anyhow it went cheaply. She was buried the day after her death, in one of the Calcutta cemeteries, no one knows in which, and there her second-rate career comes to an end. She had been neither rich

<sup>1</sup> Among them are Archdeacon Firminger's notes to his edition, and MS notes in the possession of Sir W. Foster

<sup>2</sup> *Asiatic Journal* for 1817, pp 407 and 517

<sup>3</sup> India Office Records Bengal Inventories, 1816, vol 3

nor well-educated nor well-connected nor good-tempered nor beautiful nor improper; what hope had such a female of attracting the attention of her contemporaries? And why does she attract us now?

### HER STYLE HER CHARACTER

"I reserve to myself the option of resuming the narrative style whenever I shall deem it necessary." She was in prison when she wrote this, and a tea-kettle had just been stolen from her by another lady, so that one would not expect her to reserve options, but the remark is typical of her. It expresses her character, like all her remarks. Every word she wrote is personal. Not a single sentence is dead, and even when she seems to function mechanically—to praise Providence, for instance—there is always some little turn at the end, such as "But to resume," or "You must however be all impatience to know how we fell into this pickle, take then the particulars," which pulls the paragraph into shape and makes it her own.

How very differently do human beings pass the time allotted them in this probationary existence! Surely, to consume it in supine indolence or "vain repetitions" can never render us more acceptable to Him who is the fountain of light and knowledge. We ate some preserved peaches with them, which the Consul paid for, and then took our leave, but were forced to submit to a salute from the sisters, which we would gladly have dispensed with, for they all took an enormous quantity of snuff.

Thus does she get her own back upon some unattractive Ursuline Nuns. Or consider the following trifle—it begins with all the dreariness and unreality of an ocean log, then curdles into daily life suddenly.

Numbers of man-of-war birds and eggs, were taken, which proved to be good eating, they likewise caught the finest turtle I

ever saw, weighing near 400 lbs, but by an act of unpardonable negligence in people so situated, it was suffered to walk overboard in the night.

Suffered to escape, and she so partial to nourishing food! Her opinions and desires are always sticking out like this, and ripping the chaste mantle of literature.

Were she only frank and naïve, it would be something, but she is much more: a soul courageous and gallant, an eye and ear always on the watch. She does not conceal her sufferings, but not once does she whine over them, and we get after a few pages a wonderful impression of hardness. Hard as steel? Scarcely, because that suggests nobility, but harder than her blockhead of a husband. When the verandah in which they had hidden their savings was twitched off the house by a monsoon, he abandoned himself to lamentations while she calculated the direction of the wind and finally discovered the money in a far away tuft of grass. In her sense, as in her sentiment, she is the child of her century, which despite its palpitations never lost grasp of the main chance. Her floods of tears and fainting fits are always postponed until a convenient moment they never intrude while she is looking after her luggage or outwitting her foes

To this strength of will she joins high powers of observation. Her little character sketches are delightfully malicious, Mr. Hare, the Tullohs, the grand Mrs. Hastings, Captain Ayres, Captain Lewis.—“I want to make you see them,” she says, and we see them. She is also shrewd about national characteristics, quick to detect the callousness of the lower class Frenchwoman, nor, if one is to generalise about the myriads of India, could it be better done than this:

I wish these people would not vex one by their tricks, for there is something in the mild countenances and gentle manners of the Hindoos that interests me exceedingly

And the liveliness of her eye! People and articles passed before her not as they do for most of us, in a blur, but with definite outlines. Read her description of the costume of the Consul's wife at Alexandria, or of the costume she herself donned before entering Cairo, or of the scenery of East Africa, with which she so nearly collided. All she says of it is "before we tacked *flies* were seen on the shore—had this happened during the night nothing could have saved us" yet no words could bring East Africa nearer and she does not weaken the effect by remembering that night might have concealed the flies. And her ear: like her eye it is always alive; how the cries of the sepoy at Calicut sink into her! And her mouth: how she does relish her food! She is constantly registering through her senses, and recording the results with a powerful though untrained mind. The outcome is most successful, and it is strange that her letters are not better known in this country. Though they have value historically, their main interest is human, they show us a highly remarkable character, triumphant over the difficulties of life and narrative style

Style is always being monopolised by the orderly minded; they will not admit that slap-dash people have equal literary rights, provided they write slap-dash. If Mrs. Fay got her relative pronouns correct she would be a worse writer, for they can never have been correct in her mind, she can never have spoken quite proper even when calling at Government House or learning sweet little Miss Rogers the use of the globes. She wrote as well as she could, she wrote nothing

that she herself was not. Even the tatters of the Grand Manner are hers, for she was full of aspirations, and loved to embark upon the billows of the grandiose. Her humour, irritability, power of description, sense of little things, all gain their full force because she was at the same time wishing she could write as feelingly as Mrs. Radcliffe or as wittily as Fielding. Her age produced many greater letters, but few that so faithfully reflect the character of their author. Every word tells its story. *Cherchez le style; c'est la femme*

### THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Two facts must be kept in mind while we read the earlier letters: England and France are at war, and the English in India are preparing to fight Hyder Ali, the ruler of Mysore.

(1) England went to war with France (also with Spain, America and Holland) in 1778, so when the Fays travel across France in the following year they are in enemy country. They are treated, and expect to be treated "with great politeness"; she is quite affronted when their papers are looked at, and though she sometimes sighs for Old England, she never thinks it her duty to suffer. With a clear conscience she admires Marie Antoinette, sight-sees, hob-nobs with the enemy, gives her letters to St. Lubin. The French, under Admiral Suffren, treated Hickey and his Charlotte with similar courtesy at Trincomalay three years later (Wm. Hickey, iii, 34 *seq.*) Eliza has not Charlotte's charm, yet even she finds little to resent, and her letters are an interesting example of eighteenth-century war mentality.

Peace was made in 1783 to the advantage of France.

The war had been mainly naval—West Indies, coasts of Southern India, in the latter theatre it connects with the more intimate operations of Hyder Ali.

(11.) The “fell tyger Hyder Ally” was a Mohammedan soldier, who started in Hindu employ, established himself in the uplands of Mysore, and was trying from that central position to dominate southern India, and to reach the Malabar coast on the west and the Carnatic and Coromandel on the east. He succeeded in the Malabar and occupied Calicut, its capital, but to the east he had already collided with the English in Madras (1767–69), and a second and greater war was impending when the Fays blundered on the scene. Hyder Ali had two main grievances against the English: they had taken the port of Mahe during their operations against the French, and he regarded it as under his protection, and they were intriguing with his mutinous subjects, the Nairs. In the confusion and tension his brother-in-law, the governor of Calicut, thought it wiser to detain all English people there. For further details see note on the Fays’ imprisonment at Calicut (p. 276). Soon after their release the actual war broke out.

This is the war that so roused the eloquence of Burke. Hyder Ali swept down into the Carnatic and nearly took Madras. When the French fleet arrived under Suffren he operated in conjunction with it. He died in 1782, but his son, Tipu Sahib, continued to give trouble.

Subsequent upheavals, such as the French Revolution and the Battle of Waterloo, do not appear to have incommoded Mrs Fay. But it is as well to remember that she lived through them. She saw a little of the Portuguese possessions, and a little of the Cape, both before and after

the expulsion of the Dutch: and probably she saw a good deal of America towards the close of her life, but "having arrived in the land of Columbia, I will bid you adieu"

### CALCUTTA IN 1780

When the Fays landed in Calcutta, certain very celebrated and rather dull historical events were in progress, events well known to Macaulay and every schoolboy, and the object of careful research on the part of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. Eliza herself was more interested in the price of mutton and the shapes of hats, nevertheless the celebrated events influenced her life, so some reference must be accorded to them; it will be followed by short references to Calcutta society and to Calcutta topography.

(1) *History*.—In 1773 the British Parliament had passed a "Regulating Act" to provide for the government of Bengal, a province which was technically part of the Mogul Empire but actually under the control of a politico-commercial enterprise, the Honourable East India Company. The Act created (a) A Supreme Council at Calcutta, with Warren Hastings as Governor-General and four councillors, of whom the most famous is Philip Francis, (b) A Supreme Court of Judicature, with Sir Elijah Impey as Chief Justice and three other judges, of whom Sir Robert Chambers will concern us most (p 174). Council and Court were independent of each other and their spheres not clearly defined, so there was friction between them (p 176), but far more serious was the friction that arose inside the Council itself. A prominent Hindu, who had accused Hastings of corruption, was himself subsequently accused of forgery, he was tried before the Supreme Court, and probably fairly tried, he was found guilty and was executed (1775). This is the

famous and interminable Nuncomar case; Mrs. Fay does not refer to it in her letters, but it must have been often on her lips, for it convulsed Calcutta, and finally crippled the careers both of Hastings and of Impey

Warren Hastings is far above our heads, an Imperial Pioneer and a fine fellow, feared for his ability, liked for his charm. He had just made a somewhat imprudent second marriage with a divorcee, but was living down the slight scandal it had raised. Impey was a man of inferior calibre, however, he was neither dishonourable nor weak, and, though he and Hastings had been at the same public school, there is no reason to suspect conspiracy between them on the occasion of the Nuncomar trial. The evil genius of the tangle was certainly Philip Francis. Brilliant, bitter, ambitious, immoral, and probably the author of the *Letters from Junius*, Francis came out East in the hope of advancing his career on the newly created Council, but he met with a personal mishap. He climbed up a bamboo ladder into the room of a Mrs. Grand, was discovered, sued by the husband, and condemned by Sir Elijah Impey to pay Rs 50,000 (1779). Hence his hatred of Impey, which, combined with his jealousy of Hastings on the Council, induced him to rake up the Nuncomar trial (although he had not tried to save Nuncomar at the time), and to search for anything else that was likely to injure his enemies. He drew a Colonel Watson into his schemes, and Watson drew in poor blustering Anthony Fay (p. 198) and Fay deserted his wife, celebrated events wrecked little lives.

Francis and Hastings fought a duel (p. 185), but this was only an incident in their feud. Francis returned home after it to stir up trouble in England. He aimed at



the impeachment of Hastings and of Impey for High Treason; both men had subsequently to return for the purpose of defending themselves. Hastings was tried and acquitted, amid much social publicity. The motion to impeach Impey was dropped.

Books. Fitzjames Stephen, *Nuncomar and Impey*, gives a thorough analysis of the episode; for gossip, turn to Busted, *Echoes from Old Calcutta* (4th edition), an entertaining and accurate miscellany.

(ii) *Society*.—To the student of British deportment overseas, the end of the eighteenth century in Calcutta is an interesting period. A change is at hand. The English are no longer merely traders, soldiers, adventurers, who may take up what attitude suits them towards the aborigines; they are acquiring racial consciousness and the sense of Imperial responsibility.

O never let conscience molest or offend you,

For conscience should keep all the time we're in India,

sings a local poet in the *Bengal Gazette*, but his advice was ignored and his paper suppressed. A Supreme Council and a High Court brought solemn social consequences in their train. Viceregal airs begin, the king's birthday is already a religious event although he was George the Third, Lady Governess and Chief Justice hold their state, and apart from them, with a pride exceeding their own, Charles Grant lays the foundation of Protestant Missions in Bengal. What would be the relation of this new society to the old oriental societies through which it was sprouting? No one asked the question yet, nor knew that a very peculiar brand—Anglo-India—was being added to the existing distractions of the peninsula.

A social routine soon evolved, which has partially

continued down to the present sterner epoch. Ride or walk before breakfast. Breakfast about nine. Then the gentlemen went to their work, and the ladies passed their morning as best they might, in a state of *deshabille*.

The fashionable undress, except in the article of being without stays (and stays are wholly unworn in the East) is much in the English style, with large caps or otherwise, as fancy dictates. No care or skill is left unexerted to render the appearance easy and graceful, a necessary circumstance, as gentlemen in the course of their morning excursions continually drop in, who say the prettiest things imaginable with an air of truth that wins on the credulity and harmonises the heart.

Thus writes Miss Sophia Goldborne, a contemporary of Mrs Fay's and sometimes her rival in the narrative style. Dinner burst on the world at two—enormous (p. 181), the gentlemen each drank three bottles of claret, after which both sexes fell asleep, only regaining consciousness towards sunset. Perhaps a little more work was done in the evening, but the great event was a ride or drive on the Course, or an airing on the Hooghly, then tea or coffee, formal calls, and supper at ten. Mr Mackrabie (another contemporary) writes in his diary. "*Entre nous*, the evening was stupid enough, and the supper detestable, great joints of roasted goat with endless dishes of cold fish." Bed at midnight.

Mrs. Fay's early connections were with legal circles—the Impeys, Chambers, Hydes. But after her husband deserted her she sank into what would now be termed "second society." Perhaps she did not mind much. She had soon seen through the world and its little tricks and discovered that "grand parties so much resemble each other that a particular detail would be unnecessary and

even tiresome," and that even Mrs. Warren Hastings was mildly absurd.

The delightful *Memoirs of William Hickey* (3 vols.: 1749-1790) form a perfect social pendant to our authoress. If she is a lady, Hickey is a gentleman. He was an Irish attorney, etc., who ran in and out of Calcutta during her period, and in and out of the same section of society. They never allude to one another, and it is improbable they ever met—dates just preclude it. But they had numerous friends and aspirations in common, and both clung to what either would have called the wheels of fashion's car. Their value to us to-day is that they were not first-rate, never at the top. They give an account of Calcutta that would never occur to the well-bred, the highly educated, the sincerely pious, or the satisfactorily introduced. If any one wishes to know what ordinary social life there was like a hundred and fifty years ago, let him read them, their modest careless stuff is true as a mirror and also pleasant as a design.

(111) *Topography*.—The city, like its inmates, was just assuming modern airs. Its territory already stretched over three miles along the Hooghly and about a mile and a half inland. As Mrs. Fay sailed up the animated stream she passed on her right the recently built residences on Garden Reach, and, after them, the imposing mass of the new Fort William, the river Esplanade, and the old Fort William. The Old Fort was under demolition, for bitter memories were not as carefully cherished in India then as they are to-day, and Eliza and her friends were not exercised by an episode which had happened in the debris twenty years previously, and which was to thrill the nineteenth century with increasing indignation.—the Black Hole of

Calcutta The site of the tragedy was—as it still is—the geographic centre of the city, and the bungalows of the English and the buildings they constructed for business, amusement, and religion lay mostly within a half-mile radius of this Old Fort, whereabouts stood the Government Offices, the Court House, the residences of the judges, the "Harmonicon," the Playhouse, and other buildings mentioned by Mrs Fay, and here, shortly after her arrival, rose the classical colonnade of St John's Church It is not known where she and her husband set up house, but in later years, after his desertion of her, she had a shop abutting on to the St John's churchyard, 76 in Old Post Office Street, now called Hastings Street (see note, p. 252).

North, east, and south of the English area dwelt "the blacks" in some congestion, the richer blacks repairing to the north Also apart, though for other reasons, dwelt the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, together with his wife, the Lady Governor Until recently the magnificent couple had lived out at Belvedere, Alipore, but Hastings had sold this house just before Mrs Fay arrived, and the house in which she pays her respects and which she calls "Belvidere" must be some other mansion, at present unidentified

There was no bridge over the Hooghly, and consequently little expansion on the western bank

Those who care to evoke Mrs Fay's Calcutta should look at the charming set of coloured engravings of the city by T. Daniell (1786-88), which breathe the very spirit of Anglo-Indian origins; here are porticoes and street scenes, esplanades, equipages, and mendicants, just as they met her appraising eye Among contemporary maps Upjohn's (1791) is good. Literary assistance may

be found in Firminger's notes, Busteed's *Echoes from Old Calcutta*, and the pages of *Bengal, Past and Present*, an excellent periodical which specialises on topography

### THE DEVIS PORTRAIT

(*See Frontispiece*)

This amusing picture raises a small problem. It is reproduced from the engraving "by T. Alais" in the 1817 edition. I have failed to trace the original drawing. As the inscription states, Mrs Fay is in Egyptian (not in Indian) costume—the clothes precisely correspond with her description of what she wore in Cairo—so one would assume that the portrait was made shortly after her arrival in Calcutta, *i.e.* about 1780, while she still had money, friends, youth, and interest in her escapade. But A. W. Devis, the artist, would then have been very young indeed—scarcely eighteen—nor can I find proof that he came East at so early a date. He was on an E.I.C. boat, the *Antelope*, in 1783, and was wrecked on the Pelew Islands, where he took part in the tribal wars of savages, and sketched them and their womenfolk between whiles (see *An Account of the Pelew Islands*, by George Keate, 1788—a fascinating work, replete with adventures that put the Fays' to shame). He was in Calcutta by 1784, and perhaps he drew Mrs. Fay then, but she had parted with her husband, lost her mother, and visited England in the interval, and it seems unlikely that she should retain either her Egyptian clothes or her enthusiasm about them through so many vicissitudes.

# ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM INDIA,

CONTAINING A NARRATIVE OF A

JOURNEY THROUGH EGYPT,

AND

THE AUTHOR'S IMPRISONMENT AT CALCUTTA

*BY HYDER ALLY*

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN ABSTRACT OF THREE SUBSEQUENT VOYAGES TO INDIA.

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BY MRS FAY

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PRINTED AT CALCUTTA

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1817



## PREFACE

THE volume now submitted to the public, exhibits a faithful account of certain remarkable occurrences in the history of an individual, whose lot has been to make frequent visits to several distant regions of the globe, to mingle in the society of people of different kindreds and tongues, and to experience many vicissitudes of fortune. At a time when fictitious representations of human life are sought for with so much avidity, and constitute one of the principal sources of amusement in the hours of solitude, such a work as the present will, it is presumed, not be unacceptable. Those whose curiosity is attracted by the recital of incidents that never took place, or whose sensibility can be awakened by the description of emotions that were never felt, may perhaps derive a similar gratification from the following unembellished narrative of simple facts and real sufferings.

Five and thirty years ago, it was the fate of the author to undertake a journey over land to India, in company with her husband the late Anthony Fay Esq who, having been called to the bar by the honorable society of Lincolns Inns, had formed the resolution of practising in the courts of Calcutta. They travelled through France, and over the Alps to Italy, whence embarking at Leghorn they sailed to Alexandria in Egypt. Having visited some of the curiosities in this interesting country, and made a short stay at Grand Cairo, they pursued their journey across the Desert to Suez. After passing down the Red Sea the ship in which they sailed touched at Calicut, where they were



seized by the officers of Hyder Ally, and for fifteen weeks endured all the hardships and privations of a rigorous imprisonment.

When, after residing two years in India, the author, on account of circumstances explained in the course of the work, returned to her native country, she was repeatedly urged by several of her friends to publish some account of the events that had befallen her, which, it was supposed would engage the attention of the public, being connected with important circumstances in the lives of well known and respectable individuals, and illustrative of the character of a Potentate whose movements were the subject of serious alarm in India. But, at this period a woman who was not conscious of possessing decided genius or superior knowledge could not easily be induced to leave "the harmless tenor of her way," and render herself amenable to the "pains and penalties" then, generally, inflicted on female authorships; unless inspired by that enthusiasm that tramples on difficulties, or goaded by misfortune which admits not of alternative. Being utterly uninfluenced by either of these motives, and having all the fear of criticism and aversion to publicity which characterizes the young women of her day, the author at that time declined complying with the wishes of those she yet highly honored, and never enquired farther after the fate of her letters, than to learn that they were duly received by those dear friends, to whom all her peregrinations and the knowledge of her eventual safety could not fail to be highly interesting.

Since then, a considerable change has gradually taken place in public sentiments, and its developement, we have now not only as in former days a number of women who do honour to their sex as literary characters, but many unpretending females, who fearless of the critical perils that once attended the voyage, venture to launch their little barks on the vast ocean through which amusement or

instruction is conveyed to a reading public: The wit of Fielding is no longer held over them in terrorem, and the delineations of Smollet would apply to them in vain. The race of learned ladies ridiculed by these gentlemen is extinct. A female author is no longer regarded as an object of derision, nor is she wounded by unkind reproof from the *literary Lords of Creation*. In this indulgent era the author presumes to deliver her letters to the world as they have been preserved by the dear sister to whom they were partly addressed, trusting that as this is, in its nature, the most unassuming of all kinds of writing, and one that claims the most extensive allowances, they will be received with peculiar mercy and forbearance.

Since the period to which these letters refer, the Author has made voyages to India, touching in the course of them at various places in all the quarters of the globe, and has been engaged in commercial and other speculations. Her trials and anxieties, however, have produced only a long train of blasted hopes, and heart rending disappointments — An account of these subsequent occurrences is therefore subjoined in a series of letters lately drawn from the original Journals and Memorandums, and addressed to a lady, whom the Author has the happiness to rank in the number of her friends.

Shadows, clouds, and darkness still rest on the remainder of her pilgrimage, which calls for the pilotage of kindness and the Day-star of friendship. She has, however, by the blessing of Providence been constantly enabled to rise superior to misfortune, and will not now in the evening of her days, derogate from the unostentatious energy of her character, or seek to solicit the pity of her readers by wearisome retrospect or painful complaints. With feelings acutely alive to kindness and truly grateful for every expression of it, she most thankfully esteems the generous patronage with which she has been honoured, and is rendered the more

sensible of its value, because she is conscious, that it was not meanly solicited or unworthily obtained.

To the inhabitants of Calcutta, she begs more particularly to render her thanks. Long acquaintance, high esteem, and unfeigned affection call for this peculiar tribute. Five times has she visited this city, under various circumstances, and with different feelings, yet never had cause to regret the length or the dangers of the voyage, secure of ever meeting here all that could encrease the joys of social life, in its happiest moments, or soothe the hours of languishment in the days of adversity.

CALCUTTA, *Anno.* 1816.

# ORIGINAL LETTERS

## LETTER I.

FROM MRS FAY.

*Paris, 18th April, 1779.*

I BELIEVE before I left England it was agreed that, my Letters should not in general be addressed to any one particularly, as they will be something in the style of journals, therefore a contrary method would be rather embarrassing—I suppose you begin to think that I have forgotten you all, but it really has not been in my power to write till now, of which assertion an account of our route will furnish abundant proof—We reached Dover at about seven in the evening of the (*in my eyes,*) ever memorable 10th of April The thoughts of what we all suffered on that day, can never be banished one instant from my recollection, till it shall please God to grant us a happy meeting. My constant prayers are that, we may be enabled to support this dreadful separation with fortitude—but I dare not trust myself with the subject, my very heart seems to melt as I write, and tears flow so fast as to compel me to shut one eye while I proceed It is all in vain, I must leave off And must weeks, nay months elapse before I can have the satisfaction of even hearing from you? How shall I support the idea! oh my dear Father! my beloved Mother! for your poor girl's sake, take care of your precious health, do not be unhappy The Almighty will, I doubt not, preserve us to each other, something tells me that we shall meet again, and you have still two excellent children left to be your comfort, they I know will use every effort to keep

up your spirits, happy to be so employed! but let me not repine, this trial is not permitted, but for all wise purposes I will now lay down my pen and endeavour to acquire a calmer set of ideas, for I must either write with more fortitude or not at all. Adieu for a little while; I will try to take some refreshment, and then resume my pen.—Half-past four P. M —In vain I strive, the thoughts of home still prevail, and totally preclude every other consideration. I know no better method of chasing these intruders, than by proceeding with the narrative of our journey; *allons donc* We embarked at Dover for Calais on the 11th at 5 P. M. and had a most delightful passage of just three hours, from port to port. I wished for a little sea sickness but either the wind was not high enough, or I am become too good a sailor, to expect benefit this way, for I remained perfectly well. I assure you there is a deal of ceremony used here now. On coming within gunshot of the Fort, we hoisted a French flag, and were permitted to sail quite up to the Quay We met the other packet coming out, which accounts for my not writing by that mail—I have neglected to mention that Mr. B—the young gentleman whom Captain Mills recommended as a travelling companion, joined us before we left England His appearance is by no means prepossessing, he seems a dissipated character and more calculated to shine in convivial parties than to render himself agreeable in the common routine of society, whether this opinion be just or not, time will discover. On landing we were all drawn up together, and ordered to the Custom House, where we gave in our names, occupations, &c they next marched us about half a mile farther to wait on the Governor, in order that he might put any questions he chose to us; his Lordship not being visible, we were forced to arm ourselves with patience and proceed to his Commissary, where we found it a mere matter of form, they asking but what was known before. However I assure

you, we thought more than we dared to express on the occasion. Only imagine how disagreeable to be dragged about in such a manner immediately after a Sea voyage instead of reposing ourselves. After all was settled, we first took places in the Diligence for the next day then called on Monsr. Pigault de l'Épinove, to whom you will remember I had been formerly introduced. He received us with his usual kindness and hospitality. This gentleman is descended in a direct line from one of the six brave Citizens of Calus, who so nobly offered themselves as victims to save their beloved country from the barbarous sentence pronounced against it by our third Edward. He is much esteemed by his countrymen on this account.

This being my fourth visit to Calus, I must of course have formerly described every thing worth notice there, so shall merely say we sat off from thence on the 12th Inst. at 8th a. m. and reached Boulogne about noon. The sight of this place brought to my mind many pleasant recollections of the social hours passed there. I called on several friends, and was much urged to prolong my stay among them, but that you know was impossible. Indeed far rather would I, had time permitted, have taken *one* turn round the ramparts, to enjoy the melancholy satisfaction of once again beholding the white cliffs of my dear native land, so frequently viewed from thence.

You must expect me to make frequent omissions and mistakes, for two men have just placed themselves under my windows with humstrums, and indeed there is constantly some noise or other through the day and evening, sometimes two or three dancing bears, and a few hours ago they exhibited a poor little Porcupine. I pitied the miserable animal from my heart. What can these unhappy creatures have done to merit being so tormented? (now by way of parenthesis, I could almost wish that a London mob had possession of the two musicians, as possibly the discipline

of a horse-pond might be of use in teaching them for the future, better employment on Sunday evenings), but to proceed. We left Boulogne (a place I shall ever admire, and perhaps regret), and about ten at night reached Montreuil, from whence we departed at three on Tuesday morning, dined at Abbeville, and by eight in the evening were set down at the same Inn, where you may remember we stopped when travelling this road before, but were hurried away when we had scarcely tasted a morsel, under pretence of the Diligence being ready, and afterwards detained in the yard an hour, nor did our hostess in any respect deviate from her former character, as you shall hear. As a lady in company and myself were greatly fatigued we chose tea, but none being procurable there, were forced to use our own; the rest sat down to supper, which I had predetermined to avoid doing. Before they had a quarter finished, in came the woman, never did I behold such a horribly looking great creature. "Well" said she "the coach is ready" and on being asked if she wanted to get rid of us, replied that it was equal to her whether we went or staid provided she were paid for our suppers: at last when compelled to relinquish her claim on that score from the lady and me, she insisted on being allowed twenty-four sous for the hot water, this we complied with; to oblige our hospitable countrywoman, (tell it not in Gath I blush to acknowledge the claim) but persisted in remaining till on being summoned by the driver, nearly an hour afterwards, we set off and travelled sixty miles without alighting, to Chantilly, where is a famous palace belonging to the Prince of Condé, but to my great mortification, I was through weariness obliged to remain in the house while the rest of the party went to see it. Well never mind, you can read better descriptions of it, than mine would have been. From thence we proceeded to St Denis, where I was fortunate enough to obtain a cursory view of the ancient abbey, a most magnificent

structure, the burying place of the Kings of France. Such scenes naturally induce reflections on the vanity of all human grandeur, and lead to a melancholy, rather soothing than otherwise, to minds wearied by exertion, or irritated by disappointment. Having however little leisure to indulge these reveries, we passed on to the Library, where among other trophies is deposited the sword of our illustrious Talbot, a pang shot across my heart at the exulting manner in which it was exhibited, in short I felt as an English-woman, a more severe degree of national mortification than this Memento of an event so long gone by seemed calculated to produce. The sacred relics were next displayed, amongst which are, an eye of St Thomas the apostle, the shoulder blade of I forget what saint, and a small phial of the Virgin Mary's milk, at the sight of these absurdities I silently blessed God, that my religious instruction had not been blended with such cunningly devised Fables. If all the gems they shewed us were genuine, the Treasury must be immensely rich, for many of the shrines were almost covered with them. We arrived at Paris about eight on Wednesday, and most dreadfully fatigued was I, nor will that appear strange when one considers that, for the last sixty miles the carriage went as fast as eight horses could draw it, over a strong rough pavement, never stopping but to change horses, and at St Denis to repair a wheel. As the post went off next morning, I could not recover myself sufficiently to write by it, but now feel quite strong again, and having brought you to Paris, may venture to take a little repose as it is past eleven 9th 7 A M. I have arisen thus early on purpose to finish my letter (which must be in the Office before ten). I find little alteration in this Place, the people behave as politely as if there were no War, or even dispute between us. This you know is not the region of Politics, therefore little can be mentioned under that head. I could communicate some few observations, but as perhaps this



may be inspected, judge it more prudent to suppress them. A variety of circumstances has contributed to detain us here much longer than we intended, and I am fearful we shall not leave Paris before Thursday, however this will be the only letter I shall write until I can give you intelligence of our safe arrival at Marseilles, which will be I suppose in about a fortnight. From thence to Leghorn we must coast it in a Feluca. So if you write by the mail of the 29th addressed to me at the Post Office Leghorn, your letter will be sure to meet me there. I have a thousand things more to say, but must reserve them for my next, for if I miss the post it will I am sure, make you very uneasy—God bless you

Your's affectionately

## LETTER II.

*Paris 24th April 1779*

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

Being detained for want of our passports, I find it necessary for my comfort to hold the only communication now in my power with you. Last night we were at the Colosse, a place resembling our Ranelagh, there were some brilliant fire works to be exhibited, and as it is the custom for Ladies to stand upon chairs to see them, a gentleman of our party having placed us with our backs against a box, went to procure some. During his absence the Queen<sup>1</sup> entered the box attended by the Duchess D'Alençon, and several other ladies. I had seen her Majesty before at Versailles, and thought her at that time very handsome, but had no idea how much better she would look, by candle light. She is delicately fair and has certainly the sweetest blue eyes that ever were seen; but there is a little redness, a kind of tendency to inflammation around them, and she is likewise slightly marked with the small pox, both which trifling blemishes were then imperceptible, and she appeared perfectly beautiful. On entering the box she sat down, and pressed the Duchess to sit also, which the latter in terms of great respect declining, the Queen in a tone of kindness that it is impossible to forget, said, "Then you will oblige me to stand," rising as she spoke. The Duchess then complied, and they conversed together very agreeably during their stay. Her majesty seemed highly gratified by the entertainments, and expressed her approbation, in

[<sup>1</sup> N B — These small figures refer to terminal notes, p. 273.]

what I could not help thinking, rather too familiar a way for a person of her exalted rank frequently clapping her hands and exclaiming aloud, "Ah! mon Dieu que c'est charmant, ah! que c'est joli" The Royal party soon retired, and we afterwards walked in the Rotunda! than which a more brilliant spectacle can scarcely be imagined. The ladies were all splendidly dressed, and their heads adorned with feathers in greater profusion, and far more lofty, than is customary with us. But enough of this, I must now turn to a very different subject, having hitherto neglected to inform you of a singular conversation (and its result) which passed in the Diligence, as we came to this place. We had among the passengers a Mr H— an English Jew, and two brothers, named Ar—f diamond merchants, who were just returned to their native country after a long residence in London. The former had left Paris some years and resided in a provincial town. Speaking of this circumstance he observed that, his principal reason for quitting the Capital was his dread of assassination, to which he thought it probable that his religion might render him more liable, than other inhabitants, although he admitted he had no proof that persons of his persuasion were among the more frequent Victims. This statement, of course, excited both surprize and curiosity in us, who were foreigners, and the elder Mr A—f evidently mortified at such discourse, and doubting a representation of facts from so prejudiced a quarter, and about which it had not fallen in his way to inquire, stoutly denied the charge, but the Jew would not give up the point. He said that in a certain part of the City, where there were many houses of ill fame, it was but too common to rob and murder those, who were inveigled into them, and afterwards throw the bodies into the Seine; when taken out they were conveyed to the Petit Chatelet to be owned, and that who ever would take the trouble to visit that place would find that, out of the

numbers deposited there were very few (as reported) merely drowned persons, but evidently such as had died by violence. This conversation ended (as that of men frequently does) by a wager between the parties, both of whom agreed to refer the matter to Mr Fay. The Jew was to lose, if, in one week seven bodies under such suspicious circumstances should not be found exposed at the Petit Chatelet. I thought this a monstrous supposition, for though I had often heard of people being drowned in the Seine, and the explicit detail of Mr H— led me to fear that, the manner in which they met their fate, was but too truly described, yet I could not believe the number of victims to be so great. The result of Mr F—'s researches has unhappily placed the fact beyond a doubt. Within the last seven days, ten miserable wretches have been exposed, who had marks of violence on their bodies, and of these, there were two dreadfully mangled. But I will say no more on this shocking subject than merely to observe, that there must be either some radical defect in the police, or a degree of ferocity in the people, not to be repressed by the severe penal Laws, which in other countries are found nearly adequate to the purpose. The slight degree of feeling expressed by the lower order in speaking of such things, even when pressed on their senses, evinces a hardness of heart approaching to absolute insensibility, that to me seems quite revolting. I myself asked a young woman, who had been peeping through the gate at the Petit Chatelet, what was to be seen there? "Oh" replied she, with great apparent indifference, "*seulement quelques bras et jambes*" (only some arms and legs). I have written myself into a train of most uncomfortable thoughts, so lest I infect you with the gloomy ideas that fill my mind, the wisest way will be to say adieu! We shall now soon be out of Paris.

Ever your's,  
&c &c.

### LETTER III.

*Paris, 27th April, 1779.*

MY DEAR SISTER.

As I do not propose sending this before Monday, I shall have full time to write every particular. I date once more from this sink of impurity, contrary to my expectation. We have been detained thus long that the Lieutenant de Police might have time to make the necessary enquiries about us, but have at last obtained our passports, and thank Heaven shall soon breathe a purer air. From the first place we stop at, I purpose giving you a further account of our accommodations in the superb and elegant city of Paris, famous throughout the world for its superiority over all others, especially in the points of cleanliness and delicacy I assure you that, so long as I before resided in France, I never till now formed an adequate idea of it. but adieu for the present. I am going to drink tea. How do you think I make it? Why in an earthen pot an inch thick at least, which serves the double purpose of tea kettle and teapot, so it is all boiled up together and makes a most curious mess

AUXERRE EN BURGOYNE,  
130 *Milles De Paris*

When I wrote the above I was in a great rage and not without reason, pent up as we were in a street scarce wide enough to admit the light, our chamber paved with tiles, which most likely have never been wetted, nor even rubbed,

have the wish of the house, add to the two *Cerise d'Inde* in the next lot, on the 14th, and you will not wonder that my collection was not put off until the 16th, the very day I have then received above 100 tickets! However this I do, I express with one of my reverends of four days' continuance. When I began the letter I was but just recovered from a creature to do the least thing for me in the way I have been accustomed to, obliged to procure for my acquaintance the text of a *crab*, though scarcely able to crawl, and to collect the whole of a most extravagant bill for being pestered with Debt. Well as it is, and the French country are so, to refer me to my self—but I have not told you how we travel.

We found the route for my different from what we expected, and that we must be positively under the necessity of going by land to Chalon sur Saône, which is three days of the way. Poor as you are we could get no reinforcement, so far as a road at Lezhorn, it did not suit us to take the Durance, so after mature deliberation we determined on purchasing two horses and an old simple horse-drawn carriage, but how to avoid being cheated, was the question, for Mr. B was not care to depend on his own judgement in this affair—He made enquiry and found that there were many Englishmen employed in the service of Noblemen here, so putting up good face on the matter he went boldly to the Duc de Chantre's Castle, and a scriped acquaintance with his head groom, who was very proud to see a countryman, and immediately on being told the affair, offered his assistance. Accordingly they went next day to the cattle fair, where he pitched on an excellent draught horse, only a little touched in the wind, on which account he procured him for six guineas, so there cannot be much lost by him, even if he turn out unwise. But I dare say he will prove a most useful beast, for he has drawn Mr. B—r, and myself in our chaise (which by the bye we bought for seven guineas)

at the rate of thirty five miles a day. and does not seem in the least fatigued, though we had our heavy trunk at our back: so much for Azor—now for his help-mate Zemire. In the course of conversation with his new friend, Mr. Fay found that, there was a very pretty mare in the Duc de Lausanne's stables, which had been intended for the course, but would not bear training, so he agreed to give eight guineas for her Mr B — was to ride her next day to a horse-race in the Bois de Boulogne, and we were to accompany him in a post chaise. But alas! poor man! it was an unfortunate attempt. It seems he had never been used to riding, and was ashamed to own it, (one of the weaknesses to which I really believe men are almost invariably subject), so wishing to pass for an excellent horseman, he mounted with pretended courage: but through actual fear, reined her in so tight that miss, knowing the weaknes of her rider, reared up on her hind legs, threw him first, and then fell backward over him We thought by the violence of the fall that he must have been killed, but he came off with a few bruises, we had him bled immediately, put him to bed and left him in good hands till our return Mr. Fay mounted Zemire, and we proceeded to the course, where we were very agreeably entertained, only it grieved me to see so many beautiful English horses galloping about, I could hardly believe myself in France, for all the gentlemen were dressed after our manner The Count D'Artois might very well have been taken for a Jockey in his buck-skin breeches, and round hat. The bets were chiefly between him and the Duc de Chartres, the horses were all rode by englishmen. as to our little mare she would fain have been amongst them, but she had now a rider who knew how to manage her, and is punished for her audacity, for Mr. B— has not the courage to mount her again, and she is forced to carry Mr. Fay with a portmanteau of twenty pounds weight—You will wonder at my temerity when I acknow-

ledge having myself ventured to mount Zemire, after Mr. B—'s accident I first however saw her tried by several persons, and wishing to be able to vary the exercise by riding now and then, during our journey, was induced to make the attempt. She performed twice very well, but on the third day, an umbrella being snapped close to her nose, just as I was going to set off, she began to rear, on which I instinctively abandoned both whip and reins, and throwing my whole weight forward, clasped her round the neck with all my might, this sudden manœuvre fortunately kept her down. I seized the critical moment and alighted in safety with no other injury, than a little fright, and the consciousness of looking rather foolish. Nor has she ever been guilty of the like towards any one, so that my character for horsemanship is completely established. We have been certainly very lucky in our purchases the horses perform well, and the chaise, without being particularly uneasy, seems very strong. I am told they will bring a good price in the South, but you shall hear.

I have nothing particular to say of the country, perhaps it may be national prejudice from which no person is entirely free, but notwithstanding all their boasting, I do not think it equals my own dear England. It must be allowed that the present season is not the most favourable for making observations, for they cut the Vines close to the stumps in the winter, and as they are not yet much sprouted, one sees nothing but a parcel of sticks in the manner of our hop poles, but not above thirty inches high, which gives an air of barrenness to the prospect. I do not know what my mother would do here, as she is not fond of wine, for there is nothing else to drink. For my own part, and I believe I may answer for my companions, I cannot say that I find any great hardship in being obliged to put up with tolerable Burgundy at about four pence a bottle, it is not at all



heady, so no creature thinks of drinking it with water. A pint every meal is the allowance of each. We have all necessaries with us, such as tea, sugar, bread, butter, corn for the horses &c so we have little to do with the Inns, except at night, when we provide ourselves with meat for the next day. As to breakfast and dinner we fix on a place where there is water at hand, and there sit down under the shade of a tree, and make a fire, while the horses graze comfortably, and eat their corn. Ask my dear father if he does not think this a good plan? at least we find it pleasant, and much more to our taste, than spending more time as well as money, in the wretched public houses we have hitherto met with—I wish we were hardy enough to make the grass our pillow, but that is impossible, so we must submit to be disgusted and pillaged once a day. You may remember my remarking that, I was afraid we should suffer during our journey, for the fineness of the spring which has proved to be the case. The weather has been excessively boisterous for the last fortnight with much rain, than which nothing can be more disagreeable on a journey, especially when conducted on a plan like ours.—We were obliged to stop at Fontainebleau on account of the weather by which means we saw the Palace, and gardens, and were almost wet through, for our pains. It is an immense place, the Chapel has been beautiful, but the paintings are much injured by time. There is an elegant theatre which I was much pleased with. The apartments of the royal family are truly superb. We were shewn the council chamber where the last peace was signed, and I, as an Englishwoman, beheld it with *great pleasure* you may be sure. We saw likewise the gallery of *Stags*, famous for containing above a hundred stags' heads all ranged in order with an account, when they were killed and by whom, and infamous (at least in my opinion) as being the place where Christina, Queen

of Sweden, caused Monaldeschi her chief chamberlain to be beheaded, if not absolutely in her presence, at least while she remained in an adjoining room. I cannot bear that woman. She abdicated her crown from sheer vanity but retained that passion for despotism which sheved what kind of feelings she had cherished, while seated on the throne. I think that in her, the faults of either sex were blended, to form a character, which without possessing the firmness of a man or the gentleness of a woman, was destitute of the virtues expected in both. Christina may have been an accomplished female, but she can never be called great, even by her admirers.

The gardens of Fontainebleau are all in the old fashioned-gingerbread-style, ornamented with box in a thousand fantastical shapes. The Swiss who shewed us the Palace, was very thankful for a shilling, which is more than any person in the same situation would be in England for twice as much. The forest of Fontainebleau is thirty miles across, and nobody can hunt there without the Kings permission; he comes here every season.—We found the roads very heavy, but Azor was strong enough to go through them; however we have given him a day's rest, and after dinner shall set off Jehu like.

Now don't you envy us all this pleasure? I assure you I should be very glad to go all the way in the same manner, for we travel without fatigue, and the way of living just suits me, for you know I always preferred wine to beer, but I would not have you imagine that I can shake off all thoughts of home; they return but too frequently, and I really believe now, that my illness at Paris, was brought on principally by uneasiness of mind. but I find myself unequal to this subject. I must make a resolution never to enter upon it, for what service can it do to either of us, to be continually recalling unpleasant ideas, especially when I have need of every possible consolation to support me in

the arduous task, which Providence has called upon me to undertake

I have now literally exhausted my paper, and must therefore leave you to imagine every thing my heart says to all, and how truly

I am,  
your affectionate  
&c &c.

## LETTER IV.

*Leghorn, 17th June, 1779*

MY DEAR SISTER.

I suppose you have been long uneasy at my silence, but indeed it has not been in my power to write sooner—In my last I gave you reason to imagine we should arrive here in less than three weeks, by way of Marseilles; but after we reached Lyons we were informed, that this would prove a very uncertain and dangerous method, as between the English and French scarcely any vessel can pass free therefore after mature deliberation, we determined as we had still our carriage and horses, to push our way boldly through Savoye, and cross the Alps to Italy. We stopped several days at Lyons, which as you and all the world know has long been famous for its incomparable silks, and velvets, I think it ought to be so for its asparagus which is the finest I ever tasted, and remarkably cheap Being a vegetable I am very fond of, and having found it at all times beneficial to my constitution, I wished to eat it freely, but was almost disgusted by the manner in which it was constantly brought to table at the Inn, covered with a thick sauce composed of eggs, butter, oil and vinegar

Having in vain remonstrated against this cookery, I at length insisted on seeing the Cook himself, and when he made his appearance, arrayed as is customary, in a white waistcoat, cap, and apron, with a meagre face almost as sharp as the large knife he held in his hand, I calmly repre-

sented to him that the sauce he had sent up, totally disagreed with my stomach, and requested to have the asparagus simply boiled with melted butter, the poor man looked much distressed "What without oil!" yes! "Without eggs?" certainly! this answer completed his misery, "Ah madame" exclaimed he, with clasped hands and uplifted eyes "de grace un peu de vinaigre". Madame was inexorable, and the shrug of contemptuous pity with which he retreated was ludicrous beyond expression

On arriving near the Alps, it appeared that I had formed a very erroneous idea of the route, having always supposed that we had only one mountain to pass, and that the rest of the way was level ground, instead of which when we came to Pont de Beauvoisin (50 miles from Lyons, and the barrier between France and Savoye) we heard the agreeable news, that we had a hundred and twelve miles to travel thro' a chain of mountains, to the great Mont Cenis

You may imagine how uncomfortable this information made us all, with what long faces we gazed upon each other, debating how the journey was to be performed, but being happily you know very courageous, I made light of all difficulties, and whenever there was a hill, mounted Zemire, while the two gentlemen took it by turns to lead me as I had not a proper side saddle, so poor Azor made shift to drag the chaise up pretty well, and in the descents we made him pay for the indulgence. I forgot to mention that they were very particular about our passports at this Barrier, and detained us while the Governor examined them minutely, though justice compels me to acknowledge that in general we were treated with great politeness in our passage through France, no one ever attempted to insult us, which I fear would not be the case were three French people to travel in England, I wish I could say as much for their honesty, but I must confess that here they are

miseraibly deficient, however my being acquainted with the language saved us from flagrant imposition

Our method was this we always if possible, contrived to stop at night in a large Town, (as to dinner we easily managed that you know how), but never did we suffer the horses to be put into the stable till I had fixed the price of every thing; for they generally ask four times as much for any article as it is worth. If I found there was no bringing them to reason, we left the house. In particular, at Chalons sur Soine, the first Inn we stopped at, the woman had the conscience to ask half a crown for each bed, you may suppose we did not take up our abode there, but drove on to another very good house, where they shewed us two rooms with six excellent beds in them, at the rate of four sous a bed, for as many as we wanted, so for once I committed an act of extravagance by paying for the whole; or we might perhaps have been disturbed in the night by strangers coming to take possession of those left vacant. For they are not very nice about such matters in France. I have seen rooms with six beds in them more than once during our route. I only mention the difference of price by way of shewing what people may gain by choosing their houses, for we were really better accommodated at less than one fourth of what we must have paid at the other house. Speaking of Chalons reminds me of a very unpleasant circumstance that occurred to us at the following stage. Mr Fay had most unwisely and contrary to my earnest intreaty, pinned our passports to the book of roads, which he usually carried with him on horse back, and as might be expected, they, in a short time worked themselves loose, and we were on our arrival at the end of the next day's journey alarmed with the idea of their being intirely lost, and that we should be compelled to return all the way to Paris to procure others. happily Mr. Fay went back & found them at a place where we had stopped, I need not

tell you what fright and vexation, this folly and obstinacy cost us but I hope it will have a salutary effect for the rest of our journey.

In further proof of my assertion on the subject of honesty, I must relate a little incident which occurred on our way to Lyons. Mr. Fay had changed as many guineas at Paris, as he thought would be sufficient to bring us to Chalons, and received by weight twenty four livres ten sous, for each, that is seven pence halfpenny profit. well, the last day but one we finished our current money, but as we were in a city, doubted not of being able to obtain nearly the value of our guineas. On inquiry we were recommended—to a very religious goldsmith who by the landlord's account spent almost his whole life in acts of piety: after waiting an hour and a half till he returned from mass, Mr. F delivered him a guinea, confident of receiving its full value: when behold this conscientious gentleman after the most minute inspection and weighing it in a pair of sugar scales generously offered eighteen livres as a fair price which so enraged Mr Fay that he immediately left him and went to another shop, where the utmost they would give was *twelve* livres: only think what wretches! since it was impossible for them to be ignorant of its real value Mr Fay declared that he would rather fast all day than submit to become such a dupe. This subjected us to great inconvenience, after discharging the reckoning we had only thirty sous remaining; and sat out with a sum not sufficient to procure a single refreshment for our poor horses, so that at every Inn we were obliged to represent our situation but found none who had honesty enough to offer us a fair price for our guineas, or the charity to give us even a glass of wine or a morsel of bread I leave you to guess if our appetites were not pretty keen by the time we arrived at Lyons I shall never forget how foolishly we looked at each other all day, however a good supper

obliterated all grievances, and the next morning we found a way to change our guineas for Louis-d'ors on equitable terms. So much for our starving adventure. To proceed on our journey.

On the 20th we reached Lanneburg, a village at the foot of Mont Cenis situated in what is called a valley, which though really so with respect to the mountains that surround it, is even with the clouds. I had a tolerable proof of its elevation, for the weather was so sharp, that I could not keep a minute from the fire. By the way I must observe, that having travelled through North Wales, I supposed myself to have acquired a tolerable idea of mountains and their appendages, such as cascades, torrents, and apparently air-hung-bridges &c. but the passage of the Alps set at defiance all competition, and even surpasses whatever the utmost sketch of my imagination could have pourtrayed.

The valley of Lanneburg is itself, the most strange wild place you can conceive, in some parts grotesque, in others awfully terrible. The rocks rise around you so fantastically, that you might almost think yourself transported to a place which nature had made a repository of these stupendous productions, rather with a view of fixing them hereafter in appropriate situations, than of exhibiting them here.

But above all, the cascades throughout the road are charming beyond description, immense sheets of water are seen sometimes, falling from rock to rock, foaming fretting and dashing their spray on every side, and sometimes descending in one grand flow of majestic beauty. in short they went so far beyond any idea I had formed of such appearances in nature, that they seemed to communicate new powers of perception to my mind, and if I may so express it, to expand my soul, and raise it nearer to its Creator. The passage has been so ably described by various writers that any formal account I could give you of it, would rather waste your time than add to your



information I shall only tell you how I felt and acted for I know your affection prompts the wish to travel in imagination with the sister you love, come then let us ascend Mont Cenis together.—After various deliberations it was concluded that I should go up across a mule, as the safest way; both the gentlemen determined on walking, which Mr. Fay knew not to be very difficult, having made the experiment the evening before I was strictly forbidden to touch the reins, being assured that the animal would guide himself, and that any attempt to direct him could hardly fail to prove *fatal*. Under this charge, judge what I must have felt when my mule, in the very steepest part of the ascent and when I had become fully sensible of the “high and giddy height,” all at once, thought proper to quit the pathway, and with great sang froid stalk out upon one of those precipitous projections, where only the foot of a wild Goat or Chamois ought to tread. What did I not suffer! I durst not touch the rein, durst not even call to the guide for help. Every instant appeared fraught with destruction, it seemed madness to die without an effort to save one’s self, yet to *make* an effort was to invite the fate one dreaded. Happily this dreadful poise between life and death lasted not long, for, the sagacious animal calmly picking its way fell into the track by a path, which no human eye could discern, and the guides gave me great praise for my self-command; a praise I never desire to purchase again by a similar trial. If however anything could render a stranger easy in crossing the heights, it would be the amazing skill and celerity which these people display; the road winds in a zigzag direction; and in the most acute, and of course, in the most dangerous turns they leap from crag to crag as if they held their lives on lease, and might safely run all risks, till the term expired —The plain, as it is called, at the top of this mountain is six miles across. as we proceeded we found “still hills on hills, and

Alps on Alps arise " ; for we continued to be surrounded by snow top mountains, where reigns eternal frost. The heat of the sun had thawed the passage, so that we met with no inconvenience, but we passed great quantities of ice lodged in the crannies. There is a very large lake on the plain, said to be unfathomable, that I can tell nothing about, but that it contains excellent salmon and trout, am well convinced, for we stopped at the Inn according to the laudable custom of all travellers, for the sole purpose of tasting it. An Inn, say you, at the top of Mont Cenis! Yes, it is really a fact, not that I envy them their situation, but they are not the only inhabitants: for there are more than twenty farm houses, where they make most excellent butter and cheese. Every spot around, where it is possible for the hand of cultivation to scatter seeds for the use of man, is treasured with care and nourished by industry, and you see gardens no bigger than a dining table, and fields like a patch of carpet, from time to time, smiling beneath the rugged battlements of rocks, like the violets peeping in the hedges. Far, among the apparently inaccessible heights of this " cloud capt " region, they pointed out to me a Chapel, vulgarly called *notre Dame de Neige*, and justly have they named her, for eternal snows designate her dwelling, if however these simple and sequestered beings can there draw near to God, and experience the comfort of religious hope, and providential care, this singular edifice has not been reared in vain, to bless such a region of desolation.

When you read an account of the road, it will readily be perceived that my fellow travellers must have found some difficulty in getting the horses over, as the poor beasts were not accustomed to such a rugged path, for you are to understand that, the people in the neighbouring villages of Lanneburg and Novalese have no other means of subsistence than carrying passengers over the mountain. It is

therefore their interest to render it impassable to any but themselves, so that the whole passage of fifteen miles, is covered with great loose pieces of rock, which must be clambered over the guides skip from one piece to another like goats, and go at the rate of five or six miles an hour, but my unfortunate companions could not proceed at this pace, so every ten minutes we had to wait for them—As I was carried down in an armed chair, fastened to poles and slung upon straps, in the manner of our sedans, between two men and in which I soon felt tolerably at my ease, I had the pleasure of seeing them continually sometimes in the clouds, and at others nothing visible but their heads, which was rather amusing to me, knowing they were in no danger, especially as Mr Fay had affected to make very light of it, and even said “I might walk very well if I chose it,” but when we reached the bottom, he told a very different tale, and stormed violently at his own sufferings The drollest part of our procession was, that of the poor mule which bore our chaise in a kind of machine, on its back, and another with the two wheels placed on each side, in the oddest way imaginable. A good night’s rest put us all in good humour, and we proceeded cheerfully forty miles along a very delightful road, for the most part planted with double rows of trees, to Turin, where we remained three days and were much amused, but having crossed the mountain, I must allow myself and you a little rest

June, 26th.—I was more pleased with the Palace at Turin than any other I have met with during our journey, not for its external appearance certainly, for that is unpromising, but the inside simply atones for the deficiency The rooms are all in long ranges, opening into each other by doors, which by folding within the pannels become invisible The furniture is beyond description rich and elegant, but the best part of every finely decorated house

must ever be the painting, and the palace seemed to say, "You are already in Italy." Like a true Englishwoman however, I looked more, I believe, at a picture of our Charles the first, and afterwards at one by Van Dyke of that unfortunate monarch's three children, than at any other in the collection. The face of the King is exquisitely done, but his eye struck me as too fine, and without so stiff, that I could not admire it. Poor Charles! we are tempted to forget the error of the Prince, in considering the amiable qualities and long sufferings of the man; nor is it possible to contemplate the benevolent melancholy of his countenance, and erect every accusation of his enemies. I looked on his mild penetrating eye, till my own were suffused with tears. As to his children, they are the sweetest creature I ever beheld, and to see them thus, was perhaps the more pleasant, from a consciousness of its being the only period wherein they could communicate that emotion to a reflecting mind.—There was no tracing the selfish, and eventually, callous libertine in Charles, nor the tyrant and bigot in James, all seems playful grace, and dignified gentleness, and the painter appears to have given a kind of royal polish to the beauty (certainly far beyond nature) which he had so happily depicted in these unfortunate children. Among what I deemed the most curious portraits, were those of Martin Luther, and his wife. I have frequently meditated on this great character, and always felt myself so much obliged to him (especially since my residence in a Catholic country,) that I confess I was disappointed to see him a homely, and rather vulgar looking man. I cannot believe this is a good likeness, at least the one I saw of him in the abbey of St Bertin at St Omers left a very different impression on my mind. The Reformer might not be handsome, in the common acceptation of the word, but surely, penetration courage and firmness must have stamped their expression on his features.

Here is a terrible representation of another great man, tho' in my opinion deficient in the first mentioned quality (Sir Thomas Moore) of his head rather, for it appears just severed from the body; his daughter has fainted at the horrible spectacle; and her complexion is so exactly what it should be, that the whole scene appears natural, and you feel too much for her, even to offer her restoratives to life and misery. I would not live in the same room with such a picture for the world; it would be worse than the cave of Trophonious.

I was doomed to experience another disappointment in what is affirmed to be a faithful portrait of Petrarch's Laura, which I had fancied was like the Venus of Apelles, an assemblage of all that was lovely and graceful in woman. You remember my saying, that it was worth all the pains I took in learning Italian, to read his sonnets in praise of this idolized being. So no wonder that I ran eagerly to seize on features that had inspired such verses, and awakened such tender constancy as Petrarch displayed. Judge then how disagreeably I was surprised at seeing a little red-haired, formal looking, old maidish thing, no more like the beauty in "my mind's eye" than "I to Hercules. . . ." Petrarch too was as ugly as needs be. Well, well, they are not the only couple seen to most advantage in their Poetic dress. What further I have to say about the Palace, must be very concise. I cannot help informing you though, that we saw the King of Sardinia at mass with his whole family but none of them seem to be remarkable for beauty. Though not esteemed rich, yet he lives in great splendour; the furniture of his state bed-chamber, even to the frames of the chairs, is all of massive silver.<sup>3</sup>

The Theatre is a vast building and so magnificent in every respect, that nothing you have seen can give you any idea of it; the stage is so extensive, that when they want to exhibit battles, triumphant entries, or any kind of grand

show they have room enough to produce the finest effect, and really seem to transport you to the scene they would represent. It is not uncommon to have fifty or sixty horses, at a time upon this stage, with triumphal cars, thrones &c &c. The King's box, is consistent with his superb Palace, it is as large as a handsome parlour, and lined throughout with mirrors, which have a beautiful effect, as they reflect the stage and thus double the display of its grand processions &c. all the boxes in this Theatre are neat and commodious, furnished with chairs and curtains, so that if the party choose to be retired they are at full liberty, and, as coffee and other refreshments are served, they frequently pay little attention to the Stage, except when some celebrated performer or grand spectacle excites their curiosity. There is a smaller Theatre, which opens when this is closed, but I did not see it. I visited the royal gardens, but thought them very uninteresting, as all appear after those that surround the seats of our English Nobility and gentry, and on running thro' another Palace, an academy and various other places, nothing struck me as sufficiently novel to merit your attention, and, I have written such an intolerably long letter, that I must conclude for the present, tho' I mean to bring you on my journey to-morrow, as I have not yet told you half that is on my mind, but there is such an uncertainty in my present movements, that it is desirable not to lose a single day in forwarding a letter. Believe me however and wherever I may be,

most affectionately yours,

E F.

#### IN CONTINUATION

*Leghorn, 28th June.*

I RESUME my journal of yesterday which I shall now inclose in this, I am still waiting a summons for departure,

and anxious to say all I can, to my dear friends, before what may probably be a long adieu. From Turin we sat out on the 26th ultimo, to Genoa, a distance of 130 miles, and now I own my courage begun to fail, for having been some days ill, I grew so much worse, from the motion of the chaise, that we were obliged to stop and get Mr Fay's horse ready for me to ride, which was a great ease to me; but notwithstanding this relief, on the second evening I was seized with every symptom of fever, and that of the most violent kind, "Well," thought I, "it is all over with me for a week at least," but thank God I was mistaken, for at two o'clock in the morning, I fell into the most profuse perspiration I ever experienced, which, tho' it exceedingly weakened me, yet considerably abated the disorder, and altho' I felt ill, dispirited, and every way unfit to travel, yet I made a sad shift to pursue my journey.

Unfortunately, in coming out of Alessandria the place where I had been so ill, we had a wide river to ford, and there was no way for poor miserable me to get over, but by Mr Fay's taking me before him across the mare, which was tolerably well accomplished. When he had landed me safe he went back, and with great difficulty whipped the old horse through, he was up to the girth in water, and I expected every moment, he would break the chaise to pieces for he frequently attempted to lie down. When we had overcome this difficulty we continued in tolerable spirits, until our arrival next day at the Buchetta, an appenine mountain, by the side of which Mont Cenis would appear contemptible, it is near twenty miles over, without any plain at the top, so that no sooner do you reach its summit, than you turn short, and descend immediately. Had the weather proved fine, the prospect from this prodigious eminence must have been glorious, but so thick a fog enveloped us, that we could not distinguish any thing of five yards distance, and the cold was as piercing as with us

in January. Never shall I forget the sense of wearisome, overbearing desolateness, which seemed to bow down both my body and mind at this juncture. I felt a kind of dejection unknown before through all my peregrinations, and which doubtless tended to increase the unusual fears that operated on my mind, when we arrived at the end of this day's journey. It was nearly dark, the Inn was little better than a large barn or hovel, and the men we found in it, so completely like all we conceive of Banditti, and assassins, that every horrible story I had heard or read of, instantly came into my head, and I perceived that the thoughts of my companions were occupied in the same painful way, our looks were the only medium of communication we could use, for we were afraid of speaking, lest we should accelerate the fate we dreaded. Every thing around us combined to keep alive suspicion and strengthen fear, we were at a distance from every human habitation. Various whisperings, and looks directed towards us, continually passed amongst the men, and we fancied they were endeavouring to find whether we had any concealed arms. When we retired for the night worn out as we were, not one dared to sleep and surely never night appeared so long. With the earliest dawn we departed, and as the people saw us set out without offering us any injury, we are now persuaded that we wronged them, but yet the impression made upon our minds will not easily be effaced. we feel as if we had escaped some projected mischief.

We arrived pretty early at Genoa, a grand but gloomy disagreeable city, owing to the houses being very high, and the streets so narrow you might almost shake hands across them out of the window. It abounds with magnificent Churches and Palaces, principally built of the most beautiful marble, at least they are faced and ornamented with it. Their roofs flat, and rendered very agreeable gardens, by



flowering shrubs, little arbours, covered with wood-bine and jessamine, elegant verandahs, awnings &c. In these the ladies wander from morning to night.—As far as I can hear or see, they are more remarkable for pride than any thing else. Their dress costly, but heavy and unbecoming, except so far as they manage their veils, which are so contrived as to give very good play to a pair of fine eyes. They wear rouge, but apply it better than the French ladies, who may be said rather to plaster than to paint: when the best however is made of this practice it is still a very hateful one in my opinion.—I went to view the Palaces of Doria, Doraggio, and Pallavicini, where are many fine pictures and statues; but the rooms are so large, and so many of them are only half furnished, that they had on the whole an uncomfortable look. I was much pleased with several of the churches; the Cathedral is completely lined with marble, but I was attracted more by the Jesuits' church on account of the paintings, though, I have neither health nor spirits to enter into a particular description of them. The assumption of the Virgin by Guido, is a most delightful performance to my taste. I always admire his pictures, but being simply an admirer, without knowledge on the subject, I seldom hazard a remark as to the manner in which a piece is executed.—The theatre here is large, but not to be compared with that at Turin. The gardens are every where in the same style, all neat and trim, like a desert Island in a pastry cook's shop, with garnish and frippery enough to please a Dutchman. There are many admirable churches in this city; but its chief boast, in my opinion, consists in being the birth place of Columbus, who was undoubtedly a great man, and from his talents, firmness, wisdom and misfortunes, entitled to inspire admiration and pity. I often thought of him, as I passed these streets and was ready to exclaim, you were not worthy of such a Citizen. The velvets, goldwork, and artificial flowers manufactured

here, are said to be unrivalled, but I made no purchases for very obvious reasons

We saw a very grand procession on Corpus Christi day, at which the Doge assisted, and all the principal nobility, clothed in their most magnificent habiliments, and each carrying a lighted taper, several images also, adorned with jewels (as I was informed) to an almost incredible amount, were borne along to grace the spectacle. It is to be lamented that, this noble city should disgrace itself by the encouragement given to assassination, for a man after committing half a score murders, has only to take a boat which nobody prevents him from doing, and claim the protection of any foreign ship, which none dares to refuse, and there he remains in safety. Mr Fay saw five of these wretches on board one vessel. What you have heard respecting the custom of married women in Italy being attended by their Cicisbeos, is perfectly true. They speak of it with all the indifference imaginable. Surely, after all that has been said, the usage must be an innocent one, if any thing can be called so which tends to separate the affections of husband and wife, and *that*, the constant attendance, the profound respect of another man, must be likely to effect. Altogether it is a vile fashion, make the best of it, and I heartily hope never to see such a mode adopted in old England.

We sold our horses at Genoa, for about three guineas profit—and no more, as Mr Fay embraced the first offer that was made him. You who know me, will be well aware, that I could not part with these mute but faithful companions of our journey without a sigh. Far different were my sensations on bidding adieu to our fellow traveller Mr B—r, who left us on our arrival at this place. My first impression of his character was but too just, and every day's experience more fully displayed a mind, estranged from all that was praise worthy, and prone to every species

of vice. He professed himself almost an Atheist, and I am persuaded, had led the life of one; it was perhaps fortunate that his manners were as disgusting as his principles were wicked, and that he constantly reminded one, of that expression of the Psalmist "the *Fool* hath said in his heart there is no God"; as the comment, he was but a fool, rose to remembrance at the same moment.

We took our passage in a Felucca from Genoa, and arrived here in thirty three hours. My first message was to the Post Office, where was only one letter for me, dated 10th May. I am impatient for more, being kept in daily expectation of sailing, and it would be mortifying to leave any behind. I must now conclude; believe me,

Ever most affectionately your's,

E. F.

P. S. I open this to say, our letters and remittances are arrived. Ten thousand thanks for your kindness, but I have not time to add another word.

## LETTER V

OUTER MOLE, LEGHORN,  
On board the Hellespont,

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

*July 2nd, 1779*

You may perceive from this date that I have quitted Leghorn, but how I came to take up my quarters *here*, cannot be explained, till after the relation of some particulars which I must first notice, in order to proceed regularly with my journal

Our letter of introduction from Mr Baretto<sup>4</sup> of London to his brother, the king of Sardinia's Consul at Leghorn, procured us the kindest attentions from that gentleman and his family, indeed they were so friendly to us in every respect, that I soon felt all the ease of old acquaintance in their society, and shall ever remember them, with sentiments of the most cordial esteem Through this kind family I saw whatever was worthy of note in Leghorn, and its environs, but my increasing anxiety as to our journey, took from me all power of investigation When one sees merely with the eye, and the wandering mind is travelling to the friends left far behind, or forward to the unknown clime whither its destiny points, few recollections of places and things will remain on it But far different will be its recognition of persons When these have softened an anxious hour by kindness, or relieved its irksomeness, by smiles and gaiety, the heart will register their action and their image, and gratitude engrave their names on the tablet

of remembrance    What a romantic flight! methinks I hear you exclaim; but consider, this is the land of Poesy, surely, I may be permitted to evince a little of its spirit    I shall never forget that Leghorn contains the Baretti's, and Franco's    The latter are eminent merchants, the house has been established above a century    The eldest of the present family is above eighty years of age, a most venerable and agreeable old man; with more of active kindness and benevolent politeness, than I ever met with in one, so far advanced in life, and who has seen so much of the world    He not only shewed us every attention during our stay, but has given us a letter recommending us in the strongest terms to a Mr Abraham, of Grand Cairo, which should Mr Baldwin, the East India Company's resident, be absent when we arrive there, may prove useful    At all events, we are equally indebted to Mr. Franco's friendly intentions

We have often boasted of the superiority of the British flag, but alas poor old England! her flag is here humbled in the dust, we have several ships in the mole, but if one dare venture out, so many French Privateers are hovering round, that she must be taken in a few hours    I pity the poor Captains from my heart, but the person for whom I feel most interested, is a Captain Les—r of the Hellespont, (Mr. P—'s relation). I cannot express half what I owe to his civility. From the moment he knew of my probable connection with his family, he has uniformly shown us every possible attention    His situation is very disagreeable, to be forced either to abandon so fine a ship, or incur almost a certainty of being taken prisoner in her, as she must soon venture out, for she has already eaten her head off, by lying here a whole twelvemonth on expence, as such is the deplorable state of our commerce in the Mediterranean, that no one will now underwrite an English ship at any premium. I think the number lying here is seven, and

believe they intend soon to make a bold push together; but it will be all in vain, they never can get through the Straits of Gibraltar, unmolested.

*1 o'clock p m A Hard Gale*

I told you this morning what reason I had to esteem Captain L. — He is now entitled to at least a double portion of my gratitude, if estimated by the service done. As there was no likelihood of meeting with an English vessel, we engaged a passage in a Swedish one, called the *Julius*, Captain Norberg, for Alexandria, at *£6* each, (cheap enough you will say), and had all in readiness — so last night I quitted the shores of Europe, God knows for how long — his will be done — Captain L. — as his ship lay next but one to our's, and we were not to sail 'till day break, offered us his cabin, because, as he very considerably observed, we could not sleep comfortably in our own, amidst the noise of preparing for Sea — I readily complied, well knowing the advantages of his proposal, having already dined several times on board the *Hellespont*, which is kept clean and in good order, equal to the nicest house I ever saw. This morning the *Julius* went out to the Road, and we prepared to follow, but just at that time arose a sudden squall of thunder and lightning, succeeded by a very strong gale of wind, the poor *Julius* was forced to drop anchor, and there she lies, two miles off, pitching (driving piles Captain L. — calls it) and has just struck her lower yards, she slipped one cable two hours ago, but the other brought her up — I see her now and would not exchange cabins for a trifle.

Several vessels have been driven in, in distress, one dashed directly against the *Hellespont* and snapped her Bowsprit short, we had but just time to secure the poop lanthorn from the stroke of another, the *iron* was torn away,

so you may guess it blows smartly, but I feel perfectly easy I am luckily sheltered now, and no one shall persuade me to leave this ship 'till all is over, and the weather settled again I doubt we shall not be able to sail this day or two, for the wind is rising; but so that we arrive, time enough to save our season at Suez, all will be well. Tea is waiting, and they are tormenting me to death. Adieu God bless you all, prays,

Your affectionate

E F

## LETTER VI.

*Ship Julius at sea, 20th July, 1779.*

I HOPE, my dear friends will safely receive my letter of the 2nd Instant, from Leghorn, wherein I mentioned the kindness of Captain L.— and our situation in his Ship We remained with him 'till Sunday evening, when we embarked on the Julius, and the following morning, sailed with a fair wind, but it changed in less than six hours, and came on so strong, that we were forced to put back again and cast anchor. The gale lasted 'till Wednesday evening, however we made shift to ride it out, though we were continually paying out cable (as it is called,) and expected every moment to be driven on shore

When the weather moderated, Mr. Franco sent off a letter to Mr Fay, stating that he had just heard from Mr Abraham of Grand Cairo, who was about to proceed to Europe, with his family, by the first ship; therefore to guard against any future disappointment, this kind gentleman inclosed a general letter to the Jewish merchants, Mr. Franco's name being well known throughout the East Having already seven letters of introduction to persons in Grand Cairo, we shall not, I imagine, have occasion to make use of this

On Thursday the 8th, ~~we~~ ventured to sail once more, and have hitherto gone on pleasantly enough.

Tuesday, 20th July Since my last date, I have been a good deal vexed at an accident which, perhaps, will appear very trivial I had a pair of beautiful pigeons given me at



Leghorn, which furnished me with much amusement. These pretty little creatures, their wings being cut, ranged at liberty about the ship. At length one of them fell, or rather was blown overboard. I saw it a long while struggling for life, and looking towards the vessel, as if to implore assistance, yet, notwithstanding my fondness for the poor bird, and anxious desire to extricate it from its perilous situation, if such a thing were possible, I could not even wish that, a ship running eight knots an hour, should be hove to, and a boat sent out after a Pigeon. The widowed mate lived only three days afterwards, never touching a morsel of food, from the time the other disappeared, and uttering, at intervals, the most plaintive sounds, which I could not avoid hearing, my cabin being upon deck. For you must know, it is a regulation on board Swedish vessels, that the whole ship's company join twice a day, in devotional exercises, so Capt Norberg reserved his great Cabin for the purpose, of assembling them together, or we would willingly have engaged it. So much for my little favourites. I shall now advert to a more chearful topic.

My voyage has been rendered very interesting, and instructive, by the conversation of one of our passengers, a Franciscan Friar, from Rome, who is going as a Missionary to Jerusalem, and in my opinion no man can be better calculated for the hazardous office he has undertaken. Figure to yourself, a man in the prime of life (under forty), tall, well made, and athletic in his person, and seemingly of a temperament to brave every danger. add to these advantages a pair of dark eyes, beaming with intelligence, and a most venerable auburn beard, descending nearly to his girdle, and, you cannot fail to pronounce him, irresistible. He appears also to possess, all the enthusiasm and eloquence necessary for pleading the important cause of Christianity, yet one must regret that so noble a mind, should be warped

by the belief of such ridiculous superstitions, as disgrace the Romish creed.—He became extremely zealous for my conversion, and anxiously forwarded my endeavours, after improvement in the Italian language, that I might the more readily comprehend the arguments, he adduced to effect that desirable purpose Like other disputants, we sometimes used to contend very fiercely, and one day on my speaking rather lightly of what he chose to call, a miracle of the Catholic Church, he even went so far as to tell me, that my mouth spouted forth heresies, as water gushes from a fountain.

This morning (the 22nd) at breakfast, he intreated me to give up my coffee, as a libation to the bambino (child) Jesus, and on my declining to do so, urged me with the most impressive earnestness, to spare only a single cup, which he would immediately pour out in honour of the Blessed Infant Professing my disbelief in the efficacy of such a sacrifice, I again excused myself from complying with his request upon which declaring that he was equally shocked at my willful incredulity and obstinate heresy he withdrew to another part of the vessel, and I have not seen him since

23rd A M We are now off Alexandria, which makes a fine appearance from the sea on a near approach, but being built on low ground, is, as the seamen say “very difficult to hit” We were two days almost abreast of the Town There is a handsome Pharos or light-house in the new harbour, and it is in all respects far preferable, but no vessels belonging to Christians can anchor there, so we were forced to go into the old one, of which however we escaped the dangers, if any exist <sup>5</sup>

My acquaintance with the Reverend Father has terminated rather unpleasantly A little while ago being upon deck together, and forgetting our quarrel about the libation, I made a remark on the extreme heat of the

weather, "Aye" replied he, with a most malignant expression of countenance, such as I could not have thought it possible, for a face benign like his to assume, "aye you will find it ten thousand times hotter in the Devil's House" (*Nella Casa di Diavolo*). I pitied his bigotry and prayed for his conversion to the genuine principles of that religion, whose doctrines he professed to teach.

Mr. Brand, to whom Mr. Fay sent ashore an introductory letter, came on board to visit us. I rejoice to hear from him, that there are two ships at Suez, yet no time must be lost, lest we miss the season. This gentleman resides here, as Consul for one of the German Courts, and may be of great use to us. We received an invitation to sup with him to-morrow; he has secured a lodging for us, and engaged a Jew and his wife to go with us to Grand Cairo as dragoman, (or interpreter) and attendant: should we proceed by water, which is not yet decided on, Mr. B— will provide a proper boat. I am summoned to an early dinner, immediately after which we shall go on shore with our Dragoman, that we may have time to view whatever is remarkable.

24th July. Having mounted our asses, the use of horses being forbidden to any but musselmans, we sallied forth preceded by a Janizary, with his drawn sword, about three miles over a sandy desert, to see Pompey's Pillar, esteemed to be the finest column in the World. This pillar which is exceedingly lofty, but I have no means of ascertaining its exact height, is composed of three blocks of Granite; (the pedestal, shaft, and capital, each containing one). When we consider the immense weight of the granite, the raising such masses, appear beyond the powers of man. Although quite unadorned, the proportions are so exquisite, that it must strike every beholder with a kind of awe, which softens into melancholy, when one reflects that the renowned Hero whose name it bears, was treacher-

ously murdered on this very Coast, by the boatmen who were conveying him to Alexandria; while his wretched wife stood on the vessel he had just left, watching his departure, as we may naturally suppose, with inexpressible anxiety. What must have been her agonies at the dreadful event! Though this splendid memorial bears the name of Pompey, it is by many supposed to have been erected in memory of the triumph, gained over him at the battle of Pharsalia. Leaving more learned heads than mine to settle this disputed point, let us proceed to ancient Alexandria, about a league from the modern town; which presents to the eye an instructive lesson on the instability of all sublunary objects. This once magnificent City, built by the most famous of all Conquerors, and adorned with the most exquisite productions of art, is now little more than a heap of Ruins; yet the form of the streets can still be discerned, they were regular, and many of the houses (as I recollect to have read of Athens) had fore-courts bounded by dwarf walls, so much in the manner of our Lincoln's-Inn Fields, that the resemblance immediately struck me.

We saw also the *outside* of St Athanasius's Church, who was Bishop of this Diocese, but it being now a Mosque were forbidden to enter, unless on condition of turning mahometans, or losing our lives, neither of which alternatives exactly suited my ideas, so that I deemed it prudent to repress my curiosity. I could not however resist a desire to visit the Palace of Cleopatra, of which few vestiges remain. The marble walls of the Banqueting room are yet standing, but the roof is long since decayed. Never do I remember being so affected by a like object. I stood in the midst of the ruins, meditating on the awful scene, 'till I could almost have fancied I beheld its former mistress, revelling in Luxury, with her infatuated lover, Marc Anthony, who for her sake lost all

The houses in the new Town of Alexandria thro' which we returned, are flat roofed, and, in general, have gardens on their tops. These in some measure, in so warm a country, may be called luxuries. As to the bazars (or markets) they are wretched places, and the streets exceedingly narrow. Christians of all denominations live here on paying a tax, but they are frequently ill treated, and if one of them commits even an unintentional offence against a musselman, he is pursued by a most insatiable spirit of revenge and his whole family suffers for it. One cannot help shuddering at the bare idea of being in the hands of such bigotted wretches. I forgot to mention that Mr. Brandy met us near Cleopatra's needles, which are two immense obelisks of Granite. One of them, time has levelled with the ground; the other is intire, they are both covered with hieroglyphic figures, which, on the sides not exposed to the wind and sand from the Desert, remain uninjured, but the key being lost, no one can decypher their meaning. I thought Mr B— might perhaps have heard something relative to them, he, however, seems to know no more than ourselves. A droll circumstance occurred on our return. He is a stout man of a very athletic make, and above six feet high, so you may judge what a curious figure he must have made, riding on an ass, and with difficulty holding up his long legs to suit the size of the animal, which watched an opportunity of walking away from between them, and left the poor Consul standing, erect, like a Colossus. in truth, it was a most ludicrous scene to behold.

25th July. The weather being intensely hot, we staid at home 'till the evening, when Mr. Brandy called to escort us to his house. We were most graciously received by Mrs B— who is a native of this place, but as she could speak a little Italian, we managed to carry on something like conversation. She was most curiously bedizened on the

occasion, and being short, dark complexioned, and of a complete dumpling shape, appeared altogether the strangest lump of finery I had ever beheld, she had a handkerchief bound round her head, covered with strings composed of thin plates of gold, in the manner of spangles but very large, intermixed with pearls and emeralds; her neck and bosom were ornamented in the same way. Add to all this an embroidered girdle with a pair of gold clasps, I verily think near four inches square, enormous earrings, and a large diamond sprig on the top of her forehead, and you must allow, that altogether she was a most brilliant figure. They have a sweet little girl about seven years of age, who was decked out much in the same style, but she really looked pretty in spite of her incongruous finery. On the whole, though, I was pleased with both mother and child, their looks and behaviour were kind. and to a stranger in a strange land (and this is literally so to us) a little attention is soothing and consolatory, especially when one feels surrounded by hostilities, which every European must do here. Compared with the uncouth beings who govern this country, I felt at home among the natives of France, and I will even say of Italy.

On taking leave, our Host presented a book containing certificates of his great politeness and attention towards travellers, which were signed by many persons of consideration and at the same time requesting that Mr Fay and myself would add *our* names to the list, we complied, though not without surprize, that a gentleman in his situation, should have recourse to such an expedient, which cannot but degrade him in the eyes of his Guests.

It being determined that we shall proceed by water, for reasons too tedious to detail at present, I must now prepare to embark. I shall endeavour to keep up my spirits. Be assured that I will omit no opportunity of writing, and

comfort yourselves with the idea, that before *this* reaches you, I shall have surmounted all my difficulties I certainly deem myself very fortunate in quitting this place so soon Farewell, all good be with you, my ever *ever* dear Friends prays,

Your *own*,  
E F

## LETTER VII.

GRAND CAIRO, 27<sup>th</sup> August, 1779.

MY DEAR FRIENDS, In coming to this place, we were in great peril, and bade adieu to the sea at the hazard of our lives, the Bar of the Nile being exceedingly dangerous. Fourteen persons were lost there, the day before we crossed it, a circumstance that of course tended to increase our anxiety on the subject, and which was told me just before I closed my last letter, but for the world I would not have communicated such intelligence. Our only alternative to this hazardous passage, was crossing a desert, notorious for the robberies and murders committed on it, where we could not hope for escape, and from the smallness of our number, had no chance of superiority in case of attack. The night after we had congratulated ourselves on being out of danger from the bar, we were alarmed by perceiving a boat making after us, as the people said, to plunder, and perhaps, to murder us. Our Jew interpreter, who, with his wife, slept in the outer cabin, begged me not to move our dollars, which I was just attempting to do, lest the thieves should hear the sound, and kill us all, for the supposed booty. You may judge in what a situation we remained, while this dreadful evil seemed impending over us. Mr. Fay fired two pistols, to give notice of our being armed. At length, thank God, we out-sailed them, and nothing of the kind occurred again, during our stay on board, though we passed several villages, said to be inhabited entirely by thieves.



As morning broke, I was delighted with the appearance of the country, a more charming scene my eyes never beheld. The Nile, that perpetual source of plenty, was just beginning to overflow its banks, so that on every side, we saw such quantities of water drawn up for the use of more distant lands, that it is surprising any remains. The machine chiefly used for that purpose is a wheel with earthen pitchers tied round it, which empty themselves into tubs, from whence numerous canals are supplied. Oxen and Buffaloes are the animals generally employed in this labour. It is curious to see how the latter contrive to keep themselves cool during the intense heat that prevails here; they lie in the River by hundreds, with their heads just above water, for hours together.

Rosetta<sup>7</sup> is a most beautiful place, surrounded by groves of lemon and orange trees; and the flat roofs of the houses have gardens on them, whose fragrance perfumes the air. There is an appearance of cleanliness in it, the more gratifying to an English eye, because seldom met with in any degree, so as to remind us of what we are accustomed to at home. The landscape around, was interesting from its novelty, and became peculiarly so on considering it as the country where, the children of Israel sojourned. The beautiful, I may say, the unparalleled story of Joseph and his brethren, rose to my mind as I surveyed those Banks, on which the Patriarch sought shelter for his old age, and where his self convicted sons bowed down before their younger brother, and I almost felt as if in a dream, so wonderful appeared the circumstance of my being here. You will readily conceive that, as I drew near Grand Cairo, and beheld those prodigies of human labour, the Pyramids of Egypt, these sensations were still more strongly awakened, and I could have fancied myself an inhabitant of a world, long passed away for who can look on buildings, reared, (moderately computing the

time) above *three thousand years ago*, without seeming to step back as it were, in existence, and live through days, now gone by, and sunk in oblivion "like a tale that is told "

Situated as I was, the Pyramids<sup>8</sup> were not all in sight, but I was assured that those which came under my eye, were decidedly the most magnificent We went out of our way to view them nearer, and by the aid of a telescope, were enabled to form a tolerable idea of their construction. It has been supposed by many that the Israelites built these Pyramids, during their bondage in Egypt, and I rather incline to that opinion, for, altho' it has lately been proved that they were intended to serve as repositories for the dead, yet each, being said to contain only one sarcophagus, this circumstance, and their very form, rendered them of so little comparative use, that most probably, they were raised to furnish employment for multitudes of unfortunate slaves; and who more aptly agree with this description, than the wretched posterity of Jacob? I understand there is a little flat, on the tops of the larger Pyramids, from which it is conjectured that the Egyptians made astronomical observations The largest, is said to be, above five hundred feet high, perpendicularly. The inclined plane must measure much more the steps are nearly three feet distant of the Pyramids, though I very anxiously wished to have inspected them, and the sphinx, prudence forbade me from making the attempt, as you will allow, when I proceed farther in my narrative

On the 29th, we reached Bulac the port of Grand Cairo, and within two miles of that city, to my great joy, for on this river, there is either little wind, or else it comes in squalls, so suddenly, that the boats are often in danger of being upset, as they carry only, what I believe is called, a shoulder-of-Mutton-sail, which turns on a sort of swivel, and is very difficult to manage, when the wind takes it the

wrong way. It seems indeed almost miraculous how we escaped

Mr Fay sat out almost immediately to Mr. Baldwin's,<sup>9</sup> who received him with much civility, and sent an ass for me, with directions to make all possible haste, as a Caravan was to set off in three hours

I must now give you a description of my dress,<sup>10</sup> as my Jewess decked me out, preparatory to our entering the Great City I had, in the first place, a pair of trowsers, with yellow leather half-boots and slippers over them; a long sattin gown, with wide sleeves, open to the elbows, and a girdle round my waist, with large silver clasps, over that another robe with short sleeves round my head a fine, coloured, muslin handkerchief, closely bound, but so arranged that one corner hung down three quarters of a yard behind This is the dress for the House; but as I was going out, she next put on a long robe of silk, like a surplice, and then covered my face with a piece of muslin, half a yard wide, which reached from the forehead to the feet, except an opening for the eyes, over all, she threw a piece of black silk, long and wide enough to envelop the whole form, so, thus equipped, stumbling at every step, I sallied forth, and with great difficulty got across my noble beast but, as it was in the full heat of the day and the veil prevented me from breathing freely, I thought I must have died by the way. However, at last, I was safely housed, but found a great change had taken place; all thoughts of going were now laid aside I dare not at present enter into particulars, and can only say that, some thing was wrong, and on that account we were kept in suspense, 'till about a week ago, when just as we had determined to proceed, if possible, another way, matters were adjusted so to-morrow afternoon we are to enter on the Desert, and shall, please God, arrive at Suez, most likely, on Monday, from whence I propose writing again. The season is so

far advanced that a good passage cannot be expected: we have no hopes of reaching Calcutta in less than three months, but at any rate, the voyage is preferable to going through the long Desert, from Aleppo to Bassora

When I write from India I will give a full detail of the affair to which I allude, though as it is very important, you will, most probably, see the whole in the papers. Adieu for the present it is bed time

28th. Again I take up the pen to hold a little further converse with my dear friends, while waiting the summons to depart, and as health is the most important of all earthly subjects, shall begin with that It will, I know, give you pleasure to hear that I have found scarce any inconvenience from the heat, though all of our Party, who have been in India agree that, they never felt the weather so oppressively hot as here; which proceeds from the terrible sandy deserts, that surround the town, causing the air to smell like hot bricks This however I could have borne, but just on our arrival, there broke out a severe epidemical disease, with violent symptoms People are attacked at a moments warning with dreadful pains in the limbs, a burning fever, with delirium and a total stoppage of perspiration. During two days it increases, on the third, there comes on uniformly a profuse sweat (pardon the expression) with vomiting, which carries all off —The only remedies prescribed, are lying in bed and drinking plentifully, even two gallons a day, of Nile water no nourishment, and not so much as gruel, is allowed until after the crisis, not one has died of the disease, nor, I believe, scarcely one escaped even the beasts have been affected. Mr Fay had it three weeks ago, and among all I conversed with here, I remained the only healthy person, and really hoped to have proved the truth of what is asserted by physicians, that nervous persons are not subject to be attacked by contagious distempers, not even by the Plague itself However, this day sennight, I

was seized with most violent symptoms, so that at the three days end, my strength seemed entirely exhausted; but I have, thanks be to Providence, recovered as surprizingly, and am already nearly well. It had every sign of the Plague, except that it was not mortal. Do not be frightened at the name, but I assure you, it is commonly called "*la queue de la Peste*," and the general opinion is, that had it arrived in the month of February, the living would scarce have been sufficient to bury the dead.

Grand Cairo by no means answers to its name at present, whatever it may have done formerly — There are certainly many magnificent houses, belonging to the Beys and other rich individuals, but as a city, I can perceive neither order, beauty, nor grandeur, and the contrast between the great, who seem to wallow in splendour and luxury, and the people at large, who appear to want the common necessities of life, is not more striking, than disgusting; because, those who are raised above their fellows, do not look, as though they merited the distinction, either by talent, manners or even the most ordinary pretentions. The Christians (who are called Franks) live all together in one street, which is closed at each end every night, a precaution neither unpleasant nor useless. An agreeable variety is given to the appearance of the town by the Mosques, or I should consider the whole wretchedly stupid. A wedding, here, is a gay and amusing spectacle, from the procession which accompanies the Bride in all her movements, drums, haut-boys and every other kind of noise and parade they can make, seem indispensable. but the circumstance of completely veiling, not only the face, but the whole figure of the woman, in the enveloping mantle of black silk, before described, gives an air of melancholy to these exhibitions. To show the face is considered here, an act of downright indecency, a terrible fashion for one like me, to whom free air seems the great requisite for existence.

I must not conclude without mentioning a disappointment I met with. As the fertility of Egypt depends on the due increase of the Nile, persons are hired to go round Grand Cairo, twice a day, and report how many inches the water has risen, returning solemn thanks to Almighty God for the blessing. This is continued 'till it gain a certain point, when the Dikes are broken down, and the river flows majestically into the Canal, formed for its reception, while the inhabitants hail its approach with every demonstration of joy. Such was the account I heard, and great was my anxiety, lest I should not be permitted to witness this *August* ceremony. At length the period arrived, but never, sure, were highly raised expectations more miserably deceived. For this famous Canal, being dry nine months out of the twelve, and serving during that interval as a receptacle for the filth of a populous, and not *exactly* cleanly City, I leave you to judge, how beautifully *pellucid* its waters must appear, nor could St. Giles's itself pour forth such an assembly of half naked, wretched creatures, as preceded this so vaunted stream, crying aloud, and making all sorts of frantic gestures, like so many maniacs. Not a decent person could I distinguish amongst the whole group. So much for this grand exhibition, which we have abundant cause to wish, had not taken place, for the vapours arising from such a mass of impurity, have rendered the heat more intolerable than ever. My bed chamber overlooks the Canal, so that I enjoy the full benefit to be derived from its proximity."

I am now compelled, much against my inclination, to bid you adieu, for I have a thousand things to do, and this immense letter has left me little time.

Ever your's most truly,

&c. &c

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*P S* Not being able to enlarge on the only interesting subject, has induced me to be rather diffuse on others, as

I wished to convey *some* information by this, perhaps, *last* opportunity, 'till our arrival in India, for it is doubtful whether I may have any safe channel of conveyance from Suez.

## LETTER VIII.

FROM MR. FAY<sup>12</sup> TO MR. C.

*On Board Ship, in the Red Sea,*  
NEAR SUEZ

*September 1st 1779*

HONOURED SIR,

I seize the chance of three minutes, to tell you that we yesterday arrived at Suez from Grand Cairo, after a journey of three days, over a most dreadful Desert, where every night we slept under the great canopy of Heaven, and where we were every hour in danger of being destroyed, by troops of Arabian robbers. But having a little party of English gentlemen, and servants (among whom I held a principal command) well armed, and under the orders of Major Baillie, and another military officer, we marched the whole way in order of battle, and though we could frequently see superior numbers, they never dared to molest us.

Your daughter behaved most courageously and is extremely well, considering the extraordinary fatigue she has undergone. There is another English lady and her husband on board, which promises to make it an agreeable voyage. The ship is a very fine one, and we have a handsome little chamber, and I hope in all things shall find ourselves well accommodated. We expect to sail in four hours. The ship is called the *Nathalia*, Captain Chenu, a Frenchman, and apparently a very



polite good-natured man, which is a great matter in a long voyage

I thank God I was never in better health and spirits, tho' I never slept during the whole journey on the Desert, and lived the whole time on bread and water, notwithstanding we had abundance of wine and provisions; but the heat being excessive, I found no other food agree with me so well, and Mrs Fay by adopting the same diet, preserved her health also, whereas all the rest were knocked up before we got half way over that confounded Desert, and some are now very ill; but I stood it, as well as any Arabian in the Caravan, which consisted at least of five thousand people. My wife insists on taking the pen out of my hands, so I can only say God bless you all.

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#### MY DEAR FRIENDS

I have not a moments time, for the boat is waiting, therefore can only beg that you will unite with me, in praising our heavenly Protector for our escape from the various dangers of our journey I never could have thought my constitution was so strong I bore the fatigues of the desert, like a Lion, though but just recovering from my illness We have been pillaged of almost every thing, by the Arabs This is the Paradise of thieves, I think the whole population may be divided into two classes of them, those who adopt force, and those who effect their purpose by fraud I was obliged to purchase a thick cloak, and veil, proper for the journey, and what was worse, to wear them all the way hither, which rendered the heat almost insupportable —Never was I more happy, than when I came on board, although the ship having been for six weeks in the hands of the natives, the reason of which I cannot enlarge on here, is totally despoiled of every article of furniture; we have not a chair or a table, but as the carpenter

makes them, for there is no buying such things here Our greatest inconvenience is the want of good water, what can be procured here, is so brackish, as to be scarcely drinkable. I have not another moment. God bless you! pray for me my beloved friends

## LETTER IX.

FROM MRS. FAY

MOCHA 13<sup>th</sup> September 1779

THANK GOD MY DEAR FRIENDS, I am once more enabled to date from a place of comparative liberty, and an European Gentleman having promised me a safe conveyance for my packet, I shall proceed to give you a hurried and melancholy detail of circumstances of which it has been my chief consolation to know that you were ignorant. You are of course impatient to be informed to what I allude, take then the particulars. but I must go a good way back in order to elucidate matters, which would otherwise appear mysterious or irrelevant <sup>13</sup>

The East India Company sent out positive orders some time ago, to prohibit the trade to Suez, as interfering with their privileges, but as there never was a law made, but means might be found to evade it, several English merchants freighted a ship (the Nathalia) from Serampore, a Danish settlement on the Hooghly, fourteen miles above Calcutta, whose commander, Vanderfield, a Dane, passed for owner of the ship and cargo. Mr O'Donnell one of the persons concerned, and who had property on board to the amount of above £20,000, came as passenger, as did Mr. Barrington the real supercargo, also a freighter, and two Frenchmen, brothers, named Chevalier. They left Bengal on New year's day 1779, and came first to Calicut on the coast of Malabar, where they arrived in February, found English, French, Danish and Portuguese Factors, or Consuls

there, and trade in a flourishing state, so not apprehending any danger they entered into a contract with one Isaacs, a rich old Jew, who has great influence with the government, to freight them with pepper for Bengal on their return from Suez, that being the greatest town on the Coast for that commodity — The price was settled and £700 paid as earnest. This business arranged, they proceeded on their voyage, and having luckily disposed of some part of the cargo at this place, reached Suez with the remainder in the beginning of June, landed their Goods to the amount of at least £40,000, and prepared to cross the Desert on their way to Cairo. The company besides those already mentioned, consisted of Chenu the second mate, with some officers and servants, in all twelve Europeans, strengthened by a numerous body of Arabian guards, camel drivers &c, for the conveyance of their property more than sufficient in every body's opinion, for no one remembered a Caravan being plundered, for altho' sometimes the wandering Arabs were troublesome, yet a few presents never failed to procure a release from them. Thus were they lulled into a fatal security, each calculating the profits likely to accrue, and extremely willing to compound for the loss of a few bales, should they happen to meet with any strolling depredators, not even once supposing their lives were in danger, or intending to use their firearms should they be molested.

On Monday the 14th June they left Suez, and next morning at day break, had travelled about twenty miles (nearly one third of the way) when suddenly an alarm was given of an Attack, as they, poor souls, were sleeping across their baskets (or panniers.) Capt Barrington on awaking ordered a dozen bales to be given to them immediately. but alas! they were already in possession of the whole, for the Camel drivers did not defend themselves an instant, but left their beasts at the mercy of the robbers, who after detaching a large body to drive them away with their

burthens, advanced towards the passengers. Here I must request you to pause, and reflect whether it be possible even for imagination to conceive a more dreadful scene to those concerned, particularly to Mr O'Donnell, who from a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, had in less than four years realized a fortune of near £30,000, the bulk of which he laid out in merchandise on the inviting prospect of gaining 50 Per Cent, and as his health was in a very weak state proposed retiring to Europe. What must that man have felt, a helpless spectator of his own ruin. But this was nothing to what followed on their being personally attacked. The inhuman wretches not content with stripping them to the skin, drove away their camels, and left them in a burning sandy Desert, which the feet can scarcely touch, without being blistered, exposed to the scorching rays of the sun and utterly destitute of sustenance of every kind, no house, tree, or even shrub to afford them shelter. My heart sickens, my hand trembles as I retrace this scene. Alas! I can too well conceive their situation I can paint to myself the hopeless anguish of an eye cast abroad in vain for succour! but I must not indulge in reflections, let me simply relate the facts as they occurred In this extremity they stopped to deliberate, when each gave his reasons, for preferring the road he determined to pursue. Mr O'Donnell, Chenu, the cook and two others resolved to retrace their steps back to Suez, which was undoubtedly the most eligible plan, and after encountering many hardships, they at length, arrived there in safety Of the remaining seven who went towards Cairo, only *one* survived—Mr Barrington being corpulent and short breathed, sunk under the fatigue the second day, his servant, soon followed him.—One of the French gentlemen was by this time become very ill, and his brother perceiving a house at some miles distance (for in that flat country, one may see a great way,) prevailed on him to lie down under a stunted tree,

with his servant, while he endeavoured to procure some water, for want of which the other was expiring. Hope, anxiety, and affection combined to quicken his pace, and rendered poor Vanderfield, the Danish captain, unable to keep up with him, which he most earnestly strove to do. I wept myself almost blind, as the poor Frenchman related his sufferings from conflicting passions, almost worn out with heat and thirst, he was afraid of not being able to reach the house, though his own life and that of his brother, depended on it. On the other hand the heart piercing cries of his fellow sufferer, that he was a dead man unless assisted by him, and conjuring him for God's sake, not to leave him to perish now they were in view of relief, arrested his steps and agonised every nerve. Unable to resist the solemn appeal, for some time he indulged him, 'till finding that the consequence of longer delay must be inevitable destruction to both, he was compelled to shake him off. A servant belonging to some of the party still kept on, and poor Vanderfield was seen to continue his efforts, 'till at length nature being completely exhausted, he dropped and was soon relieved from his miseries by Death. Nor was the condition of the survivors far more enviable, when having, with difficulty, reached the building after which they had toiled so long, it proved to be an uninhabited shed. Giving himself up for lost, the French gentleman lay down under shelter of the wall, to await his last moment, (the servant walked forward and was found dead a little further on) Now it so happened that an Arabian beggar chanced to pass by the wall, who seeing his condition, kindly ran to procure some water, but did not return for an hour. What an age of torture, of horrible suspense! for if "hope deferred maketh the heart sick," the sensation must cause ten-fold anguish at a moment like this

The unhappy man was mindful of his brother, but utterly unable to undertake the task himself, he directed

the beggar, as well as he could, to the spot where he had left him, with a supply of water. But alas! all his endeavours to find the unfortunate men were ineffectual, nor were their bodies ever discovered. It is supposed that they crept for shelter from the sun, into some unfrequented spot, and there expired. The survivor by the assistance of the beggar, reached the hut of a poor old woman, who kindly received him; and through whose care he was soon restored to strength, and arrived safely at Cairo, after as miraculous an escape, as ever human being experienced.

This melancholy story had been mentioned by Mr. Brandy before I landed at Alexandria, (Oh with what horror did I hear his brief recital) and the particulars I soon learnt at Cairo. The subject was in fact closely connected with my fears and sufferings, at that place, and which I hinted at the impossibility of my then revealing, neither could I, for the same reason, give you any account of the Egyptian Government, lest they should intercept my letter, altho' it is necessary you should know a little of it, for the sake of comprehending what I have further to relate, concerning these unfortunate adventurers.<sup>14</sup>

Egypt, then, is governed by twenty four Beys, of whom one presides over the rest, but this superiority is very precarious; for he holds it no longer than 'till some other of the number thinks himself strong enough to contend with him, and as they have here but two maxims in War, the one to fly, the other to pursue, those contests last not long: the vanquished, should he escape assassination retires up the country, 'till Fortune changes her aspect. while the victor takes his place. Thus do their lives pass in perpetual vicissitudes. To-day a Prince, to-morrow a Fugitive, and next day a prince again. These things are so common, that nobody notices them; since they never disturb the inhabitants or compel them to take part in their disputes. In order to be a check on these gentlemen, the Grand

Signor sends a Bashaw, to reside among them, whom they receive with great respect and compliment with presents of value, pretending the utmost deference for his authority, but at the same time a strict eye is kept over him, and on the least opposition to their will, he is sent in disgrace away—happy if he escape with life, after refunding all his presents and paying enormous sums besides.

By the above statement you will perceive that, the Beys are in reality independent, and likewise discern the hinge on which their politics turn, for as long as under colour of submission, they consent to receive a Bashaw, it is in their power constantly to throw the odium of every disagreeable occurrence on his shoulders, under pretence of Orders from the Porte. Now briefly to proceed with my little history, some time after the fatal robbery, another ship called the *St. Helena*, arrived at Suez, under Danish colours with the real owner, a Mr Moore, on board. He justly apprehensive of a similar fate, refused to land his Cargo 'till the *then* Chief Amurath Bey, had accorded him a solemn permission or rather protection, under which he safely reached Cairo, disposed of his effects, and prepared for his return to his ship with a fresh Cargo. But in the interim, Mr O'Donnell had been advised to present a memorial to the Beys, by which he reclaimed his property as an Englishman, threatened them with the vengeance of his nation if not immediately redressed, and declared himself totally independent of the Danes. This rash procedure alarmed the people in power, who however still continued apparently friendly, in hopes of a larger booty, 'till the 30th July, when they threw off the mask, seized the Caravan even to the passenger's baggage, and made Mr Moore a prisoner. You may recollect that in my letter from Cairo, I told you what a hurry Mr Fay was in, to fetch me from Bulac, not having, as he then thought, a moments time to spare. It so happened that I arrived within an hour after



the seizure of the Caravan and when all the gentlemen concerned, were in the first transports of that indignation, which such a daring outrage could not fail to excite; at once exasperated by this treacherous behaviour and alarmed, lest some new crime should be committed against them.

Every one is of opinion that their design was to cut us *all* off, had we gone out ignorant of the seizure of the Caravan. I had scarcely sat down in Mr. Baldwin's parlour, when this terrible news, which seemed to involve the fate of every European alike, burst upon me like a stroke of lightning. Never shall I forget the terrors I felt—. In a few moments the room was filled with Europeans, chiefly English, all speaking together,—calling out for arms, and declaring they would sell their lives dearly, for not one appeared to entertain a doubt of their being immediately attacked. In the midst of this confusion, Mons. Chevalier (the poor man who escaped from the Desert) cast his eyes upon me, exclaiming “Oh Madam how unhappy you are in having come to this wretched place.” This drew the attention of the rest,—and “what shall we do with the lady?”—was every one's question—at last they resolved on sending me to the house of an Italian Physician, as a place of safety, thither I was instantly taken by a native, who even in the distress and confusion of the house, and although the Italian's was only a few steps distant across a narrow lane, felt greatly shocked, because my veil chancing to be a little loose, he could see one corner of my eye, and severely reprehended the indecency of such an exposure.

On reaching my expected Asylum a scene of more serious alarm (if possible) than I had left at Mr Baldwin's awaited me. The lady and her daughter were wringing their hands, and crying out in agony, that they were utterly ruined—, that all the Europeans would be murdered, and they even appeared to think, that receiving another of

the proscribed race increased their danger Imprisonment and massacre in every shape, were the sole subjects of their conversation, and so many terrible images did their fears conjure up, and communicate to my already disordered mind, that there were times, when the reality could have been scarcely more appalling Oh England! dear England! how often did I apostrophise thee, land of liberty and safety—: but I must not review my thoughts—, a simple narrative is all I dare allow myself to write.

For several days we remained in this harrassing state of suspense, and alarm, at length news arrived that the two ships which had brought these ill-fated adventurers to Egypt's inhospitable shores, were seized by the Government, three days before they took possession of the Caravan Their prisoners indeed, we already virtually were, not being allowed to quit the City I should have mentioned that the Bashaw was the tool made use of on this occasion; who pretended he had Orders from Constantinople, to seize all English merchandise and confiscate the Vessels, suffering none but the East India Company's packets to touch at Suez This Firman was said to be obtained of his sublime highness, by the British resident at the Porte, on behalf of the E I Company, whether this pretence was true or false, we could never learn Many other reports were propagated, as must always be the case in a country under arbitrary government there being no certain rules to judge by, every one pronounces on the event as his hopes or fears dictate Some times we were all to be sent prisoners to Constantinople, then we were assured that after a general plunder of our effects, we should certainly be released, and once it was confidently reported that, the *Bowstring* would be secretly applied to prevent our telling tales

What added much to our mortification and justified our fears was, that all the Christians belonging to the two ships, were on the 10th of August dragged to Cairo in the most

ignominious manner, having previously suffered, during their imprisonment at Suez, every species of hardship which barbarity and malice could inflict. The people also at whose house we lodged, behaved to us continually with marked disrespect, if asked a question they seldom deigned to reply, and took care to enlarge perpetually on their condescension in suffering themselves to be incommoded with strangers. To be thus treated, at a time when perpetual solicitude and terror had unbraced my nerves and subdued my spirit, seemed so cruel, that I think it absolutely hurt me more than even our detention, a detention which was certainly harder upon us, than any other Europeans in one sense, since we had no connection whatever with the parties, were coming from a different quarter of the globe, not concerned in trade, and unknown to those who had visited their country on that account: no demon of avarice had led *us* into their power, nor could we afford a prey to *theirs*. These considerations however evident, made no impression on our host, they were rather motives of exultation over us, and what enhanced our misfortune, it was irremediable, for we could not change our abode, without going into another street, where we should have been unprotected.

All the Christians live in one part of the town as I before noticed. during the time when the Plague rages, they visit each other by means of bridges thrown across the streets, from the tops of the houses, and this is a convenience they often resort to at other times, as it saves them from insult, which they often meet below. I find I have written myself into such a strange humour, that I cannot proceed methodically, but I must try to arrange my thoughts and go forward better.

At length the Beys, enchanted by that Deity whose bewitching attractions few mortals can resist, whether on the banks of the Nile or the Thames in other words,

influenced by the promise of three thousand pounds, and an absolute indemnification from Mr. O'Donnell, gave us leave to proceed on our Voyage in defiance of the tremendous order of their master, and thus ended this most disagreeable and distressing business I will release you from this wearisome letter I shall have time at Mocha to continue my journal—, Adieu till to-morrow

Ever most affectionately your's,

E F

## LETTER X.

*Inclosed in the Foregoing.*

MOCHA 15<sup>th</sup> September

MY DEAR SISTER,

I resume my pen in order to give you some account of our passing the Desert, which being done by a method of travelling totally different from any thing in England, may afford amusement, and even without the charm of novelty could not fail to interest you, as the narrative of one so nearly and dearly connected.

When a Caravan is about to depart, large tents are pitched on the skirts of the City, whither all who propose joining it repair: there they are drawn up in order, by the persons who undertake to convey them. Strong bodies of Arabian soldiers guard the van and rear, others flank the sides—, so that the female passengers, and the merchandise, are completely surrounded, and, as one would hope, defended in case of attack. Each gentleman of our party had a horse, and it is common to hire a camel between two, with panniers to carry their provisions &c —. across the panniers, which are of wicker, a kind of mattress is thrown, whereon they take it by turns to lie, and court repose, during their journey. Females who can afford the expence, are more comfortably accommodated—, these travel in a kind of litter, called a Tataravan, with two poles fastened between two camels, one behind, the other before. The litter has a top and is surmounted by shabby, ill contrived Venetian blinds, which in the day, increase the

suffocating heat, but are of use during the nights which are cold and piercing.—Every camel carries skins of water, but before you have been many hours on the Desert, it becomes of the colour of coffee I was warned of this, and recommended to provide small gugs of porous earth, which after filling with *purified* water, I slung to the top of my *Tataravan*, and these with water melons, and *hard* eggs, proved the best refreshments I could have taken The water by this means was tolerably preserved, but the motion of the camels and the uncouth manner in which the vehicle is fastened to them, made such a constant rumbling sound among my provisions, as to be exceedingly annoying Once I was saluted by a parcel of hard eggs breaking loose from their net, and pelting me completely it was fortunate that *they were* boiled, or I should have been in a pretty trim, to this may be added the frequent violent jerks, occasioned by one or other of the poles slipping out of its wretched fastening, so as to bring one end of the litter to the ground, and you may judge how pleasing this mode of travelling must be

At our first outset, the novelty of the scene, and the consolation I felt, on leaving a place which had been productive of so much chagrin, and so many too well founded apprehensions, wrought an agreeable change on my harrassed feelings—, but when we had proceeded some distance on the Desert, when all traces of human habitation had vanished—, when every sign of cultivation disappeared, and even vegetation was confined to a few low straggling shrubs, that seemed to stand between life and death as hardly belonging to either—, when the immeasurable plain lay around me, a burning sun darted his fierce rays from above, and no asylum was visible in front, my very heart sunk within me—I am sure you will do justice to my feelings, the late Catastrophe being deeply imprinted on my mind, and indeed never absent from it For the world, you

should not have known what was passing there, when I made so light of the journey in my letter from Grand Cairo.

In the midst of these soul-subduing reflections, the guides gave notice of a body, apparently much larger than our own, being within view of us—All the sufferings related by the poor French gentleman, my active imagination now pourtrayed, as about to be inflicted on me. My dear Parents, my sisters, cried I, will never see me more!—should they learn my fate what agonies will they not endure!—but never can they conceive half the terrible realities, that I may be doomed to undergo! Happily, for once, my fears outwent the truth; the party so dreaded, turned off in pursuit of some other prey, or perhaps intimidated by our formidable appearance, left us unmolested.

It is impossible even amidst fear and suspense not to be struck with the exquisite beauty of the nights here; a perfectly cloudless sky, and the atmosphere so clear, that the stars shine with a brilliancy, infinitely surpassing any thing I witnessed elsewhere. Well might the ancient Egyptians become expert astronomers, possessing a climate so favourable to that study; nor were we less indebted to those Heavenly luminaries; since, by their refulgent light, and unvarying revolutions, the guides cross these trackless Deserts with certainty, and like the mariner, steer to the desired haven.

You will perceive, that my boast of having crossed the Desert, like a lion, was not literally just,—but then remember, it was his strength, not his courage to which I alluded. for it is true that, considering how much I had suffered in Cairo, I really did perform the journey well, and on the second day being convinced by the behaviour of some around me, how greatly dejection increased the actual evils of our situation,—I rallied my spirits to the utmost, and lifting up my heart in gratitude to the Almighty, for having

thus far supported us, I determined to trust in his goodness, and not desert myself.

On this day I was exceedingly affected by the sufferings of one of our party—Mr Taylor, going out as assistant surgeon on the Bengal establishment. He complained of illness when we sat out, and seemed overwhelmed with melancholy. He had been plundered of all by the Arabs—had sustained various misfortunes, and of late, appeared to be consumptive. The extreme heat of the weather so overpowered him, that he resigned all hope of life, and at length, in a fit of despondency, actually allowed himself to slide down from his horse, that he might die on the ground. Mr Taylor seeing him fall, ran to assist him in regaining his seat, but he earnestly begged to be left alone, and permitted to die in peace. It was impossible to inspire him with hope and as he appeared to have so little strength, I did not believe that, with so strong a predilection for death, he could have been kept alive—yet to see a fine young man, a countryman and fellow-traveller expiring amongst us, without striving to the last to preserve him, would have been inhuman. Thank God, our cares so far prevailed that he is still with us, though his disorder is now confirmed, and his melancholy but little abated—He thanks us for life, as if grateful for our attention, but not for the gift. I fear his heart is breaking, as well as his constitution.

When my mind was a little relieved on poor T—'s account, I had leisure to think of the horses,—you recollect how partial I ever was to these noble animals, and we had several with us, of such singular beauty and docility, that they would have attracted the attention, I had almost said the affection, of the most indifferent spectator. The wretched creatures suffered so much from heat and thirst, that their groanings were terrible, and added to this an involuntary rattling in the throat, as if they were on the point of expiring, so that one heard them with a mixture of



compassion and horror extremely painful to bear: yet notwithstanding that this continued for many hours, we were so fortunate, as not to lose a single horse in the Caravan — With the dogs, we were less successful,—three very fine ones sat out with us, but none survived—one of them was the most beautiful Italian greyhound, I ever beheld,—he cost seven guineas at Venice The first day he got tolerably well forward, but during the second his strength failed, and he appeared to suffer excruciating pain from the heat. When he was in the most frightful state, his tongue hanging out of his mouth, his eyes wildly staring, and altogether presenting the idea of madness, rather than death, his master Mr. T— had the modesty to bring him to me, and request that I would admit him into my Tataravan I hope no person will accuse me of inhumanity, for refusing to receive an animal in that condition,—self-preservation forbade my compliance I felt that it would be weakness, instead of compassion, to subject myself to such a risk, and you may be certain, my sympathy was not increased for its owner, when he solemnly assured me, by way of enforcing his intreaty, that it would cost him a less severe pang, to see his own father thus suffering, than he then felt—I was induced to credit this assertion, knowing that when last in England, he had remained there seventeen months without visiting the old gentleman, though he acknowledged having been within 150 miles of his residence A very short time after this, the poor creature dropt down gasping, but ere he had breathed his last, a brutal Arab cut him to pieces before his masters face; and on his expressing anger at his cruel behaviour, ran after him with a drawn scymiter—you may judge from this incident, what wretches we were cast amongst

We found Suez a miserable place,—little better than the Desert which it bounds, and were, as probably I have already told you, impatient to get on board, where we found

every portable necessary of life had been carried off We had been pretty well pillaged ourselves, and could therefore sympathize with the losers, as well as lament our own personal inconvenience, however, thank Heaven that we escaped as we did,—if ever they catch me on their Desert again, I think I shall deserve all they can inflict

Our passage down the Red Sea was pleasant, the wind being constantly favourable, but afforded no object of interest, save the distant view of Mount Horeb, which again brought the flight of the children of Israel to my mind, and you may be sure, I did not wonder that they sought to quit the land of Egypt, after the various specimens of its *advantages* that I have experienced

The only vessels we saw, were those built for the conveyance of coffee, for which this port is famous,—they are so bulky, clumsy, and strangely constructed, that one might almost take them for floating mountains I cannot be expected to say a great deal of my shipmates, having been so short a time together, but to own the truth, I do not look forward to much comfort, where the elements are so discordant,—however, as we are to touch at Calicut on the Coast of Malabar, you shall from thence have the particulars for, by that time we shall be pretty well familiarized with each other May the detail be more agreeable than my present ideas will warrant me in supposing

Let me now proceed to say a few words of Mocha, which is a pretty considerable place, walled round, and guarded by soldiers —It appears to great advantage after Suez, being plentifully supplied with fruit and vegetables, —the provisions not bad, and the water excellent The worst I know of it, is the excessive heat, which is even beyond that of Cairo Our sailors have a proverb, that there is only a sheet of paper between that and another place—too shocking to be mentioned—I should yet say there

were many sheets; for we have really met with so much kindness and hospitality here, as to make us almost forget the heat.

The principal trade is carried on by Banians and Rajaputs, (as they are called, tho' I cannot yet tell why) who come here from India—make comfortable little fortunes and return. A family of the former, consisting of three brothers, named George, has shewn us every possible attention ever since we landed, and the Chevalier de St. Lubin, a French gentleman, of elegant manners and superior information, has treated us, in the most sumptuous style. It is whispered among the English here, that Mons De St. L— has been on a mission from the French Court to Hyder Ally, for the express purpose of sowing the seeds of discord between him, and the English; and that he has to a great degree succeeded; how far this is true, we cannot yet say, but so intirely was Mr. Fuller, one of our passengers, persuaded of the fact, that he just now proposed we should arrest the Chevalier, who is about to proceed in a day or two to Europe. How far Mr. F— may be politically right, I cannot tell, but my heart revolted at the idea of receiving every mark of attention from a man one hour, and on bare suspicion, making him a prisoner the next; and most truly did I rejoice when this scheme was overruled. There should be very sufficient reasons for conduct, so despotic and apparently ungrateful, and we certainly were not in possession of documents to authorise such a procedure. I am much better pleased that this gentleman should return peaceably to his native country, and forward my letters to you, which he has promised on his *honour* to do, and to secure them amongst his private papers—I might have written twice as much if I chose <sup>15</sup>

And now my dear Friends, I must again bid you adieu. I trust my next accounts will be more pleasant, than this sad detail must prove, and that I shall meet letters at

Calcutta, with good news of you all. My heart aches with thinking of the distance between us; but after surmounting so many difficulties and happily escaping from so many dangers, I feel inspired with hope for the future.

Ever most affectionately your's

E F.

## LETTER XI.

ON BOARD THE NATHAN at SEA.

21<sup>st</sup> October, 1779.

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

I wrote you from Mocha, in date the 15<sup>th</sup> September, by the Chevalier de St. Lubin who has most solemnly engaged to forward my letter, and I trust will keep his word.

We have now been six weeks at sea, and in the course of a few days hope to reach Calicut. Our passage across the Indian Ocean, we found very pleasant: the Monsoon being against us, made it tedious, but no boisterous seas had we to contend with, as in the Mediterranean:—all has been calm, easy and free from alarm of every kind hitherto; fortunate indeed may we deem ourselves in having experienced such fine weather: for our ship is not half laden and has not Cargo enough to keep her steady. You will now expect me to say some thing of those with whom we are cooped up, but my account will not be very satisfactory, although sufficiently interesting to us—to begin then.

The woman, of whom I entertained some suspicion from the first, is I am now credibly informed, one of the very lowest creatures taken off the streets in London: she is so *perfectly* depraved in disposition, that her supreme delight consists in rendering every body around her, miserable.—It would be doing her too much honour to stain my paper with a detail of the various artifices she daily practices to that end.—Her pretended husband having been in India before, and giving himself many airs, is looked upon as a

to be a creature, whose consequence, whom nobody chooses to offend, the above Master has full scope to exercise her majesty in, wherein he never controul her—not but that he perfectly understands how to make himself to feel, a creature, who is the creatureorted to, it is a great thing, as one of the boys—"Lord bless you, if I am not a creature, I wish I would make no more to controul her, as she is in an ox." I frequently amuse myself with examining their countenances, where all nature is to be seen, I am so frequently, that I can only believe either of the above to be a creature, or a creature. Mrs. Howe's account of the above, a Captain Harlowe, recurs to me—this is a creature, who is a creature put—to that I refer you.

Captain, the Captain, a creature "Jack in office," being a creature, who is a creature, by the death of the Captain, a creature and his chief officer on the first Deed, a creature, who is a creature, so insolent and so he is, that every one detest him. Instead of being a creature, to accommodate every person with the few necessaries left by the plundering Arabs, he constantly appropriate them to himself. "Where's the Captain's silver spoon? God bless my soul—Sir, you have got my chair, must you be seated before the captain? What have you done with the Captain's glass?" and a great deal more of the same kind, but this may serve as a specimen. And altho' the wretch half starves us, he frequently makes comparison between *his* table, and that of an Indian, which we dare not contradict while in his power, tell me now, should you not do it on three such companions for a long voyage?—but I have a fourth who at least, merits to be added to the triumvirate, his name John Hare, Esqr, Barrister at Law, a man of the very first fashion I assure you, and who would faint at the thought of any thing Plebeian. Taylor was one day shewing him a very hand-

some silver hilted sword, which he greatly admired, till chancing to cast his eye on the scabbard he read "Royal Exchange" "Take your sword" said he, "its surprizing a man of your sense should commit such an error, for fifty guineas I would not have a City name on any article of *my* dress, now St. James's or Bond street, has a *delicious* sound, don't you think so my dear friend?"—Now would any one suppose this fine gentleman's father was in trade, and he himself brought up in that very City, he effects to despise? very true nevertheless—Quadrille he would not be thought to know, it is only played by the wives and daughters of Tradesmen, in country towns. I want to make you see him, figure to yourself a little mortal, his body constantly bent in a rhetorical attitude, as if addressing the Court, and his face covered with scorbutic blotches Happily from an affectation of singularity, he always wears spectacles. I say happily, as they serve to conceal the most odious pair of little white eyes mine ever beheld. What Butler says of Hudibras—that

"he could not ope

His mouth, but out there flew a trope,"

may literally be applied to this Heaven-born Orator, who certainly outdoes all I ever heard, in the use of overstrained compliments and far-fetched allusions But with all those oddities, were he only a good-natured harmless simpleton, one might pity him. At first he took so much pains to ingratiate himself with us, that he became a sort of favorite, —so many confessions of superior abilities in Mr Fay—such intreaties to spare him, when they should practise in the Courts together,—a studied attention to me in the *minutest* article—effectually shielded him from suspicion, till his end was answered, of raising a party against us, by means of that vile woman, who was anxious to triumph over me, especially as I have been repeatedly compelled (for the Honour of the Sex) to censure her swearing, and indecent

behaviour. I have therefore little comfort to look forward to, for the remainder of the voyage.<sup>17</sup>

It is, however, only justice to name Mr Taylor as an amiable, tho' melancholy companion, and Mr Manesty an agreeable young man, under twenty, going out as a writer on the Bombay Establishment, from whom I always receive the most respectful attention. Mr. Fuller, is a middle aged man, it is easy to see, that he has been accustomed to genteel society. How different *his* manners from those of Hare! Poor man he has, it seems, fallen into the hands of sharpers, and been completely pillaged. He has the finest dark eyes, and one of the most intelligent countenances I ever met with. His trip to Bengal is, I doubt, a last resource. May it prove successful. I have no enmity towards him, for though he has joined the other party, it is evidently with reluctance. Mr Moreau a musician, going out to India to exercise his profession, is very civil and attentive.

Dissentions have run very high on board. The very day after we sailed from Mocha, a sudden quarrel arose between the Captain, and H—the Barrister, on which the ship was ordered about, and they were going ashore in a great hurry to decide it, but by the interposition of friends, they were prevailed upon to curb their wrath, 'till their arrival at Calicut, as in case of an accident, no officer remained to supply Chenu's place. About a month after, they were reconciled, and so ended this doughty affair.

I had almost forgotten to mention Pierot, the purser of the ship—a lively, well informed little Frenchman,—full of anecdotes and always prepared with a repartée, in short, the *soul* of the party. He sings an excellent song, and has as many tricks as a monkey. I cannot help smiling at his sallies, though they are frequently levelled at me, for he is one of my most virulent persecutors. Indeed, such is our general line of conduct, for, having early discovered the



confederacy, prudence determined us to go mildly on, seemingly blind to what it was beyond our power to remedy. Never intermeddling in their disputes, all endeavours to draw us into quarrels are vainly exerted—. indeed I despise them too much to be angry

During the first fortnight of our voyage my foolish complaisance stood in my way at table, but I soon learnt our genteel maxim was “catch as catch can,”—the longest arm fared best, and you cannot imagine what a good scambler I am become,—a dish once seized, it is my care, to make use of my good fortune and now provisions running very short, we are grown quite savages, two or three of us perhaps fighting for a bone, for there is no respect of persons. The wretch of a captain wanting our passage money for nothing, refused to lay in a sufficient quantity of stock, and if we do not soon reach our Port, what must be the consequence, Heaven knows

After meals I generally retire to my cabin, where I find plenty of employment, having made up a dozen shirts for Mr. F— out of some cloth, I purchased at Mocha, to replace part of those stolen by the Arabs—Sometimes I read French and Italian, and study Portuguese. I likewise prevailed on Mr. Fay to teach me short-hand, in consequence of the airs H— gave himself because he was master of this art, and had taught his sisters to correspond *with* him in it. The matter was very easily accomplished—in short I discovered abundant methods of making my time pass usefully, and not disagreeably. How often since, in this situation have I blessed God, that he has been pleased to endow me with a mind, capable of furnishing its own amusement, in despite of every means used to discompose it

4th November —We are now in sight of the Malabar hills, and expect to reach Calicut either this evening, or to-morrow; I shall conclude this letter, and send it under charge of Mr. Manesty, to forward it from Bombay. I am

in tolerable health, and looking with a longing eye, towards Bengal, from whence I trust my next will be dated. The climate seems likely to agree very well with me, I do not at all mind the heat, nor does it affect either my spirits, or my appetite

I remain  
Ever affectionately your's,  
E F

## LETTER XII.

CALICUT,  
12th February, 1780

MY DEAR FRIENDS

It was my determination never to write to you, during the state of dreadful Captivity in which we have long been held, but having hopes of a release, think I may now venture to give you some account of our sufferings, which have been extreme, both in body and mind, for a period of fifteen weeks, which we have spent in wretched confinement, totally in the power of Barbarians<sup>18</sup>

I must premise that, such is the harrassing confusion of my mind, and the weakness of my nerves, that I can merely offer you a simple statement of facts, and even that must necessarily be incorrect; for incessant anxiety and constant anticipation of more intolerable evils, have totally unhinged my faculties. God knows whether I may ever recover them; at present all is confused and clouded —Reflections on the importance of our speedy arrival in Bengal, which so many circumstances had contributed to prevent, and the apprehension lest our delay should afford time to raise serious obstacles against Mr. Fay's admission into the Court, as an advocate, had long been as so many daggers, piercing my vitals. add to this the heart-breaking thought what immense tracts lie between me and those dear *dear* friends, whose society alone can render me completely happy. Even were the most brilliant success to crown our future views, never could I know comfort, 'till the blessed moment arrive, when I shall clasp you all to my fond heart, without fear of a future



contest, she positively insisted on having a chair brought upon deck, in which she was determined to sit, and see the engagement, observing that, it was the next best thing to escaping from shipwreck — Having no ambition to play the Heroine in this way, I resolved on going below, and exerting, (should it be necessary) my limited abilities in assisting Mr Taylor, who had agreed to officiate as Surgeon — not feeling myself inclined to brave horrors of this nature, for the mere love of exhibition Most probably had the matter become serious, she would not have been permitted to indulge her fancy, but by degrees our suspicious visitants sheered off, without venturing to commence an attack, seeing us apparently so well prepared to resist them, and we flattered ourselves that our fears had been altogether groundless.

The next morning Hare and two others, going on shore to reconnoitre brought back intelligence, that we might all be safe in the Danish Factory, on condition of our passing for Danes, — as a misunderstanding actually subsisted between Hyder Ally and the English Mr Passavant, the Danish Consul, had been on board meanwhile, and given us pretty nearly the same information, and from others we soon learnt a circumstance, which confirmed our apprehension, that some mischief was brewing, — this was the departure of Mr Freeman, the English Consul, who had left the place some weeks before, taking with him his furniture and effects, — a positive proof that he supposed hostilities were about to commence, as it has been found a common procedure in these cases, for Asiatic Princes to begin a War, by imprisoning the Embassadors or Residents, of course, a wise man will fly when the storm lowers

Now our most worthy fellow-passengers, had privately agreed to continue their journey by land, and rejoiced in the opportunity of leaving us in the lurch. — they therefore accepted Mr. Passavant's invitation immediately, without

consulting us. At first this behaviour affected me a good deal and I resolved to follow them,—Mr. Fox concurring in opinion.—But on calm reflection, we judged it most prudent to learn what reception *they* met with, before we ventured on such slippery ground. On Sunday Chenu dined on board, and appeared very earnest for our quitting the Ship, but we did not attend to his persuasions. The Gunner who had charge of the vessel was a very respectable man, and we had lately held many conversations with him, he had a vile opinion of the Captain, believing that money would tempt him to commit *any* act, however atrocious, and had resolved in case an armed force was seen approaching the ship, to cut and run down to Cochin, with all the sail he could set,—but alas! before Chenu left us this day, he ordered all the yards to be struck, saying he should stay six weeks. This was doubtless done to frighten us, and to induce us to go on shore, but having taken our resolution, we were not to be moved, especially as he dropped some dark hints, respecting the situation of those, who *were* there, in so much that we had reason to think our only chance of escaping imprisonment, was by remaining where we were. Meantime intelligence reached us from various quarters, that disputes ran high between the Captain and passengers, about the remaining half of their passage money. As they proposed leaving the ship there, he demanded payment, which they refused till they should arrive in Bengal.

On the 8th came Lewis, Hare's servant, for his own clothes,—he brought news that a challenge had again passed between his master and Chenu, on the occasion of his master's trunks being stopped for the passage money—he left them on the point of deciding it when he came off. You may suppose we became exceedingly anxious to learn the event, but had soon other matters to engross our attention.

During the three days we staid here, after every one

else departed, boats full of people, were continually coming on board by permission of our *worthy* Captain, under pretence of viewing the ship,—we thought this rather odd, but John the Gunner being, as I observed before, a prudent steady man, we trusted to his discretion. About four, on Monday afternoon, I was sitting in the round-house at work, when a large boat came along side, with *more* than twenty *armed men* in her;—one of them shewed a written *chit* as he called it from Chenu, notwithstanding which, John insisted on their leaving their arms behind them—this, they at length complied with, and were then permitted to enter. I ran down half frightened to Mr. Fay, who was reading in our cabin, and told him the affair. “Pho,” said he, it is impossible they should mean any harm are we not under the protection of the Danish flag?” this silenced me at once, and he went upon deck to see the issue. All this while our visitors feigned to be mighty ignorant, and inquisitive, peeping into every hole and corner, as if, they never saw such a sight in their lives—purposely dallying on the time ’till just dark, when to my great joy they departed. A heavy squall came on, which they sheltered from under the ship’s stern, there another boat met them, and after some parley, they both (as I thought) went away.

But in a few minutes down came Mr. Fay “you must not be alarmed, said he, I have news to tell you—we are to have a hundred and fifty sepoys on board to-night!” Seapoys for what! “Why the English are coming to attack Calicut—Chenu has promised Sudder Khan, the Governor, his assistance, who has sent these troops for our defence”—“Oh Mr F—” replied I, this is a very improbable story, for God’s sake suffer not these people to enter the ship, if you can avoid it, otherwise we are ruined I see plainly this is a second Suez business,” (for by the same treacherous pretext they gained possession of the ships there) and at *that* instant, all that those unfortunate men

suffered, coming fresh into my mind, I really thought I should have fainted—Seeing that I was rendered more uneasy by being kept in suspense, he now acknowledged, that under favour of the night, a large party, headed by a Capt Ayres, an Englishman in Hyder's service, had already made good their entrance. The Commander had indeed related the above nonsensical tale to our Gunner, as an excuse for his proceeding, but did not seem himself to expect, it would gain belief. However being nearly destitute of Arms and Ammunition (the Arabs had taken care of that) what could we do, but recommend ourselves to the Divine Protection? which I may truly say, was never more earnestly solicited by me—When the redoubtable Captain Ayres had settled every thing upon Deck, he favoured us with his company below—As this Gentleman is in great power, and had a large share in the subsequent transactions, I must here devote a few moments to giving you a little sketch of his history.

He was born in London, and at the usual age bound apprentice to a saddler, but being a lad of spirit, and associating with other promising youths of similar talents, and courage, he soon found an employment more suited to his active genius, in a word, he became a Gentleman Collector on the *Highway*. This post he maintained several years, and if we may credit what he relates when in a boasting humour, performed many notable exploits, it is true he sometimes got inclosed within the hard gripe of the Law, but always found means to liberate himself, from it, 'till on one unlucky trial, proofs ran so strong against him, that in spite of money and friends (which in his case were *never* wanting) he was *Capitally convicted*, though, afterwards, pardoned on condition of transportation for life—This induced him to enlist for the East Indies, where he exercised his former profession, and was twice imprisoned at Calcutta on suspicion, but having acted



cautiously, nothing positive appeared against him: so by way of changing the scene, he was draughted off for Madras, where finding his favourite business rather slack, and his pay insufficient to support him without it, our hero determined on deserting to Hyder Ally, which resolution he soon found means to put in practice,—carrying with him two horses, arms, accoutrements, wearing apparel, and every thing else of value he could lay hands on, to a pretty considerable amount. This shew of property, (no matter how acquired) gave him consequence with Hyder, who immediately promoted him to the rank of Captain. Being a thorough paced villain, he has during these seven years taken the lead in every species of barbarity.—He even advised his General, who is Governor of this Province, to massacre all the natives by way of quelling a rebellion which had arisen.—The least punishment inflicted by him was cutting off the noses and ears of those miserable wretches, whose hard fate subjected them to his tyranny. In short a volume would not contain half the enormities perpetrated by this disgrace to human nature—but to proceed.

At sight of him I shuddered involuntarily, though at that time ignorant of his real character, such an air of wickedness and ferocity overspread his features. The sergeant who accompanied him was (always excepting his master) the most horrid looking creature, I verily believe, in existence. from such another pair the Lord defend me! Ayres told me, with the utmost indifference that the people at the Factory had all been fighting duels:—that Mr. Passavant the Danish Chief, had sent for a guard to separate them; and that the Governor finding the ship had no owner, as all these disputes arose about dividing the spoil, had thought proper to take possession of her in the *Nabob's* name, until matters were inquired into; after which he *faithfully* promised to restore her, without the least embezzlement—the love of *Justice* alone inducing him thus to act.

Though we perceived the fallacy of these pretences, yet as it was useless to argue with the vile instrument of oppression, we only requested to be set free on shore with our effects. This he engaged for, and even offered to take charge of any *valuables* or *money*—You may be sure we pleaded poverty; declaring that except our clothes, (which could be no object in a country where so few are worn) a guinea would purchase all we possessed, in the mean time we requested a guard to protect our persons from insult—Having pledged his *Honour* for our security, the captain retired. You will believe that sleep did not visit our eyelids *that night*. The fright had disordered me so much, that a violent retching came on, succeeded by a strong fever, which occasioned dreadful pains in my limbs. In the midst of these excruciating tortures, I heard Ayres tell his Serjeant, that orders were come to plunder the Ship, and make all the officers prisoners in the Round-house.

Can any thing be imagined more distressing, than my situation without the means of relief,—no possibility of obtaining advice, and no female to whom I could look for succour or assistance. This was about two in the morning,—these words sounded like the signal of death in my ears. Immediately a party of armed men surrounded our Cabin, and demanded entrance. I clung round my husband and begged for God's sake that he would not admit them, for what could be expected from such wretches but the most shocking treatment. All this while there was such a noise without, of breaking and tearing, to come at their plunder, as convinced me that should we once lose sight of our little property, *every thing was lost*. at first they were pacified on being told that I was asleep, but soon grew out of patience, brandished their scymitears and one man who spoke a little English, threatened with horrible execrations to murder us, if we did not *instantly* comply with their demands, and open the door.—Mr. Fay drew his sword on this declara-

tion, swearing solemnly that he would run the first man through the body, who should presume to enter his wife's apartment. His air of resolution and menacing actions, had their effect so far, as to prevent them from breaking open the door, the top of which being sashed, I beheld through it, their terrific countenances, and heard them incessantly calling "*ao, ao,*" (in English come) This word has made an impression on me, which is indescribable I can never hear it pronounced on the most common occasion, without trembling but to return—Mr. Fay now intreated me to rise if possible, being fearful he could not keep them much longer at bay I endeavoured to comply; but the agonising pains I suffered, and the extreme weakness brought on by fever, rendered it impossible for me to stand upright; there was however no remedy—so by degrees I got my clothes on (I recollect now that I must have been above an hour employed in this business) Through the glass door, I could see the villains outside, use menacing gestures and urge me to make haste,—vowing vengeance on me if I kept them longer waiting

Expecting a strict search and being desirous of rescuing something from the general wreck, Mr Fay contrived to conceal our watches in my hair, having first stopped their going by sticking pins in the wheels; and the little money we possessed, and what small articles I could take without exciting suspicion, were concealed about my person Thus equipped I crawled out, *bent double*, and in an instant, the Cabin was filled with Seapoys I must here pause, and intreat my dear sister to imagine herself in my situation at that *dreadful* moment; for no language can I find, that would do justice to my feelings

But when I came on deck, the scene which presented itself would have appalled the stoutest heart,—mine already weakened by grief and apprehension could not withstand it. A sudden burst of tears alone saved me from fainting

The poor sailors were so distracted, that many of them could scarcely be restrained from jumping over board to escape slavery,—sometimes crying for their wages, and asking the Officers to pay them; who incapable of affording any consolation, walked about like men bereft of reason: no wonder, since this fatal event would, to say the least, occasion them the loss of twelve month's pay, exclusive of their private ventures

We were immediately ordered on shore, together with the carpenter and ship's steward,—we demanded our baggage, but in vain, at length having represented the necessity of a change of linen, a person was sent down with me, in whose presence I put up a few common things, in a handkerchief, not being allowed to take any thing of value, but having laid out a silk gown the day before, to put on in case I went ashore, I begged hard for that, and obtained it, though my husband was not suffered to take a second coat, or even to change that he had on. Our beds were likewise refused, lest they should contain valuables, and upon deck the bundle was again examined in search of hidden treasure,—but finding nothing, they, contrary to my expectations, searched no further, but permitted us to leave the vessel unmolested, except that they had the cruelty to toss several half extinguished *Blue lights* into the boat, the smoke of which, from the rancid oil and abominable rags used in their composition, almost stifled me — At this time it rained hard, and continued to do so the whole day, which forced me to creep under the shelter of a kind of half deck, where I sat, bent double, for two long *long* hours, and then a remarkably high surf, prevented large boats from landing,—we had no remedy but to go into a canoe, scarcely bigger than a butcher's tray, half full of water,—so that we reached the shore dripping wet— Compare this account with the many chearful and flattering conversations we have held together on the subject of my

arrival in *India*. What a striking difference! It is true we were in the hands of the natives; but little did I imagine that, any power on this Continent, however independent, would have dared to treat *English* subjects with such cruelty, as we experienced from them

As if to aggravate our miseries by every species of insult, they compelled us to walk above a mile thro' a heavy sand, surrounded by all the mob of Calicut, who seemed to take pleasure in beholding the distress of white people, those constant objects of their envy and detestation.—When we had proceeded about half way, our Guards detained us nearly an hour, in an open Square, till the Governor's pleasure should be known. He sat all the while smoking his Hooka, and looking down upon us; when having sufficiently feasted his eyes, he ordered us to be taken to the English Factory—How I dragged on my weary aching limbs, I know not. The rain still poured and as we went, a lad who had deserted from Madras, and was then a serjeant in Hyder's service, seeing a country-woman in such distress, offered to procure me an umbrella, but could not prevail on the barbarians to stop, while he ran for it, though he was their officer. I thanked the poor lad for his kind intention and Mr. Fay insisted that I should take his hat, while he walked on bare-headed to the place of our confinement.—But here I cannot describe the horror which seized me on finding, we were totally in the power of wretches, who, for, aught I knew, intended to strip and murder us: why else were we sent to an empty house? not a single chair to sit on, or any other bed than the floor. These were my heart-breaking reflections, as I threw myself in despair on a window seat, worn out with fatigue and want of nourishment, without means of procuring even a draught of water to assuage my thirst, which grew excessive, for the offer of a bribe would have been dangerous

In this miserable condition we remained till two o'clock,



it appeared, to condole with us on such unexampled suffering, than to embrace the occasion of displaying his own eloquence, for which having a very strong passion, it was no wonder, if he thought the misfortunes of others proper subjects to expatiate on. Mounting his rhetorical hobby-horse, the Orator harangued a long while, though to little purpose, endeavouring to turn our situation into ridicule,—offered to convey letters for us to Bengal,—pretended to be in raptures with the fine view of the Sea from our Veranda, which I hinted to him he might still have time to admire at his leisure, though he affected to be certain of leaving Calicut in a few hours. At length he concluded, by advising me to address a *tender* memorial to Hyder Ally, whose general character for gallantry, would not admit of his refusing any request made by a *fair* Lady. This was wonderfully witty in the speaker's opinion, as you may conceive, how *fair* the Lady in question looked. How a man could break a jest on a creature so bowed down by affliction, I know not—but I envy not his feelings.

I forgot to tell you that, the duel between the *Captain*, and the *Orator*, was prevented by the guard, doubtless to the regret of these heroes. It seems the day they went on shore, Ayres accompanied by another Captain of a pretty similar description, named West, made Mr. Passavant a visit, to look at the strangers. Now as it was of the utmost importance, that they should remain undiscovered by such dangerous people, and as their visitants, though illiterate, were sufficiently acute, all perceived immediately the necessity of being guarded,—accordingly they, every one spoke French, and this, together with their long wide coats, and *preposterous* hats, which had just then become fashionable in England, effectually shielded them from suspicion, when behold, a sudden fit of Patriotism, aided by an irresistible fondness for exhibition, rendered the great Mr. H— incapable of persevering in deception. “What” exclaimed

he, "shall *Englishmen* harbour distrust of each other! perish the ignoble ideal—be the consequences what they may, I will no longer restrain myself from embracing my beloved country-men." At the conclusion of this heroic speech, "Suiting the action to the words" advancing theatrically, he grasped the hand of Ayres, and shook it, with such violence as if he meant to demonstrate the excess of his joy and confidence, by dislocating the shoulder of his newly acquired friend

The most unreserved intimacy, immediately took place between these congenial souls, and it is asserted that unable to keep any secret from his bosom confidant, H— was really so mad, (I may say, so cruel) as absolutely to acknowledge the ship to be English property I could not have believed that his folly and imprudence would carry him so far, thus much is, however, undoubtedly fact, that the man in the spectacles is constantly pointed out, as the author of every mischief which followed—It is surprising how often we find weakness and malignity united, or rather let us say, that providence has thus ordained it, for the benefit of mankind. Probably the former induced H— to injure the party to which he had attached himself—the latter undoubtedly led him to visit us, for he could not conceal his exultation at the circumstance of our accidental capture in the Vessel, seeming to involve us *exclusively* in her fate The unfeeling wretch availed himself of this to lay a scheme, that had it been adequately seconded, must have brought on our destruction

Ayres was first prevailed on by large presents, to dissuade the Governor from confining *them*, and that point gained, he pushed their interest forward thus, "These gentlemen" said he, "have no concern here of any kind, besides, as they are people of the highest consequence, their detention would bring half India on our back, so take my advice and let them go" "Well, but replies Sudder Khan,



it appeared, to condole with my prisoners? ” “ Oh keep them than to embrace this *Beelzebub*, “ the man is a stout fellow, quence, for which breaking in, will make a most excellent wonder, if he thousand his wife up the country, there feed subjects to expatriate he will soon be glad to enlist I warrant horse, the Orator of the other party Mr H— is a brother purpose, endeavour need not fear, but he will be happy enough offered to convey, indeed he owed as much to me privately, in raptures with his honour that no ill consequence could possibly which I him from the transaction;—the person in question at his less of sufficient importance for the English to recalcitrant him solemnly; especially as he came out without leave ” You will wonder how I came by all this information, have patience, you shall know in time <sup>19</sup>

The Governor heard this argument calmly, promised fair, and acted so far agreeably to his professions that, while we were closely confined and miserably situated, our worthy fellow passengers enjoyed full liberty to walk about, and amuse themselves as they pleased —This procedure could not fail to vex us excessively, though we were then ignorant of its real cause, and whenever we ventured to expostulate on our unreasonably harsh treatment with Ayres or any other, who chanced to call, the only answer we could obtain was, with a shrug of affected compassion, “ why did you stay on board! nothing can be done for you now, you must abide the event ” These insinuations created fears, that a distinction would really be made in our eventual disposal, as much to our disadvantage, as the present state of things, but we had no remedy—all avenues to relief were closed

I think I told you that, our watches were concealed in my hair, being secured with pins to prevent them from going, one of the pins however came out, at the very time I was set on shore Never shall I forget what a terrible sensation the ticking of the watch caused! I think had it

continued long, I must completely have lost my sense I feel I dared not remove it, from a fear of worse consequences, but happily it stopped of itself When we were fixed in our prison Mr Fay took these watches, (we had three you know) and all the money we had power to secure in chequins, which are of easy conveyance (about twenty-five pounds) and putting them into his glove, hid them in a snug place, as he thought, about the Verandah. The day after we were taken prisoners, a most dreadful hurricane of rain and wind came in, (it was the breaking up of the monsoon) and next morning we found to our extreme grief, that the place where Mr Fay had concealed our treasure, to which alone we could look for the means of escape, was entirely blown down, and no vestige of our little property remaining. Mr Fay was in despair from the first, but after he had told me, I searched diligently all round, but in vain At length it struck me, from the direction in which the wind blew, that if I could make my way into an inclosure, at the back of the house, it might possibly be found there The seapoys guarded the front, but there being only one door backwards, they seldom took the trouble of going round I did not tell Mr Fay of my scheme, as there was nothing he opposed so strongly, as the appearance of seeking to escape, but when he was completely absorbed in contemplating this new misfortune, I stole to the back door There was a large lock and key inside and to my surprize, when I had turned this, my passage was clear to the stairs, leading to the inclosure, and not a soul in sight The grass was excessively high and wet, but I struggled to make my way through it and waded about, determined at least not to leave an inch unexplored Imagine my joy, when in the midst of a deep tuft I found the old glove, with all its contents safe, and uninjured What a treasure it seemed! how many are there who never felt so much true delight on receiving a magnificent fortune, as we experienced in again

it appearing this sheet anchor of our hopes, thus unexpectedly restored.

But alas! the little unlooked for liberty I had regained, was too tempting *not* to be enjoyed again; and a day or two afterwards as I was walking about in the grass, I espied a seapoy coming round. I was not certain that he saw me, so I endeavoured to reach the house unobserved. At the moment I turned round to fasten the heavy door, he ran to it, pushing it against me, with such violence that the large key which had unfortunately a very long shank, was by this means struck directly against my right breast, and gave me the most excruciating pain. I fainted through excessive agony, and was with difficulty recovered. Much I fear the consequences of this accident will embitter my future life. Having no other nurse than my poor husband, who was not only ignorant of what ought to be done, but totally without the necessaries for any kind of emollient application,—my case was truly distressing; so that even Ayres who chanced to call, expressed some concern for me, and sent plenty of milk which I used as an embrocation with success. I believe he punished the seapoy for his insolence, but this could not repair the mischief.

At the very time when this painful variety took place in the cheerless monotony of our prison days, the cruel designers who had assisted in dooming us to this wretched abode, fell completely into the pit which they had digged for us.—The evening before Ayres Tulloh and Hare had called on us together, the former was (according to his *general* policy) endeavouring to discover whether we had any concealed property; on which I exclaimed “Captain Ayres how should we have any thing left, except the baggage in the vessel, which is of little value?” as the Arabs pillaged us to the utmost of their power, we were altogether a set of poor creatures when we came to Calicut; and you are well aware we have received nothing since.” “Answer for

yourself Mrs. Fay " cried Hare, " for my *own* part I feel happy in saying, that, I am *not* poor, I have property, *valuable* property and shall not shrink from avowing that I possess it " I marked the eye of Ayres during this bombastic speech, and have since found, that I was not deceived in its expression

Sudder Khan induced by this and other similar stories, which the passengers had told of their own consequence, determined to frighten them into the payment of a large sum of money Accordingly next morning (the 13th) he sent a large party of scapoys to the Danish Factory, who peremptorily demanded them as the Nabob's prisoners Mr Passavant at first refused, but on their threatening to fire into his house, was constrained to yield to this outrageous violation of the most sacred rights, and delivered his guests to slavery God forbid that I should, generally speaking, be capable of rejoicing in the miseries of my fellow creatures, even where they merit punishment, but I must own, (blame me if you will) that for a short time I *did* feel satisfaction in this stroke of retributive justice, in as far as regarded the Tullohs, and Hare, for the vile conduct of these people, and the malevolence of their dispositions, had steeled my heart against them

It was certainly a curious sight to behold them, after all their airs of superiority reduced to take up their residence with us, whose situation, while singular, was the object of their ridicule and contempt The scene was however now changed, although *they*, like many others in the world, were able to support their neighbour's misfortunes with stoical firmness, and even render them a source of amusement, each readily discovered when personally attacked by a similar calamity, that close imprisonment is by no means a proper subject on which to exercise wit, and that people when in distress are not precisely in the humour for relishing the pleasantry of others on their troubles Tulloh

fortunately understood Moors, which is the general language among the military throughout India;—by this means he got his trunks on shore the day after the seizure, and saved them from the violent storm, which came on next morning, wherein every one imagined the ship must have been wrecked. How we wished to see her drive on shore! especially when Sudder Khan the Governor who is Hyder's brother-in-law, was seen walking about in great perturbation on the beach anxiously watching the vessel, praying to Mahomet, and from time to time, casting up the sand towards Heaven with earnest invocation and entreaties, that she might be spared, as a present to the great Hyder; very probably fearing that some blame might attach to him in case she were lost.

As it happened, however, all things went wrong for us—The cabin and steerage where our trunks had been placed were soon filled with water, and every thing, such as books, wearing apparel, beds, with laces, buckles, rings &c was either stolen or totally spoiled. These latter I might have saved, when we were brought on shore, but unfortunately the trunk, which contained my clothes, was just *without* the cabin-door, and two of the wretches who watched us sat on it, so that I could not remove an article. This disaster left us nothing except our lives to be anxious about—why do I say anxious! since life itself on the terms we held it, was hardly worth preserving. The other passenger's baggage was injured but not like our's, for we, not being favorites, had been forced to keep *our* packages at hand, during the voyage, as we had no one to get them up when wanted, whereas the rest had theirs stowed away in the hold and consequently little damage befel them.

Many ships perished in this terrible hurricane. The *St Helena* which left Mocha a week after us, met with it, and suffered so much that she was forced to put into Cochin,

(a Danish settlement in Latitude 10) with the loss of her masts, and so greatly shattered besides, as to be compelled to undergo a thorough repair—If this happened to a fine new vessel, one of the best sailors in India, what must have become of us, had we continued five days longer at Sea?—badly found in all respects, and worse manned, not half people enough to work the ship properly, even in good weather, was not this another hairsbreadth escape think you, though by a dreadful alternative? The ways of providence are inscrutable! But to revert to my main subject,—glad shall I be when it is concluded, for I detest matter of fact *writing*, almost as much as matter of fact conversation—yet this story must be told in my own way, or not at all

When the gale ceased, the whole cargo was landed and deposited in the Governor's warehouses, where he caused the Gentlemen's baggage to be opened, and like a child pleased with gewgaws, every article which struck the eye, was instantly condemned as his booty. Poor Hare's trunks were stuffed with knickknacks like a Pedlar's box. Judge then what agonies he appeared in, when the fatal moment of examination approached, lest they should become, as might be expected, objects of desire to the Governor—Not a single tooth pick case, knife, or knee-buckle was produced, but what he declared had been received as a pledge of friendship from different relations, parents, brothers, sisters, male and female cousins, to the utmost verge of propinquity, all put in their claims with success. Tulloh serving as interpreter, until he was perfectly weary of the office, ashamed of pleading such trifling causes, and only deterred from throwing up his post, by the earnest entreaties of Hare, who continued stamping, exclaiming and fretting, as if his life depended on the issue. At last a small paper bundle fell into the searcher's hands, he then became outrageous. "For Heaven's sake, cried he my

*dear* friend, (almost breathless with apprehension) Oh for Heaven's sake endeavour to preserve *this* parcel for me; should it be taken I am an *undone man*, for I shall never be able to replace the contents; let them take my clothes, my Law books, *every* thing, except my music books—all that I can yield without a sigh." Tulloh imagining that the contents must be of immense value to him from his extreme agitation, earnestly interceded for the parcel, but obtained it with great difficulty, as curiosity and avarice were awakened by perceiving the convulsive eagerness with which the owner petitioned for it —The former was soon gratified and the latter consoled; for Hare tearing open the parcel discovered to the astonished spectators neither more, nor less, than an exquisite assortment of VENETIAN FIDDLE STRINGS!! But, ah! dire mischance! the remorseless waves, (which are neither respectors of persons or things) had pervaded this invaluable treasure and rendered it wholly useless; and to complete his misery the next thing that presented itself to the sad owner's eyes, was a most expensive and finely toned *Tenor violin*, purchased at Venice, and for which the precious strings were intended,—broken all to pieces! I leave you to form any ideas you may think proper on the subject of that extravagant sorrow, such a character was likely to exhibit—and pass on to matters more interesting

The general introductory letter which, as you may recollect, Mr Franco gave us at Leghorn, had remained in Mr F—'s pocket book from that time, 'till we reached Calcut We had been told that Isaac, the Jewish merchant, who agreed to freight the *Nathalia*, and received £700 as earnest on that account, was *immensely* rich, and had great credit with Government, of which he held several large contracts for building ships &c besides being a great favourite with Sudder Khan. Every one also, even Ayres, spoke highly of his general character. But our introduction

to Mr. Baldwin had been productive of, or at least connected with so many misfortunes, that my confidence was lost, and I dreaded making further applications, lest similar events should ensue. This was very foolish reasoning you will say, and I am ready to acknowledge it, the only excuse to be made is, that my mind was weakened by calamity. However after Tulloh and the rest of these people joined us, our situation became, if possible, still more distressing and we anxiously sought every practicable mode of relief. Mr. F— therefore petitioned the Governor for leave to go out under a guard, which being granted, he immediately delivered his letter to Isaac, who seemed highly gratified at hearing from Mr. Franco whom he had personally known at Constantinople, when they were both young men, *above sixty* years ago for Isaac is also considerably turned of eighty, and like him, enjoys full possession of his faculties, both bodily and mental, being equally remarkable for temperance and sobriety. Mr. F— could not speak to our strangely acquired friend except by an interpreter, so that no confidential conversation could take place. He was apparently touched with pity for our sufferings, especially on hearing how much I was afflicted with illness. My spirits were raised by the account my husband gave of his visit, and soon after his favourable report was confirmed, by my receiving a present brought to the Factory, by a servant, belonging to the benevolent Jew, and which in our situation was truly valuable, consisting of a catty of fine tea, a tea-pot, and a tea-kettle. Although these things were expressly sent to me, yet Mrs. Tulloh and her party seized the last mentioned article, and forcibly kept it, so that I was forced to make my tea, by boiling it in my tea-pot. Ah my dear sister, I was at this time ill enough to be laid up on a sick bed, and carefully nursed, yet was I thankful for such food as I should once have loathed, and I still continued to lie on my rattan couch, without a pillow or any covering



except my clothes, and surrounded by people whom my very heart sickened to behold.

I will here by way of relaxation transcribe a few passages from my Journal, as nothing happened for some time worthy of a particular recital; reserving to myself, however, the option of resuming the narrative style, whenever I shall deem it necessary.

14th November, 1779.

Mr. Fay was sent for, this morning, to the Governor, who asked him what he wanted? he replied, *Liberty*:—there was no observation made on this answer, nor can we conceive what Sudder Khan can mean by the detention of so many persons, who never bore arms. They gave Mr. Tulloh 30 rupees for our support. All we are able to procure is tough, lean, old beef, goat's flesh, and a not unpleasant rice cake, but too sweet to be palatable with meat; we preserve either with difficulty from our perpetual visitors the crows, having no cup-board or place to put our victuals in.—Of all existing creatures crows are surely the most voracious, and the most persevering—I have seen one with his eye fixed for a full half hour on a person, and the instant that person's eye was averted, pounce on the bread, or whatever had been prepared and bear away the prize. Mem.—Ayres is remarkably like these crows, he has exactly their *thievish* expression of countenance, and the form of his head resembles their's.

15th November, 1779.

The Gentlemen waited all day at the Governor's house, being promised their baggage, but he thought proper to disappoint them—received 10 rupees subsistence money.

18th November.

A most impudent message brought from the Governor, requiring all the gentlemen to enter into the Nabob's

service; which they unanimously refused, with every mark of contempt, and were in consequence ordered to be more closely confined—One of Mr Fay's trunks brought on shore containing wearing apparel, and law books, probably much damaged, yet certainly valuable to him, as he has *none* remaining. Made application for it but without success Tulloh received 20 rupees

*20th November*

Received notice to prepare immediately to set off for Seringapatam, a large City about three hundred miles distant, where Hyder Ally usually resides—How can I support this journey over the mountains!—Mr F— is about drawing up a petition, representing the bad state of my health, and entreating permission for me to proceed to Cochin We hope to prevail on Isaac to present it

*21st November*

Discover that the journey to Seringapatam was merely a vile plot of the Governor's to put us off our guard, and thereby gain possession of what property had hitherto been concealed, thank God this feint miscarried A letter reached us from Mr O'Donnell, stating the arrival of the St Helena at Cochin He laments our misfortune and promises to take such methods as shall compel the Nabob to do us speedy and effectual justice Heaven speed his endeavours, this life is horrible

*22nd November.*

The gentlemen waited five hours at the Governor's for their effects, but returned without them He takes evident satisfaction in seeing them like slaves attendant on his *nod*—Five ships supposed to be English passed in front of our prison. How peculiarly distressing did I feel this sight!

23rd November, 1779.

Mrs Tulloh being taken ill of a fever, application was made to the Governor for medicines; but this happening to be a high festival, he, like the Pharisees in Scripture, refused to profane it by doing good—Should the woman die in the interim what cares he?

24th November, 1779

This morning got some medicines from the ship's chest—many flying reports of hostilities having actually commenced between Hyder Ally, and the English—should this really prove true, our fate will be sealed *for life*. Little did I think when pleading the cause of the Chevalier de St Lubin at Mocha, that he had been raising a storm whose effects would so materially involve us Mem—The lady is well again.

28th November, 1779.

It is now certain that the Nayhirs<sup>20</sup> have laid siege to Tellicherry; a settlement of our's about a degree to the northward, seven miles nearer lies Mahey which the French held, 'till we took it from them in March last; but not finding it worth keeping, have since evacuated it, after dismantling the fortifications

29th November, 1779.

Sudder Khan is about to march a thousand troops into Mahey, under pretence of resuming it in the Nabob's name, but every one guesses this to be merely a feint to cover his real intentions of privately assisting the Nayhirs;—should they succeed in their attack, Hyder will then throw off the mask and declare war, but if the English conquer, he will disavow the whole affair.

30th November.

I have now a lamentable tale to relate We were this morning hurried away at a moments warning to the fort, crouded together in a horrid dark place scarcely twenty feet square, swarming with rats, and almost suffocating for want of air. Mr and Mrs. Tulloh secured a small room to themselves, but my husband and I, were obliged to pass the night among our companions in misery—rats continually gnawing the feet of my couch, whose perpetual squeaking would have prevented sleep, had our harrassing reflections permitted us to court its approach

1st December, 1779.

Luckily discovered a trap-door, which led to some rooms, or rather lofts, where no human foot had trod for many *many* years These had been the store rooms of Angria the Pirate,<sup>21</sup> and they certainly contain “a remnant of all things”—Broken chairs—tables—looking-glasses—books, even a spinnet was among, the articles, but beyond all repair, and vast quantities of broken bottles, which had been filled with liquors of all kinds but the rats in their gambols had made havoc among them. I remember when I should have shuddered at the thoughts of sleeping in such a wretched place, but now privacy gave it irresistible charms, so having with difficulty obtained leave to occupy it, we exerted every nerve to get a spot cleared out before dark, for my couch, likewise so to arrange some bolts of canvas which were among the spoils, as to form a sort of mattress for Mr F—, here we lay down, comparatively happy in the hope of enjoying a tolerable nights rest, my husband being provided with a long pole to keep off the rats, but surely never were poor mortals so completely disappointed and for my own part I may add, terrified—No sooner was the light extinguished, than we heard a fluttering noise,

attended at intervals with squeaking—by degrees it approached the *beds*, and we felt that several creatures were hovering over us, but of what description we were totally ignorant—sometimes their wings swept our faces, seeming to fly heavily—then again they would remove farther off, but still continued squeaking.—Good God! what horrors I felt Mr. F— protested that whole legions of evil spirits had taken possession of our apartment, and were determined to expel the intruders. The rats also acted their part in the Comedy, every now and then jumping towards the beds, as we could hear, however Mr F— on these occasions laid about him stoutly with his pole, and thus kept *them* at bay, but our winged adversaries were not so easily foiled,—they persisted in their assaults 'till day-break, when what should we find had caused all this disturbance, but a parcel of poor harmless bats! whose “ancient solitary reign we had molested” To any one accustomed to see or hear these creatures our terror must appear ridiculous, but to me who had never chanced to meet with any such, the idea never occurred, nor did even Mr. Fay suggest any probable or natural cause of alarm. We cannot help laughing very heartily at it ourselves now, and you are at full liberty to do the same.

*2d December*

Ayres called to tell us that two ships of the line, and a frigate had just passed towards Tellicherry—We shall soon hear news from thence, Oh! that it may change our hard destiny!—The Governor marched at the head of his troops towards Tellicherry

*10th December*

Application was made this morning to the Lieutenant Governor by Mr. Isaac, who I am now convinced is our true friend, representing that this air disagreeing with me I requested permission to remove to Cochin, and that my

husband, on account of my extreme ill health, might accompany me. He promised to consult Sudder Khan upon it. The Quellidar or Governor of the Fort, spent some time with us this morning,—he is a fine old man, with a long red beard, and has altogether a most interesting appearance—and here I may as well give a short description of this place.

Calicut then, is situated on the coast of Malabar in  $11^{\circ}$  north latitude and  $75^{\circ}$  east longitude<sup>22</sup>. It was formerly a very considerable town governed by a Zamorin, who also held the adjoining country, but has been some years in the possession of Hyder Ally, of whom you must have heard on occasion of his war with the English in 1770. They would certainly have put an end to the reign of this Usurper, had he not succeeded in the art<sup>23</sup> of influencing the principal persons in power, in consequence of which he obtained a peace, much more honourable and advantageous to himself than to those who granted it. Having acquired by his genius and intrepidity every thing that he enjoys, he makes his name both feared and respected, so that nobody chooses to quarrel with him. I have indeed heard a comparison drawn between him and the King of Prussia, though I think much to the disadvantage of the latter, as supposing their *natural* abilities to be equal,—the great Frederick ought *naturally* to surpass a man who can neither write nor read, which is the case with Hyder. The lawful Prince of the country of which he has usurped the Government is held by him in actual confinement, though with every outward shew of respect, by which means he prevents the people from rising, lest their legitimate sovereign should fall a sacrifice to his resentment.

The fort must have been formerly a strong place, but is now in a dilapidated state—the walls are very thick, and they mount guard regularly, which was one inducement for sending us here, as Ayres told the Governor it was

not worth while to keep a hundred seapoys watching us, when they were wanted elsewhere and that the fort was quite good enough for us to live in,—these arguments prevailed and here we were sent When I first arrived I was so extremely ill, as to be scarcely sensible of what passed for some hours, but I remember Hare burst into a violent flood of tears, declaring that we were all doomed to death by our removal to this wretched spot, which being completely surrounded by stagnant water, could not fail to produce some of those disorders so fatal to Europeans We have not however hitherto experienced any complaint The loft we sleep in is indeed disgusting beyond belief, and the Quelladar, I suppose at the suggestion of Ayres, has ordered the easier of the two ways of entrance, that discovered by Mr F— to be blocked up; so that there is no way left but by means of a ladder placed almost in a perpendicular direction —there is a rope by which to hold, or it would be impossible for any person to descend, but even with this assistance, I have great difficulty to reach the bottom

*11th December, 1779.*

Peremptorily ordered to make ready for a journey to Seringapatnam By the Governor's desire delivered an Inventory of our losses he promises full restitution, but has given no answer to my request. I am full of solicitude on this subject; but would submit to any thing rather than remain in this wretched place

*12th December, 1779*

Mr. F— waited twice on the Lieut. Governor but without effect What can he mean by thus trifling with us? is it merely a wanton exercise of power, or intended to hide some dark design? these perpetual surmises distract me Mem Tulloh received 144 rupees to pay *all* our debts but took especial care not to let us have a single rupee,

what wretches we are cast amongst my very soul rises at them

13th December, 1779

Mr F— was sent for by the Governor, who told him, that we might both have permission to go to Cochin whenever we thought proper, that he would furnish a boat and pay every incidental expence, besides making entire satisfaction for damages sustained,—Can all this good news be true? How suspicious I grow—what a change from being credulous—yet where is the wonder after being so frequently deceived?

14th December, 1779

Preparations are going on briskly all day with our fellow passengers, who are eager for their departure, as well they may—Every thing which was taken from them on shore, has been this day restored, but those left in the ship are irrecoverable, of course we benefit nothing by this restitution—Mr F— could not obtain our promised licence to-day—These delays, weigh down my spirits, and increase all my complaints—I have still much pain in my breast, Oh that I fear, will prove a fatal blow—I shall have a great loss in Mr Taylor

15th December, 1779

The Governor still withholding our licence under pretence of business, I advised Mr F— to insist on being *immediately* dispatched, or in case of refusal, by all means to declare himself ready to accompany the others, for I saw clearly that should they once leave us, it must then be entirely at this fellow's option, whether we went all or not, and who would not rather run the risk of even *dying* of fatigue on the journey, than hazard remaining at the mercy of such wretches! I dread, lest this should be part of the old plan of which I have since never heard, and had almost



forgotten it. It is much easier to practise against two individuals than a whole company.

16th December.

The Doolies (a kind of shabby Palanquin in which a person sits upright and is carried between two men) arrived this morning about ten. The gentlemen went to take leave, when Tulloh earnestly represented our case, to which the Governor replied, that he could not possibly attend to other matters till they were gone, but pledged his word that nothing should arise on his part to detain us a single hour afterwards; every one agreed with me how dangerous it was to trust such fallacious promises. On my knees I intreated Mr. F— to pursue the method I had before pointed out, but my advice was despised. At nine in the evening the party commenced their journey, having first stripped the place of provisions and every thing else, which having been bought out of the general purse we had an undoubted right to share. They even took my tea kettle, but luckily the man who had it in charge forgot it amidst the hurry of departure, by which means I recovered it. My heart sunk within me at seeing them quit the fort, not from motives of personal esteem or regret you may suppose, for it was impossible to grieve for the loss of some of the company; we parted with as much indifference as absolute strangers; after a fellowship in misfortune sufficient to have united almost any other society more closely than an intercourse of *years* under common circumstances. I went to bed, but in spite of every endeavour to calm the agitation of my mind, passed a *sleepless* night.

17th December.

Rose in extreme anxiety which was far from being diminished by a message from the Governor, ordering Mr. F— not to attend him 'till the evening; accordingly at four

o'clock he sat out, and as I felt extremely ill, the certain consequence of fretting and want of rest, I lay down and had just sunk into a doze, when my poor husband flew into the room like a madman, uttering a thousand extravagant expressions. Starting up in new and indescribable terror, and wringing my hands, I begged only to know what had happened. "Happened!" cried he "why we are betrayed, ruined, utterly undone, you must leave this place instantly, or you may be made a prisoner here for ever." Where are we to go? I very naturally asked! I *heard* not the answer, my head swam, and I dropped on the floor completely overpowered—Whatever happened at that *fearful* moment I forget and endeavour to banish from my mind, as the effect of insanity—How he accomplished it I know not, but Mr F— actually carried me in his arms down that almost perpendicular ladder which I have described and placed me on a kind of bier. I was in this manner conveyed to my former habitation—I opened my eyes and became for a few moments sensible of the motion, but soon fainted again, and did not recover 'till I found myself once more entering the English Factory as a prisoner.

I now inquired, what was the cause of this change in our abode. and learnt that Mr F— being refused leave to depart, had become so exasperated as wholly to lose all self-command, and rushing up to the musnud (throne) of the Lieutenant Governor had actually seized him, peremptorily insisting on the immediate fulfilment of his promise. Such conduct might have been expected to bring down *instant* destruction, but fortunately every one present was persuaded that grief and vexation had literally turned his brain, and they are not only much terrified at every species of madness, but from their religious prejudices, regard the sufferers under these complaints with a superstitious awe. Swayed by these mingled emotions the wicked Governor condescended to temporize with my husband, acknowledg-

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ing that he had no *power* to release us without the Nabob's order which in consideration of my ill health he would endeavour to procure, and to pacify him further, he permitted our return to this place, where we are certainly in every respect more comfortably situated But these concessions went little towards allaying that fever of passion, which his continual and cruel delays had excited thence arose the alarm I experienced and which for a time so materially affected my health.

*19th December, 1779*

Received five rupees subsistence money which we were informed were the last we should ever have I cannot conceive what they mean to do with us or what will be our fate at last.

*21st December, 1779.*

The Governor sent for Mr. F— to offer him a commission in the Nabob's service and on his absolute refusal, swore that he might subsist how he could, that his masters money should no longer be lavished on idlers, then in a rage ordered palanquins. "you shall go to Seringapatam" said he "they will soon teach you better manners there" Mr. F— joyfully acquiesced in this mandate,—we provided necessaries for our journey which was fixed for the 24th, but the other knew better than to keep his word, so this like all our former views, and expectations of liberty ends in smoke, shall I say?

*26th December, 1779.*

A very melancholy Christmas-day passed yesterday. My dear friends little imagined they were drinking the health of a poor prisoner, (for I know you did not forget us) neither were we forgotten here, if empty compliments can be styled remembrance All the Europeans and several

of the natives attended our Levée But alas! what relief can mere ceremonious visits afford to misfortune! say rather that *aided by recollection*, such shadowy comforts add *keenness* to afflictions sting I feel my mind insensibly raised whenever I attempt to expatiate on any subject which tends to revive the ideas of our separation Even now I tread forbidden ground, for your sakes as well as my own, let me hasten to escape by skipping over this dangerous season of Christmas. I therefore pass on.

10th January, 1780

The little money saved was nearly expended, and we must soon have been reduced to our last mite had not providence sent us relief from a quarter little dreamed of Mr F— wrote about a week ago to Mr Church, Governor of Tellicherry inclosing a memorial of our case, which he requested might be translated into the language of the country and proper methods used for its safe delivery to Hyder Ally himself This morning brought in reply, a most generous humane letter from Mr Church, which, after acknowledging himself honoured by our application, and promising his utmost concurrence in every measure we may think necessary, concludes thus “ my heart bleeds for your distresses, and those of Mrs F— she in particular must have suffered greatly I have taken the liberty to accompany this letter by an order for two hundred rupees to serve *present* occasions Any sum you may in future require a line to me shall always command it, as I know the difficulty of procuring remittances where you are Englishmen ought to feel for each other, we are not without our share of troubles *here*, and I verily believe Hyder is at the bottom of all ” Now pray does not this letter deserve more than I have said of it! just thus would my dear father have treated a distressed countryman—Methinks I see his benevolent heart venting itself in tears of sympathy at the

recital. Precious tears! why am I not permitted to mingle mine with them! for they will flow in spite of my endeavours to restrain their course.

11th January.

Having now money to bribe with, we began to think of attempting an escape; for besides the silence observed on the fate of our companions, though near a month has elapsed since their departure, we live in continual dread of being forced up the country and perhaps massacred there. Every one who leaves this place must first obtain permission from the Governor, but as these passes only mention generally *so many people* and are granted indiscriminately to whoever applies for them, provided they be not suspected persons, one may easily be procured under feigned pretences (it is a matter frequently done) A Friar belonging to the Portuguese convent, usually manages these affairs when properly instructed. This information we have from a Native Portuguese named Pereira, an officer in Hyder's service, with whom Mr. F— commenced an intimacy while we were in the Fort, and who is now quartered here at his special request. Tho' I must confess I cannot like this man, yet am I obliged to trust him The visits we receive from Ayres are terrible trials to one who loathes dissimulation as I do. This wretch has once or twice mentioned a cow that annoyed him by entering the little garden, or paddock, in which it appears his house is placed; this morning he entered the factory with his scymitar in his hand unsheathed, and bloody, and with an expression of diabolical joy informed me that he had just caught the animal entering and being armed had completely chined her. You cannot imagine said he, how *sweetly* the sword did the business; my very heart shuddered with horror and indignation, yet I dared not give vent to those feelings I doubt not he would murder me with as much pleasure as

he killed the cow with, and have no reason to suppose he would be punished for the act.

*12th January, 1780*

Some quarrel unknown to me has certainly taken place between Percira and Mr. F— the looks of the former alarm me, his dark scowling eye is frequently directed towards him, with an expression of dreadful import, yet he appears desirous of forwarding our escape—He has introduced us to father Ricardo, who engages to provide us all things for our departure to Cochin.

*13th January, 1780*

The priest breakfasted with us, and promised to set about the business without loss of time, he is to receive twenty rupees, on our setting off from hence, and twenty more on our arrival at Cochin or Tellichery, through the medium of Isaac, on whom the order from Mr Church was drawn, by which means we received it without suspicion.

*14th January, 1780*

A Licence or Passport is procured for us as two Frenchmen going to Mahey. We have paid twenty rupees boat-hire to a smuggler, these are commonly very courageous men, which is some comfort to me under Mr F—'s protection and his, I will endeavour to think myself secure His house is admirably situated for our purpose, close by the sea side, this is to be our place of rendezvous. The precise time is not yet fixed upon. the intervening hours how anxiously will they pass!

*15th January, 1780*

The boatman called to desire we would be at his house at six this evening,—gave him our little baggage (we had



been obliged to purchase many necessaries) and four rupees to buy provisions. When it grew dark, Mr. F— put on a sailor's dress and I equipped myself in a nankeen jacket—a pair of long striped trowsers—a man's night cap, and over that a *mighty* smart hat,—with a pair of Mr F—'s shoes tied on my feet, and a stick in my hand. In this dress Mr. F— declared that I was the very image of my dear father, which highly gratified me. I had tied the clothes we took off, in a handkerchief, with that in one hand and brandishing my stick in the other, I boldly sallied forth,—taking care, however, to secure a retreat in case of accidents, a most fortunate precaution as the event proved.—Father Ricardo met us at the smuggler's according to appointment and we paid him twenty rupees, and gave him security for the other twenty, when this was settled, nothing remained as we supposed, but to step into the boat,—when behold! news was brought that the sailors had made their escape no one knew whither! after waiting two hours in that dangerous situation to see if they would return, and raving in all the folly of angry disappointment against those who had misled me, we made a virtue of necessity and trudged back to our prison, where we luckily effected an entrance without exciting suspicion

17th January, 1780.

Had all arranged for our escape last night but so many people were about us, that we dared not make the attempt.

19th January, 1780.

Father Ricardo has once more arranged all things for to-night,—we must give more money, but that is no object. Once free and we shall doubtless find means of proceeding on our journey.

5th February, 1780

Every day has this wicked priest contrived some scheme, to amuse us with false hopes of escaping; every *night* have we lain down in the full persuasion that it was the last we should pass in confinement, and as constantly have we awoke to meet bitter disappointments—This continued alternation of hope and fear preys on my spirits and prevents me from gaining strength, but yesterday I received a *serious* shock from the behaviour of Pereira, and which excited more alarm than almost any circumstance that has occurred to me—I had long marked his hatred to Mr F— and dreaded his revenge—I was setting at work when he entered the room—naked from the middle—just as Mr. F— was going into the next room His strange appearance and the quick step with which he followed my husband caught my attention, and I perceived that he held a short dagger close under his arm, nearly all concealed by his handkerchief and the exigency of the moment gave me courage—I sprung between him and the door through which Mr F— had just passed, drawing it close and securing it to prevent his return, and then gently expostulated with P— on the oddness of his conduct and appearance, he slunk away, and I hope, will never trouble us again, especially as he has adopted another mode of revenge which may perhaps be equally effectual, though more slow in its operation He went to Ayres and informed him that we had endeavoured to escape, mentioning every particular of our scheme, and, as far as I can learn, telling the whole truth, but fortunately naming a different evening from the one on which our unsuccessful attempt really was made on which Ayres exclaimed, “ well Pereira you have made up a very fine story, but without a word of truth, for on the very night you mention, F— was setting with me over a bottle of wine, I’ll take my oath of that for it was my birth

night" this was true likewise, so we were saved for that time; but as Ayres knows that escape is in our heads he will, I fear, guard us with redoubled vigilance, and so far Pereira's design has taken effect

*6th February, 1780*

Mr. F— has completely detected the pious father Ricardo, and his worthy colleague the smuggler, and sorely against their will compelled them to refund his money all to about twenty three rupees, which they pretend has been disbursed We now discovered, that although our offers might tempt their avarice and lead them to deceive us, yet they dared not persevere in assisting our escape, as the consequence of detection would to them be inevitable death

*10th February, 1780*

At length I begin to cherish hopes of our speedy release, as Sudder Khan returned last night from Seringapatnam; but is encamped without the Town, waiting for a lucky day, till when he dares not enter his own house—So how long we may still be detained, Heaven knows—Mr. F— and our friend Isaac propose paying him a visit to-morrow.

*13th February, 1780*

They went out on Friday and again to-day, but have not yet been able to obtain an audience, and thus we may perhaps be led on a fortnight longer, by his ridiculous superstitions Mr Isaac, however, assures my husband, that from all he can learn it is really intended to release us, which makes me comparatively easy; yet it is impossible not to feel severely this delay, at such a critical period; for should Hyder commence hostilities against the English, whilst we remain in his power, not all Isaac's influence will be sufficient to extricate us from it, our doom must be sealed for life

*14th February.*

Our indefatigable advocate walked out with Mr F—(I should have mentioned that the distance is about three miles) but they were again disappointed, Sudder Khan being still closely shut up at his devotions, which are to continue two days longer at least —How very distressing to be kept in this horrible suspense! But our friend still comforts us with the assurance, that *all* will be well —He really behaves to me like a father, and as I have now acquired some knowledge of Portuguese, we are enabled to converse tolerably well I do not recollect having described his person, and will therefore endeavour to give you some, though a very inadequate idea of it

Isaac then is a fine venerable old man, about eighty-five with a long white beard, his complexion by no means dark, and his countenance benign yet majestic, I could look at him, till I almost fancied that he resembled exactly the Patriarch whose name he bears, were it not for his eye, which is still brilliant His family I find according to ancient custom in the East, consists of two wives, to whom I am to have an introduction

*15th February.*

Saw a letter to-day from Mr. Tulloh, to Mr Passavant the Danish Factor, dated 19th January, which mentions, that they were fifteen days on their journey to Seringapatam and twelve more confined in a shed, half starved to death, as no one was permitted to assist them except with the coarsest food in small quantities, at length the Nabob granted them an audience, when having listened to their complaint, he sent for Sudder Khan, to answer the charge “Three successive days” says Tulloh “we were all sent for, and confronted with him, when Hyder commanded him to make instant restitution, however, we have as yet received nothing except that yesterday on taking leave his

highness presented us with five hundred rupees for our journey to Madras, besides ordering Palanquins, carriages for our baggage, and every other convenience, likewise a guard of a hundred seapoys to conduct us into the English bounds I spoke to him for Mr. and Mrs. F— and obtained an order for their release also Whether the ship will be returned or not, *God Knows*, we are just going to set off.” Thus far Tulloh Now the man who brought this letter, saw them all go and remained at Seringapatam ten days afterward, without hearing further; so I hope we may conclude they are out of *their* troubles. Mrs Tulloh has now seen enough poor woman to satisfy her taste for adventures. From all I can learn, it would have been utterly impossible for me to have supported the various hardships of their journey, in my precarious state of health; poor Mr Taylor how sincerely do I pity him.

17th February, 1780.

Mr. Isaac called by appointment about two o'clock and took my husband with him, to wait *once more* on the Governor. He seems to entertain no doubt of bringing back the order for our release. I endeavour to be calm and to rest with confidence on his assurance; but when I contemplate the dreadful alternative, should he meet a peremptory refusal, and recollect the deep machinations that have been practised to keep us here, my heart recoils at the idea. It is now eight in the evening, every thing is packed up and ready for our departure yet they return not Some obstacle I fear must have been thrown in the way by that vile Sudder Khan to prevent our liberation, and we are destined to remain his wretched prisoners. How shall I support the intelligence? Heaven inspire me with fortitude! I can neither write, nor attend to any thing!

## LETTER XIII.

COCHIN, 19th February, 1780

THANKS be to Providence that I am at length permitted to address my beloved friends from this land of liberty towards which my wishes have so long pointed. After wading through my melancholy journal, you will be enabled in some measure to form an idea of the joy that fills my breast on contemplating the contrast between my present situation, and that from which I have so recently escaped—I will not however indulge in reflections, but hasten to proceed with my narrative, which broke off at a most interesting period in my last letter, when I was every instant expecting the news of our release

I was not relieved from suspense till near twelve on Thursday night, when the gentlemen returned bringing with them the so anxiously desired passports for ourselves, and such trifling articles as remained in our possession, more than this I find they could not obtain for us, though absolute promises of restitution and remuneration had been frequently held out. This however seemed a slight evil compared with what even *one* days detention might produce, we therefore abandoned all thought of farther application on the subject, and on *Friday* 18th February, at 5 A.M. joyfully quitted our detested prison, and repaired to the house of our steady friend and benefactor Isaac, when we found one of his own sloops prepared to convey us to Cochin, with every necessary refreshment on board

Thus by the indefatigable exertions of this most excellent

man, we are at last released from a situation of which it is impossible for you to appreciate the horrors. To him we are indebted for the inestimable gift of liberty. No words can I find adequate to the expression of my gratitude. In whatever part of the world and under whatever circumstances my lot may be cast, whether we shall have the happiness to reach in safety the place to which all our hopes and wishes tend, or are doomed to experience again the anxieties and sufferings of captivity; whether I shall pass the remainder of my days in the sunshine of prosperity, or exposed to the chilling blasts of adversity; the name of *Isaac the Jew* will ever be associated with the happiest recollections of my life, and while my heart continues to beat, and warm blood animates my mortal frame, no distance of time or space can efface from my mind, the grateful remembrance of what we owe to this most worthy of men. When we were plundered and held in bondage by the Mahometan robbers amongst whom we had fallen; when there was no sympathizing friend to soothe us among our Christian fellow captives, when there was no hand to help us, and the last ray of hope gradually forsook the darkening scene of our distress; kind Providence sent a good Samaritan to our relief in the person of this benevolent Jew, who proved himself an Israelite indeed. Oh my dear sister! how can I in the overflowing of a grateful heart do otherwise than lament, that the name of this once distinguished people should have become a term of reproach! Exiled from the land promised to the seed of Abraham; scattered over the face of the earth, yet adhering with firmness to the religion of their fathers, this race once the boasted favourites of Heaven, are despised and rejected by every nation in the world. The land that affords shelter, denies them a participation in the rights of citizenship. Under such circumstances of mortifying contempt, and invidious segregation, it is no wonder that many of the children of





it, in more respects than one; we were entertained with all the profusion that wealth can command, and generosity display. Though religious prejudices banished us from *their* table, ours was loaded with every delicacy,—all served on massive plate; among many other articles of luxury which I had never seen before, were numbers of solid silver *Peekdanees*, which served the purpose of spitting boxes (excuse the term.) They stood at each end of the couches in the principal room. some of them were nearly three feet high, with broad bottoms; the middle of the tube twisted and open at the top, with a wide mouth, for the convenience of such as had occasion to expectorate. These are not what *we* should call delicate indulgences in England; but in a country where smoking tobacco and chewing betel are universally practised, they must be allowed to be necessary ones.

You will judge what a change these apartments were to me when contrasted, not with our prison in the Fort of Calicut, for our residence there was undoubtedly the *acme* of wretchedness, but even with the house in which I had so long lived, without any furniture at all, save my unmattressed couch, an old table and three broken chairs; and where many a time the poor Portuguese lad who served us, had entered at the hour of dinner empty handed, exclaiming that the dogs had carried off all that had been provided. My own face I never saw during the whole period, there not being so much as the fragment of a looking-glass to be obtained.

The younger wife of ISAAC attached herself to me in such a manner as I never before experienced, and really appeared as if she could not bear to part with me, even when I went with my husband to see the town of Cochin, which is truly a very pretty romantic place; but what was far more to my satisfaction, we luckily found Mr. Moore there, who proposed sailing the next day, and kindly offered us

a passage on the St Helena, which you may be sure we gratefully accepted. On our way back we were accosted by a Captain Richardson, whose ship is under repair here, and will be ready in about six weeks. He shook hands with us as country folks, and directly offered us both a passage to Bengal with every accommodation in his house during our stay here,—a most liberal proposal, was it not? and which would have been very fortunate for us, had we missed the St Helena, in the present case his offer was of course declined, but I shall ever recollect the kindness which dictated it, and trust opportunities will be afforded to evince my gratitude.

On the 21st, at 5 A M Mr F— left me with my new friends, promising to return for me in half an hour, to the great grief of the fair Jewess who was become so fond of me—but alas! I waited hour after hour, and no husband returned. I was in the greatest anxiety and consternation imaginable, dreading lest some new disaster had overtaken us, and that our ill starred journey was again stopped short in its course—It is impossible for you to conceive what I suffered during his absence and how my mind was harrassed by various tormenting conjectures,—those only, who have been subject to such cross accidents as I have so frequently experienced, can judge of my feelings—At length about noon he made his appearance, and very calmly began unpacking the chest as if to replace the things at his leisure—I asked of course what had occurred and if Mr Moore had changed his intention? “Why, answered he, Moore and all the rest are gone on board, but somehow I dont think he will sail to-day for all that” This reply almost bereft me of my senses, knowing the consequence of being left behind would be a journey by land to Madras, (for he would never have had patience to wait till Captain Richardson’s ship was ready) the expense of which alone must amount to eight or nine hundred rupees, not to mention the

intolerable fatigue of travelling in this Country. Aware that if I did not exert myself all was lost, I took a hasty leave of our kind friends, and we immediately proceeded to Cochin with our little baggage, and sent out for a boat, but by this time the afternoon breeze had set in and the sea ran so high, that none would venture over the Bar; at last a man agreed to provide a large boat and take us off for sixteen rupees. When we came to the water side, what should this mighty boat prove, but a narrow Canoe with paddles, scarcely big enough to contain us and our four rowers. I hesitated—the people ran round me on all sides, intreating me not to venture, and assuring us both by words and gestures that the danger was imminent. Captain Richardson who was among them declared that, it would be next to a miracle if we escaped: indeed every moment evidently increased the risk; but Mr. F— now seeing the error of his delay, swore to run all hazards, rather than stop any longer at Cochin: a common practice with most people who have brought themselves into difficulties by their imprudence and who seek to regain by obstinacy, what they have lost through folly. Pity such cannot always suffer alone. Finding him positive I commended myself to the protection of the Almighty and stepped in; all the spectators seeming to look upon me as a *self* devoted victim: yet how was it possible to avoid going! had I refused Mr. F— would constantly have upbraided me with whatever ill consequence might have resulted from the delay, and who could wish for life on such terms! “No” thought I at the moment, “rather let me brave death in the line of my duty, than have my future days embittered by reproach, however unmerited.” As we proceeded the waves gradually rose higher, and began to break over us: one man was continually employed in baling out the water, though his only utensil was a bamboo, which hardly held a quart. Never shall I forget what I felt on looking round in this situation; every wave rising

many feet higher than the boat, and threatening to overwhelm us with instant destruction. I sat at first with my face to the stern, but afterwards moved to the front, and when I saw a wave coming, bowed my head to receive it. We were a mile from the shore, and at least *two* from the ship, was not this sufficient to appal the stoutest heart! yet I can truly say that my mind was perfectly composed, conscious of the rectitude of my intentions,—I could look up boldly to Heaven for protection Mr F— will tell you how frequently I begged him not to entertain the least doubt of our safety “We have never” said I, “been conducted thus far by the hand of Providence to perish, remember my dear parents, is not *their* happiness involved in *our* safety? depend upon it we shall be preserved to become the humble instruments of rendering their declining years happy ”

While I was speaking a tremendous wave broke over us, and half filled the boat with water, on which, thinking it would be presumptuous to proceed, we ordered the men to make for the nearest land, but this the wind would not permit, so we were obliged to keep on, and had reached within a mile of the ship, when she began to spread her sails, and in a few minutes got under weigh with a fair wind — Our people now wanted to quit the pursuit, as she gained ground considerably, but we kept them in good humour by promising more money, and putting a white handkerchief on a stick, waved it in the air After some time we had the pleasure to see her tack about and lye to so in another half hour we came up with her, having been three hours in the condition I have described,—wet through and nearly frightened to death, being every moment in the most imminent danger To describe my joy is impossible or my impatience to quit the boat, without waiting for the chair to be lowered I scrambled on board, and had I not been relieved by a violent burst of tears, must have fainted.

Every one in the vessel blamed Mr. F— exceedingly for running such a risk by his delay as the other passengers who went on board in the morning, did not experience the slightest inconvenience. Mr. Moore luckily came in the provision boat, which was six hours in getting on board. This circumstance was the means of saving our passage

When we reached Ceylon the wind became contrary, which together with a strong current, kept us upwards of three weeks beating off the Island, before we could weather Point de Galle. This will account to you for my letter being scarcely legible.—I am at this moment writing on my knees in bed, and if I had not been contented with this method all the way, I could not have written at all. My father well knows, a vessel has not a very agreeable motion, when beating up in the winds eye

4th April, 1780.

At length thank Heaven! we are at anchor in Madras Roads, having been six weeks making a passage that with a fair wind we could almost have performed in as many days. Happily for me our society has been very different from the last I was condemned to mix with on shipboard,—of those Mr. Moore, and Mr. O'Donnell are of the most importance to us, our acquaintance with them commenced in Egypt, and as they were indeed (though innocently) the cause of all we suffered there, a very agreeable fellow-feeling has naturally taken place between us. The latter is now obliged to return to India to begin life again, (his losses on the Desert having been followed by many unavoidable expenses, as you will learn from my narrative), and seek a competence under all the disadvantages that an injured constitution added to a deep sense of disappointment and injustice, subject him to.—You may be sure we have had many conversations concerning the sad story of the Desert,

and the last moments of those who perished there —A boat is just come to take us on shore, so adieu for the present. The Roads are very full, there are eight ships of the line and above sixty other vessels, which form a magnificent spectacle

6th April, 1780.

I was exceedingly alarmed yesterday by the surf We got safe over it, but another boat upset just afterwards, however, fortunately no lives were lost —Sir Thomas Rumbold is hourly expected to embark, which is all that detains the fleet, so that perhaps I may not be able to write ten lines more—

6 P M As far as I can judge I feel pleased with Madras, and gratified by the reception I have hitherto met with. I shall of course write to you again from thence, being likely to remain here a week or two, at present I must close my letter, but as a matter of curiosity shall just mention the astonishing celerity of the Indian tailors —Yesterday evening Mr Fay, not being *overstocked* with clothes to appear in, ordered a complete suit of black silk, with waistcoat sleeves, which they brought home *before nine* this morning, very neatly made though the whole must have been done by candle-light

I cannot conclude without saying, that although I feel rather weak, my health is improving, and that the pain I suffer from the accident *which* befel me at the Factory, is not so violent as formerly—God grant I may soon be relieved from apprehension on *that* score

The Governor is gone on board —Captain Richardson of the *Ganges* under whose especial charge this packet (containing the whole of my narrative from Mocha) will be placed, as I had no safe opportunity of forwarding any letter from Calicut or Cochin, has sent for it The perusal will cost you many tears but recollect that all is *over*,

and my future communications will I trust, be of a very different complexion May this reach you safely and meet you all well and comfortable Adieu—God Almighty preserve you prays your own,

E.F.

## LETTER XIV.

MADRAS, 13<sup>th</sup> April

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

Agreably to my promise I take up the pen to give you some account of this settlement, which has proved to me a pleasant resting-place after the many hardships and distresses it has lately been my lot to encounter, and where in the kind attentions and agreeable society of some of my own sex, I have found myself soothed and consoled for the long want of that comfort, while my health has in general reaped great advantages from the same source

There is something uncommonly striking and grand in this town, and its whole appearance charms you from novelty, as well as beauty. Many of the houses and public buildings are very extensive and elegant—they are covered with a sort of shell-lime which takes a polish like marble, and produces a wonderful effect—I could have fancied myself transported into Italy, so magnificently are they decorated, yet with the utmost taste. People here say that the *chunam* as it is called, loses its properties when transported to Bengal, where the dampness of the atmosphere, prevents it from receiving that exquisite polish so much admired by all who visit Madras. This may very likely be the case

The free exercise of all religions being allowed, the different sects seem to vie with each other in ornamenting their places of worship, which are in general well built, and from their great variety, and novel forms afford much



gratification, particularly when viewed from the country, as the beautiful groups of trees intermingle their tall forms and majestic foliage, with the white chunam and rising spires, communicating such harmony softness and elegance to the scene, as to be altogether delightful; and rather resembling the images that float on the imagination after reading fairy tales, or the Arabian nights entertainment, than any thing in real life; in fact Madras is what I conceived Grand Cairo to be, before I was so unlucky as to be undeceived. This idea is still further heightened by the intermixture of inhabitants, by seeing Asiatic splendour, combined with European taste exhibited around you on every side, under the forms of flowing drapery, stately palanquins, elegant carriages, innumerable servants, and all the pomp and circumstance of luxurious ease, and unbounded wealth. It is true this glittering surface is here, and there tinged with the sombre hue that more or less colours every condition of life, —you behold Europeans, languishing under various complaints which they call incidental to the climate, an assertion it would ill become a stranger like myself to controvert, but respecting which I am a little sceptical, because I see very plainly that the same mode of living, would produce the same effects, even “in the hardy regions of the North.” You may likewise perceive that human nature has its faults and follies every where, and that *black* rogues are to the full as common as white ones, but in my opinion more impudent. On your arrival you are pestered with Dubashees, and servants of all kinds who crouch to you as if they were already your slaves, but who will cheat you in every possible way, though in fact there is no living without one of the former to manage your affairs as a kind of steward, and you may deem yourself very fortunate if you procure one in this land of pillagers, who will let nobody cheat you but himself. I wish these people would not vex one by their tricks, for there is something in the mild counte-

nances and gentle manners of the Hindoos that interests me exceedingly.

We are at present with Mr and Mrs. Popham from whom we have received every possible civility. He is a brother lawyer, and a countryman of my husbands, and she is a lively woman, her spirits have in some measure restored mine to the standard from which those amiable gentlemen, the Beys of Egypt, and Sudder Khan with his condutors Ayres and my worthy ship mates, had so cruelly chased them

We have made several excursions in the neighbourhood of Madras which is every where delightful, the whole vicinity being ornamented with gentlemen's houses built in a shewy style of architecture, and covered with that beautiful chunam. As they are almost surrounded by trees, when you see one of these superb dwellings incompassed by a grove, a distant view of Madras with the sea and shipping, so disposed as to form a perfect landscape, it is beyond comparison the most charming picture I ever beheld or could have imagined. Wonder not at my enthusiasm, so long shut up from every pleasing object, it is natural that my feelings should be powerfully excited when such are presented to me

Nothing is more terrible at Madras than the surf which as I hinted before, is not only alarming but dangerous. They have here two kinds of boats to guard against this great evil, but yet, notwithstanding every care, many lives are lost. One of these conveyances called the Massulah boat, is large, but remarkably light, and the planks of which it is constructed are actually sewed together by the fibres of the Cocoa-nut. It is well calculated to stem the violence of the surf but for greater safety it requires to be attended by the other, called a Catamaran, which is merely composed of bamboos fastened together and paddled by one man. Two or three of these attend the Massulah boat, and in case

of its being overset usually pick up the drowning passengers. The dexterity with which they manage these things is inconceivable,—but no dexterity can entirely ward off the danger. The beach is remarkably fine.

The ladies here are very fashionable I assure you I found several novelties in dress since I quitted England, which a good deal surprised me, as I had no idea that fashions travelled so fast. It is customary to take the air in carriages every evening in the environs of Madras: for excursions in the country these are commonly used, but in town they have Palanquins carried by four bearers, which I prefer. They are often beautifully ornamented, and appear in character with the country, and with the languid air of those who use them, which, though very different from any thing I have been accustomed to admire in a woman as you well know, yet is not displeasing in a country the charms of which are heightened by exhibiting a view of society entirely new to me.

MR POPHAM is one of the most eccentric beings I ever met with.—Poor man he is a perpetual projector, a race whose exertions have frequently benefitted society, but seldom I believe been productive of much advantage to themselves or their families. He is at present laying plans for building what is called the black town, to a great extent, and confidently expects to realize an immense fortune, but others foresee such difficulties in the way, that they fear he may be ruined by the undertaking. The pleasure he takes in his visionary scheme should not be omitted in the account as of some value, for it really seems to be an uncommon source of enjoyment <sup>23</sup>

The Black town is that part of Madras, which was formerly inhabited wholly by the natives, but of late many Europeans have taken houses there, rents being considerably lower than in Fort St GEORGE, which is a very strong Garrison, built by the English, and where since have been

constructed many fine houses, &c.—this is considered of course a more fashionable place to reside in. Between the Black town and the Fort, lies Choultry Plain which being covered entirely with a whitish sand, reflects such a dazzling light, and intolerable heat, as to render it a terrible annoyance especially to strangers. MR. FAY has been exceedingly pressed to take up his abode here, and really many substantial inducements have been held out to him, but as his views have been all directed to Calcutta, where knowledge and talents are most likely to meet encouragement he cannot be persuaded to remain. Besides, a capital objection is, that no Supreme Court being as yet established he could be only admitted to practise as an attorney, no advocates being allowed in the Mayors Court so that his rank as a Barrister would avail nothing here. I most cordially acquiesce in this determination. But I must suspend my scribbling, MR P— is waiting to take me to ST THOMAS'S MOUNT

*17th April, 1780*

I resume my pen, resolved to devote this day to my dear friends, as it is likely to be the last I shall spend in Madras. I found ST THOMAS' MOUNT a very beautiful place, it is a high hill of a conical form, crowned at the top with white houses, and a Church built by the Portuguese in memory of some ST THOMAS, who they say, was murdered on this spot by a Brahmin—The road to this place is delightful, being a complete avenue of the finest trees I ever saw, whose intermingling branches are absolutely impervious to the sun. Not far from hence I was shewn a prodigiously fine Banian tree, the singular nature of which is, that its branches bend down to the ground, take root and thence spring out anew, thus forming innumerable arches. I call it a vegetable Cathedral, and could not help fancying that Banian groves were formerly appropriated to

idolatrous worship, since they are admirably calculated for the celebration of any mysterious and solemn rites from which the uninitiated are excluded: and may be properly called "Temples not made with hands." On the whole I felt highly gratified by my little excursion, which was, I believe, not more than seven miles from Madras.<sup>4</sup>

I must now assure you that I have actually seen several of those things with my own eyes which we girls used to think poor Captain S—— took traveller's liberty in relating, such as dancing snakes, jugglers swallowing swords &c. The snakes were to me somewhat alarming, the other a very disgusting spectacle; when they are become familiar I may be amused with the one, since the various forms, the prismatic colours, and graceful motions of the snakes may give pleasure which the other exhibitions never can. When you have seen a man thrust a sword down his throat and are fully convinced that there is no deception, you feel that you have beheld a wonder, and there the gratification ends, for the sight is unnatural and disgusting. With some other tricks of the juggler, I was however much pleased: his power of balancing was astonishing, and he had a method of throwing four brass balls up and catching them with such amazing rapidity, that they perpetually encircled his head, forming a kind of hat around it: he likewise threaded small beads with his tongue, and performed a number of very curious sleights of hand. Dancing girls are a constant source of amusement here, but I was much disappointed in them, they wrap such a quantity of muslin round them by way of petticoat, that they almost appear to have hoops;—and their motions are so slow, formal and little varied, that you see the whole dance as it were at once; they are very inferior to those of the same profession at Grand Cairo though I never saw any there but in the streets, however their dancing is certainly less indecent at least so far as I could witness it.

There seems to be a strange inconsistency in the character of the natives, they appear the most pusillanimous creatures in existence, except those employed on the water, whose activity and exertions are inconceivable. They will encounter every danger for the sake of reward, with all the eagerness of avarice, and all the heroism of courage, so that if you have occasion to send off a note to a ship, no matter how high the surf may run, you will always find some one ready to convey it for you, and generally without being damaged, as their turbans are curiously folded with waxed cloth for that purpose, so off they skip to their Catamarans,—for the prospect of gain renders them as brisk as the most lively Europeans.

The Hindoos have generally their heads shaved but they preserve a single lock and a pair of small whiskers with the greatest care. Their manner of writing is curious, they write with iron needles, on palm-leaves which are afterwards strung together and form books. Boys are taught to write on the sand, a very good plan as it saves materials and a number can be instructed at the same time. For teaching arithmetic, great numbers of pebbles are used, so that every part of the apparatus is cheap.

The natives of India are immoderately fond of an intoxicating liquor called *Toddy* which is the unfermented juice of the Cocoa-nut or Palmyra tree,—sugar and water is also a favourite beverage. Butter is very scarce and not good; what they call *Ghee* is butter boiled or clarified, in order to preserve it, and is very useful for many purposes, such as frying &c. On the whole one may live very well at Madras,—to me it appears a land of luxury as you may suppose, when you recollect, how I had been accustomed to fare. We may think ourselves very well off in escaping from the paws of that fell tyger Hyder Ally as we did, for I am assured that the threat of sending us up the country to be fed on dry rice, was not likely to be a vain one, it

is thought that several of our countrymen are at this very time suffering in that way. if so, I heartily wish that the War he has provoked, may go forward 'till those unhappy beings are released and the usurping tyrant is effectually humbled

MR. O'DONNELL has just called and desired me to prepare for an early summons to-morrow. I have ever found him friendly and attentive and must always deem myself highly obliged to him, as he certainly had but too much occasion to feel hurt by the behaviour of MR FAY, whose temper, you know, is not the most placid in the world. He quarrelled with both him and MR MOORE during the passage about the *merest* trifles (wherein too he was palpably in the wrong) and challenged them both. Judge what I must have suffered during these altercations, vainly endeavouring to conciliate, and in agonies lest things should proceed to extremities—On our arrival here, I prevailed on MR POPHAM to act as a mediator between the parties, who at length, though with great difficulty, convinced MR. F— that he had been to blame, and induced him to make a proper apology to both gentlemen. thus ended the affair but I have reason to think, that had I not been with him, he would not have been invited to proceed farther on the ship; nor am I free from apprehension at present, yet MR O'D— has proved himself so true a friend and has so materially served my husband, that I trust our short trip from hence to Calcutta, will prove a pleasant one. I understand that several additional passengers are to join us, which may operate as a check on *fiery spirits*.

18th April.

MR. & MRS. P— have completed their hospitable kindness by insisting that we should partake of an *early* dinner (at one o'clock) after which we immediately proceed on board; and heartily rejoiced shall I be, when once over

the terrific surf I leave Madras with some regret having met with much civility and even sympathy here I must now bid you adieu, in my next I hope to announce that my long pilgrimage is ended I likewise shall expect to find letters from you, waiting my arrival at Calcutta My anxiety at times arises to impatience, lest any evil should have befallen you, during the long period in which all communication has been suspended between us my heart however yet retains its power of conversing with you Whenever I see any thing new or entertaining I directly imagine how *you* would have looked, and what *you* would have said on the occasion, and thus cheat myself into a pleasing dream of social intercourse with those most dear to me.

Our stay at Madras has been the means of procuring us some respectable recommendations to persons in Calcutta, for we have made several desirable connections here Hope again smiles on us and I endeavour to cherish her suggestions, for it is as much my *duty* as my *interest* to keep up my spirits, since in my present state of health, without them, I must wholly sink, and now more than ever I feel the necessity of using exertion

The hot winds prevail here at present, which renders the *weather* peculiarly oppressive, but a few hours will change the scene Adieu remember me in your prayers, my beloved parents, my dear sisters, and rest assured of the unalterable affection of your own

ELIZA



## LETTER XV.

CALCUTTA, 22<sup>nd</sup> May.

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

I may now indeed call for your congratulations since after an eventful period of twelve months and eighteen days, I have at length reached the place for which I have so long sighed, to which I have looked with innumerable hopes and fears, and where I have long rested my most rational expectations of future prosperity and comfort. I must now in order to keep up the connection of my story return to Madras, and from thence conduct you here regularly.

MR F— and MR POPHAM both assured me that a massulah boat was engaged, but on arriving at the beach none could be had, so there being no remedy, I went off in a common cargo boat which had no accommodations whatever for passengers, and where my only seat was one of the cross beams. How I saved myself from falling Heaven knows, MR F— was under the necessity of exerting his whole strength to keep me up, so he suffered *a little* for his negligence. It was what is called a black surf and deemed very dangerous; there were some moments when I really thought we were nearly gone, for how could I in my weak state have buffeted the waves had the boat overset? When once on board our voyage passed comfortably enough, our society was pleasant; indeed MR O'DONNELL is ever a host to us in kindness, MR MOORE our supercargo was however more strict in his enforcement

of rules than was agreeable to most of us, we were kept more orderly than so many children at school, for if we were in the midst of a rubber at whist, he would make us give over at nine precisely, and we were obliged to keep our score 'till the following evening. But this was of little moment, for as we advanced towards the place of our destination, we were too much interested to think of any thing else. We had a distant view of the pagodas of *Jaggernaut*,—three large pyramidal buildings very famous temples among the Hindoos, who there worship the images of *Jaggernaut* and keep a splendid establishment of the Priesthood attendant on the Idols in the manner of the ancient heathens. I am credibly assured that at stated intervals the principal figure is taken out in an enormous car, with a great number of wheels beneath which his votaries prostrate themselves with the most undaunted resolution, firmly persuaded that by thus sacrificing their lives, they shall pass immediately after death into a state of everlasting felicity. Well may we say that, "life and immortality were brought to light by the Gospel" since in regions where its sacred influence is unknown or unattended to, we see such gross acts of folly and superstition as these, sanctioned by authority. may it please the Almighty disposer of events to hasten the period of their emancipation, that all mankind may hail each other as brothers, and we may be brought together as "one fold, under one shepherd."

Calcutta, you know is on the Hoogly, a branch of the Ganges, and as you enter Garden-reach which extends about nine miles below the town, the most interesting views that can possibly be imagined greet the eye. The banks of the river are as one may say absolutely studded with elegant mansions, called here as at Madras, garden-houses. These houses are surrounded by groves and lawns, which descend to the waters edge, and present a constant succession of whatever can delight the eye, or bespeak wealth

and elegance in the owners. The noble appearance of the river also, which is much wider than the Thames at London bridge, together with the amazing variety of vessels continually passing on its surface, add to the beauty of the scene. Some of these are so whimsically constructed as to charm by their novelty. I was much pleased with the snake boat in particular. Budgerows somewhat resembling our city barges, are very common,—many of these are spacious enough to accommodate a large family. Besides these the different kinds of pleasure boats intermixed with mercantile vessels, and ships of war, render the whole a magnificent and beautiful moving picture, at once exhilarating the heart, and charming the senses. for every object of sight is viewed through a medium that heightens its attraction in this brilliant climate

The town of Calcutta reaches along the eastern bank of the Hoogly, as you come up past Fort William and the Esplanade it has a beautiful appearance. Esplanade-row, as it is called, which fronts the Fort, seems to be composed of palaces, the whole range, except what is taken up by the Government and Council houses, is occupied by the principal gentlemen in the settlement—no person being allowed to reside in Fort William, but such as are attached to the Army, gives it greatly the advantage over Fort St. GEORGE, which is so incumbered with buildings of one kind or other, that it has more the look of a town than of a military Garrison. *Our* Fort is also so well kept and every thing in such excellent order, that it is quite a curiosity to see it—all the slopes, banks, and ramparts, are covered with the richest verdure, which completes the enchantment of the scene. Indeed the general aspect of the country is astonishing, notwithstanding the extreme heat (the thermometer seldom standing below ninety in the afternoon) I never saw a more vivid green than adorns the surrounding fields—not that parched miserable look our lands have

during the summer heats,—large fissures opening in the earth, as if all vegetation were suspended; in fact the copious dews which fall at night, restore moisture to the ground, and cause a short thick grass to spring up, which makes the finest food imaginable for the cattle Bengal mutton, always good, is at this period excellent—I must not forget to tell you that there is a very good race ground at a short distance from Calcutta, which is a place of fashionable resort, for morning and evening airings

Through Mr O'Donnell's kindness we were introduced to a very respectable Portuguese family who received us with the greatest civility, inviting us to take up our abode with them until we could provide ourselves with a house—Mr Da C— was a widower, but his late wife's sisters, who resided with him, were born at Chandernagore, (a French settlement between twenty and thirty miles higher up the river,) but from long disuse they had lost the habit of *speaking* their native language, though they *understood* it perfectly, so I was forced to make out their Portuguese in the best manner I could, constantly answering in French In this way we frequently conversed, and I gained much information respecting the customs of the place—the price of provisions, and many other useful matters

Fortunately, throughout all our difficulties we had preserved our letters of introduction, by keeping them always concealed about us, together with Mr F—'s admission to the Bar and other credentials, which were essentially necessary to his establishment here so that my husband became immediately known to Sir Robert Chambers, who behaved to him with the utmost attention, and whose lady after hearing a little of my melancholy story, and finding I was too much indisposed to admit of my paying my respects to her, had the goodness to wave all ceremony, and accompanied by her husband, to visit me at the house of the Portuguese merchant, which was a condescension

that I certainly had no right to expect. She is the most beautiful woman I ever beheld,—in the bloom of youth; and there is an agreeable frankness in her manners, that enhances her loveliness, and renders her truly fascinating. Her kindness towards me daily increases; and she seems never weary of listening to my sad story. “She loves me for the dangers I have passed, and I love her that she does pity them.” 25

29th May.

I have delivered my letter of introduction to Mrs. HASTINGS, on whom I should have waited long ago, had the state of my health admitted of the exertion. She resides at Belvidere-house about, I believe, five miles from Calcutta, which is a great distance at this season and for an invalid. The lady was fortunately at home and had three of her most intimate friends with her on a visit, one of them, Mrs. MORTON, a most charming woman. Mrs. H— herself, it is easy to perceive at the first glance, is far superior to the generality of her sex; though her appearance is rather eccentric, owing to the circumstance of her beautiful auburn hair being disposed in ringlets, throwing an air of elegant, nay almost infantine simplicity over the countenance, most admirably adapted to heighten the effect intended to be produced. Her whole dress too, though studiously becoming being at variance with our present modes which are certainly not so, perhaps for that reason, she has chosen to depart from them—as a foreigner you know, she may be excused for not strictly conforming to our fashions; besides her rank in the settlement sets her above the necessity of studying any thing but the whim of the moment. It is easy to perceive how fully sensible she is of her own consequence. She is indeed raised to a “giddy height” and expects to be treated with the most profound respect and deference. She received me civilly and insisted on my

staying dinner, which I had no inclination to refuse, but she seemed not to evince much sympathy when I slightly touched on the misfortunes which had befallen me, nay she even hinted that I had brought them on myself, by imprudently venturing on such an expedition out of mere curiosity Alas! Mrs H— could not know what you are well acquainted with, that I undertook the journey with a view of preserving my husband from destruction, for had I not accompanied him, and in many instances restrained his extravagance and dissipated habits, he would never, never, I am convinced, have reached Bengal, but have fallen a wretched sacrifice to them on the way, or perhaps through the violence of his temper been involved in some dispute, which he was too ready to provoke—but to return I could not help feeling vexed at Mrs H—s observation, to say the best of it, it was unfeeling,—but I excuse her Those basking in the lap of prosperity can little appreciate the sufferings or make allowance for the errors of the unfortunate, whom they regard as almost beings of another order 26

You will expect me to say something of the house, which is a perfect *bijou*, most superbly fitted up with all that unbounded affluence can display, but still deficient in that simple elegance which the wealthy so seldom attain, from the circumstance of not being obliged to search for effect without much cost, which those but moderately rich, find to be indispensable The gardens are said to be very tastefully laid out, but how far this report is accurate I had no opportunity of judging, the windows being all as it were hermetically closed, sashes, blinds, and every opening, except where tatties were placed to exclude the hot wind This surprized me very much but I understand no method is so effectual for that purpose I was not permitted to take my departure till the evening, when the fair lady of the mansion, dismissed me with many general pro-

fessions of kindness, of which I knew how to estimate the value.

Next morning we received an invitation to the ball given annually on the King's birthday. This however I was under the necessity of declining on the plea of ill health and Mr. F— could hardly ever be persuaded to attend such formal assemblies.

When my husband waited on Sir Elijah Impey, the Chief Justice, to shew his credentials, he met with a most flattering reception. It so happened that he was called to the Bar from Lincoln's Inn himself, and seemed quite at home while perusing the papers, being acquainted with the hand-writing of the officers who prepared them, and perhaps that circumstance might render him more partial. On Mr. Fay's expressing some apprehensions lest his having come out without leave of the E. I. Company might throw obstacles in the way of his admission to the Bar here, Sir Elijah indignantly exclaimed "No Sir, had you dropped from the clouds with such documents, we would admit you. The Supreme Court is independent and will never endure to be dictated to, by any body of men whose claims are not enforced by superior authority. It is nothing to us whether you *had* or *had not* permission from the Court of Directors, to proceed to this settlement, you come to us as an authenticated English Barrister, and as such, we shall on the first day of the next Term, admit you to *our Bar*." Sir E— also offered to introduce him to Mr. Hyde which Mr. F— thankfully accepted. Do you not admire the high tone in which Sir E— delivers his sentiments? There exists, it seems, a strong jealousy between the Government and the Supreme Court, lest either should encroach on the prerogatives of the other. The latter not long since committed Mr. Naylor the Company's Attorney for some breach of privilege, who being in a weak state of health at the time, died in confinement—this has increased the difference.<sup>27</sup> I

merely mention this *en passant*, for it regards not us, let them quarrel, or agree; so the business of the Court be not impeded we cannot suffer. Mr F— is already retained in several causes. His whole mind will now, I trust, be occupied with his profession, and as his abilities have never been questioned, I flatter myself that he has every reason to look forward to ultimate success.

20th July

Hyder Ally has at length thrown off the mask, and commenced hostilities in good earnest. How providential was our liberation at that critical juncture! and my gratitude to Heaven was lately called forth in another instance—I recently conversed with a gentleman who crossed the Great Desert by way of Aleppo—He assures me that besides the danger from the Arab, there is so much more from other cause than in going over *that* to Suez, that he is quite confident, *I* never could have survived the journey, “or he needed any European woman”—therefore on the whole we seem to have experienced the lesser evil, though the alternative of falling into the hands of the enemy was horrible! I am concerned to say that dreadful reports are in circulation respecting the excesses committed by Hyder’s troops in the Carnatic, but the particulars are too shocking to be repeated.

You have no idea how busy I am. Lady Chambers has been kind enough to lend me some of her dresses, for mine to be made by—I have commenced house-keeping, and am arranging my establishment, which is no little trouble in a country where the servants will not do a single thing, but that for which you expressly engage them nor even that willingly. I just now asked a man to place a small table near me, he began to bawl as loud as he could for the bearers to come and help him. “Why dont you do it yourself” said I? rising as I spoke to assist. *Oh I no*



*English. I Bengal man. ·I no estrong like English, one, two, three Bengal men cannot do like one Englishman —*Adieu remember you must write me long letters. you see even the heat has not reduced mine to a single sheet. I trust that I shall never be found incapable of addressing *you* Mr. F— unites with me in kind remembrances.

I am ever most affectionately your's  
&c &c.

## LETTER XVI.

CALCUTTA, 29th August.

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

Ten thousand thanks for the precious packet of letters I yesterday received—you can form no idea of the eagerness with which I flew from my dressing room, and Mr. Fay from his study—at the joyful sound of “letters from England.” But my very eagerness wrought for a while its own disappointment, for when I laid my hands on the prize, I fell into a kind of hysteric, and it was some time before I could break the seals, and yet would not suffer Mr. I—to deprive me of the gratification for which I had so long panted—over such treasures who would not be a miser—I would not permit a single scrap to escape me till I had devoured the whole. Those only know what that impatient hunger of the heart is after information, and the intercourse of affliction, who have been debarred as long as I had been from objects so dear.

I rejoice to find that the Chevalier de St. Lubin performed his promise and that you now are in possession of every event that occurred to us till our arrival at Mocha. To know that we had passed the desert, that object of my dear mother's dread and apprehension, must have set her mind comparatively at ease, Alas! little did she suppose, how far more horrible were the miseries that we had still to undergo! thank Heaven, they are past.—I will quit the subject which agitates me too much.

I am happy to say that our house is a very comfortable

one, but we are surrounded by a set of thieves. In England, if servants are dishonest we punish them, or turn them away in disgrace, and their fate proves, it may be hoped, a warning to others; but these wretches have no sense of shame. I will give you an instance or two of their conduct, that you may perceive how enviably I am situated. My Khansaman (or house steward) brought in a charge of a gallon of milk and thirteen eggs, for making scarcely a pint and half of custard; this was so barefaced a cheat, that I refused to allow it, on which he gave me warning. I sent for another, and, after I had hired him, "now said I, take notice friend, I have enquired into the market price of every article that enters my house and will submit to no imposition, you must therefore agree to deliver in a just account to me every morning"—what reply do you think he made? why he demanded double wages; you may be sure I dismissed him, and have since forgiven the first but not till he had *salaamed* to my foot, that is placed his right hand under my foot,—this is the most abject token of submission (alas! how much better should I like a little common honesty.) I know him to be a rogue, and so are they all, but as he understands me now, he will perhaps be induced to use rather more moderation in his attempts to defraud.—At first he used to charge me with twelve ounces of butter a day, for each person; now he grants that the consumption is only four ounces. As if these people were aware that I am writing about them, they have very obligingly furnished me with another anecdote. It seems my comprodore (or market man) is gone away, he says poor servants have no profit by staying with *me*; at other gentlemen's houses he always made a rupee a day at least! besides his wages; but here if he only charges an anna or two more, it is sure to be taken off—So you see what a terrible creature I am! I dare say you never gave me credit for being so close—I find I was imposed on, in taking a



rupee, six good fowls or ducks ditto—twelve pigeons ditto—twelve pounds of bread ditto—two pounds butter ditto; and a joint of veal ditto—good cheese two months ago sold at the enormous price of three or four rupees per pound, but now you may buy it for one and a half—English claret sells at this time for sixty rupees a dozen There's a price for you! I need not say that much of it will not be seen at our table; now and then we are forced to produce it, but very seldom I assure you much caution is requisite to avoid running deeply in debt—the facility of obtaining credit is beyond what I could have imagined; the Europe shop keepers are always ready to send in goods; and the Banians are so anxious to get into employment, that they out bid each other. One says “master better take me, I will advance five thousand rupees”—another offers seven, and perhaps a third ten thousand. a Company's servant particularly will always find numbers ready to support his extravagance. It is not uncommon to see *writers* within a few months after their arrivals dashing away on the course *four in hand*: allowing for the inconsiderateness of youth, is it surprising if many become deeply embarrassed?—Several have been pointed out to me, who in the course of two or three years, have involved themselves almost beyond hope of redemption. The interest of money here being twelve per Cent, and the Banian taking care to secure bonds for whatever he advances, making up the account yearly and adding the sum due for interest, his thoughtless *master*, (as he calls him, but in fact his slave) soon finds his debt doubled, and dares not complain unless he has the means of release which alas! are denied him

I should have told you before that Mr. F— was admitted an advocate in the Supreme Court, on the 16th June,—has been engaged in several causes, wherein he acquitted himself to general satisfaction and is at present as busy as can be desired. Every one seems willing to encourage

him and if he continue but his own friend, all will, I feel persuaded, go well with us, and we shall collect our share of gold mohurs, as well as our neighbours—I like to see the briefs come in well enough. The fees are much higher here than in England, so you will say “they ought” and I perfectly agree with you.

Sir R. Chambers met with an accident some weeks ago (by jumping out of a carriage when the horses were restive) which confined him to his house a long while but he is now recovering, I was a good deal vexed both on his own account poor man, and because Mr F— was deprived of his friendly aid. I have seen little of my kind patroness since, for she goes scarce any where without her husband—we were to dine with them the very day the circumstance happened. They are gone up the country and will not return for some months.

31 *August*

I have received another packet and rejoice to hear you are all going on so well. They talk of a frigate being soon to sail, in which case I shall close and dispatch this—As I propose sending you a regular supply of Calcutta Gazettes,<sup>29</sup> there can be no necessity to fill my letters with political information. I trust that in a short time Hyder will be effectually humbled.

Mr Hare has visited us several times, and is now quite complaisant to Mr Fay. This is the way of the world you know, and of course to be expected from such a slave to outward circumstance, such a mere “summer friend” as this man ever evinced himself.—By his account the hardships they underwent would very soon have destroyed so poor a creature as I was at that time so that the difficulties we fell into, though at the moment of suffering so deplored, proved eventually our safe guard in more respects than one. Had we not touched at Calcut, I am fully persuaded we

should have been shipwrecked, and had not my illness furnished a pretext for detaining us there after the rest, I should have died among those cruel people in the most shocking way imaginable, since they were for a long while absolutely destitute of every necessary. What short-sighted beings we are! how futile, how defective our best formed calculations! I have sometimes pleased myself (I hope not improperly) with the idea, that the power of discerning clearly the beneficent designs of providence during our earthly pilgrimage, and of perceiving that in a thousand instances like these, a rough and stony path has led to safety and ultimate happiness, may be intended to form part of our enjoyment in a future state, wherein we are taught that to contemplate the Supreme Being in his perfections will constitute the height of bliss—Let me have your sentiments on the subject, its discussion can do neither of us harm and may lead to improvement

*8th September*

I have nothing particular to add—my health continues very good considering all things. This is a dull time. vacations are always so to professional people. God bless you and grant us a happy meeting—our prospects are good, nothing but the grossest misconduct can prevent our success. Adieu

Yours most affectionately

E F

## LETTER XVII

Calcutta, 27th September

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

The bad news I hinted at some time ago is already avenged, and a much more serious affair has happened since, but for the present I must relate what has occupied a great deal of attention for some days past—no less than a duel between the Governor General and the first in Council, Mr Francis, there were two shots fired, and the Governor's second fire took place, he immediately ran up to his antagonist and expressed his sorrow for what had happened, which I dare say was sincere, for he is said to be a very amiable man. Happily the ball was soon extracted, and if he escape fever, there is no doubt of his speedy recovery. What gave occasion to the quarrel is said to have been an offensive Minute entered on the Council books by Mr Francis, which he refused to rescind, but being unacquainted with the particulars, I have as little right as inclination to make any comments on the subject—It always vexes me to hear of such things. What a shocking custom is that of duelling! yet there are times when men may be so situated that, as the world goes, one knows not how they could act otherwise, much may be effected by the judicious interference of friends, but those qualified for the task are rarely to be met with. Mr Francis is highly respected here, and being now at the head of what is called the opposition party, his death would be severely felt by many who affect great indifference about the event<sup>30</sup>



Since I wrote last we have had a good deal of trouble with our Mohametan servants, on account of an old custom; not one of them would touch a plate on which pork had been laid—so that whenever we had any at table our plates remained, till the cook or his mate came up to change them. This being represented as a religious prejudice, I felt it right to give way, however ridiculous it might appear, in fact it was an inconvenience we felt in common with the whole settlement, except the gentlemen of the Army who had long before emancipated themselves from any such restraint, finding this to be really the case the whole of the European inhabitants agreed to insist upon their servants doing the same as those of the officers at the Fort, or quitting their places. They chose the latter alternative, and as their prejudices run very high in all religious matters, we were in doubt whether they would not prefer suffering the greatest extremity rather, than touch the very vessels which contained this abhorred food,—but behold in about four days they came back again requesting to be reinstated, and acknowledging that the only penalty incurred by touching the plates was the necessity of bathing afterwards. From this you may judge of their excessive idleness, however all now goes on well and we hear no more of their objection—

The serious affair at which I hinted in the beginning of this letter, was the cutting off Col Baillie's detachment with dreadful slaughter. I trust we shall soon have ample revenge, for that fine old veteran Sir Eyre Coote is about to take the field and his very name will strike those undisciplined hordes with terror—Oh how I feel interested in the event!<sup>31</sup>

Nothing surely can be more disagreeable than the weather here at present, it is very hot with scarcely a breath of air stirring, and such swarms of insects buzzing about, but beyond all the bug fly is disgusting—one of them will scent a room, they are in form like a ladybird but their

smell is a thousand times more offensive than that of our bugs. A good breeze would disperse them all, but that we must not expect till the monsoon changes, that is, about the middle of next month.

I never told you that one of the Captains who had charge of us at Calicut made his escape some months ago, and came to ask our assistance till he could get employment up the country. Mr F— gave him a lower room, and he remained with us several weeks. his name is West. This was the man from whom we collected intelligence of the plots laid against us there, and which had nearly proved successful. West is a stout fellow accustomed in his early days to labour, and seasoned to the climate,—he is gone up to Patna, in charge of some boats and is to remain there. Ayres used to treat him very ill at times, and *he* says attempted more than once to assassinate him, because he refused to concur with a party that Ayres headed, consisting of six or eight abandoned wretches whose intention it was to cut off several of the more opulent natives *secretly*, and possess themselves of their effects, while they should contrive to fix the guilt of the transaction on some persons who were obnoxious to them. West threatened to reveal the whole plot, on which they pretended to abandon it, but he soon found their object was to rid themselves of him, and he effected his escape in a canoe (at the utmost risk of perishing in the attempt) to Cochin, from whence he easily got a passage to Bengal. What a horrible fellow is that Ayres! surely he will meet his deserts. should the English take him he will be shot instantly as a deserter.

We have found out a nephew of Isaac's named Daniel, he is a man of no great consequence here, either in point of situation or circumstances though not absolutely poor — we asked him to dinner, and endeavoured by every means in our power to evince the grateful sense we entertain of his worthy uncle's kindness and beneficence.

*3rd November.*

Since my last date I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of another packet from England, with the gratifying intelligence that you were all well on the 7th of April. My time has passed very stupidly for some months, but the town is now beginning to fill,—people are returning for the cold season. Term has commenced, and Mr F— has no reason to complain of business falling off, if *he* fall not from it, all will be well. My first Patroness Lady Chambers is returned from her tour but Sir Robert having purchased an elegant mansion in Calcutta, (for which he is to pay £6,000, in England) her Ladyship has full employment in arranging and fitting up her new abode, so that I see but little of her; she is however always kind and full of condescension towards me when we do meet.

*19th December*

Mr. Fay has met with a gentleman here, a Dr. Jackson who comes from the same part of Ireland, and knows many of his connections, they soon became intimate. Dr J— is physician to the Company, and in very high practice besides, I have been visited by the whole family. The eldest son a fine noble looking young man, is a Lieutenant in the Army, and has lately married a very pretty little woman, who came out in the same ship under the protection of his mother, as did Miss Chantry a most amiable and interesting young Lady, who now resides with them. They have not been long arrived<sup>32</sup>. The Doctor's Lady is a native of Jamaica and like those "children of the sun," frank and hospitable to a degree—fond of social parties in the old style "where the song and merry jest circulate round the festive board" particularly after supper. Dinner parties they seldom give, but I have been present at several elsewhere since the commencement of the cold season. The

dinner hour as I mentioned before is two, and it is customary to sit a long while at table, particularly during the cold season, for people here are mighty fond of grills and stews, which they season themselves, and generally make very hot. The Burdwan stew takes a deal of time, it is composed of every thing at table, fish, flesh and fowl,—somewhat like the Spanish Olla Podrida.—Many suppose that unless prepared in a silver saucepan it cannot be good, on this point I must not presume to give an opinion, being satisfied with plain food; and never tasting any of these incentives to luxurious indulgence. During dinner a good deal of wine is drank, but a very little after the cloth is removed, except in Bachelor parties, as they are called, for the custom of reposing, if not of sleeping after dinner is so general that the streets of Calcutta are from four to five in the afternoon almost as empty of Europeans as if it were midnight.—Next come the evening urings to the Course, every one goes, though sure of being half suffocated with dust. On returning from thence, tea is served, and universally drank here, even during the extreme heats. After tea, either cards or music fill up the space, 'till ten, when supper is generally announced. Five card loo is the usual game and they play a rupee a fish limited to ten. This will strike you as being enormously high but it is thought nothing of here. Tré dille and Whist are much in fashion but ladies seldom join in the latter, for though the stakes are moderate, bets frequently run high among the gentlemen which renders those anxious who sit down for amusement, lest others should lose by their blunders.

Formal visits are paid in the evening, they are generally very short, as perhaps each lady has a dozen to make and a party waiting for her at home besides. Gentlemen also call to offer their respects and if asked to put down their hat, it is considered as an invitation to supper. Many a hat have I seen vainly dangling in its owner's hand for half an

hour, who at last has been compelled to withdraw without any one's offering to relieve him from the burthen.

Great preparations are making for the Christmas, and New year's public balls;—of course you will not expect me to write much till they are over; nor to own the truth am I in spirits, having great reason to be dissatisfied with Mr. Fay's conduct. Instead of cultivating the intimacy of those who might be serviceable or paying the necessary attention to persons in power; I can scarcely ever prevail on him to accompany me even to Dr. Jackson's who is generally visited by the first people; but he cannot endure being subjected to the forms of society—some times he has called on Sir Robert Chambers, but the other Judges he has never *seen*, except on the bench since his admission: he did not even accept Sir Elijah Impey's obliging offer to introduce him to Mr Hyde, but suffered Mr. Sealy to perform that ceremony, and when the Chief Justice advanced to accompany him, he was forced to acknowledge that he had been already introduced,—upon which the great man turned on his heel and hardly ever noticed him afterwards. This happened on the day Mr Fay was admitted to the bar at Mr Hyde's public breakfast at whose house the professional gentlemen all meet on the first day of every Term and go from thence in procession to the Court House<sup>33</sup> I will now close this letter in the hope of having better accounts to give you in my next

Your's affectionately

E. F

## LETTER XVIII.

CALCUTTA, 27th Jan, 1781

MY DEAR SISTER,

SINCE my last we have been engaged in a perpetual round of gaiety—keeping Christmas, as it is called, though sinking into disuse at home, prevails here with all its ancient festivity. The external appearance of the English gentlemen's houses on Christmas-day, is really pleasing from its novelty. Large plantain trees are placed on each side of the principal entrances, and the gates and pillars being ornamented with wreaths of flowers fancifully disposed, enliven the scene.

All the servants bring presents of fish and fruit from the Bannan down to the lowest menial, for these it is true we are obliged in many instances to make a return, perhaps beyond the real value, but still it is considered as a compliment to our *birth day* (great day). A public dinner is given at the Government house to the gentlemen of the Presidency, and the evening concludes with an elegant Ball & Supper for the Ladies. These are repeated on New year's day and again on the King's birth day. I should say have been, for that grand festival happening at the hottest season, and every one being obliged to appear full dressed, so much inconvenience resulted from the immense croud, even in some cases severe fits of illness being the consequence, that it has been determined to change the day of celebration to the 8th of December which arrangement gives general satisfaction—I shall not attempt to describe

these splendid entertainments farther than by saying that they were in the highest style of magnificence: in fact such grand parties so much resemble each other, that a particular detail would be unnecessary and even tiresome.

I felt far more gratified some time ago, when Mrs Jackson procured me a ticket for the Harmonic<sup>34</sup> which was supported by a select number of gentlemen who each in alphabetical rotation gave a concert, ball, and supper, during the cold season, I believe once a fortnight—that I attended was given by a Mr Taylor, which closed the subscription and I understand it will not be renewed, a circumstance generally regretted as it was an elegant amusement and conducted on a very eligible plan. We had a great deal of delightful music, and Lady Chambers, who is a capital performer on the harpsichord played amongst other pieces a Sonata of Nicolai's in a most brilliant style. A gentleman who was present and who seemed to be quite charmed with her execution, asked me the next evening, if I did not think that *jug* Lady C— played the night before, was the prettiest thing I ever heard? He meant the rondo which is remarkably lively, but I dare say "Over the water to Charley" would have pleased him equally well.

Mrs Hastings was of the party, she came in late, and happened to place herself on the opposite side of the room, beyond a speaking distance, so strange to tell, I quite forgot she was there! After some time had elapsed, my observant friend Mrs Jackson, who had been impatiently watching my looks, asked if I had paid my respects to the Lady Governess? I answered in the negative, having had no opportunity, as she had not chanced to look towards me when I was prepared to do so. "Oh, replied the kind old lady, you must fix your eyes on her, and never take them off 'till she notices you, Miss Chantry has done this, and so have I; it is absolutely necessary to avoid giving offence." I followed her prudent advice and was soon honoured with

a complacent glance, which I returned as became me by a most respectful bend. Not long after she walked over to our side and conversed very affably with me, for we are now through Mrs Jackson's interference on good terms together

She also introduced me to Lady Coote<sup>35</sup> and her inseparable friend Miss Molly Bazett. It was agreed between them when they were both girls that, whichever married first the other was to live with her, and accordingly when Sir Eyre took his lady from St Helena, of which place her father was governor, Miss Molly who is a native of the island accompanied them to England and from thence to India, where she has remained ever since,—thus giving a proof of steady attachment not often equalled and never perhaps excelled.

*19th February*

Yesterday being the Anniversary of our release from imprisonment, we invited Dr Jackson's family, Mr O'Donnell and some friends to assist in its celebration, I call it my 'Jubilee Day' and trust my dear friends at home did not forget the occasion

This reminds me to tell you that Sudder Khan and Ayres our chief enemies have both closed their career of wickedness. The former died of wounds received before Tellicherry, and the latter having repeatedly advanced close to the lines of that place, holding the most contemptuous language and indecent gestures towards the Officers, setting every one at defiance and daring them to fire at him, (I suppose in a state of intoxication, miserable wretch!) was at length picked off, to use a military phrase—Too honourable a death for such a monster of iniquity. My hope was, that he would have been taken prisoner, and afterwards recognised and shot as a deserter

Poor West is also dead; he never reached his destina-



tion—the boat he went up in, by some accident struck on a sand bank and nearly all on board perished

26th March.

A Frigate being ordered to sail for Europe with dispatches from Government, I shall avail myself of the occasion, and close this letter with a few remarks on our theatrical amusements.

The house was built by subscription; it is very neatly fitted up, and the scenery and decorations quite equal to what could be expected here. The parts are entirely represented by amateurs in the drama—no hired performers being allowed to act. I assure you I have seen characters supported in a manner that would not disgrace *any* European stage. *Venice Preserved* was exhibited some time ago, when Captain Call (of the Army) Mr. Droz (a member of the Board of Trade) and Lieutenant Norfar, in Jaffier, Pierre, and Belvidera shewed very superior theatrical talents. The latter has rather an effeminate appearance off the stage, yet I am told he is a very brave Officer when on service; and though always dressed as if for a ball, when he makes his appearance, is among the most alert in a moment of danger. I cannot imagine how he contrives it, for the present mode of arranging the hair requires a great deal of time to make it look tolerable, however this is said to be the case <sup>36</sup>—One of the chief inconveniences in establishments of this kind, is that the performers being independent of any controul, will some times persist in taking parts to which their abilities are by no means adequate,—this throws an air of ridicule over the whole, as the spectators are too apt to indulge their mirth on the least opening of that kind. In fact many go to see a tragedy for the express purpose of enjoying a laugh, which is certainly very illiberal and must prove detrimental to the hopes of an enfant institution like the one in question.

—for my own part I think such a mode of passing an evening highly rational; and were I not debarred by the expence should seldom miss a representation—but a gold mohur is really too much to bestow on such a temporary gratification Adieu—I shall write again soon

Your's most affectionately

E F.

## LETTER XIX.

CALCUTTA, 26th May

MY DEAR SISTER,

You must have perceived that the style of my letters for some months past has been constrained, nor could it possibly be otherwise, for not wishing to grieve your affectionate heart by a recital of the melancholy change in my prospects, occasioned by Mr Fay's imprudent behaviour, I was reduced to enlarge on less important subjects. Some hints however escaped me which must have led you to suspect that all was not going on properly, but his conduct of late has been such that no hope remains of his *ever* being able to prosecute his profession here

Ever since our arrival he has acted in every respect directly contrary to my advice—By constantly associating with persons who had distinguished themselves by thwarting the measures of Government,—he soon became equally obnoxious. On one occasion when a tax was proposed to be levied on houses, several meetings were held at our house, wherein he openly insisted on the illegality of such a procedure, and encouraged his *new* friends to assert their independence. I remonstrated in the strongest terms against measures so pregnant with evil, and which must terminate in utter ruin, if not speedily abandoned, the character of our *chief ruler* being well known;—he will never *desert* a friend or *forgive* an enemy, what chance then has an individual who rashly incurs his resentment of escaping its baneful effects? all this and more I repeatedly

but alas *vainly* urged—my representations were as heretofore treated with contempt he still persevered, giving himself entirely up to low and unworthy pursuits, while his professional duties were wholly neglected and his best friends slighted

We were frequently invited to parties which he as constantly evaded, leaving me to make what excuses I could for his absence—My dear kind Patroness Lady Chambers, still continues on my account to shew him attention as do the Jacksons and some few others. she has lately added a son to her family,—I was with her at the time, and the sweet infant seems to have formed closer ties between us. On a late occasion however she was compelled to speak plunk. The christening is to take place in a few days, Sir Elijah and Lady Impey have offered to stand for the child, and Lady C— wishes me to be present, but Sir E— positively refuses to meet Mr F— who of course cannot be included, so unless I can reconcile him to the omission I must remain at home also

*3rd June.*

The grand ceremony is over. I had no difficulty with Mr F— he declared himself pre-engaged the instant I mentioned the subject, and insisted that I should make some apology for him which was readily promised—You may suppose that I could not under such circumstances enjoy much pleasure though Sir E— and his Lady behaved very graciously. But the idea that my husband was so totally proscribed where he might have figured among the foremost pierced my very soul, yet was I forced to put on the appearance of cheerfulness, that I might seem to receive as a compliment what was certainly so intended. The public countenance of Lady C— and being admitted to such a select party cannot but operate favourably for me at this crisis, when I shall stand so much in need of support

24<sup>th</sup> June.

Though term is now far advanced, Mr. Fay has scarcely a brief. The attorneys are positively afraid to employ him, and causes have actually come on with two advocates on one side and one on the other, rather than permit him to appear in them. What a noble opportunity of making an ample fortune is thus wantonly thrown away! Heaven grant me patience. I have only this reflection to console me, that every effort in my power has been made to ward off the blow which is now inevitable

I yesterday confided to Lady C— my real situation. who (on my stating that Mr. F— must certainly be obliged to quit the Settlement very shortly,) with the utmost kindness insisted on my making her house, my home whenever that event should take place, and Sir R— has in the most cordial way enforced the invitation—Thus through the goodness of Providence am I provided with a secure and highly respectable asylum, till a passage to Europe can be obtained on moderate terms, a difficult matter to accomplish.

17<sup>th</sup> July

On the last day of the present month we must quit our house, and when my husband and I may reside under the same roof together again, Heaven alone can tell. It is astonishing to see with what apparent unconcern he supports the shock: but the acquisition of a new Patron has raised his spirits. Colonel Watson, a man of superior abilities and immense fortune has been long a determined opposer of Government, and the *bitter* enemy of Sir Elijah Impey, against whom he has set an impeachment on foot, to prosecute which it is requisite that a confidential agent should serve the process on the defendant here, and proceed to England with the necessary documents<sup>37</sup> Mr. F— has contrived to get himself appointed to this office: he has

drawn up a set of articles many copies of which are preparing by Bengalee writers, who though they profess to understand English and are tolerably correct in copying what is put before them, know not the meaning of any thing they write, a great convenience this to such as conduct affairs that require secrecy, since the persons employed, cannot, if they were so disposed, betray their trust. Colonel Watson never comes here, all is carried on with an air of profound mystery—I like not such proceedings and doubt if any good can come of them, but I dare not interfere nor drop even a hint which might lead to suspicion that any thing extraordinary is going forward. The duty of a wife which is paramount to all other civil obligations, compels me silently to witness what is beyond my power to counteract, although the character of a highly revered friend is obliquely glanced at, and may be in future more seriously implicated in the business—you will guess to whom I allude Adieu you shall hear from me again when I change my abode.

Your's affectionately

E F

## LETTER XX.

CALCUTTA, 28<sup>th</sup> August

MY DEAR SISTER,

Since I wrote last, my feelings have been harassed in various ways almost beyond endurance—Mr Fay quitted me on the 31<sup>st</sup> ultimo, and the rest of that day was devoted to the distressing (however just and necessary) task of delivering back such articles of furniture as had not been paid for, to the persons who supplied us with them, and also returning what had been borrowed of different friends for our convenience, what remained was taken possession of next morning, by a man to whom my unfortunate husband had given a bond for money advanced on the most exorbitant terms, to support his extravagance. Thus am I left destitute of every thing but my clothes, to endure the wretched effects of his imprudence, with a constitution weakened by the sufferings and privations, I underwent during my eventful journey, added to the dread which I cannot avoid feeling lest that unlucky blow I received in Calicut should be productive of serious consequences.

Lady Chambers welcomed me as a sister, she wishes me to accompany her every where but time alone can reconcile me to general society —The very day of my removal here, a circumstance was disclosed that determined me no longer to bind my destiny with that of a man who could thus set at defiance all ties divine and human. After consulting my legal friends I demanded a separation, to which he having consented, a deed was drawn up by Mr S—— under the

inspection of Sir Robert Chambers, in the fullest manner possible rendering me wholly independent of Mr F—'s authority, with power, to make a will &c in short conceived in the strongest terms our language could supply I have appointed Mr G Jones Solicitor of Lincoln's Inn and Mr Mc Veagh one of the masters in Chancery here to act as my Trustees Two more respectable men I could not have chosen You my dear sister, who know better than any one, what exertions I have used, and what sacrifices I have *vainly* made for this most ungrateful of beings, will not be surprised to find that even *my* patience was not proof against this last outrage

But let me dismiss the hateful subject merely stating that the deeds were signed on the 11th instant His secret is safe with me, though when we met on that occasion he had the insolence to hint his belief that out of *revenge* I should divulge it So let him *still* think, for I deigned no reply except by a look, when I with secret triumph beheld his hitherto undaunted eye sink beneath the indignant glance of mine

“Tis Conscience that makes cowards of us all.”

*5th September*

Sir Robert being appointed President of the Court at Chinsurah, is gone up to take possession of his charge, accompanied by Lady Chambers and the family <sup>38</sup> So here am I left alone to ramble over this great house and meditate on irreparable evils Sir R— has however kindly entrusted me with the keys of his immense library, which will furnish a rich treat when my mind acquires sufficient calmness to look beyond itself in search of amusement

The acquaintance of Mrs Wheler I have found a most valuable acquisition <sup>39</sup> I went with Lady C— to pass a day with her at the gardens, and have been treated with the



utmost attention ever since. She has authorised me to look up to her as a steady patroness on all occasions Mr Hastings being gone up the country on political business Mr Wheler of course takes the chair during his absence so you may judge what influence Mrs. W— possesses; but “ she bears her honors so meekly ” and contrives to soften the refusals which she is frequently compelled to give by so much affability and sympathy, as to conciliate all parties and render herself generally beloved.

I have never mentioned yet how indifferently we are provided with respect to a place of worship, divine service being performed, in a room, (not a very large one) at the Old Fort, which is a great disgrace to the settlement They talk of building a Church and have fixed on a very eligible spot whereon to erect it but no further progress has been made in the business <sup>40</sup>

I now propose, having full leisure to give you some account of the East Indian customs and ceremonies, such as I have been able to collect, but it must be considered as a mere sketch, to point your further researches And first for that horrible custom of widows burning themselves with the dead bodies of their husbands, the fact is indubitable, but I have never had an opportunity of witnessing the various incidental ceremonies, nor have I ever seen any European who had been present at them I cannot suppose that the usage originated in the superior tenderness, and ardent attachment of Indian wives towards their spouses, since the same tenderness and ardour would doubtless extend to his offspring and prevent them from exposing the innocent survivors to the miseries attendant on an orphan state, and they would see clearly that to live and cherish these pledges of affection would be the most rational and natural way of shewing their regard for both husband and children I apprehend that as personal fondness can have no part here at all, since all matches are made between the

[illegible]

called a filthy tribe formed as it were of the refuse of the rest. Those are indeed considered the very dregs of the people, and supply all the lowest offices of human life. They all profess what is called the religion of Brahma, from the caste which bears his name all the priests are chosen, who are treated in every respect with distinguished honour and reverence. Their religious Code is contained in a book called the Veda, which only the Brahmins are allowed to read, it is written in a dead language called the Sanscrit. They worship three Deities, Brahma, the creator, Vistnoo the preserver, and Sheevah the destroyer. But they profess to believe them only the representations or types of the great spirit Brahma (the Supreme God) whom they also call the spirit of wisdom, and the principle of Truth. none but Hindoos are allowed to enter temples, but I am told the Idols worshipped there are of the very ugliest forms that imagination can conceive, and to whom Pope's description of the heathen deities may, in other respects, be strictly applied

“ Gods changeful, partial, passionate unjust  
Whose attributes *are* rage, revenge, or lust ”

I lament to add to such wretched objects as these, numbers of the deluded natives are devoted in the strongest and most absolute manner possible. A certain sect named Pundarams live in continual beggary, extreme hunger alone induces them to ask for food, which when granted, they only take just what will preserve life, and spend all their days in singing songs in praise of Sheevah, another sect add a tabor, and hollow brass rings about their ancles to increase the noise with which they extol *their* deity. I consider both these as a species of monks but believe the holy fathers fall far short of the Jogees and Seniases of India, in their religious austerities. These not only endure all possible privations with apparent indifference, but invent for themselves various kinds of tortures which they carry to an

astonishing length; such as keeping their hands clenched 'till the nails grow into them,—standing on one foot for days and even weeks together—and hiring people to support their hands in a perpendicular position

Their expiatory punishments are some of them dreadful. I myself saw a man running in the streets with a piece of iron thrust through his tongue which was bleeding profusely. On the Churruk Poojah (swinging feast) hundreds I have heard, are suspended at an amazing height by means of hooks, firmly fixed in the flesh of the back, to which sometimes a cloth is added round the body to afford the miserable victim a chance of escape, should the hook give way. I, by accident, (for voluntarily nothing should have tempted me to witness such a spectacle) saw one of these wretches, who was whirling round with surprizing rapidity, and at that distance scarcely appeared to retain the semblance of a human form. They firmly expect by this infliction to obtain pardon of all their offences, and should death be the consequence, they go straight to heaven—thus changing the horrid state of privation and misery in which they exist here, for one of bliss. If such be their real persuasion, who can condemn the result.

Indeed under other circumstances it is found that, notwithstanding their apparent gentleness and timidity, the Hindoos will meet death with intrepid firmness—they are also invincibly obstinate, and will *die* rather than concede a point. Of this a very painful instance has lately occurred. — A Hindoo beggar of the Brahmin caste went to the house of a very rich man, but of an inferior tribe, requesting alms, he was either rejected, or considered himself inadequately relieved, and refused to quit the place. As his lying before the door and thus obstructing the passage was unpleasant, one of the servants first intreated, then insisted on his retiring, and in speaking pushed him gently away, he chose to call this push a blow, and cried aloud for redress, declaring that he would never stir from the spot 'till he had

obtained justice against the man who now endeavoured to sooth him but in vain, like a true Hindoo he sat down, and never moved again, but thirty-eight hours afterwards expired, demanding justice with his latest breath, being well aware that in the event of this, the master would have an enormous fine to pay, which accordingly happened. I am assured that such evidences of the surprizing indifference to life, the inflexible stubbornness, and vindictive dispositions of these people are by no means rare, it seems extraordinary though, that sentiments and feelings apparently so contrary to each other should operate on the same minds, seeing them so quiet and supine, so (if it may be so expressed) only half alive, as they generally shew themselves, one is prepared for their sinking, without an effort to avert any impending danger, but that they should at the same time nourish so violent and active a passion as revenge, and brave even death so intrepidly as they often do in pursuit of it, is very singular:—but enough of these silly enthusiasts.

I had lately the opportunity of witnessing the marriage procession of a rich Hindoo. The bride (as I was told) sat in the same palanquin with the bridegroom, which was splendidly ornamented,—they were accompanied by all the relations on both sides, dressed in the most superb manner,—some on horse back, some in palanquins, and several on elephants;—bands of dancing girls and musicians I understood preceded them,—and in the evening there were fireworks at the bride's father's house and the appearance of much feasting &c. but no Europeans were present. This wedding was of a nature by no means uncommon here; a rich man had an only daughter, and he bargained to dispose of her, or rather to take for her a husband out of a poor man's family, but of his own *Caste*: for this is indispensable. In this case the bridegroom is brought home to his father-in-law's house and becomes a member of the family; so that although the law prohibits a man from giving a dowry

with his daughter, yet you see he does it in effect, since he gives a house to a man who wants' one, gives in fact, a fortune but saddled with an encumbrance,—perhaps in a few years the old man may die, and the young one having fulfilled the wishes of his parents, and provided for his own wants, may employ some of his female relations to look round among the poorer families of his caste for a pretty girl, whom he will take as a second wife, tho' the first always retains the pre-eminence, and governs the house, nor can the husband devote more of his time to one than the other,—the law compelling him to live with them alternately, you may be sure the account is strictly kept. My Banian Dattaram Chuckerbutty has been married between twenty and thirty years, without taking a second lady, and he boasts of being much happier with his old wife (as he calls her) than the generality of his friends are amidst the charms of variety. For my own part, I have not a doubt but he is in the right.

The Hindoo ladies are never seen abroad, when they go out their carriages are closely covered with curtains, so that one has little chance of satisfying curiosity. I once saw two apparently very beautiful women—they use so much art however, as renders it difficult to judge what claim they *really* have to that appellation—Their whole time is taken up in decorating their persons—the hair—eye-lids—eye-brows—teeth—hands and nails, all undergo certain processes to render them more completely fascinating, nor can one seriously blame their having recourse to these, or the like artifices—the motive being to secure the affections of a husband, or to counteract the plans of a rival.

27th September

The Hindoos who can afford to purchase wood for a funeral pile, burn their dead, one cannot go on the river

without seeing numbers of these exhibitions, especially at night, and most disgusting spectacles they are. I will not enlarge on the subject. This mode however is far superior to that of throwing them into the river as practised by the poor, where they offend more senses than one. I have been frequently obliged to return precipitately from a walk along the river side, by the noisome exhalations which arose from these wretched objects.

Some of the Hindoo customs respecting the sick are really shocking—When a person is given over by the Brahmins, (who are physicians as well as priests) the relations immediately carry him, if within a reasonable distance, to the banks of the Ganges, where he is smeared with the mud, quantities of which I am told are thrust into his mouth, nose, and ears. This treatment soon reduces him to a dying state; nor is it desirable that he should recover, since he must in that case lose caste; for it is an established rule, that whoever removes from the spot where the sacred rites have been performed, becomes an outcast. Dr. Jackson was once fortunate enough to be called in to attend the wife of a Hindoo Rajah whom they were on the point of taking to the river when he arrived—he assured the Rajah that he perceived no dangerous symptoms and would answer for her doing well.—Luckily the tremendous ceremonies had not commenced. The event justified our good Doctor's predictions—the lady is still living and his success in this instance, has led to several others, highly gratifying to the best feelings of humanity and certainly beneficial to his fortune.

This letter has run to such an enormous length that I must now conclude, with wishing that I may soon hear good news of you. I remain,

Your's most affectionately

E. F.

## LETTER XXI.

CALCUTTA, 17th December.

MY DEAR SISTER

Sir R— and Lady C— have been down since I wrote last, and remained here during term, but are now gone up again, though much distressed Mrs. C— prefers staying here—A melancholy event has occurred in the family, the sweet little boy just turned of six months old, to whom I was so fondly attached, died a few weeks ago Dear interesting child! I shall *long* lament his loss He was not ill more than three days, so rapid is the progress of disease in this country

Mr and Mrs Hosea are arrived in Town and have taken accommodations on the *Grosvenor*, Captain Coxon I was in hopes of being able to take my passage with them but am disappointed.<sup>41</sup>

Mr H— was Resident at one of the upper stations, he is a man of high character and generally esteemed, and his wife one of the most amiable women I ever knew; it is impossible to do otherwise than love her As she daily looks to be confined, her leaving Calcutta till after that period, is out of the question, so they must suffer the *Grosvenor* to proceed to Madras without them, where she is expected to remain a month at least, and the family and baggage of Mr H— are to follow in a Country ship at the risk of arriving too late

The agreement is that, if she sail from thence before a certain day a small sum is to be forfeited, but *after* that day,



should Captain Coxon be compelled to proceed on his voyage without them, he is still to receive ten thousand rupees, that is half the passage money by way of compensation. I state these particulars to shew what large sums are exacted of passengers

The society of Mrs Chambers, who is a fine looking respectable old lady, well informed and chearful, with that of Mrs. Hosea, who has charming spirits, enables me to pass the time far more pleasantly than when I was left here during the rains Besides I often visit at Dr Jacksons, and have made acquaintance with several agreeable families, who allow me to call on them without formality, the very idea of which is hateful to me at present: so cruelly fallen are my once highly and justly raised expectations For what place do I now hold in the Society with which I am permitted to mix? Alas, none except by sufferance. but most ardently do I wish to escape from this fatal spot the scene of so many severe afflictions, and seek comfort with those who have never failed to afford it There I shall not be constantly reminded of past hopes, now alas! sunk in disappointment Think not these observations proceed from a repining spirit, or unmindfulness of favors received, I have been most beneficently treated and my views have been furthered in a way which I had no right whatever to expect Can attentions like those be forgotten? No! it forms my proudest boast that *I have* such friends, and while life remains I must ever cherish the remembrance of their generous exertions. The approaching season always inspires melancholy reflections—I will therefore pass it over, and look forward to the next, when by the blessing of Providence I hope to be with my beloved family.

27th January, 1782

My dear Mrs Hosea has thank heaven, got happily over her confinement, which took place three weeks ago,

and all the lowly bustle and preparation for their departure — Sir Robert's eldest son, Thomas, goes under their care, he is a charming boy, nearly seven years of age, which is rather late, but no good opportunity has occurred 'till now, — a Miss Shore (the daughter of an intimate friend) about the age of Thomas, also proceeds with them — Mrs. H— takes one little girl of her own, sixteen months old, the father is to be left with Lady C— she promises to be a lucky child.

We are to have the christening to-morrow when I shall take my leave of large parties, except one, which I must attend — Mr. H—'s infant daughter is to be christened on the next morning — Sir R—'s whole family is invited — At present I devote myself entirely to Mrs. H— who I really think is a friend for me — Would it were in my power to accompany her, but that for many reasons is impossible.

Another Indian man (The Dartmouth Captain Thompson) has just sailed, but *she* too is absolutely *crowded* with passengers, so I must have patience — It is almost incredible what quantities of baggage, people of consequence invariably take with them, I myself counted twenty-nine trunks that were sent on board, for Mr. and Mrs. H— exclusive of chest of drawers and other packages, with cabin stores &c. and more still remain to be shipped — This separate passage to Madras will add greatly to the expense; for Captain Coxon would not have charged a rupee more, had they embarked with him at Bengal, even removing so much baggage from one ship to another will occasion no small inconvenience.

CHINSURAH, 10th February.

My time has been too much taken up for this fortnight past to afford leisure for writing — I have another melancholy event to record, but let me proceed regularly.

Our friends left us on the second Instant — Poor Mrs.

H— was dreadfully affected at parting with her infant; it seemed cruel for a mother to abandon her child only twenty-five days old; but it must in all probability have fallen a sacrifice. Her anxiety in other respects was great. Admiral Suffren is said to keep a sharp look out after English ships going down the Bay; but, I trust, Sir E. Hughes will find the French fleet better employment than cruising about after our vessels <sup>42</sup>

Sir R— and Lady C— felt severely the shock of their son's departure but poor Mrs. C— whose very soul seemed treasured up, if I may so express myself, in her grandson, sunk under the blow. On the fifth she was seized with a violent illness, of which on the seventh she expired. Sir R— is deeply afflicted, and I should be surprised if he were not, for, to him she was ever an exemplary parent; and gave an irrefragable proof of strong maternal affection, by accompanying him to this country at her advanced period of life. Her death is generally lamented, as a most charitable humane good woman. "Let her works praise her." She was in her seventieth year. We came up here immediately after the funeral which took place the next day, and was most numerously attended; I may say by almost the whole settlement—gentlemen as well as ladies. Her character demanded this testimony of respect and that it was paid, affords me pleasure.

You will expect me to give you some account of this place; but after having told you that it contains many very fine houses,—is regularly built,—and kept remarkably clean; nothing more remains to be said. One cannot expect much cheerfulness among the inhabitants, though they are treated with the utmost kindness, and all private property is held sacred.

A strange circumstance occurred at the time of its capture, which will probably become a subject of litigation. A King's ship, either a frigate or a sloop of war, was lying

of Calcutta, when news arrived that the Dutch had commenced hostilities — The Captain accompanied by a party of his officers and seamen, proceeded with all expedition to Chinsurah, which he reached about 2 A. M. next day, and summoned the place to surrender to *His Majesty's Arms*. The Governor being totally unprovided with the means of resistance complied, so that when a detachment of the Company's troops marched in at seven o'clock to take possession they found the business already settled, and had the Dutch not completely against them. The Captain was induced to relinquish his capture, but insisted that his people were entitled to prize money, and has put in his claim accordingly — Is it not an odd affair?

21st February.

Sir R — I am going to dispatch some letters for England and I will profit by the occasion, having at present nothing further to communicate. All remains in uncertainty.

I am,  
Your affectionate  
E. F.

## LETTER XXII.

CALCUTTA, 17th March.

MY DEAR SISTER,

This is in all probability the last letter I shall write from Bengal. Mrs. Wheeler has been indefatigable in her exertions; and has at length secured a passage for me on the *Valentine*, Captain Lewis; a fine new ship—this is her first voyage. I shall have a female companion too, which is certainly desirable. Colonel and Mrs. Tottigham with their family accompany us, besides these we shall have seven military gentlemen, two of the company's civil servants, and thirteen children, under Captain Lewis's immediate protection. The ship is expected to sail in the beginning of next month. I dined in company with Captain Lewis yesterday at Mrs. W—s, and we were both much pleased with his behaviour.—When we retired after dinner my good friend congratulated me on the prospect of sailing with such a commander, for many of them assume airs of consequence, but Captain Lewis does not seem at all that way disposed; and should the passengers prove agreeable, I really think we may promise ourselves a comfortable voyage.

I am using every effort in preparing my baggage, and Lady C— with her usual kindness renders me every assistance; nor have my other friends been neglectful of any thing that can contribute to my comfort both on the passage and after my arrival in England; till my health shall, with the blessing of Providence, be restored, when

I may be enabled to seek out some decent means of support.

I had a very eligible proposal made me of entering into partnership with a most amiable lady who has lately engaged in the school line, but was compelled to decline it, my complaints requiring a change of climate, and that I should consult those medical friends who have been accustomed to prescribe for me. I much regret this circumstance, having no doubt but we might have suited each other extremely well, for she has proved herself a sincere friend in many instances and must ever possess my grateful esteem

*28th March*

I had the pleasure last evening, of being present at the marriage of Captain P M——and my young friend Miss T——, the wedding was kept at Dr Jackson's and of course they intended to have a little ball, but hardly any one could be prevailed on to dance so late in the season. I had given a solemn promise that nothing should induce me to run the risk, so to comply was out of the question —At length Mrs Jackson, senior, who is turned of sixty-five, opened the ball with a very good minuet, and afterwards footed it away for about two hours, as gaily as the youngest her example took effect, and they made up a tolerable set. The dance was succeeded by a magnificent supper, to which nearly thirty persons sat down. After the customary toasts we retired, and I reached home before one. May they be happy is my sincere wish.

This is a terrible season for reaching the ships, none but stout vessels can venture down. Colonel Tottingham pays seventy pounds for a sloop to convey his family. I am in this respect fortunate. Sir R—— and Lady C—— are going to a place called Bearcole for the benefit of sea-bathing, and I shall accompany them to Ingellee; which is within a tide of the Valentine. my friends will then proceed by

land to the bathing-place; and one of the sloops by Sir R—'s orders will convey me and my baggage to the Barrabola head where the ship is lying at anchor to complete her cargo.

*5th April.*

I have every thing now ready and only wait for the completion of Sir R—s preparations. I feel very impatient to get to sea, being persuaded that it will have a salutary effect on my health,—change of scene and company will also be of service. I have taken leave of every one, and for many shall preserve sentiments of the most grateful esteem.

ON BOARD THE VALENTINE,<sup>43</sup>

*Barrabola Head, 14th April.*

I left Calcutta, on Tuesday the ninth Instant with Sir R— and Lady C— the latter I am concerned to say is in a very weak state, but trust sea bathing will be beneficial. We had a boisterous trip of it down to Ingellee, and every one but myself was dreadfully sea-sick.

My kind friends quitted me on Saturday evening.—I felt quite forlorn at our separation. To be thrown among strangers after experiencing for near nine months, the attentive hospitality of such a family as I was torn from, almost overcame my fortitude,—but I soon lost every other sensation in that overwhelming one of sea-sickness, which lasted the whole way, nor could I go on board till the afternoon.—I shall keep this open till the Pilot goes, that you may have the satisfaction of hearing that we have passed the *first* dangers.

*20th April*

Our commander is by no means the placid being we supposed.—I doubt he will prove a very tyrant—instead of paying attention, or shewing respect, he *exacts* both, and

woe be to those who fail in either. We are still waiting for the remainder of our Cargo and Captain Lewis vents his rage in drinking "*confusion to the Board of Trade*" every day.

28th April

We had a narrow escape last evening though I knew not of the danger till it was over. I was seized after tea with severe spasms in the stomach, and had the doctor with me, when suddenly the ship began to pitch and toss violently; and I heard Captain Lewis, call out in a *voice* of thunder "Stand by the sheet anchor, heave the lead." Presently all was quiet again, nor had I the least suspicion till next morning of our having been *adrift* on the Barrabola sand, and what might have been our fate Heaven knows, had not the sheet anchor brought us up, for it is a most dangerous place, surrounded by shoals and out of sight of land.

It is pleasant to see Captain Lewis so alert on perilous occasions, he appears to be an excellent seaman, but the roughest being surely that nature ever formed, in language and manners. The oaths he swears by, are most horrible and he prides himself in inventing new ones. How were Mrs Wheler and I mistaken? I see he must be humoured like a child, for the least contradiction makes him almost frantic.

2nd May

Now I must indeed say farewell—the Pilot is just quitting us, and has promised to put this on board the first vessel that sails for England, there is one under dispatch God bless you. Within six months, I trust we shall all meet in health and safety

I am,  
Your's affectionately  
E F



## LETTER XXIII.

ST JAMES'S VALLEY, ST. HELENA    24<sup>th</sup> September, 1782.

MY DEAR SISTER,

A more uncomfortable passage than I have made to this place, can hardly be imagined. The port of my cabin being kept almost constantly shut, and the door opening into the steerage, I had neither light nor air but from a scuttle. thereby half the space was occupied by a great gun, which prevented me from going near the port when it *was* open.

Mrs. Tottingham at first took her meals in the Cuddy, but the gentlemen were in general too fond of the bottle to pay us the least attention; after tea, we were never asked to cut in at cards, though they played every evening Captain Lewis swore so dreadfully, making use of such vulgar oaths and expressions, and became so very rude and boisterous, that Mrs Tottingham withdrew intirely from table, and never left her cabin for the last thirteen weeks. but the Colonel took care to send her whatever was necessary, I had no one to perform the like kind office for me, and was therefore forced to venture up among them, or risk starvation below

The table was at first most profusely covered, being our Captains favourite maxim "never to make two wants of one"; Every one foresaw what must be the consequence, but he would not listen to reason. Thus we went on till the beginning of August, when he declared that we had

rounded the Cape of Good hope; offering to back his opinion by receiving twenty guineas, and return a guinea a day till we reached St Helena: but no one accepted the bet; yet doubts seemed to hang on the minds of many. However on the 5th at noon, hearing that we were in Latitude 33 32 S I began to think with the Captain that, it was needless to *spare* our stock, since a few days would bring us a fresh supply—but alas! at 4 P M land was perceived on the *East* coast of Africa; so near, that before we tacked *flies* were seen on the shore—had this happened during the night, nothing could have saved us from shipwreck—Can I sufficiently bless Providence for this second escape?

On examining the state of our water and provision, after the error was discovered, we were put on an allowance of a quart of water a day, for all purposes, and for nearly a month before we arrived here, we were forced to live on *salt* provisions, even the poor children and the sick, had no better fare

While off the Cape, we encountered very stormy weather but happily sustained no injury, except the loss of a fore-top-mast which was easily replaced—Captain Lewis, one day, thought fit to refuse me a passage through his cabin, for which I had expressly stipulated I retired, and in a few minutes he came down to apologize for his behaviour, and a most curious apology he made He began by saying that he had been beaten at *piquet*, and that losing always made him cross, “besides, said he, to tell you the truth I do not like ladies, not, (with a great oath) that I have any particular objection to you, on the contrary I really think you are a quiet good sort of woman enough, but I cannot *abide* ladies, and I declare that, sometimes when you come up to me upon deck, and say, ‘how do you do Captain Lewis’ it makes my back open and shirt (*sic*) like a knife”—so much for this gentleman’s *respect* and politeness! I

was forced to appear satisfied and he seemed very penitent for some days, till another cross fit came on.

Judge if I did not rejoice at the sight of this romantic Island, though its appearance from the sea is very unpromising,—inaccessible rocks, and stupendous crags frowning every side but one, nor is there any anchorage except at that point—The town is literally an ascending valley between two hills, just wide enough to admit of one street. The houses are in the English style, with sashed windows, and small doors. Here are back-gardens, but no gardens, which makes the place intensely hot for want of a free circulation of air; but when you once ascend *Ladder Hill* the scene changes, and all seems enchantment. The most exquisite prospects you can conceive burst suddenly on the eye—fruitful vallies,—cultivated hills and diversified scenery of every description. The inhabitants are obliging and attentive, indeed, remarkably; so altogether I find it a most welcome resting place. After being kept on salt provisions for a month, one is not likely to be very fastidious; former abstinence giving more poignant relish to the excellent food, which is set before us.

Lord North, and the Hastings, China ships, arrived soon after us, but we are all still detained for Convey—how vexatious.

18th October.

Yesterday Captain Lewis gave a grand entertainment on board the *Valentine*. I was obliged to preside for Mrs. Tottingham would not venture on the water till there was a necessity for it. We had a most brilliant party. I danced a good deal, but find no inconvenience from it. It is odd enough, that he should have fixed on your birth day. You may be sure I silently drank my own toast. Mrs. Comettee and the other ladies seemed highly gratified, and well they might, for no expence was spared to render it completely elegant

20th October.

The *Chapman* is just arrived, in a most dreadful state, having lost near fifty of her Crew in her passage from Mozambique, from whence she sailed in Company with the *Dartmouth*, which was wrecked off the Carnicobar island the very ship I was, as I then thought, so *unfortunate* in *company*—so that in this instance, as in many others, I may with impunity impute my safety to that Providence which

"I could then danger, fate and death,  
Happily steered my way."

11th November.

Among the passengers in the *Dartmouth* were Mrs Irwin and her infant son a most interesting child, three years of age, who were wonderfully preserved through suffering enough to overwhelm the strongest constitution; and proceeded to St Helena on the *Chapman* on board which were Mr Crumajor and his mother, who secured accommodations on the *Lord North*, not choosing to venture farther on the *Chapman*—Upon which I was applied to, to accompany Mr Irwin who could not well proceed without a female companion, and was not able to procure accommodations on the other ships—I instantly determined on accompanying her for the express purpose of endeavouring to soften the inconveniences under which she laboured, and to soothe her mind harrassed by the many hardships of her distressing voyage

25th November.

This day we left St Helena in company with the *Lord North*, *Valentine*, and *Hastings*—The *Chapman* unfortunately sails very ill and cannot keep up with the other ships. Captain Lewis told me at St Helena in order to prevent my quitting the *Valentine*, that we should be left in the

lurch the first fair opportunity, and so it happened long ere we reached England.


Our passage was tremendous, the Sea breaking over the ship and continually carrying some thing or other away; nor had we any naval stores to replace what was thus lost. Captain Walker and Mr Gooch, the second officer, were daily employed with the people, repairing the sails and rigging, nor did they shrink from any labour. I never beheld such exertion: very frequently they were obliged to take the wheel, for scarcely a sufficient number could be found to keep watch.

On entering the channel the weather was so thick that no observation could be taken for five days. One night after remaining several hours in dreadful suspense respecting our situation, Captain Walker came down about half past ten o'clock, to tell us that we were off Scilly. What a declaration! off Scilly! on a stormy night in the beginning of February! This intelligence was not likely to tranquillize our feelings. Mrs Irwin and myself passed a sleepless night, and in the morning, one of the sailors ascertained the place we were driven into to be St Ives Bay, a most dangerous place; but thanks to providence, we sustained no injury, except being forced round the Land's End, which was to us a serious misfortune, being utterly unable to beat back into the English channel, our men being worn out with illness and exertion, and our stores of every kind nearly exhausted.

No Pilot would venture to stay on board. The *Chapman* having no poop, looked so unlike an Indiaman, that she was taken for an American, and we poor forlorn creatures set down at once as prisoners. "Why don't you release those women," said they, "We will have nothing to do with you, we know better." We found afterwards that although the preliminaries of peace had been some time signed, no account of the important event had reached this

remote spot. Captain Waller now proposed proceeding to Waterd Haven to refit, but the indraught, as it is called, having brought us off Lundy, he changed his resolution and took a pilot on board for King road, where we anchored at 10 o'clock on the 27th February 1783.

THE END OF THE FIRST PART.



PART SECOND  
CONTAINING AN ABSTRACT OF THE  
AUTHOR'S THREE SUBSEQUENT  
VOYAGES TO INDIA





## LETTER I.

TO MRS. L.—

BLACKHEATH, 12th February, 1815

MY DEAR MADAM,

The interest which you are pleased to take in my welfare, and the kind inquiries you make respecting the success I have performed since my first memorable one, induce me to offer you a simple statement of facts relative to them, though to accomplish this even in the briefest manner, some circumstances must be revealed which I would rather consign to oblivion, and some wounds must be re-opened, which time has mollified, if not healed — The manuscript submitted to your perusal, closes with an account of my arrival in England, and thus ended my first eventful visit to India, a period which according to my own estimation, had comprized a whole life of suffering and anxiety, and dissolved for ever the strongest tie the human heart can form for itself, a period in which physical and moral evils had alike combined to inflict whatever can wound the heart to its inmost core, and destroy that confidence in our fellow creatures, without which the world seems indeed "a howling wilderness," peopled with terrific monsters, each prowling either by violence or fraud for his defenceless prey

Happily for me gentler beings had blended in my path their benign influences, my sorrows had been cheered and consoled by many. I was still young, and with buoyant spirits relieved in some degree from their late severe pres-

sure, hailed my native land; yet a sigh of regret would mingle with my joyful anticipations, at quitting the society wherein, though assailed by tempestuous winds and mountainous seas, I had so frequently enjoyed, "The feast of reason and the flow of soul" amidst congenial minds.

For ever blest be the moment when I quitted the *Valentine*; from that circumstance arose a friendship which has constituted one of the sweetest enjoyments of my life, and which still remains unbroken, though my friend and I seldom meet; but her letters are invaluable. Few possess such epistolary talents: they have been my chief solace and consolation in distress, but to proceed: Mrs Irwin, her little boy and myself went on to town, where a dreadful shock awaited me, my dear mother was no more, the tie to which a daughter most fondly clings was rent asunder; tho' I had still a father and two most affectionate sisters remaining, it was long ere I could justly appreciate their worth, or draw consolation from their society. For nearly a whole year I laboured under very severe indisposition, and incurred great expence for medical attendance, not less than £150. I was several times considered in imminent danger, Mrs Irwin too was long, after her arrival, affected with the most distressing nervous debility. All this is not to be wondered at, for during the passage from St. Helena, both of us were in an infirm state, and our health had suffered much from the circumstances in which we were placed. It is true we experienced all possible relief from the kindness of those around us, whom we daily beheld subjected to privations and exertions the most trying, yet ever affording us comfort and attention. In each benevolent act Captain Walker was amply assisted by Mr. Gooch, and the Surgeon Mr Crowfoot, a most worthy and scientific young man, to whose skill I was probably more indebted for the prolongation of a precarious existence, than I was aware of at the time. My health being in some measure

restored, I tried various plans in pursuit of independence; but none seemed to promise success, my friends wished me to remain at home, but Calcutta appeared the most likely theatre of exertion, and you cannot wonder that my heart warmed towards a place, where I had met such friendship and generosity, and where so much general encouragement was given to the efforts of respectable individuals. I still bore in mind the offer which had been made to me in Bengal, and determined to pursue this plan, and having become acquainted with a Miss Hicks, a young woman of the strictest integrity, and who possessed many valuable qualifications, I engaged her to accompany me as an assistant. Captain Waller was about to proceed to Bombay, in command of the *Lord Camden*, and offered me a passage on very moderate terms, provided I took charge of four ladies, who wished to have a protectress during the voyage. Being already near Bombay, I felt little reluctance to comply, especially as my friend Mr Gooch held the same station in the *Camden* which he had, so meritoriously filled, in the *Cypriot*. The passage to be sure, would be rather circuitous, but in a fine new ship, navigated by persons of whose nautical abilities I had such indubitable proofs, *that* appeared of little moment. The prospect of strengthening my connections in India, influenced me still further. Having therefore arranged my plans on a general ground, allowing for the deviations which in such a case as mine, might be allowed to arise from circumstances, I embarked on the *Lord Camden*, and sailed from the Downs for India, on the 17th March 1784—Here let me pause for the present, I will soon resume my pen

I am &c

E. F.

## LETTER II.

TO MRS. L.—

*15th February, 1815.*

MY DEAR MADAM,

For some days we had rather boisterous weather, but this subsided as we approached the Canary Islands, where (to my great mortification) we did not stop.—On the third of April had a view of the peak of Teneriffe which is said to be 2,000 feet high, perpendicularly. It must have been formerly a considerable Volcano; so lately as the year 1704 there was an irruption from it which did immense damage. On the 10th we passed the Cape de Verd Islands, but to my regret without touching at any; for curiosity was ever with me a predominant feeling. The Island of Fogo has a Volcano, which sometimes flames out in a terrible manner, and discharges pumice stones to a great distance. The weather at this time was intensely hot, but we had plenty of apples on board, which afforded great refreshment, and soon after they were finished, we spoke a Danish ship, whose captain made the ladies a handsome present of oranges and pine apples. It is not easy for you, my dear madam, to conceive the importance of such accommodations; but those who have been many weeks, perhaps months, shut up in a floating prison, without the power of procuring refreshments which even health demands, will be well aware of their value.—At length the trade winds visited us, “and bore healing on their wings;” we passed the Tropic of Capricorn very pleasantly, but soon

afterwards a change took place: such are the vicissitudes of a sea life. I have not yet mentioned the names of the ladies who accompanied me, there were Mrs Pemberton, and Misses Turner, Bellas, and Fisher, who with Miss Hicks and myself occupied two thirds of the roundhouse, and I note it as rather a singular circumstance, that we were only five times on deck during the passage, which was owing to a previous arrangement between the Captain and me, to guard against imprudent attachments, which are more easily formed than broken; and I am happy to say the plan succeeded to our wish—About this time, Captain Walker fell dangerously ill, but fortunately recovered before the 8th of June, when the birth day of Miss Ludlow, a Bristol lady, who subsequently became Mrs Walker, was celebrated in high style. all the ship's company had a dinner of fresh provisions, and we sat down to a most sumptuous repast, vegetables and fruit having been provided in England, and salad raised purposely for the occasion.

We were now going at the rate of eight knots an hour, off the Cape, with a heavy swell, but the young folks, nevertheless, so earnestly solicited for a dance, that the Captain could not refuse, so all the furniture being removed out of the cuddy, I led off, by particular request, but had only gone down one couple, when a tremendous *lee lurch* put us all in confusion. I declined standing up again, but the rest during three or four hours, tumbled about in the prettiest manner possible, and when no longer able to dance, made themselves amends by singing and laughing, no serious accident happened to any one, and the evening concluded very agreeably.

On the 11th June we struck soundings at 7 A M off Cape L'Aguillas, this exactly confirmed Capt Walker's observations, and was matter of greater rejoicing to me, than can be imagined by persons who were never brought

into danger, by the ignorance or inattention of those intrusted with the command. The next day we shipped so many seas from the heavy land-swell, as to extinguish the fire, we were therefore constrained to put up with a cold dinner. However our good Captain, ever provident, produced a fine round of beef, preserved by Hoffmann, which well supplied the deficiency.

On the 24th June, we anchored in the Bay of Johanna, one of the African Isles to the northward of Madagascar. It is a fertile little spot. We here met with plenty of refreshments and very cheap. The oranges are remarkably fine. I took a good quantity of them. Their beef is pretty good. Captain Walker purchased several bullocks for the ship's use and to supply our table. The inhabitants are very civil, but are said to be the greatest thieves in existence. We were much amused with the high titles assumed by them. The Prince of Wales honoured us with his company at breakfast, after which Mr. Lewin<sup>45</sup> one of our passengers, took him down to his cabin, where having a number of knick-knacks, he requested his royal highness to make choice of some article to keep in remembrance of him, when to Mr. L's astonishment he fixed on a large mahogany book-case, which occupied one side of the cabin, and on being told that could not be spared, went away in high displeasure, refusing to accept any thing else. The Duke of Buccleugh washed our linen. H R H the Duke of York officiated as boatman, and a boy of fourteen, who sold us some fruit, introduced himself as Earl of Mansfield. They seem very proud of these titles.—We all went on shore, and while those who were able to walk, rambled about to view the country, which they described as very delightful, I awaited their return in a thatched building erected for the accommodation of strangers. We were careful to return before sun-set, the night air being reckoned very pernicious to Europeans.—These people are almost constantly at war

of the different Lieut. Being in great want of money, they prevailed on Captain Walker to give them the quantity that would have been expended in the service of a state.

On the 21st July we left Johanna, with a pleasant breeze, and a calm, calm sea, and experienced great fatigue for the first time, though very soothing sea, but on the 20th, we were near Old-woman's Island, and at 11 AM we were in the Bay of Bora. An alarming accident happened on the 21st of the 10th, the gunner's mate reloaded one of the guns, and with a slipper, he dropped it, in consequence of which it went off and into the water. Never did I see a more terrible sight. The poor creature's face was as white as a sheet, yet he swam like a fish till a boat came to him. I think God he escaped with some hurt, but he was upon deck next day.

On the 21st we went on shore with Mr. Coggan the Naval Surgeon, and Mr. Turner's brother-in-law. We found the residence, where the many fine ships were, and the number of Europeans who were present. But, perused me, I was at home, till the 22nd, the complexion of the workmen destroyed the pleasant illusion—Mr. Coggan received me very kindly, and by his hospitable treatment, rendered my stay at Bora-bora agreeable and possible. On Saturday the 24th we received a visit from the Governor (Mr. Boddam) which I find to be considered as a great compliment. We went to church, on the 25th, and in the evening sat up to receive company, and the two following evenings, a tiresome ceremony to me who detect parade and was merely a traveller, but Mrs. Coggan assured me it would be an affront to the settlement if I submitted not to the established custom. The like usage formerly prevailed in Bengal, but is now abolished. On the 29th we went to pay our respects



to the Governor at *Perell* his country seat, a delightful place and a charming ride to it. Indeed all the environs are beautiful, in this respect it has greatly the advantage of Calcutta; but the town itself is far inferior. They have a handsome church and a good assembly-room, where they dance all the year round

We dined one day at Mr Nesbit's, chief of the Marine, who gave us a repast in the true *old* Indian style. "The tables they groaned with the weight of the feast." We had every joint of a calf on the table at once, nearly half a Bengal sheep, several large dishes of fish; boiled and roasted turkies, a ham, a kid, tongue, fowls, and a long train of *et ceteras*. The heat was excessive, the hour two, and we were thirty in company, in a lower roomed house, so you may conceive what sensations such a prodigious dinner would produce. It is however a fact that they ate with great appetite and perseverance, to my astonishment, who could scarcely touch a morsel.

On the 1st August, the *Camden* being ordered to Madras without any prospect of proceeding from thence to Bengal, Captain Walker secured a passage for Miss Hicks and myself on the *Nottingham*, Captain Curtis, who offered us the best accommodations and refused to accept of any remuneration. He afterwards disposed of his ship, but under the express stipulation that we should retain our cabin. I dined on the 8th at Mr. D. Scott's with our fellow passengers Mr and Mrs Lewin, and a very agreeable day we passed, the whole of the cuddy passengers being invited, so that we sat down once more together, assuredly for the last time. On the 23d I dined with Miss Bellas at her uncle's gardens where I met with a most cordial reception, and was introduced to Captain Christie whom she married before I quitted the settlement, and alas! I must add survived her marriage only thirteen weeks. She died, as I afterwards heard, of a confirmed liver complaint. Her

On the 15th September we anchored in Anjengo roads, to take in coir rope and cables for which this is the great mart. They are fabricated of the outer rind of the coconut, whose quality is such that the salt water nourishes it, and it possesses also an elasticity which enables it to contract or dilate itself, in proportion to the strain on it. This property is peculiarly useful in these seas, where squalls

frequently come on with frightful violence and rapidity, and the preservation of an anchor is an object of importance. The surf runs very high here, and is at times extremely dangerous. Captain Ross brought off an invitation from Mr. Hutchinson the chief, to dine with him, but no one chose to venture on shore. I have not forgotten the fate of Mrs. Blomer, who was drowned some years ago with seven others in attempting to land on the beach.

Here is a pretty strong Fort on the sea side. Every one who went on shore spoke with rapture of the country. The vicinity of the great chain of mountains which separates the coast of Malabar from that of Coromandel, and which are said to be the highest in the world, (the Alps and Andes excepted) gives an awful termination to the prospect. The water is here so indifferent that few Europeans attempt to drink it. Formerly Anjengo was famous throughout India for its manufactures of long-cloth and stockings, but these have fallen to decay. We left this dangerous place on the 22nd, the wind several times blew so strong, we had great apprehensions of being driven on shore, and a very narrow escape we certainly had, for on examining the anchor, only one fluke was found remaining, the other must have been so nearly broke by the strain on it, that it would not bear heaving up. Our passage was remarkably tedious, though we had a pleasant man in command, who kept an exceeding good table, but not expecting to be more than five or six weeks at sea, instead of *twelve*, our stock of fresh provisions was quite exhausted long ere we reached Calcutta, and only distilled water to drink. On the 27th November we arrived, and to my great surprise after all that had been said against the probability of such an event taking place, found the *Camden* had been some time in the river. Mr. Baldwin the chief officer died soon after, and my friend Mr. Gooch succeeded him. In this situation he remained for several voyages, with Captain Dance till he obtained

the account of the *Trichinopoly*, and I had frequently the pleasure of seeing him during my residence in Bengal. Now about to enter on a new scene, I will take leave of the good old man.

Your's &c.

E. F.

## LETTER III.

To MRS. L.—

BLACKHEATH, 19th February, 1815.

MY DEAR MADAM,

At Calcutta I met with great kindness from many whom I had formerly known, and who now appeared desirous of forwarding any plan, I might adopt. At length with the approbation of Captain Walker, and several other friends, I determined on placing Miss Hicks in business as a milliner. It was agreed that my name should not appear, although I retained in my own hands the entire management of the concern, allowing Miss H. one third of the profits. Mr. Berry purser of the *Camden* had the goodness to open a set of books, and to give me every necessary instruction how to keep them in proper order, which afterwards proved very advantageous in the prosecution of my concerns. You are aware how many difficulties both from within and without must have opposed themselves to this design, and how much even the same feeling operated in contrary directions; at least, if the wish for independence may be termed pride, to which it is certainly allied. Soon after, a proposal was made me to engage in a seminary for young ladies, on so liberal a plan, that I have since frequently, regretted not having complied with the solicitations of my friends; but I had in fact gone rather too far to recede, having made several large purchases, which could not be disposed of suddenly but at considerable loss. Within four months after our arrival, Miss

Hicks married Mr Lacey;<sup>46</sup> and the following Christmas lay in of a fine boy, but unfortunately lost him at the end of six weeks, after which her health declined so fast, as to render it absolutely necessary that she should proceed to Europe. I took that opportunity of sending home for education, a natural child of my husband's, whose birth had caused me bitter affliction, yet I could not abandon him, though he was deserted by his natural protector. They accordingly embarked on the 5th of September 1786, on the *Severn Packet* Captain Kidd, with every prospect of a favourable passage, but on the 9th, owing to the rapidity of the current, the vessel struck on a sand, called the Broken Ground, just below Ingellee, and every European on board unhappily perished, except the second officer in whose arms the poor little boy expired, but Mrs Lacey supported herself in the fore chains with exemplary fortitude, till a tremendous sea broke over them, and he saw her no more, but by great exertion reached the shore on a broken spar. I felt her loss severely, for she possessed a mind and spirit that would have graced any station.

After this melancholy event I was compelled to conduct business in my own name, but on a more extensive scale, and succeeded tolerably well, till the unlucky year 1788, when such immense investments were brought out, that nearly all concerned in that branch of commerce, were involved in one common ruin. Yielding to the storm, for I had large consignments which I was compelled to receive, my brother having become security for them at home, I solicited and obtained the indulgence of my creditors for eighteen months under four trustees, Messrs Fairlie, Colvin, Child, and Moscrop, whose names were sufficient to sanction any Concern, and such was the confidence reposed in my integrity, that every thing remained in my own hands as formerly. Never, I am proud to say, was that confidence abused, pardon the seeming vanity of this assertion, in

justice to my own character, I must say thus much, and can boldly appeal to those who are best acquainted with the whole transaction for the truth of my statement. Having received several consignments from my kind friends at home, which sold to great advantage, and various other means suggesting themselves, wherein I was benevolently assisted by many who saw and compassionated my arduous struggles after independence, I succeeded in settling either in money or goods, every claim on me, and again became possessed of a little property; then in the beginning of 1794, anxiety to see my dear friends, led me to resolve on returning once more to Europe. I must here mention what operated as a strong encouragement to prosecute the plan immediately. In May 1791 Mr. Benjamin Lacey brother of my lamented friend's husband came to Bengal, bringing out a small investment for me. I received him into my family, and altho' only nineteen years of age, he evinced such abilities, that I soon obtained a situation for him, where he conducted himself so much to the satisfaction of his employers, as to be intrusted with confidential commissions to Madras and elsewhere, which he executed with judgment and integrity. This young man happening to be in Calcutta, I embraced the opportunity of leaving to him the management of my concerns. As a proof that my confidence was not misplaced, allow me here to notice, that altho' my stock and bills were delivered over to him without inventory, or engagement on his part when I left India, he in the course of *eleven* days after, transmitted regular accounts of the whole, and where placed, making himself answerable for the proceeds in the strongest manner; so that had we both died, my friends would have found no difficulty in claiming my effects. Having by his assistance laid in a small investment, I embarked on the 25th March on board the American ship *Henry*, Captain Jacob Crowninshield, bound for Ostend; and on the 29th the pilot quitted

us I found the *Henry* a snug little vessel, Capt. C. a well behaved man, and his officers, though not of polished manners, yet in their way disposed to offer me every attention that could render the passage agreeable. I suffered at times from the heat, but on the whole enjoyed better health than during my former voyage. Having only one passenger on board besides myself, but little occurred to relieve the monotony of a sea life. I frequently played chess, and was almost constantly beaten. Cards and backgammon had their turn, but I grew tired of all, till at length, on the 2nd July we anchored off St Helena.

I went on shore in the afternoon and learnt with some vexation that a large fleet sailed only the day before. I wished to have written, specially as we were not bound direct to England. Many changes had happened in this curious little Island, during my twelve years absence. Few recollected me; but Captain Wall of the *Buccleugh* formerly chief officer of the *Valentine*, behaved with the greatest attention,—I shall ever acknowledge his kindness. Fresh provisions were very scarce, a drought had prevailed until this season for four years, and it would require three good seasons to repair the damage sustained, by their stock perishing for want of water—A circumstance happened during our stay, the like of which was not remembered by the oldest inhabitant, though from the appearance of the place, one would conclude such events were common—a large fragment of rock, detached by the moisture, fell from the side of Ladder Hill, on a small out-house at the upper end of the valley, in which two men were sleeping in separate beds. The stone broke thro' the top and lodged between them, the master of the house was suffocated, it is supposed, by the rubbish, as no bruises were found on his body, the other man forced his way through, and gave the alarm, but not time enough to save his companion. This accident has caused many to tremble for their safety, since



all the way up the valley, houses are built under similar projections, and will some time or other probably experience the same fate. Among the Alps such things are common. An unpleasant affair also occurred to me. I had, when last here, given a girl who had attended me from Calcutta, and behaved very ill, to Mrs. Mason, with whom I boarded, under a promise that she should not be sold, consequently no slave paper passed. Mr. Mason, however, in defiance of this prohibition, disposed of her for £10. This act militating against the established regulations, advantage was taken of my return to the Island, to call upon me as the original offender, not only for that sum, but a demand was made of £60 more, to pay the woman's passage back to Bengal with her two children!!! After every effort, I could only obtain a mitigation of £10, being forced to draw on my brother Preston at sixty days sight in favour of the Court of Directors, for £60, a sum that I could ill afford to lose, but the strong hand of power left me no alternative.<sup>47</sup> On the 6th July we quitted St. Helena, and on the 11th anchored off Ascension. Our Captain and the gentlemen went on shore to look at the Island. The following remarks I extract from his journal. "The soil near the sea, appears dry and barren in the extreme, like cinders from a fire; indeed the whole Island bears evident marks of the former existence of volcanoes, several craters still appearing on the hills; perhaps it owes its origin to some great convulsion of nature, as I am persuaded does St Helena: altho' the sea coast presents a dreary view, yet on walking farther the prospect becomes enchanting; a most delightful verdure covers the *smaller* hills, and the vallies; and no doubt they afford plenty of water, tho' not being very well, I was too much fatigued to examine. The 2nd officer saw five or six goats, but could not get near enough to fire at them."

Numbers of man-of-war birds and eggs were taken,

which proved to be good eating, they likewise caught the finest turtle I ever saw, weighing near 400lbs, but by an act of unpardonable negligence in people so situated, it was suffered to walk overboard in the night. We had however the good luck to catch a fine albercuore which weighed near 100lbs, its flesh when roasted resembled veal, we were fortunate in having an excellent cook on board, who really made the most of our scanty provisions. On the 3rd of August, three large ships hove in sight, one of which bore down towards us and fired several guns to bring us to. They sent a boat on board with orders for our Captain to attend the commander, he came back, to our great joy, in about half an hour, having been treated with much civility by the French Captain. It was now we heard the distressing news of Ostend being in the hands of the French, indeed they boasted of having gained the advantage every where, except in the West Indies—These were three frigates mounting from 28 to 32 guns, they had been 20 days, from Brest and had taken 22 prizes. We had been assured by Captain Wall, that the French dared not shew their *noses* in the channel, but I with sorrow now witnessed the contrary, not on my own account, being safe enough on board an American, but Captain C informed me, there were more than 200 English prisoners on board those ships—He now acquainted me with his determination to proceed to America, and very politely offered me a passage, that I might witness the disposal of my property, which I of course declined, not feeling the least desire to prolong my voyage. So having arranged my affairs in the best manner possible under existing circumstances, I took a final leave of the *Henry* on the 4th September, and landed with my baggage at Cowes in the Isle of Wight—From this place I soon reached London, pleased as I went, to behold scenes from which I had been so many years banished, and anticipating the delight with which my dear father would

receive his long absent child. Alas! I was doomed to behold him no more. He expired only four months before my arrival—The remainder of my family I had the happiness of finding in perfect health—The property sent to America came to a tolerable market, but Captain Crowninshield instead of making the returns in cash, sent a ship called the *Minerva*, with his younger brother Richard Crowninshield in command of her, which ship it was proposed that I should take out to India under certain conditions. She was a fine new vessel of about 300 tons burthen, I had her coppered, and proposed her first making a voyage to America, and on her return sailing for Bengal about Christmas. But when completely fitted for sea, with a *picked* cargo on board for Boston, she took fire by the bursting of a bottle of aquafortis, which had been negligently stowed among other goods, and though immediately scuttled and every precaution taken, sustained material damage. This involved me in a series of misfortunes. Mr. P. Wynne who had shipped to the amount of £428 on the *Minerva*, by mere accident discovered that, contrary to the general opinion, the Captain was responsible for all goods committed to his charge under regular bills of lading, and accordingly commenced an action against him, in which he was successful, the whole debt and costs near £600 falling on the Captain, and from his inability, on me. This decision caused a change in the tenor of bills of lading, which now contain clauses against fire and several other casualties, whereas before “the dangers of the seas” were alone excepted. Thus did my loss operate to the advantage of others. To prevent the total wreck of my little property, I was compelled to proceed immediately on the original plan, as affording the only chance of attaining independence, and ultimately securing a home in my native country.

Having resolved never again to travel alone, I engaged a Miss Tripler as a companion, for two years, at £30 per

annum; but had soon cause to regret the agreement. A proposl being made by my dearest friend Mrs Irwin to take out a young lady, who had been educated in England, and was going to rejoin her friends in Bengal, I felt no disposition to refuse, having frequently seen Miss Rogers and knowing her to be a most amiable little girl; besides as I had a piano-forte, and a pair of globes with me, and a good collection of books, I was pleased with the idea of contributing to *her* improvement, and amusing myself at the same time—The ship being obliged to touch at Guernsey, I determined to join her there, so, on the 17th July she sailed for that place Miss Tripler and my Bengal servant proceeding on her, as the most saving plan Here let me pause, reserving the account of my third voyage for another letter

I remain truly your's  
E. F.

## LETTER IV.

TO MRS. L.—

BLACKHEATH, 24<sup>th</sup> February, 1815

MY DEAR MADAM,

On Sunday the 2nd August 1795 at 5 A M Miss Rogers and myself, accompanied by Captain Richard Crowninshield quitted London for Southampton, from whence the packets sail for Guernsey. I did not leave my sister and nieces without deep regret, they were *always* very dear to me, but now, having lost my parents, the tie was drawn still closer; abstracted from this consideration, I rather rejoiced at quitting England, as the whole time of my stay had been imbittered by a succession of losses and disappointments, arising partly from my individual misfortune respecting the ship, and partly from the general state of commerce at this inauspicious period Alas! in the number of wretched Emigrants whom I saw crowding the port of Southampton, I felt that I had but too many fellow-sufferers, and it was easy to read in many a sorrowful countenance that, “the times were out of joint”

On arriving there, we were advised to go on by land to Lymington, and embark from thence, this gave me an opportunity of passing a few hours at Newtown Park, a short mile from *Lymington*, the residence of Mrs Irwin's sister Mrs P—n The house and grounds are strikingly beautiful, and an Observatory at the top of the former, commands an extensive view over the Isle of Wight, and great part of the channel; and Mrs P—n assured me,

that not long before, she saw from thence near four hundred vessels sail together. The wind becoming fair, we embarked on the 5th August, and next evening safely reached the *Mercator* at Guernsey. We found all on board greatly fatigued, the ship having arrived only the night before, after a most harassing passage of eighteen days. What an escape we had! On the 8th we went on shore, passed through the market, which appears to be well supplied, particularly with fruit, vegetables, poultry, and butter, we took a quantity of the latter, which lasted perfectly good all the way out. I was pleased with the market people, they were so remarkably clean and civil. The women wore bonnets with enormous stiffened crowns, underneath which, they had becoming laced mobs. Provisions are in general good and cheap, the fish excellent, such delicious soles I never tasted any where. We went to church and heard prayers both in French and English, a dialect of the former prevails here, but it is a vile jargon, I could scarcely understand one word in ten. This must be a very healthy place, I saw here a lady who, at the age of ninety-four, had full possession of her faculties, and I heard there were several others on the island nearly of the same age. Mr. Tupper, a gentleman to whom I had a letter, was in his 76th year, he and his whole family paid Miss Rogers and myself the greatest attention. I was surprised to see the magnificent style in which their house was fitted up, the drawing room stove was of silver, the curtains rich silk, with gilt cornices, the chimney piece cost eighty pounds, and every other article corresponding, but even these were trifling, when compared with the many capital paintings and valuable prints which adorned every room in the house. I afterwards found that the prevailing taste with the wealthy here, is for expensive houses, for the roads are so bad and steep, that single horse chaises are the only carriages in use. On the 17th August, Mr. J. Tupper came by appointment to

shew us the Island, of which we made almost the tour. The lands are highly cultivated, but such roads I never saw; they are barely wide enough to admit a chaise, fortunately we met only one, which backed for us to pass. I admire the exact manner in which the hedges are kept, they add great beauty to the prospect. I have seldom seen more picturesque views; the land and sea vallies are particularly striking. Their parties, though elegant, are by no means expensive, for liquors are duty free, and the best wines do not cost more than 16s per dozen, except claret, which is at from 25 to 28s. The hospitality with which we were all treated by this worthy family, excited the most grateful emotions, and I bade them adieu with sincere regret.

I am yours truly,

E F

## LETTER V.

BLACKHEATH, 25<sup>th</sup> February, 1815

MY DEAR MADAM,

We were a pretty large party on board, Mr Campbell, fresh from the Highlands of Scotland, on whom the officers were continually playing their jokes, Mr Smith, a youth going to the Madeiras, and Mr Regail, who was one of the most interesting young men I ever met with his manners were elegant, his mind highly polished, and his disposition placid and benevolent, but he appeared bending beneath a deep dejection, he never joined in conversation, if it were gay, he ate no more than barely sufficed nature, and tho' from politeness and native suavity, he never refused to join our evening parties at cards, yet his depression was visible even in the moments of amusement. He had been brought up in Russia, and had, for his age (which could not be more than 24) seen much of the world, and evidently mixed in the first society, and I apprehend some singular blight had happened in his fortunes.

On the 7<sup>th</sup> September we landed at Funchall, the Capital of Madeira. I was exceedingly delighted with our approach to the Island. the town is built on rising ground, and as you draw near to it, appears imposing and magnificent, having several churches and convents. Behind the town the ground rises abruptly into steep hills, covered with vineyards, and ornamented with pleasure houses, at once exhibiting the appearance of prosperity and cultivation, and



the charms of picturesque and romantic scenery —A Mr L — to whom I had letters, went with us to a Hotel, for unfortunately his lady being in England, he could not entertain us at his own house. Living in this manner was very expensive and disagreeable also, we paid 5s each for dinner, exclusive of wine, and neither the waiter, nor any other servant, understood a word of English, or any other language we could speak. It was only with the landlady we could have any communication. We found Funchall much less beautiful than its first appearance promised, the streets were ill paved, narrow, dirty and solitary, but the great church is a handsome building, and the hospital a very excellent one, before which is a fine fountain, which is always a refreshing sight in a country like this. The American Consul visited us the next morning, and invited us to his country house, for which we sat out at 5 o'clock. Miss R—s and I were in silk net hammocks, slung upon poles, and each carried by two men, who went at a great rate, considering the road lay up a steep hill, this is the only mode of conveyance, except riding on horse back, as no wheel carriages can be used in a country so hilly—They employ a kind of dray or sledge drawn by oxen to transport goods

We found a large party assembled, the lady of the house, a pleasant Irish gentlewoman, had all the frankness and hospitality of her country, and with her husband, a most amiable and companionable man, made us quickly forget we were strangers. Even the Portuguese ladies, seemed familiar with us, tho' unluckily we could not converse with them. We had a ball at night, but the weather being too warm for dancing, we exchanged it for whist. I cannot help observing here, how frequently people who travel, will find an advantage in knowing some thing of this game, as they may sit down with persons of different nations and languages and enjoy with them an amusement,

that for the time, admits of an interchange of ideas and facilitates good-will, even where conversation is denied. We sat down above thirty to an elegant supper, the grapes I found delicious here, but the season for other fruits was over. The vineyards are tended with unusual care; the grapes of which wine is made, are not suffered to ripen in the sun, which they told me is the reason of the superior flavour in Madeira wine. The Consul's house was most delightfully situated, it overlooked the whole town of Funchall, the surrounding country, and the wide spreading ocean, it had a beautiful garden, which produced abundance of peaches, apricots, quinces, apples, pears, walnuts, bananas, guavas, and pine-apples, and behind rose a fine grove of pine trees. I quitted this paradise with regret, and found my ride down-hill very fatiguing and disagreeable.

We staid here till the 21st, and by means of our first friend, spent several pleasant days, and gay evenings, but the weather was so intolerably hot, and the travelling so disagreeable, that if I had not been detained by business, I would much rather have passed my time on board. One day we went with the American Consul to visit a Convent of Ursulines; we found the Chapel door open, but were not suffered to pass the threshold. the nuns were very chatty, and like most ignorant persons, exceedingly curious, asking a hundred ridiculous questions. How very differently do human beings pass the time allotted them in this probationary existence! Surely, to consume it in supine indolence or "vain repetitions" can never render us more acceptable to Him, who is the fountain of light and knowledge. We ate some preserved peaches with them, which the Consul paid for, and then took our leave, but were forced to submit to a salute from the sisters, which we would gladly have dispensed with, for they all took an enormous quantity of snuff. These are the only nuns I ever saw who do not conceal their hair. On leaving these

pious ladies, we went to Golgotha, or the chapel of skulls, (as it is called) being entirely lined with skulls and other human bones What an idea!

We drank tea the same day, with Signor Esmerado, whose large house and extensive grounds once belonged to the Jesuits This is one of the richest families in the Island; the display of plate surprised me; the tea tray was the largest I ever saw, and of massive silver; wine and sweetmeats, were served in the same costly style. After tea there were several minuets danced, they with difficulty suffered us to depart, and were the means of introducing us to another pleasant evening party, where the lady of the house played remarkably well on the piano-forte, and sung in a style of superior excellence.

One day we went on horse-back, to visit the church of Nossa Senhora de la Monte, (our Lady of the Mount) about three miles from Funchall, upon a very high ground which must have cost a large sum in building. The ascent to it, is at least by a hundred steps. The church is not large, but richly ornamented. there is a wonder-working image of the virgin, in a chrystal shrine, very small, not more than two feet high, it looks exactly like a doll; but her little ladyship, however insignificant her appearance, had more votaries than any other saint on the Island. Here we saw some paintings, which considered as the work of a self-taught Genius, (and I was assured this was a fact) had extraordinary merit. In this little excursion, I was surprised to see the diversity of climate exhibited in a short distance; the vintage was over, below; while the grapes around us were like bullets, and I am told they never completely ripen, we observed the same effect in Mr. Murray's plantation, half a mile lower. This gentleman, who was the English Consul, had laid out above £20,000 in improving a spot, which after all, will never bring any thing to maturity; yet it is a most charming place, there are three ranges of gardens, one

above another, the lower are very large and well laid out, on a level, artificially formed, in the midst of which stands a good house, but not sufficiently elegant to correspond with such extensive grounds. In these are several reservoirs, containing gold and silver fish, which are supplied with water by small cascades, as as to be kept constantly full. Nor are Mr. Murray's improvements confined to his own estate, the road up to the mount and the wall which secures it, with many fountains, conduits, and reservoirs, were made by him. He has also opened many cross-paths, winding round the hill in the prettiest manner imaginable, with stone seats, and alcoves, to rest on from time to time, and has planted the hollows with chestnut trees, entirely at his own expence. Poor man! he had been obliged by ill health to abandon his little paradise, and was at this time in Lisbon. We afterwards called upon the British Vice-Consul Mr C——k, at his country seat, which was remarkable for its extensive prospect, we thought him and Mrs C very good kind of people, but were surprized to find that altho' the latter was English, she had resided abroad from infancy, and knew scarcely a hundred words of her native language.

Altho' we were certainly treated with much kindness and hospitality at this place, yet were we assured, that the inhabitants had little enjoyment of society with each other, that being all engaged in one line of merchandize, the pursuits of interest, were found to jar with those of good-fellowship, and that on the whole, Madeira was an unpleasant residence, except to the sick, and the way-faring

I am yours truly

E. F.

## LETTER VI.

TO MRS. L——.

BLACKHEATH, 28th February, 1815.

MY DEAR MADAM,

We were much tossed by the equinoctial gales on quitting Madeira, as might be expected; but on the 23rd September we obtained a sight of the peak of Teneriffe: all that day we kept standing in for the land, but to little purpose, as the mountains are too high to admit of approach, except in a calm. On the 26th we cast anchor in the road of Oratavia: the visit-boat came out, and as soon as our bill of health had been examined, the Captain was permitted to go on shore. I sent by him a letter which, Mr. P—— the American Consul at Madeira, had given me, and received in reply a most cordial invitation from Mr. and Mrs. Barry for Miss Rogers and myself, to take up our abode with them during our stay with which we thankfully complied in the evening. The appearance of this country, pleased me much better than Madeira, as it is more cultivated and better inhabited: the city of Oratavia constitutes a fine feature in the beautiful scene. We were received most kindly by the worthy couple who invited us, and at whose house we met with the best society in the Island. I greatly prefer the Spanish ladies to the Portuguese, finding them more easy in their manners, and much better educated. Many spoke French and Italian with facility, and several had been so connected with the English, as to

have attained enough of the language, to be tolerably intelligible in it. their persons were pleasing, and some would have been really handsome, but for the presence of Mrs. Barry, who altho' in her thirty-fourth year, I thought the most beautiful woman I ever beheld. She was in England just before Sir Joshua Reynold's death, and he declared repeatedly, that would his health permit him ever to take another picture, it should be Mrs. Barry's. Her height was commanding, with just enough of the *enbonpoint* to be agreeable. Dimples have been called "the first of the graces." I never saw a countenance display more of them, her smile was perfectly fascinating.

I was disappointed in my intention of ascending the Peak of Teneriffe, the season being too far advanced, and I was assured by many, that I was quite unequal at any time to have endured the fatigue. After travelling 15 miles over loose stones and rugged ascents, you find yourself still at the foot of the Peak, here it is necessary to remain till two in the morning, when the task of clambering begins, over pumice stone and ashes, and should you reach the top by sunrise, you may esteem yourself very fortunate. four hours are generally allowed for the ascent, and after all, should the Peak be enveloped in clouds, which is frequently the case, you have your labour for your pains, but on a clear day the view is truly sublime, you can distinctly see the seven Canary Islands, some assert that both the Continent of Africa and the Island of Madeira have been seen from hence, but I cannot suppose the human vision capable of extending so far, tho' I do not doubt that both places are comprehended within the immense horizon such a prodigious height may command. Having heard a very good account of Santa Cruz, which is between 20 and 30 miles across the Island, we determined to visit it, little aware of the roads we must encounter. Ladies here travel on Asses, on which are placed a sort of

armed chair, with cushions and a foot-stool, this plan appeared to be easy, but we soon found that the roads at Madeira, were bowling greens compared to these, how the poor animals that bore us, contrived to keep their legs, clambering over the rocks that from time to time had fallen in the path, I know not; the shocks they gave me I shall never forget. Mr. Barry had provided a cold turkey, wine &c. for a repast, and when ready for it, we went into a peasant's cottage, and dined comfortably, endeavouring to laugh away our fears and fatigues, the remains of our meal afforded a feast to the peasants, who live in a most wretched style, seldom tasting either meat, eggs, or milk. the mother of the mistress of the cottage was near eighty, and to see, with what eagerness the poor old creature watched every morsel we put into our mouths, was really affecting. Notwithstanding their coarse fare, the common people here, are a stout, hardy race, fair complexioned, well featured, and remarkably lively, as we found by our attendants, for as each animal has a man to guide it, we were almost stunned by their incessant chatter. Soon after dinner, we renewed our journey; my animal fell down, but I was not hurt, and for the next five miles, our road was easy, and lay over a delightful plain which brought us to the ancient city of Laguna, the Capital of the Island, which is tolerably large, well inhabited, and has two good churches, with several convents, from thence the road to Santa Cruz lay entirely on the descent, over large stones and fragments of rock. The jumbling was horrible, and *pour surcroit de malheur*, so strong a wind blew from the sea, that my whole strength was scarce sufficient to hold my umbrella, yet I did not dare give it up, the rays of the sun were so powerful, and the reflection from the stones intolerable. I was at one time so exhausted, that I declared I must give up the journey, but the creature I rode, carried me on in spite of me, and stopped not until we arrived at the house of Mr.

R——y in Santa Cruz, who gave us all a hearty welcome. This gentleman lived in a most delightful situation fronting the Mole, where notwithstanding our fatigue, we walked in the evening, when our good host got tipsy for joy, and with great difficulty allowed *us* to retire. Alas! weary as we were, the musquitoes would scarcely permit us to sleep; my companion suffered terribly from them.

Santa Cruz is indeed a fine place, and the country around, well deserves the pen of Mrs Ratcliffe to celebrate its cloud-capt mountains, vallies teeming with abundance, that in the language of Holy Writ, seemed to " Laugh and sing " beneath the eye of their majestic mountains, and here to render every *coup d'oeil* complete, the vast Atlantic occupies the front, and offers its immense world of waters to our contemplation

The most curious, perhaps I ought to say the most *interesting* circumstance that happened to me in this expedition, was the violent passion our kind entertainer conceived for me, and which was certainly opened in a manner perfectly new " My *dare* soul, what shall I do to *plase* you? Is it fifty pipes of wine you would like? but why will I talk of wine? you shall have my house, my garden, all I have in the world! at nine o'clock to-morrow I will resign every thing up to you, and by J—s if you'll consent to marry me, I'll be drunk every day of my life just for joy " Irresistible as the last argument was, my heart of adamant withstood it Poor R——y! never did a kinder heart, a more generous spirit exist, and but for a fault which indeed proceeded really from the warmth of his heart, he would have been a most agreeable companion, he was beloved by every one Poor man! let me here close his history, by recording that he was since killed by a shot in the streets of Santa Cruz, at the time of Lord Nelson's attack against it. We returned soon after this declaration, and found the road present objects of new



beauty, because we were a little more at ease in our conveyance, from habit.—We found a new guest with Mrs. Barry, a Mr. Edwards, who was just arrived from Turkey and attended by a native of that country; he was completely a citizen of the world, held a commission in the service of the Grand Signior, had been every where, and seen every thing; he was elegant, accomplished, and every way agreeable. Our fellow voyager Mr. Campbell, during all the time we were at Teneriffe, continued the butt of the Captain's jokes, in which others were too ready to join him; on our return, they persuaded him that his legs were swelled, which was ever the precursor of mortal disease in the Island. and the poor fellow submitted to be swathed in flannel, and dosed with every nauseous mess they gave him, with the utmost patience, until Mr. Barry's good nature released the victim, who was to be sure the most ignorant creature in the ways of the world, I ever met with.

I cannot omit to mention, that when we left Santa Cruz, one of Mr. B.'s servants walked over from Oratavia that morning, and returned with us apparently without fatigue, as he laughed and talked all the way home, tho' the real distance was fifty miles, and the badness of the roads of course rendered the exertion much greater, but I was assured this was not remarkable.

On the 6th October after breakfast, we took leave of our kind hosts: and here instead of putting on a semblance of concern, I was obliged to stifle my actual emotions, lest they should appear affected. I never recollect being equally moved at a separation, after so short an acquaintance. But Mrs Barry is so truly amiable, and we were treated with such generous hospitality by both parties, that it seemed more like a parting between near relations, than casual acquaintances. Since then Oceans have rolled between us, and time and sorrow have combined to efface the

traces of recollection in my mind of a variety of circumstances, yet every thing I then saw and enjoyed, is still fresh in my memory. Adieu, my dear madam, for a while believe me

Yours truly  
E. F.

## LETTER VII.

To MRS. L —.

BLACKHEATH, 1st March 1815.

MY DEAR MADAM,

On the 7th October 1795, we set sail from Oratavia with a fair wind, and as it continued, I was sorry we were obliged to stop at St. Iago, where we anchored, on the 13th, in Port Praya Bay. This Bay makes a noble appearance; the surrounding hills rising like an amphitheatre from the sea. The next morning we went on shore about eight o'clock, but were excessively incommoded by the sun, which in these climates rises very rapidly when once above the horizon. Signor Basto the Commandant of the Island, received us very politely, and most of the principal inhabitants came out to pay their respects to, and gaze at, the strangers; among the rest a tall Negro priest, whose shaven crown had a strange appearance. Signor B. led us to a summer house which he had built for the sake of *coolness*, and where there was indeed wind; but the air from a brick-kiln would have been equally pleasant and refreshing; while the glare was insupportable, as the place was open on all sides; fortunately I had brought a pack of cards, so to whist we sat, and his Excellency the Governor joined us, and did us the honour to play several rubbers; and as he spoke neither English nor French, I know not how we could have amused each other better, as I have observed before. An elegant dinner was provided for us, at which I was obliged to preside. In the evening we

walked out to see the country, which is well cultivated and highly picturesque; but the inhabitants make a wretched appearance, generally living in huts, even when they are rich. The sugar-cane raised here is remarkably strong, they have also very good cotton, which they manufacture into a pretty kind of cloth; but it is very dear, and exceedingly narrow, being only about a quarter wide. After tea we returned on board, tho' Signor Basto offered to accommodate us with a house to ourselves; but as it is considered dangerous to sleep on shore, we declined his offer, and bade him adieu with many thanks for his civilities. In the course of the day we learned, that this place is so unhealthy, that out of twenty who land here, fifteen generally die within six months. What a pity! every production of warm countries thrives here in abundance, but Man, who cultivates them, sickens and dies.

Our Captain here laid in a stock for a long voyage, and we set sail with a pleasant gale, the day following we caught a fine dolphin, I never saw any thing so beautiful as the colours it displayed when dying. On the 29th October we crossed the Line, and again poor Mr. Campbell was the butt of the party, he had been taught to expect a great shock on passing it, and really stepped forward to look at it, but the boatswain, who was his countryman, advised him to keep aloof; he however declared very seriously that, "he felt a very great shock, he must say, at the time." Nothing further occurred worthy of notice till our arrival at Madras, which took place on the 25th January 1796. I found this town much improved since my former visit, and was particularly pleased with the Exchange, which is a noble building, ornamented with whole length pictures of Lord Cornwallis, Sir Eyre Coote, and General Meadows. The Theatre and Pantheon, where the assemblies are held, are three miles from Madras. At this place we parted with poor Mr. Campbell. I shall never forget the agony of tears

I one day found him in “What is the matter” said I. “Miss Rogers is going away and I am *here*,” answered he, the words were very comprehensive; many young people will be aware that they express love and misery in the extreme. Poor Mr. C— must mourn in vain, for alas! “his love met no return.”

On the 6th February we again set sail, and were fortunately but little annoyed by the surf. On the 22nd we reached Fulta, where the pilot being over-anxious to get forward, made sail at night, when the soundings suddenly shallowing he found it necessary to cast anchor, tho’ not quite early enough, for in swinging round the ship struck. At first she lay easy, having made a bed in the sand, but when the tide came in, she heeled terribly, and it was the opinion of most on board, that she would never be got off. The chief officer advised us to secure whatever valuables we had, about our own persons, for fear of the worst, (which precaution I had already taken) and used all possible means for the preservation of the vessel himself. Happily the rising tide floated her off—You cannot judge of the acuteness of my feelings on this occasion; to see all my hopes and cares frustrated, and the quick transition from sorrow and disappointment on seeing the ship afloat again, without having sustained the least injury, can only be imagined, by those who have experienced such changes.

On Wednesday the 24th February we reached Calcutta in safety, where we remained several months. Here we found a resting place after a long voyage, diversified by many pleasant and perilous occurrences, and here therefore I shall make a pause in the narrative.

I remain,

My dear Madam,

Yours truly,

E. F

## LETTER VIII.

TO MRS. I

BLACKHEATH, 3rd March, 1815.

MY DEAR MADAM,

On Wednesday the 24th February 1796 (as I mentioned in the conclusion of my last letter) my feet once more pressed the ground of Calcutta. Miss Rogers, Miss Tripler, and myself, went directly to a large house which Mr. Benjamin Lacey had taken for us by my desire. We procured a freight for the *Minerva* and sent her off, within a month after her arrival. The ship had been detained so long on her passage from various causes, that our goods came to a very bad market, we were compelled therefore to sell part by retail, and dispose of the remainder by auction. A small copper bottomed ship called the *Rosalie*, a very fast sailer, was purchased, and the command given to Capt. Robinson, an American, who came out with us, and on the 26th of August following, I embarked on her, with Mr Benjamin Lacey and Miss Tripler, for the United States, after bidding a painful adieu to my dear young friend and companion Miss Rogers, whose place Miss Tripler had neither inclination nor ability to supply, but having fettered myself by an engagement, I was forced to submit, besides I could not well have proceeded alone.—We set sail with a fair wind, but a very strong current running astern. On the night of the 29th the water broke with such violence against the ship, that I called for dead-lights, but was assured by the Captain that there was not the *least* occasion

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My dear Madam,  
Yours truly,  
E. F.





for them; loth to be thought cowardly or an ignorant sailor, I instantly gave up the point, but had great reason to lament my acquiescence: in less than a quarter of an hour, a most tremendous sea broke in at the starboard side of the cabin, and half filled it with water, which soaked a bale of valuable muslins, with me their unfortunate owner. On this the pilot bawled out, that if the dead-lights were not put up instantly, he would cut cable and get under weigh, so at length they were fixed.—In the morning we had the additional mortification to find, that the ship had sprung a leak, and what was worse than all, that she appeared generally too weak to support the voyage, but as it would have been wrong to give her up without a trial, we proceeded with the tide to Ingillee, in the faint hope of the leak closing — On the 30th we reached the lower buoy of the Barabulla. Our leak still continuing to increase, on the 1st September we were obliged to put back for Calcutta. In the evening of the 4th, we anchored off Cooly Bazar, and the next day went on shore at Calcutta, where the *Rosalie* was examined, and pronounced totally unfit for the voyage.

On the 11th September I went on board the *Swallow Packet* with Captain Simson, who was a Guinea pig (as it is called) on board the *Camden* when I came out in 1784. He has been a very fortunate young man, so early in life to obtain a command. We had a very elegant repast or Tiffin, and I must say, Captain S seemed heartily glad to receive his old shipmate. Mr L— and Miss T— having accompanied me, the former was suddenly taken ill with an ague and fever. this added to the fatigue, loss, and disappointment, I had so lately endured, was very near too much for me. I brought him back, procured the best advice for him, and in a few days he was relieved, but before he was able to crawl out, I was in the same situation with a similar intermittent, but escaped the cold fit. I was exceedingly reduced but restored by the free use of bark, and other



To one whose eye has been fatigued with viewing the flat country of Bengal, this place appears delightful, but yet diversified prospects do not repay the want of fertile plains. Here I bought some beautiful sandal-wood and ivory boxes, for which this place is famous. Captain and Mrs. Hodson behaved to us with unbounded kindness. In the evening we quitted Vizagapatam. The town makes an agreeable appearance from the sea, not unlike St. James Valley in St. Helena. All who can afford it, live at Waltair, which however does not contain above ten houses.

On Friday the 24th February I once more landed on Madras Beach, and the day following saw many of my friends; among others Captain Gooch, who looked remarkably well: there is nothing more pleasant than to meet unexpectedly an old friend, after a long absence and in a foreign country. He dined with us, and every one was charmed with his behaviour, so different from many who on getting into commands, fancy that insolence establishes superiority.

On the 27th we dined at St Thomé, with Mr. Stevens, Mr. B Lacey's agent; in the evening we sat down to *vingt-un*, at a rupee a fish, which Mr. S. assured us was very low. I lost only two dozen. We rose from the card table at half past eleven, and for the honour of Madras hospitality, were suffered to get into our palanquins at that time of night, without the offer of a glass of wine to support us during a four miles' jumble, or a shawl to keep us from the damp air.

On the 2nd of March Captain Gooch paid us a farewell visit. I was a good deal affected at parting, how many thousand miles had each to traverse before we met again! At 5 P. M. we left Madras, there was scarce any surf, but the sea ran high. I found every thing very dear here, consequently made few purchases.

On the 4th of March we got under weigh at day break,

and set sail for a new country, towards which I now looked with eager expectation. On the 15th I had the misfortune to fall into the after-hold, which opens into the great cabin, the steward having carelessly left the scuttle open, while he went for a candle. I was taken up senseless, having received a severe blow on the head and many bruises, but thank heaven, no material injury. There was a large open case of empty bottles under the opening, and had I fallen the other way, I must have gone directly on it, judge what the consequences must have been.

About the 20th we began to be troubled with calms and southerly winds, when our Captain politely accused Miss Tripler and me of being two Jonahs, saying he never knew a good voyage made, where a Woman or a Parson was on board. I had a very agreeable revenge, for that very afternoon a breeze sprung up, which proved to be the trade wind, and for some time we enjoyed a fine run; but the ship was the most uneasy I ever sailed in, rolling and pitching on every occasion. On the 23rd of April a violent gale came on, and for several days we had very unpleasant weather. I was in great fear of the passage round the Cape, and we were all in trouble, as provisions ran very short— all our wine and spirits were expended, and we had neither butter, cheese, nor coffee remaining. On the 18th of May we arrived off False Bay, and on the 20th at noon, Mr D Trail the Harbour-Master came on board, and we cast anchor soon after. Mr. Lacey wrote to Lord Macartney for leave to proceed to Cape Town, as without his permission no passengers are suffered to land. We received a visit from Mr Gooch First Lieutenant of the *Jupiter*, an elder brother of Captain Gooch, of whose arrival at Madras we brought the first news. I called by invitation on Captain Linzee to look at the *Dort* late Admiral De Lucas' ship. Captain L. has been three years a Post Captain, tho' not yet four and twenty. When in command

of the *Nemesis*, he cut out two French vessels from some Mahomedan Port in the Mediterranean, and was afterwards taken himself. He but just saved his distance now, for hearing at Cape Town on his arrival ten days ago, that the *Dort* was under sailing orders, he sat off on horse-back, and arrived but twelve hours before she was to have sailed. Mr. Gooch brought Mrs Losack the wife of the Captain of the *Jupiter*, to visit me, and they took us with them on board that ship, where we drank tea and supped.

On Monday the 22d we went on shore at noon, and were received by Major Grimstone the Commanding Officer, who politely apologized for detaining us so long. At one, six of us mounted a waggon with eight horses, which to my great surprize were driven by one man in hand, at the rate of six miles an hour, over loose stones, or whatever else came in the way, so that we were almost jumbled to death. We passed three beaches, and to avoid quick-sands, they drove through the surf; the roaring of which, the horses splashing as they galloped along, added to the crack of the driver's long whip, formed altogether a charming concert. As the driver cannot wield these enormous instruments with one hand, another man sits by to hold the reins, while by lengthening or shortening his arm he dexterously contrives to make every horse in turn feel the weight of the lash. At length we reached Cape Town in safety, but were terribly tired and bruised. Between the beaches, the road (such as it is) passes along stupendous mountains, from whose craggy tops, masses of stone are continually falling, some of them large enough to crush a church, many have rolled into the sea, where they form a barrier against the surf, and may defy its force for ages.

We heard that the former Governor, General Craig, sailed from hence on Tuesday preceding, he was once forced to put back, but the second attempt succeeded.

There were no less than six vessels here. The flag was

struck on the 15th, and would not be hoisted again until the 15th August, during which interval the Dutch suffered no ships to remain in Table Bay. Our people are not so cautious, perhaps, experience may render them so. I like the appearance of the place, for altho' the houses are generally low, they occupy much ground, being built of stone, or covered with plaster, and containing five or six rooms on a floor, they look well, and though with only one upper story, yet the ceilings being lofty, they do not seem deficient in height. The church is handsome, the service is performed in Dutch and English, there are no pews but benches and chairs, which I greatly prefer, as it gives the idea of social worship more, and is consistent with that equality, which in the more immediate presence of God, becomes his creatures, as being equally dependant on Him. It is true this was partly lost here, because the Governor and his family use benches, covered with crimson velvet. We sat off after service for Simon's Town and reached the ship at 4 P. M. On Monday Mr Gooch took us in the morning to see the *Tremendous*, Admiral Pringle's ship. Here we saw furnaces for heating balls.

On Wednesday the 31st we dined on board the *Dort*, where we met Captain and Mrs Losack, Lord Augustus Fitzroy, Captain Holles of the *Chichester*, and Captain Osborne of the *Trusty*, we went and returned in Captain L—'s barge. Next day we dined on board *L'Imperieuse* with Lord Augustus Fitzroy. In addition to our yesterday's party were Captain Stevens of the *Rattle-Snake*, Captain Granger of the *Good Hope*, Captain Alexander of the *Sphinx*, Mr Pownall Naval Officer and his wife, and Mr Trail. His Lordship gave us a most magnificent dinner, and to my great joy, was too much the man of fashion, to urge the gentlemen to hard drinking, as had been the case on board the *Dort*. He has an excellent band. When we retired Mrs. Losack and Mrs. Pownall entered into con-

versation, about the Cape, which they both agreed was the vilest place imaginable; Mrs. L— is a fine dashing lady. Since her marriage, the *Jupiter* has been on a cruize I asked her if they were ever fired upon. “Oh yes, from a battery and returned the fire” “Did you go below?” “Not I indeed.” “Then I suppose you must have been greatly alarmed for fear of being shot?” “Why to tell you the truth I was so much engaged in observing how they loaded the guns and manœuvred the ship, that I *never* once thought of danger.” There is a courageous lady for you!

We played at whist in the evening and retired at eleven Captain Alexander took us on board in his Barge. On the 4th of June the Admiral, at one, fired two guns, then all the Men of War in the Harbour followed with twenty one each: the effect produced by the reverberation from so many stupendous rocks was most noble! Mr. Gooch and the Doctor came on board to take leave, and on going away, the boats crew gave us three cheers, which our people returned. On the whole, our time passed here pleasantly; the politeness of my Countrymen, contrasted with the manners of our American officers served to soothe the irritation of our minds, and teach us to endure that for a season, with patience, which we had often found to be a trial of our spirits and temper, in the hopes of meeting by and by with Gentlemen.

On the 5th of June the wind was as foul as it could blow, and split our only main sail. It is a great misfortune to sail in a vessel ill provided with stores and necessaries: we had an opportunity of observing this day, what a good ship can perform; *L'Imperieuse* Frigate being ordered on a cruize, got under weigh at noon, passed us at 3 p. m and was safely out before night. Lord Augustus was polite enough to hoist his colours while going by, and struck them immediately afterwards Our Captain was too much of a Yankee

however to return the compliment I forgot to mention, that yesterday four large ships came in, they proved to be the *Rose*, the *Hillsborough*, and the *Thurlow* East India-men, under convoy of H M 74 Gun ship the *Raisable*.

On the 8th of June we were still in sight of Simon's Town, though we were out two days. On the 11th of July we crossed the equinoctial Line, and I felt satisfied in thinking, that I was once more in my own hemisphere. There are cases in which it is wisdom to please ourselves with trifles, at this time my spirits were very low, and sunk with what I might now term a presentiment, as I approached another people and another world, which was eventually the grave of that property, for which I had toiled so long. On the 28th of August a pilot came on board from Philadelphia, and from him we had the mournful account, that a sickness raged in the city, almost as fatal as that which ravaged it a few years before, and that a general distress prevailed in America frequent Bankruptcies, Trade at a stand, and an open war with France daily expected, as they took every thing from America which fell in their way—As we did not like to proceed to Philadelphia after hearing this account, we tacked and stood to the northward, but we had a succession of vexatious hindrances, having narrowly escaped shipwreck in Egg Harbour, and did not reach New York till the 3rd of September, when we landed at 6 in the evening, and went immediately to a house recommended by my friend Captain Crowninshield, most happy to part with the strange beings with whom we had been so long and painfully immured

Now having arrived in the land of Columbia, I will bid you adieu for a while.

I am, My dear Madam,  
Yours truly,

E. F.



*Advertisement.*

The work had been printed thus far when the death of the author took place. The subsequent parts of her journal, not appearing to contain any events of a nature sufficiently interesting to claim publication, no additional extracts have been deemed necessary by the administrator, who from a view of benefiting the estate has been induced to undertake the present publication.



Society. The Fays did not see anything of the English community while at Alexandria, but, though small, it already existed. A Dane, who landed twenty years earlier, says:

The English keep themselves quiet and conduct themselves without making much noise. If any nice affair is to be undertaken they withdraw themselves from it and leave to the French the honour of removing all difficulties. When any benefits result from it they have their share, and if affairs turn out ill they secure themselves in the best manner they can.

<sup>6</sup> P. 70. MR BRANDY. The news the Consul brought was bad. the previous Suez caravan had been plundered. Mrs Fay dare not put this in her letter for fear of the Turkish censor (p. 90)

<sup>7</sup> P. 76. ROSETTA. 20 miles from Alexandria, and 10 from the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. It was then a prosperous city. Edward Wortley Montagu (Lady Mary's son) had, until recently, lived there in semi-Oriental state (Nichols, *Literary Anecdotes*, iv 640). The place is still delightful, though the sands are choking it; in the nineteenth century when Alexandria expanded, it decayed.

<sup>8</sup> P. 77. THE PYRAMIDS. There are of course the three Gizeh pyramids, visible long before boat or tram reaches Cairo. The Great Pyramid is 451 feet high. What does "steps three feet distant of" mean? Probably "of" should be "on."

<sup>9</sup> P. 78. GEORGE BALDWIN was the East India Company's agent at Cairo. He reported at length to Calcutta on the hardship endured by the English in Egypt, and particularly on the catastrophe of the Suez caravan, which Mrs Fay is about to describe. (India Office Records. Original Consultations of the Supreme Council for December 23, 1779.) Baldwin says that if his advice had been followed all would have been well, with which, however, the Supreme Council did not concur.

<sup>10</sup> P. 78. MRS FAY'S DRESS. See frontispiece, also note, p. 24. If, as is probable, the picture was done in India, she must have brought her costume safely through the various misfortunes of the journey.

<sup>11</sup> P. 81. CUTTING OF THE CANAL. This was the Khalig Canal (now filled up). The ceremony dated back to Ancient Egypt, and had at one time involved human sacrifice. The dyke was broken when the river, as measured by the Nilometer on the Island of Rodah opposite, had risen to 16 cubits. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, ch. xxvii., has a detailed account.

<sup>12</sup> P. 85. MR FAY'S LETTER: the only example of his epistolary style, and the only indication that his wife had been a Mrs C. If C should happen to be a misprint for P, then her maiden name would be Preston (p. 242)

<sup>13</sup> P. 86 *seq.* THE NATALIA AND THE PLUNDERED CARAVAN. A note is now due on this mysterious and agitating subject. Mrs Fay had to bottle herself up so long as she was on Egyptian soil, once on the *Natalia*, she



later, and to have introduced him as Judas Iscariot into a picture of the Last Supper—having induced him to sit on the understanding that he was representing St John. The picture is still in St John's Church, Calcutta Mr Tulloh (if he it be) appears as a robust and handsome man But Zoffany quarrelled with so many people that there is a doubt which he selected for Judas, some say it was a Mr Paull

Tulloh & Co sold Mrs Fay's effects after her death

<sup>17</sup> P 107 JOHN HARE How she loathes this chattering mannikin! Wm Hickey (i. 274) did not find him so bad "A genteel-looking young man of very slight form and apparently in bad health"; they met in London in 1772 Hare built up a good practice at Calcutta, he and Fay were both employed to defend J A Hicky, the editor of the *Bengal Gazette* (p 183), he became sheriff of the city in 1782 His end was tragic He was returning home overland (1784) with letters of introduction from Sir Elijah Impey to Lord Thurlow, and he had some diamonds with him which he allowed his attendants to see, they murdered him and threw the body into the Euphrates Thus the ostentation and expansiveness that Mrs Fay censures proved his death She certainly sums up his faults well; and his letter to Sirdar Khan (quoted on p 277) fully bears out her charge of pomposity But he was probably nicer than she says We must never forget that she herself was a most trying woman, particularly on a boat, and that Mr Hare would not have found her table manners funny, or appreciated her contempt for the violin

<sup>18</sup> P 110 *seq.* IMPRISONMENT AT CALICUT This important episode calls for detailed comment

Names of the prisoners Mr and Mrs Fay, Mr and Mrs Tulloh, Mr. Hare and his servant Lewis, Mr Taylor, Mr Manesty, Mr Fuller, and one other, possibly John the Gunner The Fays were imprisoned from November 5, 1779, to February 17, 1780, the others got free on December 16

Place the English Factory (Residency) at Calicut, then the Fort, then back to the Factory

Calicut was an old Hindu city The name, Calicoda, means "cock crowing", a cock was supposed to have crowed on the fort, and the city to extend so far as the sound could carry Hyder Ali acquired it peaceably from the Hindu ruler (Zamorin) in 1766, but had to reconquer it in 1773 His brother-in-law, Sirdar (Sudder) Khan was now governor When the *Natalia* arrived war with the English was contemplated, and the English factor had already fled The *Natalia* was a Danish boat—hence the appeal to the Danish factor Passavant—and her captain was French, but Sirdar Khan rightly surmised that the chief financial interests in her were English The Fays roused his suspicions first by refusing to place themselves under Danish protection He began by imprisoning them, and added the other passengers in a few days The imprisonment was monstrous Nevertheless, Hyder Ali had

pool reason to suspect English intrigues against him that autumn. He was driven out of Calicut in 1782. His son Tipu Sultan got it back in 1789. It is now British. The population is largely Moplah—fanatic and turbulent to day as in Mrs. Fay's time.

We possess—most fortunately!—the portentous memoir that Mr. Hare drew up and presented to Sirdar Khan on November 18, just after he had been robbed of his luggage. (Quoted in *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. xii, 257 seq. He sent it in duplicate to Madras, and it has thus been preserved in the I. I. C. archives.) It entirely confirms Mrs. Fay's account—also her estimate of Mr. Hare's character and oratory. How sublime is its exordium!

Your Memorialist begs leave in the first place to remind your Excellency that the Humanity and Policy of enlightened ages have suggested Certain Rules of universal Conduct under the denomination of the Laws of Nations.

That the progress of civilisation has tempered and refined these Laws, so that a turn of attention to them forms in some measure the perfection of National Character.

In violation of public peace and alliance between the powers of the Nabob and Great Britain, nine English subjects have been seized by an armed force and their persons confined without the necessaries of life, separated from their property, the whole of it has been violently plundered and such parts of it as remained are damaged and rendered useless by the salt water.

Their imprisonment being in the first instance against and contrary to the Law of Nations is aggravated by circumstances of peculiar and wanton cruelty. The indecent tone and insolence of the numerous force which constitute their Guard, molest equally their peace by Day and their rest by Night, their situation is moreover destitute of every domestic convenience and consolation, and the whole of their money has been taken from their chests and publicly confiscated (Rs. 6000 in all).

Sirdar Khan was unmoved. On January 1, 1780, a letter from Mr. Passavant, the Danish factor, was received by Mr. Church, the English factor, at Tellicherry (*Bengal Past and Present*, iii, 168), and no doubt it was partly owing to this letter that Mr. Church sent his ill-omened assistance to the Fays.

Meanwhile the missionary Schwartz was at Seringapatam, trying to patch things up between Hyder Ali and the Madras Government, but he did not know of the Calicut outrage. A second mission was now despatched under George Gray with a letter from the Governor of Madras to Hyder Ali, requesting the release of "Mr. Hare and ten other Europeans" (Feb. 1780). Gray reports on his arrival that they had all been released by February 17—the very date Mrs. Fay's narrative implies. Gray's own reception was cold, and in the following June the war started. The Fays only just escaped.

If they had been sent up country as Captain Ayres advised (p. 124), how would they have fared? The answer is to be found in two most interesting

little memoirs, *The Imprisonment of James Scurry*, published in 1824, and *The Imprisonment of James Bristow*, published 1794. Scurry and Bristow were two young sailors, captured by the French admiral during his naval operations and handed over by him to Hyder Ali. They remained in the interior several years, drilling recruits. They were circumcised and went semi-native and Bristow was assigned a wife, from whom he parted with great regret when peace was declared. Similar experiences would doubtless have overtaken Mr. Fay.

<sup>19</sup> P 124. She got the information about this plot from West in Calcutta (p 187)

<sup>20</sup> P 134. THE NAYHIRS—i.e. NAIRS—are a Hindu community who interest anthropologists. They practise matriarchy and to a certain extent polyandry also. Mrs Fay is wrong in supposing they were attacking the English. On the contrary the English had instigated them to rebel against Hyder Ali, and their operations near Tellicherry were probably to this end. The rebellion was soon crushed.

Mahe was another cause of dissension between Hyder Ali and the English (p 17).

<sup>21</sup> P 135. KANHOJI ANGRIA was a Mahratta freebooter of the earlier eighteenth century who infested the western coast, sometimes he is called an admiral. For his encounters with the English in Bombay, see Clement Downing, *History of the Indian Wars*, recently edited by W. Foster.

<sup>22</sup> P 137. CALICUT see note on p 276

<sup>23</sup> P 164. MR POPHAM and his projects made much dust in Madras at this time. When William Hickey landed in 1783, he was erecting sixty houses at once, having purchased as building material the stranded hull of an East Indiaman. He came to grief, so did every one who trusted him. "A hard marriage settlement, some extravagance, and Mr. Stephen Popham have forced me to quit my country perhaps for ever," complains a Mr. William Cane, and a Mrs Augusta Barclay censures "his *peculiarities*, I must not presume to use a stronger word," and is glad to feel that she sees as little of him as possible. (Hickey, vol iii *passim*.)

<sup>24</sup> P 166. ST THOMAS MOUNT. There are two "Mounts" near Madras connected with St Thomas. A legend brings him to India to found Nestorian Christianity on the "Little Mount" by the banks of the Adyar. There he was pierced by the lance of a Brahmin, and ran six miles in a wounded condition to the "Great Mount," where he died (A D 68). It is the Great Mount to which Mrs Fay refers. The church on the summit was built by the Portuguese in 1547, when Nestorianism was dying out, it contains early inscriptions, also a picture of the Virgin Mary by St. Luke, which St Thomas

brought with him from Palestine. He is buried in a third locality, Saint Thome, close to Madras, on the shore.

21 P 174 THE CHAMBERS were Mrs Fay's chief protectors at Calcutta. Sir Robert (1737-1803) had gained distinction in England, Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford, friend to Dr Johnson, whom he made laugh immoderately for reasons not obvious to Boswell (Boswell, iii 304). He came East in 1774, as judge in the Supreme Court. Here he did not increase his reputation, being weak in the Nuncomar trial, and generally undignified and frivolous. William Hickey addressed him as a "contemptible animal" (iii 255), on which "a look of surprise pervaded the whole Court," but the animal took no action. J. A. Hickey satirised him as Sir Viner Plant in the *Bengal Gazette*. Chambers became Chief Justice after Impey's resignation, and returned to England in 1799.

His wife, Fanny, was the daughter of the sculptor Joseph Wilton. She was renowned for her beauty, smartness, and goodness. At the age of sixteen she "stood for Hebe at the Royal Academy," and in later life composed a volume of family prayers.

Old Mrs Chambers was also of the party. Also several children, one of whom perished on the *Gracioso*. Their Calcutta house was probably in Old Post Office Street; they acquired a good deal of property, and had some country estates; they have a vault in the South Park Cemetery. Mrs Fay does not mention them in her subsequent visits, possibly they had seen sufficient of her.

22 P 175 MRS HASTINGS Anne Maria Apollonia Chapuset (Marian), Hastings' second wife. They fell in love coming out on the boat. She was still married to a Baron Imhoff, whom she did not care for and who did not care for her. A divorce was arranged after the trio reached India, and she and Hastings were married in 1777, and lived together for many happy years. "An unsavoury episode," complain the historians. A contemporary writes "She has a good person and has been very pretty, is sensible, lively, and wants only to be greater mistress of the English language to prove she has a great share of wit." When Mrs Fay called on her, she was about 43. Zoffany has painted her. "Belvidere House" raises a small difficulty, for Hastings had sold the bungalow bearing that name a few months before Mrs Fay's visit, the present residence of the Governor of Bengal is on its site.

23 P 176 NORTH NAYLOR, the Company's attorney, had given Hastings advice which the Supreme Court held to be illegal and, after a complicated quarrel, he was committed to prison for contempt of court. He developed dysentery in the Calcutta Jail, and, though he was released, died soon after.



" P. 121. Food. From various passages it is clear that our horses was of the hungry type. People who write long letters often are. That very June "the Surgeon of an Indian ship died after eating a heavy dinner of beef, mutton and being 90." *Burmes, Old Calcutta*; but the writing did not deter her. She ate and ate till she ended—expensive, pork, mutton, mutton, preserved peaches, &c.

" P. 123. THE CALCUTTA GAZETTE, a respectable Government paper, did not appear till 1784. It was then called the *Bengal Gazette*. A respectable reality, and interesting as the first paper to be published in India. J. A. Hickey, editor. First published, February, 1780. Here is a specimen of its text:

A few days ago a dispute arose between two young gentlemen and many others from Southampton about a lady of a very complicated. The friends of each party of some apprehensions that a duel would have been the consequence, but it happily ended in a reciprocal estrangement.

Here is a poem from it:

O lovely Sue  
How sweet art thou.  
Thou'rt never more art true.  
Thou'rt gone as far  
Ere I can see  
As never can I see thee.

A footnote explains that "thou" must be pronounced as in Scotland. The paper was suppressed in 1782 because of its attacks on Hastings and general dissension and vulgarity (*Burmes, Essays of Old Calcutta*, 122-222). J. A. Hickey was successfully defended by Anthony Fay.

" P. 125. DON FRANCIS FRANCHI AND HASTINGS. In the words of a contemporary Mohammedan historian: "At the end of Peshwa or the beginning of Talaran both parties, according to the established custom of the nation, went out by themselves and fought with pistols. The Governor being befriended by destiny came off victorious, but Mr. Franchi was wounded. As he was pronounced to live a great deal more, the pistol ball, although it entered at his right side, did neither break the bone nor even reach the vein. It stopped between bone and flesh and in a few days he was cured."

They had quarrelled over an alleged promise of Francis not to interfere with the military operations that Hastings was conducting. Had he, or had he not given such a promise? The provocative minute was really Hastings', not Francis'. It is full of deliberate insinuation such as "I judge of his public conduct by my experience of his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honesty." A challenge arrived in due course. Francis, who had courage entered in his journal for August 16 "Employed in settling my affairs, examining papers, &c., in one of the worst—dead work." They met

under the "Trees of Destruction" near the Alipore Bridge Much gentlemanly business—enquiries and so on—ensued, and just as much hatred and suspicion remained They achieved a certain amount of pleasure for an old village woman who happened to be passing and thought the encounter between the mad sahibs great fun (Busteed, *Echoes from Old Calcutta*, ch 6) And Hastings was so far successful that Francis did not interfere further on the Council, but shortly after left for England

<sup>31</sup> P 186 COLONEL BAILLIE defeated by Hyder Ali near Madras (Sept 1780), and carried away as prisoner to Seringapatam, where he died in misery two years later His misfortunes recall her own imprisonment to her

Her hopes of Sir Eyre Coote were justified He checked Hyder Ali at Porto Novo, and ended the invasion of the Carnatic (1781) His previous Indian career had been distinguished fought at Plassey He died at Madras, and on her next visit she sees a picture of him in the Exchange there (p 261)

<sup>32</sup> P 188 ROWLAND JACKSON a doctor of ability, who had lost his estates in Ireland owing to a lawsuit, and was obliged to take service in India He wished to be appointed "Physician" to the Calcutta Hospitals, which Hastings opposed, on the ground that the other practitioners were only "surgeons," and that the distinction was unfair He died in 1784 His son's name was Edward, the name of the young lady whom Edward married was Phœbe Tutting, the other young lady's name was Maria Chantry (Firminger)

<sup>33</sup> P 190 JOHN HYDE one of the judges in the Supreme Court A fantastic and hospitable person The "public breakfast" is described in detail by Wm Hickey Hyde's house was close to the Court (site of present town hall), so the Bar procession had not far to go He was himself a hearty feeder satirised by J A Hicky as "Turkey Cram" His notebooks at Calcutta contain (says Firminger) several references to Anthony Fay, but I have not had the opportunity of examining them He died at Calcutta, 1796

<sup>34</sup> P 192 THE HARMONICON—dancing house, concert hall, and tavern—stood in the Lal Bazaar, opposite the Jail

<sup>35</sup> P. 193 LADY COOTE, wife to the Commander-in-Chief Her father had been Governor of St Helena

<sup>36</sup> P 194 THE PLAY HOUSE, "erected in 1775, stood close to the north-west corner of the present Lyon's range" (Firminger) It consisted of pit and boxes, Mrs Fay, for her gold mohur, would have sat in a box This particular performance of Otway's *Venice Preserved* made a stir The *Bengal Gazette* of February 11, 1781, says of it "Captain Call played Jaffier admirably well, and may be styled the Garrick of the East. Mr Norford played Belvidera with such an amorous glow of features and utterance—and was so characteristic in the description of madness—as to procure him (as usual) universal applause "

<sup>37</sup> P 198 HENRY WATSON. chief engineer at Calcutta, also ship-builder and speculator in marine stores He had lately quarrelled with the Government over his dock-scheme, and had acted as second to Philip Francis in the Warren Hastings duel (p. 185) His retention of Mr. Fay might well alarm Eliza, it showed that her husband had gone over to the opposition, and turned against Impey and Chambers, his former patrons Did he now send Mr Fay back to England, to prepare the impeachment against Impey? And did Mr Fay make a muddle of this, as of everything else he touched? Probably Watson had a superb house on Garden Reach He loved Calcutta, and did not leave it until he was dying (1785) He bequeathed his fortune of £300,000 to his natural daughter; his widow only inherited the dock projects, but she did well out of it in the long run

Mrs Fay's account of her husband is confirmed by an illuminating and scathing passage in the Impey MSS (B M 16260) Writing from Patna, under the date of August 31, 1781, Sir Elijah Impey speaks of Colonel Watson's hostility and then continues

This very man is at this time pushing his animosity against me in another way There is a very low man here of the name of Fay, who had been called to the Bar in England, and, therefore, I thought it proper he should be admitted an advocate here This man at Watson's instigation as I believe has drawn the paper a copy of which I herewith transmit

He entertains him, as I am informed, in his house, and means to send him to England with the paper Fay sent it to me in an hand imitating printing He did not say who was the prosecutor employing him

<sup>33</sup> P 201. CHINSURAH, a Dutch settlement on the Hoogh, was seized by the English as soon as news of hostilities with Holland reached them — i.e. in July 1781. It was finally ceded to us by treaty in 1824

<sup>32</sup> P. 201. MRS WHELER. Charlotte, second wife of Edward Wheeler, member of Council, important people Mrs Fay's misfortunes seem to have raised her into society from which she subsequently sank

<sup>40</sup> P 202 CHURCH AT CALCUTTA There was none for the moment, St John's was not begun until 1783. When Mrs Fay returned to Calcutta and set up a millinery establishment, her shop abutted on to its graveyard. The sacred edifice, whose absence she had deplored, then became a nuisance, for the Vestry erected a wall which deprived her shop of light and air. She wrote complaining Her letter must be quoted in full, since it is the only additional letter extant, and it is not without native acidity.

To the Rev Mr Blanshard, the Rev Mr Owen, Mr Cockerell, Mr Thornhill, Mr Sealey, Mr Johnson, members of the Church Vestry

13th April, 1789

GENTLEMEN—Pardon the freedom I use in making an application, which I flatter myself, however, will be attended with success having nothing for its object that can in the smallest degree injure the property of the Church.

Permit me then to acquaint you that, about five years since, I became an inhabitant, and, sometime after purchaser of the house I now reside in, formerly the Post Office, and forms the south-west boundary of the old burying-ground, now the compound of the New Church. At the period I mention, the lower floor was nearly as habitable as the upper one, but shortly after, a considerable part of it was rendered almost useless, in consequence of a wall being built up against the window, so close as to prevent the recession of either light or air. There is also great reason to apprehend that from the accumulation of damp between the walls and the house, and the want of a free ventilation, walls of the latter will sustain material injury.

Suffer me, therefore, to request, Gentlemen, that you will have the goodness to take the subject of this letter into consideration, and be pleased to allow that part of the wall, which stands against my house, to be taken down, or such openings to make in it, as may suffice to restore the premises to their former usefulness—I am, Gentlemen, Your most humble servant,

ELIZA FAY

(Quoted by Firminger from the St John's Church records)

41 P 209 WILLIAM HOSEA had been seventeen years in the Company's service, his wife's name was Mary. The *Grosvenor* met with a terrible catastrophe, to which Mrs Fay never refers: the captain ran the ship ashore at night on the east coast of Africa, in the neighbourhood of Delagoa Bay (Aug 4, 1782). One hundred and thirty-five people survived the wreck, including four ladies and two children. They tried to march southward to the Cape, but got into difficulties with the natives, and only three (seamen) arrived. See *Bengal Past and Present*, vol II No 3, for the official account, also Hickey, II 199. Rumours of young savages with light skins led to the theory that the ladies had married with their captors, and borne offspring.

Mrs Fay nearly met with a similar disaster on the *Valentine* (p 219)

42 P 212 SUFFREN AND HUGHES They fought five engagements on the Coromandel Coast, which won the admiration of experts (Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, 1660-1783, ch XII). Suffren was a charming character and an accomplished admiral. Hughes was solid and second-rate, as his picture at Greenwich suggests, but his action was largely responsible for keeping the French out of India.

43 P 216 THE VALENTINE The log of this vessel records the embarkation of Mrs Fay and her luggage at Barrabola Head, also, though in guarded terms, the disgraceful muddle off the African coast. The name of the ship-surgeon who attended Mrs Fay for colic, and with whom she was subsequently accused of flirting, was Patrick Ivory (India Office Records Log 452, G)

44 P 221 THE CHAPMAN I have ventured to repunctuate this passage. The text of 1817 reads, "On board which were Mr Casamajor and his mother, who secured accommodations on the *Lord North*." Not

choosing to venture farther on the *Chapman*, upon which I was applied to . . ." The grammar is too queer even for Mrs. Fay; nor do the sentence make sense. Vaguely disapprobatory, Archdeacon Firminger has, without comment, substituted *Valentine* for *Chapman*. But by putting a comma after *Lord North* and a full stop after *Chapman*, the situation becomes intelligible.

<sup>45</sup> P. 232. MR. LEWIN. Thomas Lewin (1755-1843) of the Madras Civil Service.

<sup>46</sup> P. 239. MISS HICKS. Register of St. John's, Calcutta, March 19, 1785: "John Lacey, a bachelor, shopkeeper, to Ann Hicks, single woman. T. Blanchard, Chaplain."

<sup>47</sup> P. 242. SLAVE GIRL AT ST. HELENA. This is the worst action recorded of Mrs. Fay. It aroused great indignation locally (India Office Records, St. Helena, 57). She stranded the girl on the island in 1782, probably in payment of a bill. The girl was no fool, and, on discovering that her late mistress was plying by on the *Henry*, she at once went to the Governor and denounced her. In her deposition she "made oath on the Holy Evangelists that she was called Kitty Johnson as her supposed Father was Johnson the Governor's Groom at Calcutta, that her Mother's name was Silvia, a Free Woman, half cast, and she believes that a woman, called Peg Chapman, her supposed godmother, sent her to service to Mrs. Fay, then Martha Mather at Calcutta." Kitty goes on to say that Mrs. Fay was following her husband to England and "was intimate with the Doctor of the Ship going home, and as the Depment knew of it Mrs. Fay did not like to keep her" (cf. p. 217). She further complains that she has been left without her consent, sold into slavery, and ill-treated; has now two children and wishes to return to her mother who is said to be alive. The Governor then summoned Mrs. Fay. In her statement she keeps a dignified silence about the doctor, merely remarking she left Kitty on the island "on account of her bad behaviour as a present to Miss Betty Mason, but did not suppose she would have been sold." The Governor took a serious view, and told Mrs. Fay she must either settle the matter or remain to stand her trial. Accordingly she drew a Bill for £60 on "my brother Thomas W. Preston" (presumably her brother-in-law); £10 were to purchase Kitty's freedom, £40 for her passage with her babies to Bengal, and £10 for maintenance on arrival.

Slavery was of course still a normal part of Anglo-Oriental life. "Two Coffee boys, who play remarkably well on the French Horn, about eighteen years of age, belonging to a Portuguese Paddie lately deceased. For particulars enquire of the Vicar of the Portuguese Church": thus runs a Calcutta advertisement in 1781. Cf. also William Hickey's *Nabob* (vol. II), and the lady presented to him by Bob Pott. At St. Helena, probably on account of this scandal regulations were passed which compelled the owners of slaves to teach them some useful profession and to produce

them at Divine Service at least once a fortnight (India Office Records, as above, the volume also records the accident of the stone that fell on Ladder Hill)

49 P 265 DR HARE eminent Calcutta doctor He treated W Hickey

What are Hartley and Hare to grim Dr Death

Who moves slowly, but perfects the cure?

Their prescriptions may rob me too soon of my breath

And heighten the pains I endure

*Bengal Gazette, 1780*

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LECT'  
XXVIV.

Synthesis  
necessary  
after ana-  
lysis

“It is true, indeed, that after having decomposed everything, we must, as it were, return on our steps by recomposing everything anew; for unless we do so, our knowledge would not be conformable to the reality and relations of nature. The simple qualities of body have not each a proper and independent existence; the ultimate faculties of mind are not so many distinct and independent existences. On either side, there is a being one and the same; on that side, at once extended, solid, coloured, &c., on this, at once capable of thought, feeling, desire, &c.

“But although all, or the greater number of, our cognitions comprehend different fasciculi of notions, it is necessary to commence by the acquisition of these notions one by one, through a successive application of our attention to the different attributes of objects. The abstraction of the intellect is thus as natural as that of the senses. It is even imposed upon us by the very constitution of our mind.”<sup>a</sup>

The expres-  
sion, ab-  
straction  
of the  
senses

“I am aware that the expression, *abstraction of the senses*, is incorrect; for it is the mind always which acts, be it through the medium of the senses. The impropriety of the expression is not, however, one which is in danger of leading into error, and it serves to point out the important fact, that abstraction is not always performed in the same manner. In Perception,—in the presence of physical objects, the intellect abstracts colours by the eyes, sounds by the ear, &c. In Representation, and when the external object is absent, the mind operates on its reproduced cognitions, and looks at them successively in their different points of view.”<sup>β</sup>

“However abstraction be performed, the result is notions which are simple, or which approximate to

<sup>a</sup> Laromiguière, *Leçons*, t. II. p. 342 —Ed

<sup>β</sup> Laromiguière, *Leçons*, t. II. p. 344, slightly abridged —Ed

simplicity; and if we apply it with consistency and order to the different qualities of objects, we shall attain at length to a knowledge of these qualities and of their mutual dependencies, that is, to a knowledge of objects as they really are. In this case, abstraction becomes analysis, which is the method to which we owe all our cognitions"<sup>a</sup>

The process of abstraction is familiar to the most uncultivated minds, and its uses are shown equally in the mechanical arts as in the philosophical sciences. "A carpenter," says Kames,<sup>β</sup> speaking of the great utility of abstraction, "considers a log of wood with regard to hardness, firmness, colour, and texture; a philosopher, neglecting these properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analysis, and examines its taste, its smell, and component principles; the geometician confines his reasoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness, in general, every artist, abstracting from all other properties, confines his observations to those which have a more immediate connection with his profession"

But is Abstraction, or rather, is exclusive attention, the work of Comparison? This is evident. The application of attention to a particular object, or quality of an object, supposes an act of will,—a choice or preference, and this again supposes comparison and judgment. But this may be made more manifest from a view of the act of Generalisation, on which we are about to enter

The notion of the figure of the desk before me is an abstract idea,—an idea that makes part of the total notion of that body, and on which I have concentrated my attention, in order to consider it exclu-

Abstraction the work of comparison

Generalisation  
Idea abstract and undivided

<sup>a</sup> Laromiguiere, *Leçons*, t. ii. p. 345.—Ed.

<sup>β</sup> *Elements of Criticism*, Appendix, § 40, vol. ii. p. 533, ed. 1755.—Ed.

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sively. This idea is abstract, but it is at the same time individual; it represents the figure of this particular desk, and not the figure of any other body. But had we only individual abstract notions, what would be our knowledge? We should be cognisant only of qualities viewed apart from their subjects; (and of separate phænomena there exist none in nature); and as these qualities are also separate from each other, we should have no knowledge of their mutual relations.<sup>a</sup>

Abstract  
General  
notions,  
—what  
and how  
formed

It is necessary, therefore, that we should form Abstract General notions. This is done when, comparing a number of objects, we seize on their resemblances; when we concentrate our attention on these points of similarity, thus abstracting the mind from a consideration of their differences, and when we give a name to our notion of that circumstance in which they all agree. The general notion is thus one which makes us know a quality, property, power, action, relation; in short, any point of view under which we recognise a plurality of objects as a unity. It makes us aware of a quality, a point of view, common to many things. It is a notion of resemblance, hence the reason why general names or terms, the signs of general notions, have been called *terms of resemblance*, (*termini similitudinis*). In this process of generalisation, we do not stop short at a first generalisation. By a first generalisation we have obtained a number of classes of resembling individuals. But these classes we can compare together, observe their similarities, abstract from their differences, and bestow on their common circumstance a common name. On these second classes we can again perform the same

<sup>a</sup> We should also be overwhelmed with their number — *Jotting*

operation, and thus ascending the scale of general notions, throwing out of view always a greater number of differences, and seizing always on fewer similarities in the formation of our classes, we arrive at length at the limit of our assent in the notion of *being* or *existence*. Thus placed on the summit of the scale of classes, we descend by a process the reverse of that by which we have ascended, we divide and subdivide the classes, by introducing always more and more characters, and laying always fewer differences aside; the notions become more and more composite, until we at length arrive at the individual.

I may here notice that there is a twofold kind of quantity to be considered in notions.<sup>a</sup> It is evident, that in proportion as the class is high, it will, in the first place, contain under it a greater number of classes, and, in the second, will include the smallest complement of attributes. Thus *being* or *existence* contains under it every class; and yet when we say that a thing exists, we say the very least of it that is possible. On the other hand, an individual, though it contain nothing but itself, involves the largest amount of predication. For example, when I say,—this is Richard, I not only affirm of the subject every class from existence down to man, but likewise a number of circumstances proper to Richard as an individual. Now, the former of these quantities, the external, is called the *Extension* of a notion, (*quantitas ambitus*); the latter, the internal quantity, is called its *Comprehension* or *Intension*, (*quantitas complexus*). The extension of a notion is, likewise, styled its *circuit*, *region*, *domain*, or *sphere* (*sphæra*), also its *breadth* (*πλάτος*). On the other hand, the compre-

Twofold  
quantity in  
notions —  
Extension  
and Com-  
prehension

Their dis-  
tinction

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Lectures on Logic*, vol. I. p. 140 et seq. — Ed.

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Their law

hension of a notion is, likewise, called its *depth* (*βάθος*). These names we owe to the Greek logicians<sup>a</sup> The internal and external quantities are in the inverse ratio of each other. The greater the extension, the less the comprehension; the greater the comprehension, the less the extension.<sup>β</sup>

a [See Ammonius, *In Categ.*, f 33 Gr, f 29 Lat Brandis, *Scholiaz in Arist.*, p 45] [Αἱ κατηγορίαι καὶ πλάτος ἔχουσι καὶ βάθος, βάθος μὲν ἤν ἐστι τὰ μερινά-τερα αὐτῶν πρόσδο-, πλάτος δὲ ἤν ἐστι τὰ πλάγια μετέσ-σιν, οἷον ὅτι βάθος μὲν λείβῃς οὔ-ω τῇ, οὐσία καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ξυλυχον καὶ τὸ ζῶον καὶ οὔ-ως ἐφεξῆς, πλάτος δὲ, ὅ-αν διέδῃς τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ἀτόμα-ον — Ed ]  
β [Cf. *Port Royal Logic*, part i. c vi p 74 Eugenios,] [*Λογική*, b i c iv p 194 *et seq* — Ed ]

## LECTURE XXXV.

THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY.—GENERALISATION —  
NOMINALISM AND CONCEPTUALISM.

I ENTERED, in my last Lecture, on the discussion of that great cognitive power which I called the Elaborative Faculty,—the Faculty of Relations,—the Discursive Faculty,—Comparison, or Judgment; and which corresponds to what the Greek philosophers understood by *διάνοια*, when opposed, as a special faculty, to *νοῦς*. I showed you, that, though a comparison,—a judgment, involved the supposition of two relative terms, still it was an original operation, in fact involved in consciousness, and a condition of every energy of thought. But, besides the primary judgments of existence,—of the existence of the ego and non-ego, and of their existence in contrast to, and in exclusion of, each other,—I showed that this process is involved in perception, external and internal, inasmuch as the recognitions,—that the objects presented to us by the Acquisitive Faculty are many and complex, that one quality is different from another, and that different bundles of qualities are the properties of different things or subjects,—are all so many acts of Comparison or Judgment

This being done, I pointed out that a series of operations were to be referred to this faculty, which, by philosophers, had been made the functions of specific powers. Of these operations I enumerated —

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Recapitulation



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1°, Composition or Synthesis; 2°, Abstraction, Decomposition or Analysis; 3°, Generalisation, 4°, Judgment; and, 5°, Reasoning.

The first of these,—Composition or Synthesis,—which is shown in the formation of Complex or Collective notions, I stated to you was the result of an act of comparison. For a complex notion, (I gave you as examples, *an army, a forest, a town*), being only the repetition of notions absolutely similar, this similarity could be ascertained only by comparison. In speaking of this process, I explained the support afforded in it to the mind by language. I then recalled to you what was meant by Abstraction. Abstraction is no positive act; it is merely the negation of attention. We can fully attend only to a single thing at a time; and attention, therefore, concentrated on one object or one quality of an object, necessarily more or less abstracts our consciousness from others. Abstraction from, and attention to, are thus correlative terms, the one being merely the negation of the other. I noticed the improper use of the term *abstraction* by many philosophers, in applying it to that on which attention is converged.<sup>a</sup> This we may indeed be said to *prescind*,<sup>β</sup> but not to *abstract*. Thus let A, B, C, be three qualities of an object. We prescind A, in abstracting it from B and C; but we cannot, without impropriety, simply say that we abstract A. Thus by attending to one object to the abstraction from

<sup>a</sup> [Cf Kant, *De Mundi Sensibilis Forma*, [§ 6, *Vermischte Schriften*, II. 449 “*Proprie dicendum esset ab aliquibus abstrahere, non aliquid abstrahere* . . . Conceptus intellectualis *abstrahit* ab omni sensitivo, non *abstrahitur* a sensitivis, et forsitan rectius diceretur *abstrahens*, quam *abstractus*”—Ed.] Maine de Biran

[*Examen des Leçons de M. Laromiguière*, § 3, *Nouvelles Considérations*, p. 194 —Ed.] Bilfinger, *Dilucidationes*, § 262.]

<sup>β</sup> [On *Prescision*, and its various kinds, see Derodon, *Logica*, pars II. c. VI. § 11 —*Opera*, p. 233, ed. 1668; and Chauvin *Lexicon Philosophicum*, v. *Præcisio* (*Præcisio*)]

all others, we, in a certain sort, decompose or analyse the complex materials presented to us by Perception and Self-consciousness. This analysis or decomposition is of two kinds. In the first place, by concentrating attention on one integrant part of an object, we, as it were, withdraw or abstract it from the others. For example, we can consider the head of an animal to the exclusion of the other members. This may be called Partial or Concrete Abstraction. The process here noticed has, however, been overlooked by philosophers, insomuch that they have opposed the terms *concrete* and *abstract* as exclusive contraries. In the second place, we can rivet our attention on some particular mode of a thing, as its smell, its colour, its figure, its motion, its size, &c., and abstract it from the others. This may be called Modal Abstraction.

The abstraction we have been now speaking of is performed on individual objects, and is consequently particular. There is nothing necessarily connected with Generalisation in Abstraction. Generalisation is indeed dependent on abstraction, which it supposes; but abstraction does not involve generalisation. I remark this, because you will frequently find the terms *abstract* and *general* applied to notions, used as convertible. Nothing, however, can be more incorrect. "A person," says Mr Stewart, "who had never seen but one rose, might yet have been able to consider its *colour* apart from its other qualities, and, therefore, there may be such a thing as an idea which is at once abstract and particular. After having perceived this quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form the notion of redness or whiteness in general, which may be called a *general abstract idea*. The words *abstract* and *general*, therefore, when

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applied to ideas, are as completely distinct from each other as any two words to be found in the language."<sup>a</sup>

I showed that abstraction implied comparison and judgment; for attention supposes preference, preference is a judgment, and a judgment is the issue of comparison.

I then proceeded to the process of Generalisation, which is still more obtrusively comparison, and nothing but comparison. Generalisation is the process through which we obtain what are called *general* or *universal* notions. A general notion is nothing but the abstract notion of a circumstance in which a number of individual objects are found to agree, that is, to resemble each other. In so far as two objects resemble each other, the notion we have of them is identical, and, therefore, to us the objects may be considered as the same. Accordingly, having discovered the circumstance in which objects agree, we arrange them by this common circumstance into classes, to which we also usually give a common name.

I explained how, in the prosecution of this operation, commencing with individual objects, we generalised these into a lowest class. Having found a number of such lowest classes, we then compare these again together, as we had originally compared individuals; we abstract their points of resemblance, and by these points generalise them into a higher class. The same process we perform upon these higher classes; and thus proceed, generalising class from classes, until we are at last arrested in the one highest class, that of *being*. Thus we find Peter, Paul, Timothy, &c., all agree in certain common attributes, and which distinguish them from other animated beings. We accordingly collect them into a class, which we call *man*. In

<sup>a</sup> [*Elements*, vol. I. c. 14 § 1. Coll. Whately, [*Logic*, b. 1. § 6, p. 49, b. 11 *Works*, vol. II. p. 165—Ed.] So c. v. § 1, p. 122 (8th edit.)—Ed.]

like manner, out of the other animated beings which we exclude from *man*, we form the classes, *horse*, *dog*, *ox*, &c. These and *man* form so many lowest classes or species. But these species, though differing in certain respects, all agree in others. Abstracting from their diversities, we attend only to their resemblances, and as all manifesting life, sense, feeling, &c,—this resemblance gives us a class, on which we bestow the name *animal*. Animal, or living sentient existences, we then compare with lifeless existences, and thus going on abstracting from differences, and attending to resemblances, we arrive at naked or undifferenced existence. Having reached the pinnacle of generalisation, we may redescend the ladder, and this is done by reversing the process through which we ascended. Instead of attending to the similarities, and abstracting from the differences, we now attend to the differences, and abstract from the similarities. And as the ascending process is called Generalisation, this is called Division or Determination;—division, because the higher or wider classes are cut down into lower or narrower,—determination, because every quality added on to a class limits or determines its extent, that is, approximates it more to some individual, real, or determinate existence.

Having given you this necessary information, in regard to the nature of Generalisation, I proceed to consider one of the most simple, and, at the same time, one of the most perplexed, problems in philosophy,—in regard to the object of the mind,—the object of consciousness, when we employ a general term. In the explanation of the process of generalisation all philosophers are at one, the only differences that arise among them relate to the point,—whether we can form an adequate idea of that which is denoted by an

Generalisation — Can we form an adequate idea of what is denoted by an abstract general term?

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Order of  
discussion

abstract, or abstract and general term. In the discussion of this question, I shall pursue the following order first of all, I shall state to you the arguments of the Nominalists,—of those who hold, that we are unable to form an idea corresponding to the abstract and general term; in the second place, I shall state to you the arguments of the Conceptualists,—of those who maintain that we are so competent; and, in the last, I shall show you that the opposing parties are really at one, and that the whole controversy has originated in the imperfection and ambiguity of our philosophical nomenclature. In this discussion I avoid all mention of the ancient doctrine of Realism. This is curious only in an historical point of view; and is wholly irrelevant to the question at issue among modern philosophers.

This controversy principally agitated in Britain and France

This controversy has been principally agitated in this country, and in France, for a reason that I shall hereafter explain; and, to limit ourselves to Great Britain, the doctrine of Nominalism has, among others, been embraced by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Principal Campbell, and Mr Stewart; while Conceptualism has found favour with Locke, Reid, and Brown.<sup>a</sup>

Two opinions which still divide philosophers

Throwing out of view the antiquities of the question, (and this question is perhaps more memorable than any other in the history of philosophy),—laying, I say, out of account opinions which have been long exploded, there are two which still divide philosophers. Some maintain that every act and every object of mind is necessarily singular, and that the name is that alone which can pretend to generality. Others again hold that the mind is capable of forming notions, representations, correspondent in universality to the classes contained under, or expressed by, the general term.

<sup>a</sup> See below, pp 297, 301 —ED

The former of these opinions,—the doctrine as it is called of Nominalism,—maintains that every notion, considered in itself, is singular, but becomes, as it were, general, through the intention of the mind to make it represent every other resembling notion, or notion of the same class. Take, for example, the term *man*. Here we can call up no notion, no idea, corresponding to the universality of the class or term. This is manifestly impossible. For as *man* involves contradictory attributes, and as contradictions cannot coexist in one representation, an idea or notion adequate to *man* cannot be realised in thought. The class *man* includes individuals, male and female, white and black and copper-coloured, tall and short, fat and thin, straight and crooked, whole and mutilated, &c., &c.; and the notion of the class must, therefore, at once represent all and none of these. It is, therefore, evident, though the absurdity was maintained by Locke,<sup>a</sup> that we cannot accomplish this; and, this being impossible, we cannot represent to ourselves the class *man* by any equivalent notion or idea. All that we can do is to call up some individual image, and consider it as representing, though inadequately representing, the generality. This we easily do, for as we can call into imagination any individual, so we can make that individual image stand for any or for every other which it resembles, in those essential points which constitute the identity of the class. This opinion, which, after Hobbes, has been in this country maintained, among others, by Berkeley,<sup>β</sup> Hume,<sup>γ</sup> Adam Smith,<sup>δ</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Essay on Human Understanding*, 1 sect vii, *Works*, 1 p 34 — *Essay on the Academic Philosophy*, *Works*, 1 v c vii § 9 — ED  
<sup>β</sup> *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1 v p 184 — ED  
<sup>γ</sup> *Treatise of Human Nature*, part I  
<sup>δ</sup> *Dissertation concerning the Formation of Language* — ED

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Campbell,<sup>a</sup> and Stewart,<sup>β</sup> appears to me not only true but self-evident.

The doctrine of Nominalism as stated by Berkeley

No one has stated the case of the nominalists more clearly than Bishop Berkeley, and as his whole argument is, as far as it goes, irrefragable, I beg your attention to the following extract from his Introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge*<sup>γ</sup>

Berkeley quoted.

“It is agreed, on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved. This mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by *abstraction* the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

“Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making

<sup>a</sup> *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, book II c 7—Ed

<sup>β</sup> *Elements*, part II c IV Works, vol. II p 173—Ed

<sup>γ</sup> Sections, VII VII. X. Works, I. 5 et seq., 4to edit. Cf *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. *Metaphysics*, vol. XIV p 622, 7th edit—Ed.

thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense, that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed, which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense

“Whether others have this wonderful faculty of *abstracting their ideas*, they best can tell for myself, I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be



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said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever<sup>a</sup> To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of *abstraction*. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which are simple and illiterate, never pretend to *abstract notions*. It is said they are difficult, and not to be attained without pains and study. We may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned."

Such is the doctrine of Nominalism, as asserted by Berkeley, and as subsequently acquiesced in by the principal philosophers of this country. Reid himself is, indeed, hardly an exception, for his opinion on this point is, to say the least of it, extremely vague.<sup>β</sup>

Conceptualism

Locke

The counter-opinion, that of Conceptualism, as it is called, has, however, been supported by several philosophers of distinguished ability. Locke maintains the doctrine in its most revolting absurdity, boldly admitting that the general notion must be realised, in spite of the principle of Contradiction. "Does it not require," he says, "some pains and skill

<sup>a</sup> This argumentation is employed by Derodon, *Logica*, [pars II c vi. § 16. *Opera*, p 236 —Ed ], and others

<sup>β</sup> For Reid's opinion, see *Intellectual Powers*, essay vi., chap II. and vi.—Ed.

to form the *general idea* of a triangle? (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult), for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.”<sup>a</sup>

This doctrine was, however, too palpably absurd to obtain any advocates; and conceptualism, could it not find a firmer basis, behoved to be abandoned. Passing over Dr Reid’s speculations on the question, which are, as I have said, wavering and ambiguous, I solicit your attention to the principal statement and defence of conceptualism by Dr Brown, in whom the doctrine has obtained a strenuous advocate “If, then, the generalising process be, first, the perception or conception of two or more objects; secondly, the relative feeling of their resemblance in certain respects, thirdly, the designation of these circumstances of resemblance, by an appropriate name,—the doctrine of the Nominalists, which includes only two of these stages,—the perception of particular objects, and the invention of general terms, must be false, as excluding that relative suggestion of resemblance in certain respects, which is the second and most important step of the process; since it is this intermediate feeling alone that leads to the use of the term, which, otherwise, it would be impossible to limit to any set of objects. Accordingly, we found that, in the impossibility of accounting, on their own principles, for this limitation, which it is yet absolutely necessary to explain in some manner or other,—the Nominalists,

Brown  
quoted

<sup>a</sup> See above, p 297, note a.—Ed

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to explain it, uniformly take for granted the existence of those very general notions, which they at the same time profess to deny,—that, while they affirm that we have no notion of a kind, species, or sort, independently of the general terms which denote them, they speak of our application of such terms only to objects of the same kind, species, or sort; as if we truly had some notions of these general circumstances of agreement to direct us,—and that they are thus very far from being Nominalists in the spirit of their argument, at the very moment when they are Nominalists in assertion, — strenuous opposers of those very general feelings, of the truth of which they avail themselves in their very endeavour to disprove them

“If, indeed, it were the name which formed the class, and not that previous relative feeling, or general notion of resemblance of some sort, which the name denotes, then might anything be classed with anything, and classed with equal propriety. All which would be necessary, would be merely to apply the same name uniformly to the same objects; and, if we were careful to do this, John and a triangle might as well be classed together, under the name man, as John and William. Why does the one of those arrangements appear to us more philosophic than the other? It is because something more is felt by us to be necessary in classification, than the mere giving of a name *at random*. There is, in the relative suggestion that arises on our very perception or conception of objects, when we consider them together, a reason for giving the generic name to one set of objects rather than to another,—the name of man, for instance, to John and William, rather than to John and a triangle.

This reason is the feeling of the resemblance of the objects which we class,—that general notion of the relation of similarity in certain respects, which is signified by the general term,—and without which relative suggestion, as a previous state of the mind, the general term would as little have been invented, as the names of John and William would have been invented, if there had been no perception of any individual being whatever to be denoted by them.”<sup>a</sup>

This part of Dr Brown’s philosophy has obtained the most unmeasured encomium; it has been lauded as the most important step ever made in the philosophy of mind; and, as far as I am aware, no one has as yet made any attempt at refutation. I regret that in this, as in many other principal points of his doctrine, I find it impossible not to dissent from Dr Brown. An adequate refutation of his views would, indeed, require a more elaborate criticism than I am at present able to afford them; but I trust that the following hasty observations will be sufficient to evince, that the doctrine of Nominalism is not yet overthrown.

Dr Brown has taken especial care that his theory of generalisation should not be misunderstood; for the following is the seventh, out of nine recapitulations, he has given us of it in his forty-sixth and forty-seventh Lectures. “If, then, the generalising process be, first, the perception or conception of two or more objects; secondly, the relative feeling of their resemblance in certain respects; thirdly, the designation of these circumstances of resemblance by an appropriate name, the doctrine of the Nominalists,

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doctrine  
criticised

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which includes only two of these stages,—the perception of particular objects, and the invention of general terms,—must be false, as excluding that relative suggestion of resemblance in certain respects, which is the second and most important step of the process; since it is this intermediate feeling alone that leads to the use of the term, which, otherwise, it would be impossible to limit to any set of objects.”

This contains, in fact, both the whole of his own doctrine, and the whole ground of his rejection of that of the Nominalists. Now, upon this, I would, first of all, say, in general, that what in it is true is not new. But I hold it idle to prove that his doctrine is old and common, and to trace it to authors with whom Brown has shown his acquaintance, by repeatedly quoting them in his Lectures; it is enough to show that it is erroneous.

His con-  
futation of  
Nominal-  
ism

The first point I shall consider is his confutation of the Nominalists. In the passage I have just adduced, and in ten others, he charges the Nominalists with excluding “the relative suggestion of resemblance in certain respects, which is the second and most important step in the process.” This, I admit, is a weighty accusation, and I admit at once that if it do not prove that his own doctrine is right, it would at least demonstrate theirs to be sublimely wrong. But is the charge well founded? Dr Brown, in a passage which I once read to you,<sup>a</sup> and with which he concludes his supposed exposition of what he calls “the series of Reid’s wonderful misconceptions,” wisely warns his pupils against according credit to all second-hand statements. “I trust,” he says, “it will impress you with one important lesson, which could not be

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect xxiii, vol. II. p 64 —Ed.

taught more forcibly than by the errors of so great a mind, that it will always be necessary for you to consult the opinions of authors, when their opinions are of sufficient importance to deserve to be accurately studied, in their own works, and not in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account of them. From my own experience, I can most truly assure you, that there is scarcely an instance in which, on examining the works of those authors whom it is the custom more to cite than 'to read, I have found the view which I had received of them faithful." No advice assuredly can be more sound, and I shall accordingly follow it now, as I have heretofore done, in application to his own reports. Let us see whether the nominalists, as he assures us, do really exclude the apprehension of resemblance in certain respects, as one step in their doctrine of generalisation. I turn first to Hobbes as the real father of this opinion,—to him, as Leibnitz truly says, "*nominalibus ipsis nominaliorem*" The classical place of this philosopher on the subject is the fourth chapter of the *Leviathan*, and there we have the following passage—"One universal name is imposed on many things for their *similitude in some quality or other accident*; and whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall *any one* of those many." There are other passages to the same effect in Hobbes, but I look no further

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1 That the Nominalists allow the apprehension of resemblance, proved against Brown by reference to Hobbes

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of many similar passages, I select the two following. In both he is stating his own doctrine of nominalism. In the Introduction, sect. 22.—“To discern *the agreements or disagreements* that are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea,” &c. In the *Minute Philosopher*, sect. 7:—“But may not words become general by being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular ideas, which, from a *mutual resemblance*, belong to the same kind, without the intervention of any abstract general idea?”

Hume.

I next take down Hume. His doctrine on the point at issue is found in book i. part i. sect. 7 of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, entitled, *On Abstract Ideas*. This section opens with the following sentence:—“A great philosopher has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy” In glancing over the subsequent exposition of the doctrine, I see the following:—“When we have found a *resemblance* among several objects, we apply the same name to all of them,” &c. Again:—“As individuals are collected together and placed under a general term, with a view to that *resemblance* which they bear to each other,” &c. In the last page and a half of the section, it is stated, no less than four times, that *perceived resemblance* is the foundation of classification.

Adam Smith's doctrine is to the same effect as his predecessor's. It is contained in his *Dissertation concerning the First Formation of Languages*, (appended to his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*), which literally is full of statements to the purport of the following, which alone I adduce — "It is this application of the name of an individual to a great number of objects whose *resemblance* naturally recalls the idea of that individual, and of the name which expresses it, that seems originally to have given occasion to the formation of these classes and assortments, which in the schools are called *genera* and *species*, and of which the ingenious and eloquent Rousseau finds himself so much at a loss to account for the origin. What constitutes a species is merely a number of objects, bearing *a certain degree of resemblance* to one another, and on that account denominated by a single appellation, which may be applied to express any one of them."

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Smith

The assertion, that perceived resemblance is the principle of classification, is repeated *ad nauseam* by Principal Campbell and Mr Stewart. I shall quote only from the latter, and I take the first passage that strikes my eye — "According to this view of the process of the mind, in carrying on general speculations, that idea which the ancient philosophers considered as the essence of an individual, is nothing more than the particular quality or qualities in which it *resembles* other individuals of the same class; and in consequence of which a generic name is applied to it."<sup>a</sup>

From the evidence I have already quoted, you will see how marvellously wrong is Brown's assertion, that the nominalists not only took no account of, but absolutely excluded from their statement of the pro-

<sup>a</sup> *Elements*, vol 1 c 14 sect 11 *Works*, vol 11 p 175



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cess of generalisation, the apprehension of the mutual similarity of objects. You will, therefore, not be surprised when I assure you, that not only no nominalist ever overlooked, ever excluded, the manifested resemblance of objects to each other, but that every nominalist explicitly founded his doctrine of classification on this resemblance, and on this resemblance alone.<sup>a</sup> No nominalist ever dreamt of disallowing the notion of relativity,—the conception of similarity between things,—this they maintain not less strenuously than the conceptualist; they only deny that this could ever constitute a general notion.

II That Brown is wrong in holding that the feeling (notion) of similitude is general, and constitutes the general notion,—proved by the following axioms

But perhaps it may be admitted, that Brown is wrong in asserting that the nominalist excludes resemblance as an element of generalisation, and yet maintained, that he is right in holding, against the nominalists, that the notion, or, as he has it, the feeling of the similitude of objects in certain respects, is general, and constitutes what is called the general notion. I am afraid, however, that the misconception in regard to this point will be found not inferior to that in regard to the other.

1 Notion of similarity supposes notion of certain similar objects

In the first place, then, resemblance is a relation; and a relation necessarily supposes certain objects as related terms. There can thus be no relation of resemblance conceived apart from certain resembling objects. This is so manifest, that a formal enunciation of the principle seems almost puerile. Let it,

<sup>a</sup> [See Tellez, *Summa Phil Un-* *Cursus Philosophicus*, p 110 (edit  
*versæ*, [pars I. disp IV sect 1. subs  
8-16, vol. 1 p 49 *et seq* (edit 1644)  
Cf sect. II subs 1 *et seq*, p 65 —  
Ed] Derodon, *Logica*, [pars II c  
v art 2, § 5, p 211 Cf art 4, p  
224 *et seq* —Ed] Arriaga, *Logica*,  
[disp VI sect 1 subs 1 *et seq*,  
1652) —Ed]

however, be laid down as a first axiom, that the notion of similarity supposes the notion of certain similar objects.

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In the second place, objects cannot be similar without being similar in some particular mode or accident,—say in colour, in figure, in size, in weight, in smell, in fluidity, in life, &c &c. This is equally evident, and this I lay down as a second axiom

2 Similar objects are similar in some particular mode

In the third place, I assume, as a third axiom, that a resemblance is not necessarily and of itself universal. On the contrary, a resemblance between two individual objects in a determinate quality, is as individual and determinate as the objects and their resembling qualities themselves. Who, for example, will maintain that my actual notion of the likeness of a particular snowball and a particular egg, is more general than the representations of the several objects and their resembling accidents of colour?

3 A resemblance not necessarily universal

Now, let us try Dr Brown's theory on these grounds. In reference to the first, he does not pretend, that what he calls the general feeling of resemblance, can exist except between individual objects and individual representations. The universality, which he arrogates to this feeling, cannot accrue to it from any universality in the relative or resembling ideas. This neither he nor any other philosopher ever did or could pretend. They are supposed, *ex hypothesi*, to be individual,—singular.

Brown's theory tested by these axioms

Neither, in reference to the second axiom, does he pretend to derive the universality which he asserts to his feeling of resemblance, from the universality of the notion of the common quality, in which this resemblance is realised. He does not, with Locke and others, maintain this; on the contrary, it is on the admitted ab-

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surdity of such a foundation that he attempts to establish the doctrine of conceptualism on another ground.

But if the universality, assumed by Dr Brown for his "feeling of resemblance," be found neither in the resembling objects, nor in the qualities through which they are similar, we must look for it in the feeling of resemblance itself, apart from its actual realisation : and this in opposition to the third axiom we laid down as self-evident. In these circumstances, we have certainly a right to expect that Dr Brown should have brought us cogent proof for an assertion so contrary to all apparent evidence, that although this be the question which perhaps has been more ably, keenly, and universally agitated than any other, still no philosopher before himself was found even to imagine such a possibility. But in proof of this new paradox, Dr Brown has not only brought no evidence ; he does not even attempt to bring any. He assumes and he asserts, but he hazards no argument. In this state of matters, it is perhaps superfluous to do more than to rebut assertion by assertion ; and as Dr Brown is not *in possessorio*, and as his opinion is even opposed to the universal consent of philosophers, the counter assertion, if not overturned by reasoning, must prevail.

Possible  
grounds  
of Brown's  
supposition  
that the  
feeling of  
resem-  
blance is  
universal

But let us endeavour to conceive on what grounds it could possibly be supposed by Dr Brown, that the feeling of resemblance between certain objects, through certain resembling qualities, has in it anything of universal, or can, as he says, constitute the general notion. This to me is indeed not easy ; and every hypothesis I can make is so absurd, that it appears almost a libel to attribute it, even by conjecture, to so ingenious and acute a thinker.

First

In the first place, can it be supposed that Dr

Brown believed that a feeling of resemblance between objects in a certain quality or respect was general because it was a relation? Then must every notion of a relation be a general notion; which neither he nor any other philosopher ever asserts.

Second

In the second place, does he suppose that there is anything in the feeling or notion of the particular relation called *similarity*, which is more general than the feeling or notion of any other relation? This can hardly be conceived. What is a feeling or notion of resemblance? Merely this; two objects affect us in a certain manner, and we are conscious that they affect us in the same way as a single object does, when presented at different times to our perception. In either case, we judge that the affections of which we are conscious are similar or the same. There is nothing general in this consciousness, or in this judgment. At all events, the relation recognised between the consciousness of similarity produced on us by two different eggs, is not more general than the feeling of similarity produced on us by the successive presentation of the same egg. If the one is to be called general, so is the other. Again, if the feeling or notion of resemblance be made general, so must the feeling or notion of difference. They are absolutely the same notion, only in different applications. You know the logical axiom,—the science of contraries is one. We know the like only as we know the unlike. Every affirmation of similarity is virtually an affirmation that difference does not exist, every affirmation of difference is virtually an affirmation that similarity is not to be found. But neither Brown nor any other philosopher has pretended, that the apprehension of difference is either general, or a ground of generalisation. On the contrary, the apprehension

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of difference is the negation of generalisation, and a descent from the universal to the particular. But if the notion or feeling of the dissimilarity is not general, neither is the feeling or notion of the similarity

Third

In the third place, can it be that Dr Brown supposes the particular feeling or consciousness of similarity between certain objects in certain respects to be general, because we have, in general, a capacity of feeling or being conscious of similarity? This conjecture is equally improbable. On this ground every act of every power would be general; and we should not be obliged to leave Imagination, in order to seek for the universality which we cannot discover in the light and definitude of that faculty, in the obscurity and vagueness of another.

Fourth

In the fourth place, only one other supposition remains; and this may perhaps enable us to explain the possibility of Dr Brown's hallucination. A relation cannot be represented in Imagination. The two terms, the two relative objects, can be severally imaged in the sensible phantasy, but not the relation itself. This is the object of the Comparative Faculty, or of Intelligence Proper. To objects so different as the images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence, different names ought to be given; and accordingly this has been done wherever a philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has been formed. In the German language, which is now the richest in metaphysical expressions of any living tongue, the two kinds of objects are carefully distinguished.<sup>a</sup> In our language, on the contrary, the terms *idea*, *conception*, *notion*, are used almost as convertible for either; and the vagueness and confusion which is thus produced, even within the narrow

<sup>a</sup> See *Reid's Works*, p. 407, note ‡, and 412, note — Ed

sphere of speculation to which the want of the distinction also confines us, can be best appreciated by those who are conversant with the philosophy of the different countries

Dr Brown seems to have had some faint perception of the difference between intellectual notions and sensible representations; and if he had endeavoured to signalise their contrast by a distinction of terms, he would have deserved well of English Philosophy. But he mistook the nature of the intellectual notion, which connects two particular qualities by the bond of similarity, and imagined that there lurked under this intangible relation the universality which, he clearly saw, could not be found in a representation of the related objects, or of their resembling qualities. At least, if this do not assist us in accounting for his misconception, I do not know in what way we otherwise can.

What I have now said is, I think, sufficient in regard to the nature of Generalisation. It is notoriously a mere act of Comparison. We compare objects; we find them similar in certain respects, that is, in certain respects they affect us in the same manner; we consider the qualities in them, that thus affect us in the same manner, as the same; and to this common quality we give a name; and as we can predicate this name of all and each of the resembling objects, it constitutes them into a class. Aristotle has truly said that general names are only abbreviated definitions,<sup>a</sup> and definitions, you know, are judgments. For example, *animal* is only a compendious expression for *organised and animated body*; *man*, only a summary of *rational animal*, &c

Summary  
of the  
Author's  
doctrine of  
General-  
isation

## LECTURE XXXVI.

THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY.—GENERALISATION.—  
THE PRIMUM COGNITUM

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Pecapitulation

WE were principally employed, in our last Lecture, in considering Dr Brown's doctrine of Generalisation, and, in doing this, I first discussed his refutation of Nominalism, and, secondly, his own theory of Conceptualism. In reference to the former, I showed you that the ground on which he attempts to refute the Nominalists, is only an inconceivable mistake of his own. He rejects their doctrine as incomplete, because, he says, they take no account of the mutual resemblance of the classified objects. But so far are the nominalists from taking no account of the mutual resemblance of the classified objects, that their doctrine is notoriously founded on the apprehension of this similarity, and on the apprehension of this similarity alone. How Dr Brown could have run into this radical misrepresentation of so celebrated an opinion, is, I repeat, wholly inconceivable. Having proved to you by the authentic testimony of the British nominalists of principal celebrity, that Dr Brown had in his statement of their doctrine simply reversed it, I proceeded, in the second place, to test the accuracy of his own. Dr Brown repudiates the doctrine of Conceptualism as held by Locke and others. He admits that

we can represent to ourselves no general notion of the common attribute or attributes which constitute a class; but he asserts that the generality, which cannot be realised in a notion of the resembling attribute, is realised in a notion of the resemblance itself. This theory, I endeavoured to make it evident, was altogether groundless. In the first place, the doctrine supposes that the notion, or, as he calls it, the feeling, of the mutual resemblance of particular objects in particular respects, is general. This, the very foundation of his theory, is not self-evidently true,—on the contrary, it stands obtrusively, self-evidently, false. It was primarily incumbent on Dr Brown to prove the reality of this basis. But he makes not even an attempt at this. He assumes all that is in question. To the noun-substantive, “feeling of resemblance,” he prefixes the adjective “general,” but he does not condescend to evince that the verbal collocations have any real connection.

But, in the second place, as it is not proved by Dr Brown, that our notion of the similarity of certain things in certain respects is general, so it can easily be shown against him that it is not.

The generality cannot be found in the relation of resemblance, apart from all resembling objects, and all circumstances of resemblance; for a resemblance only exists, and is only conceived, as between determinate objects, and in determinate attributes.<sup>a</sup> This is not denied by Dr Brown. On the contrary, he arrogates generality to what he calls the “feeling of similarity of certain objects in certain respects.” These are the expressions he usually employs. So far, therefore, all

<sup>a</sup> If generality in relation of resemblance apart from particular objects and qualities, then only one general notion at all.—*Marginal Jotting*



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is manifest, all is admitted; a resemblance is only conceived, is only conceivable, as between particular objects, in particular qualities. Apart from these, resemblance is not asserted to be thinkable. This being understood, it is apparent, that the notion of the resemblance of certain objects in a certain attribute, is just the notion of that attribute itself; and if it be impossible, as Brown admits, to conceive that attribute generally, in other words, to have a general notion of it, it is impossible to have a general notion of the resemblance which it constitutes. For example, we have a perception or imagination of two figures resembling each other, in having three angles. Now here it is admitted, that if either the figures themselves be removed, or the attribute belonging to each, (of three angles), be thrown out of account, the notion of any resemblance is also annihilated. It is also admitted, that the notion of resemblance is realised through the notion of triangularity. In this all philosophers are at one. All likewise agree that the notion of similarity, and the notion of generality, are the same; though Brown, as we have seen, has misrepresented the doctrine of Nominalism on this point. But though all maintain that things are conceived similar only as conceived similar in some quality, and that their similarity in this quality alone constitutes them into a class, they differ in regard to their ulterior explanation. Let us suppose that, of our two figures, the one is a rectangled, and the other an equilateral, triangle; and let us hear, on this simple example, how the different theorists explain themselves. The nominalists say,—you can imagine a rectangular triangle alone, and an equilateral triangle alone, or you can imagine both at once; and in this case, in the consciousness

of their similarity, you may view either as the inadequate representative of both. But you cannot imagine a figure which shall adequately represent both *qua* triangle, that is, you cannot imagine a triangle which is neither an equilateral nor a rectangled triangle, and yet both at once. And as on our (the nominalist) doctrine, the similarity is only embodied in an individual notion, having relation to another, there is no general notion properly speaking at all.

The older Conceptualists, on the other hand, assert that it is possible to conceive a triangle neither equilateral nor rectangular,—but both at once. Dr Brown differs from nominalists and older conceptualists; he coincides with the nominalists in rejecting as absurd the hypothesis of the conceptualist, but he coincides with the conceptualist in holding, that there is a general notion adequate to the term triangle. This general notion he does not, however, place, with the conceptualist, in any general representation of the attribute triangle, but in the notion or feeling of resemblance between the individual representations of an equilateral and of a rectangled triangle. This opinion is, however, untenable. In the first place, there is here no generalisation; for what is called the common notion can only be realised in thought through notions of all the several objects which are to be classified. Thus, in our example, the notion of the similarity of the two figures, in being each triangular, supposes the actual perception or imagination of both together. Take out of actual perception, or actual representation, one or both of the triangles, and no similarity, that is, no general notion, remains. Thus, upon Dr Brown's doctrine, the general notion only exists in so far as the individual notions, from which it is general-

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ised, are present, that is, in so far as there is no generalisation at all. This is because resemblance is a relation; but a relation supposes two particular objects; and a relation between particular objects is just as particular as the objects themselves.

Brown's  
doctrine  
of general  
notions,—  
further  
considered

But let us consider his doctrine in another point of view. In the example we have taken of the equilateral and rectangular triangles, triangularity is an attribute of each, and in each the conceived triangularity is a particular, not a general, notion. Now the resemblance between these figures lies in their triangularity, and the notion or feeling of resemblance in which Dr Brown places the generality, must be a notion or feeling of triangularity,—triangularity must constitute their resemblance. This is manifest. For if it be not a notion of triangularity, it must be a notion of something else, and if a notion of something else, it cannot be a general notion of two figures as triangles. The notion of resemblance between the figures in question must, therefore, be a notion of triangularity. Now the triangularity thus conceived must be one notion,—one triangularity, for otherwise it could not be, (what is supposed), one common or general notion, but a plurality of notions. Again, this one triangularity must not be the triangularity, either of the equilateral triangle, or of the rectangular triangle alone; for, in that case, it would not be a general notion,—a notion common to both. But if it cannot be the triangularity of either, it must be the triangularity of both. Of such a triangularity, however, it is impossible to form a notion, as Dr Brown admits; for triangularity must be either rectangular or not rectangular, but as these are contradictory or exclusive attributes, we cannot conceive them together in the

same notion, nor can we form a notion of triangularity except as the one or the other.

This being the case, the notion or feeling of similarity between the two triangles cannot be a notion or feeling of triangularity at all. But if it be not this, what can it otherwise possibly be? There is only one conceivable alternative. As a general notion, containing under it particular notions, it must be given up; but it may be regarded as a particular relation between the particular figures, and which supposes them to be represented, as the condition of being itself not represented, but conceived. And thus, by a different route, we arrive again at the same conclusion,—that Dr Brown has mistaken a particular, an individual, relation for a general notion. He clearly saw that all that is picturable in imagination is determinate and individual; he, therefore, avoided the absurdity involved in the doctrine of the old conceptualists, but he was not warranted, (if this were, indeed, the ground of his assumption), in assuming, that because a notion cannot be pictured in imagination, it is, therefore, general.

Instead of recapitulating what I stated in opposition to Dr Brown's views in my last Lecture, I have been led into a new line of argument; for, in fact, his doctrine is open to so many objections that, on what side soever we regard it, argument will not be wanting for its refutation. So far, therefore, from Nominalism being confuted by Brown, it is plain that, apart from the misconception he has committed, he is himself a nominalist.

I proceed now to a very curious question which has likewise divided philosophers. It is this,—Does Language originate in General Appellatives, or by Proper

The ques-  
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Appella-  
tives or by  
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Names,—  
considered

Names? Did mankind in the formation of language, and do children in their first applications of it, commence with the one kind of words, or with the other? The determination of this question,—the question of the *Primum Cognitum*, as it was called in the schools,—is not involved in the doctrine of Nominalism. Many illustrious philosophers have maintained, that all terms, as at first employed, are expressive of individual objects, and that these only subsequently obtain a general acceptance.

1. That all terms, as at first employed, expressive of individual objects,—maintained by Vives and others

This opinion I find maintained by Vives,<sup>a</sup> Locke,<sup>b</sup> Rousseau,<sup>c</sup> Condillac,<sup>d</sup> Adam Smith,<sup>e</sup> Steinbart,<sup>f</sup> Tittel,<sup>g</sup> Brown,<sup>h</sup> and others “The order of learning,” (I translate from Vives), “is from the senses to the imagination, and from this to the intellect,—such is the order of life and of nature. We thus proceed from the simple to the complex, from the singular to the universal. This is to be observed in children, who first of all express the several parts of different things, and then conjoin them. Things general they call by a singular name; for instance, they call all smiths by the name of that individual *smith* whom they have first known, and all meats, *beef* or *pork*, as they have happened to have heard the one or the other first, when they begin to speak. Thereafter the mind collects universals from particulars, and then again reverts to particulars from universals.” The same doctrine, without probably

<sup>a</sup> *De Anima*, lib. ii., *De Descendi Ratione*, — *Opera*, vol. ii. p. 530, Basileæ, 1555 —Ed

<sup>b</sup> See below, p. 321 —Ed

<sup>c</sup> [See Toussaint, *De la Pensée*, c. x. p. 278-79] *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Irregularité parmi les Hommes*, *Œuvres*, t. i. p. 268, ed. 1826 —Ed

<sup>d</sup> See below, p. 321. —Ed

<sup>e</sup> See below, p. 321. —Ed

<sup>f</sup> [*Anleitung des Verstandes*, § 45 Cf § 83-89]

<sup>g</sup> [*Erläuterungen der Philosophie*] [*Logik*, p. 214 et s.g. (edit. 1793) —Ed]

<sup>h</sup> See below, p. 321 —Ed

<sup>i</sup> Cf. Toletus, *In Phys. Arist.*, lib. i. c. i. t. 5, qu. 5, f. 10 b. Conimbricenses, *Ibid.*, lib. i. c. i. qu. 3, art. 2, p. 79, and qu. 4, art. 2, p. 89 —Ed

any knowledge of Vives, is maintained by Locke <sup>LECT XXXVI</sup>  
 “There is nothing more evident than that the ideas <sup>Locke</sup>  
 of the persons children converse with, (to instance in them alone), are like the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals; and the names of *nurse* and *mamma*, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe, that there are a great many other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in, and to that they give, with others, the name *man*, for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea.”

The same doctrine is advanced in many places of his works by Condillac <sup>Condillac</sup>. Adam Smith has, however, <sup>Adam Smith</sup>  
 the merit of having applied this theory to the formation of language; and his doctrine, which Dr Brown, <sup>Brown</sup>  
 absolutely, and Mr Stewart, <sup>Stewart</sup> with some qualification, adopts, is too important not to be fully stated, and in his own powerful language — “The assignation,” says Smith, <sup>Smith quoted</sup>  
 “of particular names, to denote particular objects,—that is, the institution of nouns substantive,—

<sup>a</sup> *Essay*, iii 3, 7 — ED

<sup>β</sup> See *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines*, partie i sect iv c 1., sect. v., partie ii sect 1. c. 18., *Logique*, ch. iv. p 36 *et seq* (edit Nieuport) — ED

<sup>γ</sup> Lecture xlvii p. 306 (edit 1830)

<sup>δ</sup> *Elements*, vol 1. part ii c 18 *Works*, vol ii p 159 Cf *Elements*, vol ii part ii c ii § 4 *Works*, p 173 — ED

<sup>ε</sup> *Considerations concerning the first Formation of Languages*, appended to *Theory of Moral Sentiments* — ED

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would probably be one of the first steps towards the formation of language. Two savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had been bred up remote from the societies of men, would naturally begin to form that language by which they would endeavour to make their mutual wants intelligible to each other, by uttering certain sounds whenever they meant to denote certain objects. Those objects only which were most familiar to them, and which they had most frequent occasion to mention, would have particular names assigned to them. The particular cave whose covering sheltered them from the weather, the particular tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the particular fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be denominated by the words *cave*, *tree*, *fountain*, or by whatever other appellations they might think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark them. Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience of these savages had led them to observe, and their necessary occasions obliged them to make mention of other caves, and other trees, and other fountains, they would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects the same name by which they had been accustomed to express the similar object they were first acquainted with. The new objects had none of them any name of its own, but each of them exactly resembled another object, which had such an appellation. It was impossible that those savages could behold the new objects, without recollecting the old ones; and the name of the old ones, to which the new bore so close a resemblance. When they had occasion, therefore, to mention or to point out to each other any of the new objects, they would naturally utter the name of the correspondent old one, of which

the idea could not fail, at that instant, to present itself to their memory in the strongest and liveliest manner. And thus those words, which were originally the proper names of individuals, would each of them insensibly become the common name of a multitude. A child that is just learning to speak, calls every person who comes to the house its papa, or its mamma; and thus bestows upon the whole species those names which it had been taught to apply to two individuals. I have known a clown who did not know the proper name of the river which ran by his own door. It was *the river*, he said, and he never heard any other name for it. His experience, it seems, had not led him to observe any other river. The general word *river*, therefore, was, it is evident, in his acceptance of it, a proper name signifying an individual object. If this person had been carried to another river, would he not readily have called it a river? Could we suppose any person living on the banks of the Thames so ignorant as not to know the general word *river*, but to be acquainted only with the particular word *Thames*, if he was brought to any other river, would he not readily call it *a Thames*? This, in reality, is no more than what they, who are well acquainted with the general word, are very apt to do. An Englishman, describing any great river which he may have seen in some foreign country, naturally says, that it is another Thames. The Spaniards, when they first arrived upon the coast of Mexico, and observed the wealth, populousness, and habitations of that fine country, so much superior to the savage nations which they had been visiting for some time before, cried out that it was another Spain. Hence, it was called New Spain; and this name has stuck to that unfortunate



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country ever since. We say, in the same manner, of a hero, that he is an Alexander ; of an orator, that he is a Cicero ; of a philosopher, that he is a Newton. This way of speaking, which the grammarians call an An-tonomasia, and which is still extremely common, though now not at all necessary, demonstrates how much all mankind are naturally disposed to give to one object the name of any other which nearly resembles it ; and thus to denominate a multitude, by what originally was intended to express an individual

“It is this application of the name of an individual to a great multitude of objects, whose resemblance naturally recalls the idea of that individual, and of the name which expresses it, that seems originally to have given occasion to the formation of those classes and assortments which, in the schools, are called *genera* and *species*.”

On the other hand, an opposite doctrine is maintained by many profound philosophers. A large section of the schoolmen<sup>a</sup> embraced it, and among more modern thinkers, it is adopted by Campanella<sup>β</sup> Campanella was an author profoundly studied by Leibnitz, who even places him on a line with, if not above, Bacon ; and from him it is not improbable that Leibnitz may have taken a hint of his own doctrine on the subject. In his great work, the *Nouveaux Essais*, of which Stewart was not till very latterly aware, he says,<sup>γ</sup> that “general terms serve not only for the perfection of languages, but are even necessary for their essential constitution. For if by *particulars* be under-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Conimbricenses, *In Phys Arist*, lib 1. c. 1. qu. 3, art. 1, p 78, and qu 4, art 1, p 87 Tole-tus, *Ibid*, lib 1. c. 1. text 3 *et seq* f 10 a —Ed

<sup>β</sup> [See Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ix p 334 ]

<sup>γ</sup> Liv III. c. 1. p 297 (edit Erd-mann) —Ed

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Leibnitz

Leibnitz  
quoted

stood things individual, it would be impossible to speak, if there were only proper names, and no appellatives, that is to say, if there were only names for things individual, since, at every moment we are met by new ones, when we treat of persons, of accidents, and especially of actions, which are those that we describe the most; but if by particulars be meant the lowest species (*species infimas*), besides that it is frequently very difficult to determine them, it is manifest that these are already universals, founded on similarity. Now, as the only difference of *species* and *genera* lies in a similarity of greater or less extent, it is natural to note every kind of similarity or agreement, and, consequently, to employ general terms of every degree; nay, the most general being less complex with regard to the essences which they comprehend, although more extensive in relation to the things individual to which they apply, are frequently the easiest to form, and are the most useful. It is likewise seen that children, and those who know but little of the language which they attempt to speak, or little of the subject on which they would employ it, make use of general terms, as *thing*, *plant*, *animal*, instead of using proper names, of which they are destitute. And it is certain that all *proper* or individual names have been originally *appellative* or general." In illustration of this latter most important doctrine, he, in a subsequent part of the work, says<sup>a</sup> — "I would add, in conformity to what I have previously observed, that proper names have been originally appellative, that is to say, general in their origin, as Brutus, Cæsar, Augustus, Capito, Lentulus, Piso, Cicero, Elbe, Rhine, Rhur, Leine, Ocker, Bucephalus, Alps, Pyrenees,

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&c.," and, after illustrating this in detail, he concludes — "Thus I would make bold to affirm that almost all words have been originally general terms, because it would happen very rarely that men would invent a name, expressly and without a reason, to denote this or that individual. We may, therefore, assert that the names of individual things were names of species, which were given *par excellence*, or otherwise, to some individual, as the name *Great Head* to him of the whole town who had the largest, or who was the man of most consideration, of the Great Heads known. It is thus likewise that men give the names of genera to species, that is to say, that they content themselves with a term more general or vague to denote more particular classes, when they do not care about the differences. As, for example, we content ourselves with the general name *absinthium* (wormwood), although there are so many species of the plant that one of the Bauhins has filled a whole book with them."

Turgot

That this was likewise the opinion of the great Turgot, we learn from his biographer. "M. Turgot," says Condorcet,<sup>a</sup> "believed that the opinion was wrong, which held that in general the mind only acquired general or abstract ideas by the comparison of more particular ideas. On the contrary, our first ideas are very general, for seeing at first only a small number of qualities, our idea includes all the existences to which these qualities are common. As we acquire knowledge, our ideas become more particular, without ever reaching the last limit; and, what might have deceived the metaphysicians, it is precisely by this process that we learn that these ideas are more general than we had at first supposed."

<sup>a</sup> [ *Vie de M. Turgot*, Londres, 1786, p. 214 ]

Here are two opposite opinions, each having nearly equal authority in its favour, maintained on both sides with equal ability and apparent evidence. Either doctrine would be held established were we unacquainted with the arguments in favour of the other.

But I have now to state to you a third opinion, intermediate between these, which conciliates both, and seems, moreover, to carry a superior probability in its statement. This opinion maintains, that as our knowledge proceeds from the confused to the distinct,—from the vague to the determinate,—so, in the mouths of children, language at first expresses neither the precisely general nor the determinately individual, but the vague and confused; and that out of this the universal is elaborated by generification, the particular and singular by specification and individualisation.

I formerly explained why I view the doctrine held by Mr Stewart and others in regard to perception in general, and vision in particular, as erroneous; inasmuch as they conceive that our sensible cognitions are formed by the addition of an almost infinite number of separate and consecutive acts of attentive perception, each act being cognisant of a certain *minimum sensible*.<sup>a</sup> On the contrary, I showed that, instead of commencing with minima, perception commences with masses; that, though our capacity of attention be very limited in regard to the number of objects on which a faculty can be simultaneously directed, yet that these objects may be large or small. We may make, for example, a single object of attention either of a whole man, or of his face, or of his eye, or of the pupil of his eye, or of a speck upon the pupil. To

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3 A third or intermediate opinion maintained,—that language at first expresses only the vague and confused

That Perception commences with masses, already shown

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. xiii, vol. i. p. 243.—ED

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each of these objects there can only be a certain amount of attentive perception applied, and we can concentrate it all on any one. In proportion as the object is larger and more complex, our attention can of course be less applied to any part of it, and, consequently, our knowledge of it in detail will be vaguer and more imperfect. But having first acquired a comprehensive knowledge of it as a whole, we can descend to its several parts, consider these both in themselves, and in relation to each other, and to the whole of which they are constituents, and thus attain to a complete and articulate knowledge of the object. We decompose and then we recompose.

The mind,  
in elabor-  
ating its  
knowledge,  
proceeds  
by analy-  
sis, from  
the whole  
to the  
parts

But in this we always proceed first by decomposition or analysis. All analysis indeed supposes a foregone composition or synthesis, because we cannot decompose what is not already composite. But in our acquisition of knowledge, the objects are presented to us compounded; and they obtain a unity only in the unity of our consciousness. The unity of consciousness is, as it were, the frame in which objects are seen. I say, then, that the first procedure of mind in the elaboration of its knowledge is always analytical. It descends from the whole to the parts,—from the vague to the definite. Definitude, that is, a knowledge of minute differences, is not, as the opposite theory supposes, the first, but the last term of our cognitions. Between two sheep an ordinary spectator can probably apprehend no difference, and if they were twice presented to him, he would be unable to discriminate the one from the other. But a shepherd can distinguish every individual sheep; and why? Because he has descended from the vague knowledge which we all have of sheep,—from the vague know-

Illustrated

ledge which makes every sheep, as it were, only a repetition of the same undifferenced unit,—to a definite knowledge of qualities by which each is contrasted from its neighbour. Now, in this example, we apprehend the sheep by marks not less individual than those by which the shepherd discriminates them ; but the whole of each sheep being made an object, the marks by which we know it are the same in each and all, and cannot, therefore, afford the principle by which we can discriminate them from each other. Now this is what appears to me to take place with children. They first know,—they first cognise, the things and persons presented to them as wholes. But wholes of the same kind, if we do not descend to their parts, afford us no difference,—no mark by which we can discriminate the one from the other. Children, thus, originally perceiving similar objects,—persons, for example,—only as wholes, do at first hardly distinguish them. They apprehend first the more obtrusive marks that separate species from species, and, in consequence of the notorious contrast of dress, men from women ; but they do not as yet recognise the finer traits that discriminate individual from individual. But, though thus apprehending individuals only by what we now call their specific or their generic qualities, it is not to be supposed that children know them by any abstract general attributes, that is, by attributes formed by comparison and attention. On the other hand, because their knowledge is not general, it is not to be supposed to be particular or individual, if by particular be meant a separation of species from species, and by individual the separation of individual from individual ; for children are at first apt to confound individuals together, not only in name but in reality.



says, "We ought to proceed from the better known to the less known, and from what is clearer to us to that which is clearer in nature. But those things are first known and clearer, which are more complex and confused; for it is only by subsequent analysis that we attain to a knowledge of the parts and elements of which they are composed. We ought, therefore, to proceed from universals to singulars; for the whole is better known to sense than its parts, and the universal is a kind of whole, as the universal comprehends many things as its parts. Thus it is that names are at first better known to us than definitions, for the name denotes a whole, and that indeterminately, whereas the definition divides and explicates its parts. Children, likewise, at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, but thereafter they learn to discriminate each individual from another."<sup>a</sup>

The subtle Scaliger teaches the same doctrine; and he states it better perhaps than any other philosopher.—

J C Scaliger

"Universalis magis, ac prius esse nota nobis. Sic enim patres a pueris omnes homines appellari. Quia æquivocationibus nomina communicantur ab ignavis etiam rebus differentibus definitione. Sic enim chirothecam meam, puerulus quidam manum appellabat. An ei pro chirothecæ specie manus species sese representabat? Nequaquam. Sed iudicium aberat, quod distingueret differentias. An vero summa genera nobis notiora? Non. Composita enim notiora nobis. Genera vero partes sunt specierum quas in partes ipsæ species multa resolvuntur arte. Itaque eandem ob rationem ipsa genera, sub notione comprehensionis et prædica-

<sup>a</sup> *Phys. Ausc.*, 1. 1.—ED. [Cf. Averroes, Simplicius, Pacius, Conimbricenses, Tolet.]  
In loc. cit. Philoponus, Themistius,



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bilitatis, sunt notiora quam ipsæ species. Cognoscitur animal. Animalium species quot ignorantur? Sunt enim species partes prædicabiles. Sic totum integrum nobis notius, quam partes e quibus constat. Omne igitur quodcumque sub totius notione sese offert, prius cognoscitur, quam ejus partes. Sic species constituta, prius quam constituentia ut equus, prius quam animal domabile ad trahendum, et vehendum. Hoc enim postea scimus per resolutionem. Sic genus prædicabile, prius quam suæ species. Sic totum integrum, prius quam partes. Contrarius huic ordo Naturæ est.”<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *De Subtilitate*, Ex cccvii. § 21 [Cf Zabarella, *De Ordine Intelligenti*, c. 1. (*De Rebus Naturalibus*, p 1042), and *In Phys Arist*, lib i c. 1, text 5. Andreas Cæsalpinus, *Peripateticæ Quaestiones*, lib 1 qu 1, p 1 et seq (edit. 1571). Philip Mocenicus, *Contemplationes*, cont ii. pars ii. c. 16, p 34 (ed 1588). Piccolomineus, *Physica*, p 1313 et seq (ed. 1597) Biel, *In Sent*, lib 1 dist. iii. qu 5. Zimara, *De Primo Cognito*, in calce t. iv *Aristotelis Operum Arceirois* (Venet 1560) Fonseca, *In Metaph Arist*, lib i c. ii. qu 2, t. 1. p 147-172. Bergardus, *Circulus Pisanus*, pp 5, 6 (edit. 1661). Fracastorius, *De Intellectione*, lib i. sub fine, *Opera* (ed. 1584), f 130 a. Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, § 194. Crousaz, *Logique*, t. iii. part i. sect iii c 4, p 141.]

## LECTURE XXXVII.

## THE ELABORATIVE FACULTY.—JUDGMENT AND REASONING.

In our last Lecture, I terminated the consideration of the faculty of Comparison in its process of Generalisation. I am to-day to consider it in those of its operations, which have obtained the special names of Judgment and Reasoning.

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Judgment  
and Reasoning

In these processes the act of Comparison is a judgment of something more than a mere affirmation of the existence of a phænomenon, — something more than a mere discrimination of one phænomenon from another; and, accordingly, while it has happened, that the intervention of judgment in every, even the simplest, act of primary cognition, as monotonous and rapid, has been overlooked, the name has been exclusively limited to the more varied and elaborate comparison of one notion with another, and the enouncement of their agreement or disagreement. It is in the discharge of this, its more obtrusive function, that we are now about to consider the Elaborative Faculty.

Acts of  
Comparison

Considering the Elaborative Faculty as a mean of discovering truth, by a comparison of the notions we have obtained from the Acquisitive Powers, it is evident that, though this faculty be the attribute by which man is distinguished as a creation higher than the animals, it is equally the quality which marks his

Judgment  
and Reasoning,  
necessary  
from the  
limitation  
of the human  
mind

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inferiority to superior intelligences. Judgment and Reasoning are rendered necessary by the imperfection of our nature. Were we capable of a knowledge of things and their relations at a single view, by an intuitive glance, discursive thought would be a superfluous act. It is by such an intuition that we must suppose that the Supreme Intelligence knows all things at once.

Our knowledge commences with the vague and confused.

I have already noticed that our knowledge does not commence with the individual, and the most particular objects of knowledge,—that we do not rise in any regular progress from the less to the more general, first considering the qualities which characterise individuals, then those which belong to species and genera, in regular ascent. On the contrary, our knowledge commences with the vague and confused, in the way which Aristotle has so well illustrated in the passage alleged to you.<sup>a</sup>

Illustrated.

This I may further explain by another analogy. We perceive an object approaching from a distance. At first we do not know whether it be a living or an inanimate thing. By degrees we become aware that it is an animal, but of what kind, —whether man or beast,—we are not as yet able to determine. It continues to advance, we discover it to be a quadruped, but of what species we cannot yet say. At length, we perceive that it is a horse, and again, after a season, we find that it is Bucephalus. Thus, as I formerly observed, children, first of all, take note of the generic differences, and they can distinguish species long before they are able to discriminate individuals. In all this, however, I must again remark, that our knowledge does not properly commence with the general, but with the vague and confused. Out of

<sup>a</sup> See above, p 330 —ED.

this the general and the individual are both equally evolved. LECT  
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“In consequence of this genealogy of our knowledge we usually commence by bestowing a name upon a whole object, or congeries of objects, of which, however, we possess only a partial and indefinite conception. In the sequel, this vague notion becomes somewhat more determinate; the partial idea which we had becomes enlarged by new accessions; by degrees, our conception waxes fuller, and represents a greater number of attributes. With this conception, thus amplified and improved, we compare the last notion which has been acquired, that is to say, we compare a part with its whole, or with the other parts of this whole, and finding that it is harmonious,—that it dovetails and naturally assorts with other parts, we acquiesce in this union, and this we denominate an act of Judgment. Act of  
judgment,  
—what

“In learning Arithmetic, I form the notion of the number *six*, as surpassing *five* by a single unit, and as surpassed in the same proportion by *seven*. Then I find that it can be divided into two equal halves, of which each contains three units. By this procedure, the notion of the number six becomes more complex; the notion of an even number is one of its parts. Comparing this new notion with that of the number, six becomes fuller by this addition. I recognise that the two notions suit,—in other words, I judge that six is an even number. Illustrated

“I have the conception of a triangle, and this conception is composed in my mind of several others. Among these partial notions, I select that of two sides greater than the third, and this notion, which I had at first, as it were, taken apart, I reunite with the others

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from which it had been separated, saying the triangle contains always two sides, which together are greater than the third

“When I say, body is divisible; among the notions which concur in forming my conception of body, I particularly attend to that of divisible, and finding that it really agrees with the others, I judge accordingly that body is divisible.

Subject.  
Predicate.  
Copula

“Every time we judge, we compare a total conception with a partial, and we recognise that the latter really constitutes a part of the former. One of these conceptions has received the name of *subject*, the other that of *attribute* or *predicate*.”<sup>a</sup> The verb which connects these two parts is called the *copula*. *The quadrangle is a double triangle; nine is an odd number, body is divisible.* Here *quadrangle, nine, body.* are subjects: *a double triangle, an odd number, divisible,* are predicates. The whole mental judgment, formed by the subject, predicate, and copula, is called, when enounced in words, *proposition*.

Proposition

How the  
parts of a  
proposition  
are to be  
determined

“In discourse, the parts of a proposition are not always found placed in logical order; but to discover and discriminate them, it is only requisite to ask,—What is the thing of which something else is affirmed or denied? The answer to this question will point out the subject; and we shall find the predicate if we inquire,—What is affirmed or denied of the matter of which we speak?

“A proposition is sometimes so enounced that each of its terms may be considered as subject and as predicate. Thus, when we say,—*Death is the wages of sin*; we may regard *sin* as the subject of which we predicate *death*, as one of its consequences, and we

<sup>a</sup> CROSSLAND, [*Logic*, tom. iii. part ii. c. i. pp. 178, 181.—Ed.]



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priety, and its convenience would fully warrant its establishment. But this distinction has not always been meant to express nothing more. It has, in fact, been generally supposed to mark out two distinct faculties.

Reasoning,  
—Deductive and  
Inductive

Reasoning is either from the whole to its parts ; or from all the parts, discretively, to the whole they constitute, collectively. The former of these is Deductive ; the latter is Inductive Reasoning. The statement you will find, in all logical books, of reasonings from certain parts to the whole, or from certain parts to certain parts, is erroneous. I shall first speak of the reasoning from the whole to its parts,—or of the Deductive Inference.

Deductive  
Reasoning,  
—its axiom. Two  
phases of  
Deductive  
Reasoning,  
determined  
by two  
kinds of  
whole and  
parts

1°, It is self-evident, that whatever is the part of a part, is a part of the whole. This one axiom is the foundation of all reasoning from the whole to the parts. There are, however, two kinds of whole and parts ; and these constitute two varieties, or rather two phases of deductive reasoning. This distinction, which is of the most important kind, has nevertheless been wholly overlooked by logicians, in consequence of which the utmost perplexity and confusion have been introduced into the science.

Subject or  
predicate  
may be  
considered  
severally as  
whole and  
as part

I have formerly stated that a proposition consists of two terms,—the one called subject, the other predicate ; the subject being that of which some attribute is said, the predicate being the attribute so said. Now, in different relations, we may regard the subject as the whole, and the predicate as its part, or the predicate as the whole and the subject as its part.

Illustrated

Let us take the proposition,—*milk is white*. Now, here we may either consider the predicate *white* as one of a number of attributes, the whole complement of

which constitutes the subject *milk*: In this point of view, the predicate is a part of the subject. Or, again, we may consider the predicate *white* as the name of a class of objects, of which the subject is one. In this point of view, the subject is a part of the predicate

You will remember the distinction, which I formerly stated, of the twofold quantity of notions or terms<sup>a</sup> The Breadth or Extension of a notion or term corresponds to the greater number of subjects contained under a predicate, the Depth, Intension, or Comprehension of a notion or term, to the greater number of predicates contained in a subject. These quantities or wholes are always in the inverse ratio of each other. Now, it is singular, that logicians should have taken this distinction between notions, and yet not have thought of applying it to reasoning. But so it is, and this is not the only oversight they have committed in the application of the very primary principles of their science. The great distinction we have established between the subject and predicate considered severally, as, in different relations, whole and part, constitutes the primary and principal division of Syllogisms, both Deductive and Inductive, and its introduction wipes off a complex mass of rules and qualifications, which the want of it rendered necessary. I can of course, at present, only explain in general the nature of this distinction; its details belong to the science of the Laws of Thought, or Logic, of which we are not here to treat

LECT  
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hension  
and Exten-  
sion of  
notions,  
as applied  
to reason-  
ingI have  
two Lect-  
ures on  
this subject  
in the  
course of  
the year

<sup>a</sup> See above, p. 289 — I D



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the subject  
is viewed  
as the  
whole, the  
predicate  
as the part  
This whole  
either Phy-  
sical or  
Mathema-  
tical

and is, again, either a Physical or Essential whole. or an Integral or Mathematical whole.<sup>a</sup> A Physical or Essential whole is that which consists of not really separable parts, of or pertaining to its substance. Thus, man is made up of two substantial parts,—a mind and a body ; and each of these has again various qualities, which, though separable only by mental abstraction, are considered as so many parts of an essential whole. Thus the attributes of respiration, of digestion, of locomotion, of colour, are so many parts of the whole notion we have of the human body ; cognition, feeling, desire, virtue, vice, &c, so many parts of the whole notion we have of the human mind ; and all these together, so many parts of the whole notion we have of man. A Mathematical, or Integral, or Quantitative whole, is that which has part out of part, and which, therefore, can be really partitioned. The Integral or, as it ought to be called, Integrate whole (*totum integratum*), is composed of integrant parts (*partes integrantes*), which are either homogeneous, or heterogeneous. An example of the former is given in the division of a square into two triangles ; of the latter, of the animal body into head, trunk, extremities, &c

These wholes, (and there are others of less importance which I omit), are varieties of that whole which we may call a Comprehensive, or Metaphysical ; it might be called a Natural whole.

This being understood, let us consider how we proceed when we reason from the relation between a comprehensive whole and its parts. Here, as I have said, the subject is the whole, the predicate its part ; in

<sup>a</sup> See Eugenios, [Αεγικη, c. iv. pp dyck, *Institut Logicae*, lib. 1. c. xiv. 196, 203 (1766) —Ed.] [Cf Burgers- p 52 et seq, edit. 1660]

other words, the predicate belongs to the subject. Now, here it is evident, that all the parts of the predicate must also be parts of the subject; in other terms, all that belongs to the predicate must also belong to the subject. In the words of the scholastic adage,—*Nota notæ est nota rei ipsius; Predicatum predicatorum est predicatum subiecti.* An example of this reasoning.—

Europe contains England;

England contains Middlesex;

Therefore, Europe contains Middlesex.

In other words,—England is an integrant part of Europe, Middlesex is an integrant part of England, therefore, Middlesex is an integrant part of Europe. This is an example from a mathematical whole and parts. Again —

Socrates is just, (that is, Socrates contains justice as a quality);

Justice is a virtue, (that is, justice contains virtue as a constituent part);

Therefore, Socrates is virtuous.

In other words;—justice is an attribute or essential part of Socrates; virtue is an attribute or essential part of justice, therefore virtue is an attribute or essential part of Socrates. This is an example from a physical or essential whole and parts.

What I have now said will be enough to show, in general, what I mean by a deductive reasoning, in which the subject is the whole, the predicate the part.

I proceed, in the second place, to the other kind of Deductive Reasoning,—that in which the subject is the part, the predicate is the whole. This reasoning proceeds under that species of whole which has been called the Logical or Potential or Universal. This

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the part,  
the predi-  
cate as the  
whole

whole is determined by the Extension of a notion, the genera having species, and the species individuals, as their parts. Thus *animal* is a universal whole, of which *bird* and *beast* are immediate, *eagle* and *sparrow*, *dog* and *horse*, mediate parts; while *man*, which, in relation to animal, is a part, is a whole in relation to Peter, Paul, Socrates, &c. The parts of a logical or universal whole, I should notice, are called the *subject parts*.

From what you now know of the nature of generalisation, you are aware that general terms are terms expressive of attributes which may be predicated of many different objects; and inasmuch as these objects resemble each other in the common attribute, they are considered by us as constituting a class. Thus, when I say, that a horse is a quadruped; Bucephalus is a horse, therefore, Bucephalus is a quadruped;—I virtually say,—*horse* the subject is a part of the predicate *quadruped*, *Bucephalus* the subject is part of the predicate *horse*, therefore, *Bucephalus* the subject is part of the predicate *quadruped*. In the reasoning under this whole, you will observe that the same word, as it is whole or part, changes from predicate to subject, *horse*, when viewed as a part of *quadruped*, being the subject of the proposition; whereas when viewed as a whole, containing *Bucephalus*, it becomes the predicate.

Inductive  
Reasoning,  
—its axi-  
om.

Such is a general view of the process of Deductive Reasoning, under the two great varieties determined by the two different kinds of whole and parts. I now proceed to the counter-process,—that of Inductive Reasoning. The deductive is founded on the axiom, that what is part of the part, is also part of the containing whole; the inductive on the principle, that what is

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true of every constituent part belongs, or does not belong, to the constituted whole

Of two kinds, as it proceeds in the whole of Comprehension or of Extension

Induction, like deduction, may be divided into two kinds, according as the whole and parts about which it is conversant, are a Comprehensive or Physical or Natural, or an Extensive or Logical, whole. Thus, in the former,—

Gold is a metal, yellow, ductile, fusible in *aqua regia*, of a certain specific gravity, and so on;

These qualities constitute this body, (are all its parts);

Therefore, this body is gold.

In the latter,—Ox, horse, dog, &c, are animals,—that is, are contained under the class animal,

Ox, horse, dog, &c, constitute, (are all the constituents of), the class quadruped.

Therefore, quadruped is contained under animal

Both in the deductive and inductive processes the inference must be of an absolute necessity, in so far as the mental illation is concerned, that is, every consequent proposition must be evolved out of every antecedent proposition with intuitive evidence. I do not mean by this, that the antecedent should be necessarily true, or that the consequent be really contained in it; it is sufficient that the antecedent be assumed as true, and that the consequent be, in conformity to the laws of thought, evolved out of it as its part or its equation. This last is called Logical or Formal or Subjective truth: and an inference may be subjectively or formally true, which is objectively or really false

Deductive and Inductive illation must be of an absolute necessity

The account given of Induction in all works of Logic is utterly erroneous. Sometimes we find this inference described as a precarious, not a necessary,

Accidental  
Illation  
It is  
not  
necessary

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reasoning. It is called an illation from some to all. But here *the some*, as it neither contains nor constitutes *the all*, determines no necessary movement, and a conclusion drawn under these circumstances is logically vicious. Others again describe the inductive process thus :—

What belongs to some objects of a class belongs to the whole class ;

This property belongs to some objects of the class ,  
Therefore, it belongs to the whole class.

This account of induction, which is the one you will find in all the English works on Logic, is not an inductive reasoning at all. It is, logically considered, a deductive syllogism ; and, logically considered, a syllogism radically vicious. It is logically vicious to say, that, because some individuals of a class have certain common qualities apart from that property which constitutes the class itself, therefore the whole individuals of the class should partake in these qualities. For this there is no logical reason,—no necessity of thought. The probability of this inference, and it is only probable, is founded on the observation of the analogy of nature, and, therefore, not upon the laws of thought, by which alone reasoning, considered as a logical process, is exclusively governed. To become a formally legitimate induction, the objective probability must be clothed with a subjective necessity, and *the some* must be translated into *the all* which it is supposed to represent.

In the deductive syllogism we proceed by analysis, —that is, by decomposing a whole into its parts ; but as the two wholes with which reasoning is conversant are in the inverse ratio of each other, so our analysis in the one will correspond to our synthesis in the

In Extension and Comprehension, the analysis of the one corresponds to the synthesis of the other.

other. For example, when I divide a whole of extension into its parts,—when I divide a genus into the species, a species into the individuals, it contains,—I do so by adding new differences, and thus go on accumulating in the parts a complement of qualities which did not belong to the wholes. This, therefore, which, in point of extension, is an analysis, is, in point of comprehension, a synthesis. In like manner, when I decompose a whole of comprehension, that is, decompose a complex predicate into its constituent attributes, I obtain by this process a simpler and more general quality, and thus this, which, in relation to a comprehensive whole, is an analysis, is, in relation to an extensive whole, a synthesis.

As the deductive inference is Analytic, the inductive is Synthetic. But as induction, equally as deduction, is conversant with both wholes, so the synthesis of induction on the comprehensive whole is a reversed process to its synthesis on the extensive whole.

From what I have now stated, you will, therefore, be aware, that the terms *analysis* and *synthesis*, when used without qualification, may be employed, at cross purposes, to denote operations precisely the converse of each other. And so it has happened. Analysis, in the mouth of one set of philosophers, means precisely what synthesis denotes in the mouth of another; nay, what is even still more frequent, these words are perpetually converted with each other by the same philosopher. I may notice, what has rarely, if ever, been remarked, that *synthesis* in the writings of the Greek logicians is equivalent to the *analysis* of modern philosophers: the former, regarding the extensive whole as the principal, applied analysis, κατ' ἐξοχήν,

Confusion  
among phi-  
losophers  
from not  
having ob-  
served this

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to its division ;<sup>a</sup> the latter, viewing the comprehensive whole as the principal, in general limit analysis to its decomposition. This, however, has been overlooked, and a confusion the most inextricable prevails in regard to the use of these words, if the thread to the labyrinth is not obtained.

<sup>a</sup> Thus the Platonic method of *division*, p. 173 —ED [Cf Zabarella, *Division* is called *Analytical*. See *In Proc' Analyt.*, lib. II. c. vii. text Laertius, III. 24. Compare *Discus-* 70, 81 *Opera Logica*, pp. 1190, 1212.]

## LECTURE XXXVIII.

## THE REGULATIVE FACULTY.

LECT  
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ulative  
Faculty  
Peculiarity  
of sense in  
which the  
term Fa-  
culty is  
here em-  
ployed.Designa-  
tions of the  
Regulative  
Faculty  
—Νοῦς,  
ReasonCommon  
Sense,—  
its various  
meanings

I now enter upon the last of the Cognitive Faculties, —the Faculty which I denominated the Regulative. Here the term *faculty*, you will observe, is employed in a somewhat peculiar signification, for it is employed not to denote the proximate cause of any definite energy, but the power the mind has of being the native source of certain necessary or *a priori* cognitions; which cognitions, as they are the conditions, the forms, under which our knowledge in general is possible, constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual nature. It is in this sense that I call the power which the mind possesses of modifying the knowledge it receives, in conformity to its proper nature, its Regulative Faculty. The Regulative Faculty is, however, in fact, nothing more than the complement of such laws,—it is the *locus principiorum*. It thus corresponds to what was known in the Greek philosophy under the name of νοῦς, when that term was rigorously used. To this faculty has been latterly applied the name *Reason*; but this term is so vague and ambiguous, that it is almost unfitted to convey any definite meaning. The term *Common Sense* has likewise been applied to designate the place of principles. This word is also ambiguous. In the first place, it was the expression used in the Aristotelic



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Authorities  
for the use  
of the term  
Common  
Sense as  
equivalent  
to *Νοῦς*

philosophy to denote the Central or Common Sensory, in which the different external senses met and were united.<sup>a</sup> In the second place, it was employed to signify a sound understanding applied to vulgar objects, in contrast to a scientific or speculative intelligence, and it is in this signification that it has been taken by those who have derided the principle on which the philosophy, which has been distinctively denominated the Scottish, professes to be established. This is not, however, the meaning which has always or even principally been attached to it, and an incomparably stronger case might be made out in defence of this expression than has been done by Reid, or even by Mr Stewart. It is in fact a term of high antiquity, and very general acceptance. We find it in Cicero,<sup>β</sup> in several passages not hitherto observed. It is found in the meaning in question in Phædrus,<sup>γ</sup> and not in the signification of community of sentiment, which it expresses in Horace<sup>δ</sup> and Juvenal.<sup>ε</sup> “Natura,” says Tertullian,<sup>ζ</sup> speaking of the universal consent of mankind to the immortality of the soul,—“Natura pleraque suggeruntur quasi de *publico sensu*, quo animam Deus dotare dignatus est.” And in the same meaning the term *Sensus Communis* is employed by St Augustin.<sup>η</sup> In modern times it is to be found in the philosophical writings of every country of Europe. In Latin it is used by the German Melanchthon,<sup>θ</sup> Victorinus,<sup>ι</sup> Keckermannus,<sup>κ</sup> Christian Thomasius,<sup>λ</sup>

<sup>a</sup> See *De Anima*, III. 2, 7. Cf. *In loc. cit.*, Conimbricenses, pp. 373, 407.—Ed

<sup>β</sup> See *Reid's Works*, p. 774.—Ed

<sup>γ</sup> L. I. f. 7.—Ed.

<sup>δ</sup> *Sat.*, I. 3, 66. But see *Reid's Works*, p. 774.—Ed

<sup>ε</sup> *Sat.*, VIII. 73.—Ed

<sup>ζ</sup> See *Reid's Works*, p. 776.—Ed

<sup>η</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 776.—Ed

<sup>θ</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 778.—Ed

<sup>ι</sup> [Victorinus Strigelius, *Hypomnemata in Dialect. Melanchthonis*, pp. 798, 1040, ed. 1566.]

<sup>κ</sup> See *Reid's Works*, p. 780.—Ed

<sup>λ</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 785.—Ed

Leibnitz,<sup>a</sup> Wolf,<sup>β</sup> and the Dutch De Raet,<sup>γ</sup> by the Gallo-Portuguese Antonius Goveanus,<sup>δ</sup> the Spanish Nunnesius,<sup>ε</sup> the Italian Genovesi,<sup>ξ</sup> and Vico,<sup>η</sup> and by the Scottish Abercromby,<sup>θ</sup> in French by Balzac,<sup>ι</sup> Chanet,<sup>κ</sup> Pascal,<sup>λ</sup> Malebranche,<sup>μ</sup> Bouhours, Barbeyrac;<sup>ν</sup> in English by Sir Thomas Browne,<sup>ξ</sup> Toland,<sup>ο</sup> Charleton.<sup>π</sup> These are only a few of the testimonies I could adduce in support of the term Common Sense for the faculty in question; in fact, so far as use and wont may be allowed to weigh, there is perhaps no philosophical expression in support of which a more numerous array of authorities may be alleged. The expression, however, is certainly exceptionable, and it can only claim toleration in the absence of a better.

I may notice that Pascal and Hemsterhuis<sup>ρ</sup> have applied *Intuition* and *Sentiment* in this sense; and Jacobi<sup>σ</sup> originally employed *Glaube*, (*Belief* or *Faith*), in the same way, though he latterly superseded this expression by that of *Vernunft*, (*Reason*.)

Were it allowed in metaphysical philosophy, as in physical, to discriminate scientific differences by scientific terms, I would employ the word *noetic*, as derived

Noetic and  
Dianoetic,  
—how to  
be employ-  
ed

<sup>a</sup> See Reid's Works, p 785 —ED

<sup>β</sup> Ibid, p 790 —ED

<sup>γ</sup> See Clavis Philosophiæ Naturalis Aristotelico-Cartésiana, Dissert 1 De Cognitione Vulgari et Philosophica, p 7 "Communis facultas omnium hominum," Dissert. II De Præcognitis in Genere, §§ IV V pp 34, 35 "Communes Notiones," § X p 41 "Communis Sensus." —ED

<sup>δ</sup> See Reid's Works, p 779 —ED

<sup>ε</sup> Ibid —ED

<sup>ξ</sup> Ibid., p 790 —ED

<sup>η</sup> Ibid —ED

<sup>θ</sup> Ibid, p 785 —ED

<sup>ι</sup> Ibid, p 782 —ED

<sup>κ</sup> Ibid —ED

<sup>λ</sup> Ibid., p 783 —ED

<sup>μ</sup> Ibid, p 784 —ED

<sup>ν</sup> Des Droits de la Puissance Souveraine, Recueil de Discours, t 1. pp 36, 37 A translation from the Latin of Noodt, in which *mens sana* and *sensus communis* are both rendered by *le sens commun* —ED

<sup>ξ</sup> See Reid's Works, p 782 —ED

<sup>ο</sup> Ibid, p 785 —ED

<sup>π</sup> Charleton uses the term in its Aristotelian signification, as denoting the central or common sensory and its function See his *Immortality of the Human Soul demonstrated by the Light of Nature* (1657), pp 92, 98, 158 —ED

<sup>ρ</sup> See Reid's Works, p 792 —ED

<sup>σ</sup> Ibid, p 793 —ED

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Nomencla-  
ture of the  
cognitions  
due to the  
Regulative  
Faculty

from νοῦς, to express all those cognitions that originate in the mind itself, *dianoetic* to denote the operations of the Discursive, Elaborative, or Comparative faculty. So much for the nomenclature of the faculty itself.

On the other hand, the cognitions themselves, of which it is the source, have obtained various appellations. They have been denominated κοινὰ προλήψεις, κοινὰ ἔννοιαι, φυσικὰ ἔννοιαι, πρῶται ἔννοιαι, πρῶτα νοήματα, *naturæ judicicia*, *judicicia communibus hominum sensibus infixa*, *notiones* or *notitiæ connatæ* or *innatæ*, *semina scientiæ*, *semina omnium cognitionum*, *semina æternitatis*, *zopyra*, (*living sparks*), *præcognita necessaria*, *anticipationes*; *first principles*, *common anticipations*, *principles of common sense*, *self-evident* or *intuitive truths*, *primitive notions*, *native notions*, *innate cognitions*, *natural knowledges* (*cognitions*), *fundamental reasons*, *metaphysical* or *transcendental truths*, *ultimate* or *elemental laws of thought*, *primary* or *fundamental laws of human belief*, or *primary laws of human reason*, *pure* or *transcendental* or *a priori cognitions*, *categories of thought*, *natural beliefs*, *rational instincts*, &c. &c.<sup>a</sup>

Importance  
of the dis-  
tinction of  
native and  
adventi-  
tious know-  
ledge.

The history of opinions touching the acceptation, or rejection, of such native notions, is, in a manner, the history of philosophy; for as the one alternative, or the other, is adopted in this question, the character of a system is determined. At present I content myself with stating that, though from the earliest period of philosophy, the doctrine was always common, if not always predominant, that our knowledge originated, in part at least, in the mind, yet it was only at a very recent date that the criterion was explicitly enounced, by which the native may be

a See Reid's Works, Note A, § v p 755 et seq — Ed

Criterion  
of neces-  
sity first  
enounced  
by Leib-  
nitz

Partially  
anticipat-  
ed by Des-  
cartes

discriminated from the adventitious elements of knowledge. Without touching on some ambiguous expressions in more ancient philosophers, it is sufficient to say that the character of universality and necessity, as the quality by which the two classes of knowledge are distinguished, was first explicitly proclaimed by Leibnitz. It is true, indeed, that, previously to him, Descartes all but enounced it. In the notes of Descartes on the *Programma* of 1647, (which you will find under Letter XCIX. of the First Part of his *Epistolæ*), in arguing against the author who would derive all our knowledge from observation or tradition, he has the following sentence —“I wish that our author would inform me what is that corporeal motion which is able to form in our intellect any common notion,—for example, things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, or any other of the same kind ; for all those motions are particûlar, but these notions are universal, having no affinity with motions, and holding no relation to them.” Now, had he only added the term *necessary* to universal, he would have completely anticipated Leibnitz. I have already frequently had occasion incidentally to notice, that we should carefully distinguish between those notions or cognitions which are primitive facts, and those notions or cognitions which are generalised or derivative facts. The former are given us, they are not, indeed, obtrusive,—they are not even cognisable of themselves. They lie hid in the profundities of the mind, until drawn from their obscurity by the mental activity itself employed upon the materials of experience. Hence it is, that our knowledge has its commencement in sense, external or internal, but its origin in intellect. “Cognitio omnis a sensibus exordium, a

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mente originem habet primam.”<sup>a</sup> The latter, the derivative cognitions, are of our own fabrication; we form them after certain rules; they are the tardy result of Perception and Memory, of Attention, Reflection, Abstraction. The primitive cognitions, on the contrary, seem to leap ready armed from the womb of reason, like Pallas from the head of Jupiter; sometimes the mind places them at the commencement of its operations, in order to have a point of support and a fixed basis, without which the operations would be impossible; sometimes they form, in a certain sort, the crowning,—the consummation, of all the intellectual operations. The derivative or generalised notions are an artifice of intellect,—an ingenious mean of giving order and compactness to the materials of our knowledge. The primitive and general notions are the root of all principles,—the foundation of the whole edifice of human science. But how different soever be the two classes of our cognitions, and however distinctly separated they may be by the circumstance,—that we cannot but think the one, and can easily annihilate the other in thought,—this discriminative quality was not explicitly signalised till done by Leibnitz. The older philosophers are at best undeveloped. Descartes made the first step towards a more perspicuous and definite discrimination. He frequently enounces that our primitive notions, (besides being clear and distinct), are universal. But this universality is only a derived circumstance,—a notion is universal, (meaning thereby that a notion is common to all mankind), because it is necessary to the thinking mind,—because the mind cannot but think it. Spinoza, in one passage of his treatise *De Emendatione Intellectus*,<sup>β</sup> says :

And by  
Spinoza

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. xxi, vol. ii. p. 27.—ED.      <sup>β</sup> *Opera Posthuma*, p. 391

—"The ideas which we form clear and distinct, appear so to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they seem absolutely to depend from our sole power [of thought]; the confused ideas on the contrary," &c. This is anything but explicit; and, as I said, Leibnitz is the first by whom the criterion of necessity,—of the impossibility not to think so and so,—was established as a discriminative type of our native notions, in contrast to those which we educe from experience, and build up through generalisation.

The enunciation of this criterion was, in fact, a great discovery in the science of mind; and the fact that a truth so manifest, when once proclaimed, could have lain so long unnoticed by philosophers, may warrant us in hoping that other discoveries of equal importance may still be awaiting the advent of another Leibnitz. Leibnitz has, in several parts of his works, laid down the distinction in question; and, what is curious, almost always in relation to Locke. In the fifth volume of his works by Dutens,<sup>a</sup> in an Epistle to Bierling of 1710, he says, (I translate from the Latin):—"In Locke there are some particulars not ill expounded, but upon the whole he has wandered far from the gate,<sup>β</sup> nor has he understood the nature of the intellect, (*natura mentis*). Had he sufficiently considered the difference between necessary truths or those apprehended by demonstration, and those which become known to us by induction alone,—he would have seen that those which are necessary, could only be approved to us by principles native to the mind, (*menti insitis*); seeing that the senses indeed inform us what may take place, but not what necessarily takes place. Locke has not observed

The enunciation of this criterion, a great step in the science of mind.

Leibnitz quoted

<sup>a</sup> P 358    <sup>β</sup> This refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* [*A. Minor*, c. 1—2].

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Leibnitz  
further  
quoted

that the notions of being, of substance, of one and the same, of the true, of the good, and many others, are innate to our mind, because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture. It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense,—except the intellect itself.” He makes a similar observation in reference to Locke, in Letter XI., to his friend Mr Burnet of Kemnay.<sup>a</sup> And in his *Nouveaux Essais*, (a detailed refutation of Locke’s Essay, and not contained in the collected edition of his works by Dutens), he repeatedly enforces the same doctrine. In one place he says,<sup>β</sup>—“Hence there arises another question, viz. :—Are all truths dependent on experience, that is to say, on induction and examples? Or are there some which have another foundation? For if some events can be foreseen before all trial has been made, it is manifest that we contribute something on our part. The senses, although necessary for all our actual cognitions, are not, however, competent to afford us all that cognitions involve; for the senses never give us more than examples, that is to say, particular or individual truths. Now all the examples which confirm a general truth, how numerous soever they may be, are insufficient to establish the universal necessity of the same truth; for it does not follow that what has happened, will happen always in like manner. For example; the Greeks and Romans and other nations have always observed that during the course of twenty-four hours, day is changed into night, and night into day. But we should be wrong, were we to believe that the same rule holds everywhere, as the

<sup>a</sup> *Opera*, vol. vi p. 274 (edit Dutens)      <sup>β</sup> *Avant-Propos*, p. 5 (edit Raspe)

contrary has been observed during a residence in Nova Zembla. And he again would deceive himself, who should believe that, in our latitudes at least, this was a truth necessary and eternal, for we ought to consider that the earth and the sun themselves have no necessary existence, and that there will perhaps a time arrive when this fair star will, with its whole system, have no longer a place in creation,—at least under its present form. Hence it appears, that the necessary truths, such as we find them in pure Mathematics, and particularly in Arithmetic and Geometry, behove to have principles the proof of which does not depend upon examples, and, consequently, not on the evidence of sense, howbeit that without the senses, we should never have found occasion to call them into consciousness. This is what it is necessary to distinguish accurately, and it is what Euclid has so well understood, in demonstrating by reason what is sufficiently apparent by experience and sensible images. Logic, likewise, with Metaphysics and Morals, the one of which constitutes Natural Theology, the other Natural Jurisprudence, are full of such truths; and, consequently, their proof can only be derived from internal principles, which we call innate. It is true, that we ought not to imagine that we can read in the soul, these eternal laws of reason, *ad aperturam libri*, as we can read the edict of the Prætor without trouble or research; but it is enough, that we can discover them in ourselves by dint of attention, when the occasions are presented to us by the senses. The success of the observation serves to confirm reason, in the same way as proofs serve in Arithmetic to obviate erroneous calculations, when the computation is long. It is hereby, also, that the cognitions of men differ



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from those of beasts. The beasts are purely empirical, and only regulate themselves by examples ; for as far as we can judge, they never attain to the formation of necessary judgments, whereas, men are capable of demonstrative sciences, and herein the faculty which brutes possess of drawing inferences is inferior to the reason which is in men." And, after some other observations, he proceeds :—" Perhaps our able author," (he refers to Locke), " will not be wholly alien from my opinion. For after having employed the whole of his first book to refute innate cognitions, taken in a certain sense, he, however, avows, at the commencement of the second, and afterwards, that ideas which have not their origin in Sensation, come from Reflection. Now reflection is nothing else than an attention to what is in us, and the senses do not inform us of what we already carry with us. This being the case, can it be denied that there is much that is innate in our mind, seeing that we are as it were innate to ourselves, and that there are in us existence, unity, substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intellectual notions ? These same objects being immediate, and always present to our understanding, (although they are not always perceived by reason of our distractions and our wants), why should it be a matter of wonder, if we say that these ideas are innate in us, with all that is dependent on them ? In illustration of this, let me make use likewise of the simile of a block of marble which has veins, rather than of a block of marble wholly uniform, or of blank tablets, that is to say, what is called a *tabula rasa* by philosophers ; for if the mind resembled these blank tablets, truths would be in us, as the figure of Hercules is in a piece of

marble, when the marble is altogether indifferent to the reception of this figure or of any other. But if we suppose that there are veins in the stone, which would mark out the figure of Hercules by preference to other figures, this stone would be more determined thereunto, and Hercules would exist there, innately in a certain sort; although it would require labour to discover the veins, and to clear them by polishing and the removal of all that prevents their manifestation. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us; like our inclinations, dispositions, natural habitudes or virtualities, and not as actions; although these virtualities be always accompanied by some corresponding actions, frequently, however, unperceived.

“It seems that our able author [Locke] maintains that there is nothing virtual in us, and even nothing of which we are [not] always actually conscious. But this cannot be strictly intended, for in that case his opinion would be paradoxical, since even our acquired habits and the stores of our memory are not always in actual consciousness, nay, do not always come to our aid when wanted; while again, we often call them to mind on any trifling occasion which suggests them to our remembrance, like as it only requires us to be given the commencement of a song to help us to the recollection of the rest. He, therefore, limits his thesis in other places, saying that there is at least nothing in us which we have not, at some time or other, acquired by experience and perception.” And in another remarkable passage, Leibnitz says, “The mind is not only capable of knowing pure and necessary truths, but likewise of discovering them in itself, and if it possessed only the simple capacity of receiving cognitions, or the passive

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power of knowledge, as indetermined as that of the wax to receive figures, or a blank tablet to receive letters, it would not be the source of necessary truths, as I am about to demonstrate that it is : for it is incontestable, that the senses could not suffice to make their necessity apparent, and that the intellect has, therefore, a disposition, as well active as passive, to draw them from its own bosom, although the senses be requisite to furnish the occasion, and the attention to determine it upon some in preference to others. You see, therefore, these very able philosophers, who are of a different opinion, have not sufficiently reflected on the consequences of the difference that subsists between necessary or eternal truths and the truths of experience, as I have already observed, and as all our contestation shows. The original proof of necessary truths comes from the intellect alone, while other truths are derived from experience or the observations of sense. Our mind is competent to both kinds of knowledge, but it is itself the source of the former ; and how great soever may be the number of particular experiences in support of a universal truth, we should never be able to assure ourselves for ever of its universality by induction, unless we knew its necessity by reason. . . . The senses may register, justify, and confirm these truths, but not demonstrate their infallibility and eternal certainty."

And in speaking of the faculty of such truths, he says : "It is not a naked faculty, which consists in the mere possibility of understanding them ; it is a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, which determines our mind to elicit, and which causes that they can be elicited ; precisely as there is a difference between the figures which are bestowed indifferently

on stone or marble, and those which veins mark out or are disposed to mark out, if the sculptor avail himself of the indications."<sup>a</sup> I have quoted these passages from Leibnitz, not only for their own great importance, as the first full and explicit enunciation, and certainly not the least able illustrations, of one of the most momentous principles in philosophy; but, likewise, because the *Nouveaux Essais*, from which they are principally extracted, though of all others the most important psychological work of Leibnitz, was wholly unknown, not only to the other philosophers of this country, but even to Mr Stewart, prior to the last years of his life.<sup>β</sup>

We have thus seen that Leibnitz was the first philosopher who explicitly established the quality of necessity as the criterion of distinction between empirical and *a priori* cognitions. I may, however, remark, what is creditable to Dr Reid's sagacity, that he founded the same discrimination on the same difference and I am disposed to think, that he did this without being aware of his coincidence with Leibnitz; for he does not seem to have studied the system of that philosopher in his own works; and it was not till Kant had shown the importance of the criterion, by its application in his hands, that the attention of the learned was called to the scattered notices of it in the writings of Leibnitz. In speaking of the principle of causality, Dr Reid says.—“We are next to consider whether we may not learn this truth from experience,—That

Reid discriminated native from adventitious knowledge by the same difference, independently of Leibnitz

Reid quoted

<sup>a</sup> *Nouv. Essais*, liv. 1 § 11 See included in the collected edition of above, Lect. xxix, vol. II p 195 — the works of Leibnitz by Dutens

<sup>β</sup> The reason of this was, that it was not published till long after the death of its author, and it is not included in the collected edition of Leibnitz's *Opera Philosophica* by Erdmann, it is now easily procured

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effects which have all the marks and tokens of design, must proceed from a designing cause.

“I apprehend that we cannot learn this truth from experience, for two reasons.

“*First*, Because it is a necessary truth, not a contingent one. It agrees with the experience of mankind since the beginning of the world, that the area of a triangle is equal to half the rectangle under its base and perpendicular. It agrees no less with experience, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. So far as experience goes, these truths are upon an equal footing. But every man perceives this distinction between them,—that the first is a necessary truth, and that it is impossible it should not be true; but the last is not necessary, but contingent, depending upon the will of Him who made the world. As we cannot learn from experience that twice three must necessarily make six, so neither can we learn from experience that certain effects must proceed from a designing and intelligent cause. Experience informs us only of what has been, but never of what must be”<sup>a</sup>

And in speaking of our belief in the principle that an effect manifesting design must have had an intelligent cause, he says:—“It has been thought, that, although this principle does not admit of proof from abstract reasoning, it may be proved from experience, and may be justly drawn by induction, from instances that fall within our observation.

“I conceive this method of proof will leave us in great uncertainty, for these three reasons:

“1st, Because the proposition to be proved is not a contingent but a *necessary* proposition. It is not

<sup>a</sup> *Int. Powers*, Essay vi. chap. vi. *Works*, p. 459.

that things which begin to exist commonly have a cause, or even that they always in fact have a cause; but that they must have a cause, and cannot begin to exist without a cause. LECT  
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“Propositions of this kind, from their nature, are incapable of proof by induction. Experience informs us only of what *is* or *has been*, not of what *must be*; and the conclusion must be of the same nature with the premises.

“For this reason, no mathematical proposition can be proved by induction. Though it should be found by experience in a thousand cases, that the area of a plane triangle is equal to the rectangle under the altitude and half the base, this would not prove that it must be so in all cases, and cannot be otherwise; which is what the mathematician affirms.

“In like manner, though we had the most ample experimental proof, that things which have begun to exist had a cause, this would not prove that they must have a cause. Experience may show us what is the established course of nature, but can never show what connections of things are in their nature necessary.

“*2dly*, General maxims, grounded on experience, have only a degree of probability proportioned to the extent of our experience, and ought always to be understood so as to leave room for exceptions, if future experience shall discover any such.

“The law of gravitation has as full a proof from experience and induction as any principle can be supposed to have. Yet, if any philosopher should, by clear experiment, show that there is a kind of matter in some bodies which does not gravitate, the law of gravitation ought to be limited by that exception.

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"Now, it is evident that men have never considered the principle of the necessity of causes, as a truth of this kind which may admit of limitation or exception; and therefore it has not been received upon this kind of evidence.

"3dly, I do not see that experience could satisfy us that every change in nature actually has a cause.

"In the far greatest part of the changes in nature that fall within our observation, the causes are unknown; and, therefore, from experience, we cannot know whether they have causes or not.

"Causation is not an object of sense. The only experience we can have of it, is in the consciousness we have of exerting some power in ordering our thoughts and actions. But this experience is surely too narrow a foundation for a general conclusion, that all things that have had or shall have a beginning, must have a cause.

"For these reasons this principle cannot be drawn from experience, any more than from abstract reasoning."<sup>a</sup>

Hume arrived at the same conclusion

It ought, however, to be noticed that Mr Hume's acuteness had arrived at the same conclusion. "As to past experience," he observes, "it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognisance; but why this experience should be extended to future times and to other objects,—this is the main question on which I would insist."<sup>β</sup>

The philosopher, however, who has best known how

<sup>a</sup> *Intellectual Powers*, Essay vi. this Essay.  
chap vi. *Works*, pp. 455, 456 Reid <sup>β</sup> *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, § 1v. *Philosophical Works*, vol. iv p 42.—ED

to turn the criterion to account is Kant; and the general success with which he has applied it, must be admitted even by those who demur to many of the particular conclusions which his philosophy would establish.

But though it be now generally acknowledged, by the profoundest thinkers, that it is impossible to analyse all our knowledge into the produce of experience, external or internal, and that a certain complement of cognitions must be allowed as having their origin in the nature of the thinking principle itself; they are not at one in regard to those which ought to be recognised as ultimate and elemental, and those which ought to be regarded as modifications or combinations of these. Reid and Stewart, (the former in particular), have been considered as too easy in their admission of primary laws; and it must be allowed that the censure, in some instances, is not altogether unmerited. But it ought to be recollected, that those who thus agree in reprehension are not in unison in regard to the grounds of censure, and they wholly forget that our Scottish philosophers made no pretension to a final analysis of the primary laws of human reason,—that they thought it enough to classify a certain number of cognitions as native to the mind, leaving it to their successors to resolve these into simpler elements “The most general phænomena,” says Dr Reid, “we can reach, are what we call Laws of Nature. So that the laws of nature are nothing else but the most general facts relating to the operations of nature, which include a great many particular facts under them. And if, in any case, we should give the name of a law of nature to a general phænomenon, which

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Philosophers divided in regard to what cognitions ought to be classed as ultimate, and what as modifications of the ultimate.

Reid and Stewart have been censured for their too easy admission of first principles

Reid quoted in self-vindication



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human industry shall afterwards trace to one more general, there is no great harm done. The most general assumes the name of a law of nature when it is discovered; and the less general is contained and comprehended in it." In another part of his work, he has introduced the same remark. "The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine, to be traced through all its windings; but, if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done; a quicker eye may in time trace it farther."<sup>a</sup> The same view has been likewise well stated by Mr Stewart <sup>β</sup> "In all the other sciences, the progress of discovery has been gradual, from the less general to the more general laws of nature; and it would be singular indeed, if, in this science, which but a few years ago was confessedly in its infancy, and which certainly labours under many disadvantages peculiar to itself, a step should all at once be made to a single principle, comprehending all the particular phænomena which we know. As the order established in the intellectual world seems to be regulated by laws analogous to those which we trace among the phænomena of the material system; and as in all our philosophical inquiries, (to whatever subject they may relate), the progress of the mind is liable to be affected by the same tendency to a premature generalisation, the following extract from an eminent chemical writer may contribute to illustrate the scope and to confirm the justness of some of the foregoing reflections. 'Within the last fifteen or twenty years, several new metals

Stewart  
quoted to  
the same  
effect

<sup>a</sup> *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Works, vol. v p 13 Cf *Elements*, c. i. § 2 Works, p 99 —Ed vol. i. c. v part ii. § 4. *Coll Works*,  
<sup>β</sup> *Phil Essays*, Prel. Diss c i. *Coll* vol. ii. pp 342, 343 —Ed

and new earths have been made known to the world. The names that support these discoveries are respectable, and the experiments decisive. If we do not give our assent to them, no single proposition in chemistry can for a moment stand. But whether all these are really simple substances, or compounds not yet resolved into their elements, is what the authors themselves cannot possibly assert; nor would it, in the least, diminish the merit of their observations, if future experiments should prove them to have been mistaken, as to the simplicity of these substances. This remark should not be confined to later discoveries; it may as justly be applied to those earths and metals with which we have been long acquainted.' 'In the dark ages of chemistry, the object was to rival nature; and the substance which the adepts of those days were busied to create, was universally allowed to be simple. In a more enlightened period, we have extended our inquiries and multiplied the number of the elements. The last task will be to simplify; and by a closer observation of nature, to learn from what a small store of primitive materials, all that we behold and wonder at was created.' "

That the list of the primary elements of human reason, which our two philosophers have given, has no pretence to order, and that the principles which it contains are not systematically deduced by any ambitious process of metaphysical ingenuity, is no valid ground of disparagement. In fact, which of the vaunted classifications of these primitive truths can stand the test of criticism? The most celebrated, and by far the most ingenious, of these,—the scheme of Kant,—though the truth of its details may be admitted, is no longer regarded as affording either a necessary

That Reid and Stewart offer no systematic deduction of the primary elements of human reason, is no valid ground for disparaging their labours

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deduction or a natural arrangement of our native cognitions ; and the reduction of these to system still remains a problem to be resolved.

Philosophers have not yet established the principle on which our ultimate cognitions are to be classified and reduced to system

In point of fact, philosophers have not yet purified the antecedent conditions of the problem,—have not yet established the principles on which its solution ought to be undertaken. And here I would solicit your attention to a circumstance, which shows how far philosophers are still removed from the prospect of an ultimate decision. It is agreed, that the quality of necessity is that which discriminates a native from an adventitious element of knowledge. When we find, therefore, a cognition which contains this discriminative quality, we are entitled to lay it down as one which could not have been obtained as a generalisation from experience. Thus I admit. But when philosophers lay it down not only as native to the mind, but as a positive and immediate datum of an intellectual power, I demur. It is evident that the quality of necessity in a cognition may depend on two different and opposite principles, inasmuch as it may either be the result of a power, or of a powerlessness, of the thinking principle. In the one case, it will be a Positive, in the other a Negative, necessity. Let us take examples of these opposite cases. In an act of perceptive consciousness, I think, and cannot but think, that I and that something different from me exist,—in other words, that my perception, as a modification of the ego, exists, and that the object of my perception, as a modification of the non-ego, exists. In these circumstances, I pronounce Existence to be a native cognition, because I find that I cannot think except under the condition of thinking all that I am conscious of to exist. Existence is thus a form, a cate-

Necessity,  
—either  
Positive,  
or Negative,  
as it  
results  
from a  
power, or  
from a  
powerless-  
ness of  
mind.

The first  
order of  
Necessity,  
—the Posi-  
tive,—il-  
lustrated,  
by the act  
of Percep-  
tion

gory, of thought. But here, though I cannot but think existence, I am conscious of this thought as an act of power,—an act of intellectual force. It is the result of strength, and not of weakness.

In like manner, when I think  $2 \times 2 = 4$ , the thought, though inevitable, is not felt as an imbecility; we know it as true, and, in the perception of the truth, though the act be necessary, the mind is conscious that the necessity does not arise from impotence. On the contrary, we attribute the same necessity to God. Here, therefore, there is a class of natural cognitions, which we may properly view as so many positive exertions of the mental vigour, and the cognitions of this class we consider as Positive. To this class will belong the notion of Existence and its modifications, the principles of Identity, and Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, the intuitions of Space and Time, &c.

But besides these, there are other necessary forms of thought, which, by all philosophers, have been regarded as standing precisely on the same footing, which to me seem to be of a totally different kind. In place of being the result of a power, the necessity which belongs to them is merely a consequence of the impotence of our faculties. But if this be the case, nothing could be more unphilosophical than to arrogate to these negative inabilities the dignity of positive energies. Every rule of philosophising would be violated. The law of Parcimony prescribes, that principles are not to be multiplied without necessity, and that an hypothetical force be not postulated to explain a phænomenon which can be better accounted for by an admitted impotence. The phænomenon of a heavy body rising from the earth, may warrant us in the assumption of a special power; but it would

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By an ar-  
ithmetical  
example

The second  
order of  
necessity,  
—the Ne-  
gative.  
This not  
recognised  
by philoso-  
phers

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surely be absurd to devise a special power, (that is, a power besides gravitation), to explain the phænomenon of its descent.

Illustrated

Now, that the imbecility of the human mind constitutes a great negative principle, to which sundry of the most important phænomena of intelligence may be referred, appears to me incontestable; and though the discussion is one somewhat abstract, I shall endeavour to give you an insight into the nature and application of this principle.

Principles  
referred to  
in the dis-  
cussion

I begin by the statement of certain principles, to which it is necessary in the sequel to refer.

1 The Law  
of Non-  
Contradic-  
tion

The highest of all logical laws, in other words, the supreme law of thought, is what is called the principle of Contradiction, or more correctly the principle of Non-Contradiction.<sup>a</sup> It is this:—A thing cannot be and not be at the same time,—*Alpha est, Alpha non est*, are propositions which cannot both be true at

2 The Law  
of Exclud-  
ed Middle

once A second fundamental law of thought, or rather the principle of Contradiction viewed in a certain aspect, is called the principle of Excluded Middle, or, more fully, the principle of Excluded Middle between two Contradictories A thing either is or it is not,—*Aut est Alpha aut non est*, there is no medium; one must be true, both cannot. These principles require, indeed admit of, no proof. They prove everything, but are proved by nothing. When I, therefore, have occasion to speak of these laws by name, you will know to what principle I refer.

Grand law  
of thought,  
—That the  
conceivable  
lies be-  
tween two  
contradic-  
tory ex-  
tremes

Now, then, I lay it down as a law which, though not generalised by philosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its application to the phænomena,—That all that is conceivable in thought, lies between two

<sup>a</sup> See Appendix, II.—Ed

extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictions, one must. For example, we conceive space,—we cannot but conceive space. I admit, therefore, that Space, indefinitely, is a positive and necessary form of thought. But when philosophers convert the fact, that we cannot but think space, or, to express it differently, that we are unable to imagine anything out of space,—when philosophers, I say, convert this fact with the assertion, that we have a notion,—a positive notion, of absolute or of infinite space, they assume, not only what is not contained in the phenomenon, nay, they assume what is the very reverse of what the phenomenon manifests. It is plain, that space must either be bounded or not bounded. These are contradictory alternatives; on the principle of Contradiction, they cannot both be true, and, on the principle of Excluded Middle, one must be true. This cannot be denied, without denying the primary laws of intelligence. But though space must be admitted to be necessarily either finite or infinite, we are able to conceive the possibility, neither of its finitude, nor of its infinity.

We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded,—as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no further space. Every one is conscious that this is impossible. It contradicts also the supposition of space as a necessary notion; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space, and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole. The one

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and illus-  
trated, by  
reference  
to Space,—  
1°, as a  
MaximumSpace  
either  
bounded  
or not  
boundedSpace as  
absolutely  
bounded  
inconceiv-  
able

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contradictory is thus found inconceivable; we cannot conceive space as positively limited.

Space, as infinitely unbounded, inconceivable.

On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realise in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory; we cannot conceive space as infinite, as without limits. You may launch out in thought, beyond the solar walk, you may transcend in fancy even the universe of matter, and rise from sphere to sphere in the region of empty space, until imagination sinks exhausted;—with all this what have you done? You have never gone beyond the finite, you have attained at best only to the indefinite, and the indefinite, however expanded, is still always the finite. As Pascal energetically says, “Inflate our conceptions as we may, with all the finite possible we cannot make one atom of the infinite.”<sup>a</sup> “The infinite is infinitely incomprehensible.”<sup>b</sup> Now then, both contradictories are equally inconceivable, and could we limit our attention to one alone we should deem it at once impossible and absurd, and suppose its unknown opposite as necessarily true. But as we not only can, but are constrained to consider both, we find that both are equally incomprehensible; and yet though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law to admit that one, but one only, is necessary.

Though both these contradictory alternatives are inconceivable one or other is yet necessary

That the conceivable lies always between two inconceivable extremes, is illustrated by every other relation of thought. We have found the maximum of space incomprehensible, can we comprehend its minimum? This is equally impossible. Here, likewise, we recoil from one inconceivable contradictory

Space 2<sup>d</sup> as a Minimum.

<sup>a</sup> *Pensées*, Première Partie, art. iv. § 1, (vol. ii. p. 64, edit. Faugère) des espaces imaginables; nous n'enfantons que des atomes, au prix de Pascal's words are:—“Nous avons la réalité des choses”—Ed  
beau enfler nos conceptions au delà <sup>b</sup> *Ibid*, Sec Part., art. iii. § 1 —Ed

only to infringe upon another. Let us take a portion of space however small, we can never conceive it as the smallest. It is necessarily extended, and may, consequently, be divided into a half or quarters, and each of these halves or quarters may again be divided into other halves or quarters, and this *ad infinitum*.

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An absolute minimum of space, and its infinite divisibility, alike inconceivable

But if we are unable to construe to our mind the possibility of an absolute minimum of space, we can as little represent to ourselves the possibility of an infinite divisibility of an extended entity.

In like manner Time;—this is a notion even more universal than space, for while we exempt from occupying space the energies of mind, we are unable to conceive these as not occupying time. Thus, we think everything, mental and material, as in time, and out of time we can think nothing. But, if we attempt to comprehend time, either in whole or in part, we find that thought is hedged in between two incomprehensibles. Let us try the whole And here let us look back,—let us consider time *a parte ante*. And here we may surely flatter ourselves that we shall be able to conceive time as a whole, for here we have the past period bounded by the present; the past cannot, therefore, be infinite or eternal, for a bounded infinite is a contradiction. But we shall deceive ourselves We are altogether unable to conceive time as commencing; we can easily represent to ourselves time under any relative limitation of commencement and termination, but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, than that it would be equally possible to think without thought, as to construe to the mind an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination of time, that is, a beginning and an end, beyond which time is conceived as

Further illustration by reference to Time,—1°, as a Maximum

1 Time, *a parte ante*, as an absolute whole, inconceivable



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2 Time, as  
an infinite  
regress, in-  
conceiv-  
able

3 Time, as  
an infinite  
progress,  
inconceiv-  
able

Time, 2°,  
as a Mini-  
mum The  
moment  
of time  
either di-  
visible to  
infinity, or  
composed  
of certain  
absolutely  
smallest  
parts Both  
alternatives  
inconceiv-  
able

non-existent. Goad imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralysed within the bounds of time, and time survives as the condition of the thought itself in which we annihilate the universe. On the other hand, the concept of past time as without limit, — without commencement, is equally impossible. We cannot conceive the infinite regress of time ; for such a notion could only be realised by the infinite addition in thought of finite times, and such an addition would itself require an eternity for its accomplishment. If we dream of effecting this, we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed. The negation of a commencement of time involves, likewise, the affirmation, that an infinite time has, at every moment, already run ; that is, it implies the contradiction, that an infinite has been completed. For the same reasons, we are unable to conceive an infinite progress of time ; while the infinite regress and the infinite progress taken together, involve the triple contradiction of an infinite concluded, of an infinite commencing, and of two infinities, not exclusive of each other.

Now take the parts of time,—a moment, for instance ; this we must conceive, as either divisible to infinity, or that it is made up of certain absolutely smallest parts. One or other of these contradictories must be the case. But each is, to us, equally inconceivable. Time is a protensive quantity, and, consequently, any part of it, however small, cannot, without a contradiction, be imagined as not divisible into parts, and these parts into others *ad infinitum*. But the opposite alternative is equally impossible ; we cannot think this infinite division. One is necessarily true ;

but neither can be conceived possible. It is on the inability of the mind to conceive either the ultimate indivisibility, or the endless divisibility of space and time, that the arguments of the Eleatic Zeno against the possibility of motion are founded,—arguments which at least show, that motion, however certain as a fact, cannot be conceived possible, as it involves a contradiction.

The same principle could be shown in various other relations, but what I have now said is, I presume, sufficient to make you understand its import. Now the law of mind, that the conceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, I call the Law of the Conditioned. You will find many philosophers who hold an opinion the reverse of this,—maintaining that the absolute is a native or necessary notion of intelligence. This, I conceive, is an opinion founded on vagueness and confusion. They tell us we have a notion of absolute or infinite space, of absolute or infinite time. But they do not tell us in which of the opposite contradictories this notion is realised. Though these are exclusive of each other, and though both are only negations of the conceivable on its opposite poles, they confound together these exclusive inconceivables into a single notion, suppose it positive; and baptise it with the name of absolute. The sum, therefore, of what I have now stated is, that the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or cogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or incogitable. The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or poles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is that of

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This grand principle called the Law of the Conditioned

The counter opinion founded on vagueness and confusion

Sum of the author's doctrine

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Unconditional or Absolute Limitation ; the other that of Unconditional or Infinite Illimitation. The one we may, therefore, in general call the Absolutely Unconditioned, the other, the Infinitely Unconditioned ; or, more simply, the Absolute and the Infinite ; the term *absolute* expressing that which is finished or complete, the term *infinite* that which cannot be terminated or concluded. These terms, which, like the Absolute and Infinite themselves, philosophers have confounded, ought not only to be distinguished, but opposed as contradictory. The notion of either unconditioned is negative —the absolute and the infinite can each only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable. In other words, of the absolute and infinite we have no conception at all. On the subject of the unconditioned,—the absolute and infinite, it is not necessary for me at present further to dilate.

The author's doctrine both the one true and the only orthodox inference

I shall only add, in conclusion, that, as this is the one true, it is the only orthodox, inference. We must believe in the infinity of God ; but the infinite God cannot by us, in the present limitation of our faculties, be comprehended or conceived. A Deity understood would be no Deity at all, and it is blasphemy to say that God only is as we are able to think Him to be.<sup>a</sup> We know God, according to the finitude of our faculties ; but we believe much that we are incompetent properly to know. The Infinite, the infinite God, is what, to use the words of Pascal, is infinitely inconceivable. Faith,—Belief,—is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge. In this, all Divines and Philosophers, worthy of the name, are found to coincide ; and the few who assert to man a knowledge of the infinite, do this on the daring, the

<sup>a</sup> See *Discussions*, p 15, footnote —Ed

extravagant, the paradoxical supposition, either that Human Reason is identical with the Divine, or that Man and the Absolute are one. LECT  
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The assertion has, however, sometimes been hazarded, through a mere mistake of the object of knowledge or conception; as if that could be an object of knowledge, which was not known, as if that could be an object of conception, which was not conceived

To assert that the infinite can be thought, but only inadequately thought, is contradictory

It has been held, that the infinite is known or conceived, though only a part of it, (and every part, be it observed, is *ipso facto* finite), can be apprehended; and Aristotle's definition of the infinite has been adopted by those who disregard his declaration, that the infinite, *qua* infinite, is beyond the reach of human understanding.<sup>a</sup> To say that the infinite can be thought, but only inadequately thought, is a contradiction *in adjecto*; it is the same as saying that the infinite can be known, but only known as finite.

The Scriptures explicitly declare that the infinite is for us now incognisable;—they declare that the finite, and the finite alone, is within our reach. It is said, (to cite one text out of many), that “*now* I know *in part*,” (*i.e.* the finite); “*but then*” (*i.e.* in the life to come), “*shall* I know even as I am known,”<sup>β</sup> (*i.e.* without limitation)<sup>γ</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Phys*, i 4, 6 (Bekker) Τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον ἢ ἀπειρον ἄγνωστον The definition occurs, *Phys*, iii 6, 11 Ἀπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὗ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεὶ τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω To the ἀπειρον is opposed the ὅλον and

τέλειον, for it is added,—Οὐδὲ μὴ δὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον See *Discussions*, p 27 —ED

<sup>β</sup> 1 *Corinthians*, xiii 12

<sup>γ</sup> See Appendix, III —ED

## LECTURE XXXIX.

THE REGULATIVE FACULTY.—LAW OF THE CONDITIONED, IN ITS APPLICATIONS.—CAUSALITY.

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Law of the  
Conditioned in  
its applica-  
tions

I HAVE been desirous to explain to you the principle of the Conditioned, as out of it we are able not only to explain the hallucination of the Absolute, but to solve some of the most momentous, and hitherto most puzzling, problems of mind. In particular, this principle affords us, I think, a solution of the two great intellectual principles of Cause and Effect, and of Substance and Phænomenon or Accident. Both are only applications of the principle of the Conditioned, in different relations.

Causality  
—the prob-  
lem, and  
attempts at  
solution.

Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that concerning the nature and genealogy of the notion of Causality, is, perhaps, the most famous; and I shall endeavour to give you a comprehensive, though necessarily a very summary, view of the problem, and of the attempts which have been made at its solution. This, however imperfect in detail, may not be without advantage; for there is not, as far as I am aware, in any work a generalised survey of the various actual and possible opinions on the subject.

The phæ-  
nomenon of  
Causality,  
—what

But before proceeding to consider the different attempts to explain the phænomenon, it is proper to state and to determine what the phænomenon to be explained really is. Nor is this superfluous, for we shall find that some philosophers, instead of accom-

modating their solutions to the problem, have accommodated the problem to their solutions.

What appears to us to begin to be, is necessarily thought by us as having previously existed under another form.

"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are, by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a Cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify? If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance, had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence being either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something,—or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself; we view the Creator as the cause of the universe. "*Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*,"<sup>β</sup> expresses, in its purest form, the whole intellectual phænomenon of causality.

Hence an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. This illustrated

There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the causes. Take an example. A neutral salt is an effect of the conjunction of an acid and alkali. Here we do not, and here we cannot, conceive that, in effect, any new existence has been added, nor can we conceive that any has been taken away. But another example —Gunpowder is the effect of a mixture of sulphur, charcoal, and nitre, and these three substances are again the effect,—result, of simpler constituents,

<sup>α</sup> Cf *Discussions*, p 609 —Ed

*Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. p 83,

<sup>β</sup> Persius, iii 84 [Cf Rixner, § 62]

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Not necessary to the notion of Causality, that we should know the particular causes of the particular effect.

and these constituents again of simpler elements, either known or conceived to exist. Now, in all this series of compositions, we cannot conceive that aught begins to exist. The gunpowder, the last compound, we are compelled to think, contains precisely the same quantum of existence that its ultimate elements contained prior to their combination. Well, we explode the powder. Can we conceive that existence has been diminished by the annihilation of a single element previously in being, or increased by the addition of a single element which was not heretofore in nature? "Omnia mutantur; nihil interit,"<sup>a</sup>—is what we think, what we must think. This then is the mental phenomenon of causality,—that we necessarily deny in thought that the object which appears to begin to be, really so begins; and that we necessarily identify its present with its past existence. Here it is not requisite that we should know under what form, under what combinations, this existence was previously realised, in other words, it is not requisite that we should know what are the particular causes of the particular effect. The discovery of the connection of determinate causes and determinate effects is merely contingent and individual,—merely the datum of experience; but the principle that every event should have its causes is necessary and universal, and is imposed on us as a condition of our human intelligence itself. This last is the only phenomenon to be explained. Nor are philosophers, in general, really at variance in their statement of the problem. However divergent in their mode of explanation, they are at one in regard to the matter to be explained.<sup>β</sup> But there is one exception. Dr Brown has given a very different account

<sup>a</sup> Ovid, *Met*, xv. 165 —Ed.

notion of Causality, see Platner, *Phil*

<sup>β</sup> On the nature and origin of the *Aph.*, 1 § 845 *et seq* —Ed.

of the phænomenon in question. To this statement of it, I beg to solicit your attention ; for as his theory is solely accommodated to his view of the phænomenon, so his theory is refuted by showing that his view of the phænomenon is erroneous. To prevent misconception, I shall exhibit to you his doctrine in his own words :<sup>a</sup>—

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XXXIX.Brown's  
account of  
the phæno-  
menon of  
Causality

“ Why is it, then, we believe that continual similarity of the future to the past, which constitutes, or at least is implied in, our notion of power ? A stone tends to the earth,—a stone will always tend to the earth,—are not the same proposition ; nor can the first be said to involve the second. It is not to experience, then, alone that we must have recourse for the origin of the belief, but to some other principle which converts the simple facts of experience into a general expectation or confidence, that is afterwards to be physically the guide of all our plans and actions.

Brown  
quoted

“ This principle, since it cannot be derived from experience itself, which relates only to the past, must be an original principle of our nature. There is a tendency in the very constitution of the mind from which the experience arises,—a tendency, that, in everything which it adds to the mere facts of experience, may truly be termed instinctive, for though that term is commonly supposed to imply something peculiarly mysterious, there is no more real mystery in it than in any of the simplest successions of thought, which are all, in like manner, the results of a natural tendency of the mind to exist in certain states, after existing in certain other states. The belief is, a state or feeling of the mind as easily conceivable as any other state of it,—a new feeling, aris-

<sup>a</sup> *Phil of the Human Mind*, Lect VI. p 34, edit. 1830



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ing in certain circumstances, as uniformly as, in certain other circumstances, there arise other states or feelings of the mind, which we never consider as mysterious; those, for example, which we term the sensations of sweetness or of sound. To have our nerves of taste or hearing affected in a certain manner, is not, indeed, to taste or hear, but it is immediately afterwards to have those particular sensations; and this merely because the mind was originally so constituted, as to exist directly in the one state after existing in the other. To observe, in like manner, a series of antecedents and consequents, is not, in the very feeling of the moment, to believe in the future similarity, but, in consequence of a similar original tendency, it is immediately afterwards to believe that the same antecedents will invariably be followed by the same consequents. That this belief of the future is a state of mind very different from the mere perception or memory of the past from which it flows, is indeed true; but what resemblance has sweetness, as a sensation of the mind, to the solution of a few particles of sugar on the tongue; or the harmonies of music, to the vibration of particles of air? All which we know, in both cases, is, that these successions regularly take place; and in the regular successions of nature, which could not, in one instance more than in another, have been predicted without experience, nothing is mysterious, or everything is mysterious . . . .

“It is more immediately our present purpose to consider, What it truly is which is the object of inquiry, when we examine the physical successions of events, in whatever manner the belief of their similarity of sequence may have arisen? Is it the mere series of regular antecedents and consequents them-

selves? or, Is it anything more mysterious, which must be supposed to intervene and connect them by some invisible bondage?

“We see in nature one event followed by another; the fall of a spark on gunpowder, for example, followed by the deflagration of the gunpowder and, by a peculiar tendency of our constitution, which we must take for granted, whatever be our theory of power, we believe, that, as long as all the circumstances continue the same, the sequence of events will continue the same; that the deflagration of gunpowder, for example, will be the invariable consequence of the fall of a spark on it; in other words, we believe the gunpowder to be susceptible of deflagration on the application of a spark, and a spark to have the power of deflagrating gunpowder.

“There is nothing more, then, understood in the train of events, however regular, than the regular order of antecedents and consequents which compose the train; and between which if anything else existed, it would itself be a part of the train. All that we mean, when we ascribe to one substance a susceptibility of being affected by another substance, is that a certain change will uniformly take place in it when that other is present;—all that we mean, in like manner, when we ascribe to one substance a power of affecting another substance, is, that, where it is present, a certain change will uniformly take place in that other substance. Power, in short, is significant not of anything different from the invariable antecedent itself, but of the mere invariableness of the order of its appearance in reference to some invariable consequent,—the invariable antecedent being denominated a *cause*, the invariable consequent an

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*effect.* To say, that water has the power of dissolving salt, and to say that salt will always melt when water is poured upon it, are to say precisely the same thing;—there is nothing in the one proposition, which is not exactly and to the same extent enunciated in the other.”

Now, in explaining to you the doctrine of Dr Brown, I am happy to avail myself of the assistance of my late lamented friend, Dr Brown’s successor, whose metaphysical acuteness was not the least remarkable of his many brilliant qualities.

Without  
quoting Dr  
Brown’s  
doctrine of  
Causality

“Now, the distinct and full purport of Dr Brown’s doctrine, it will be observed, is this,—that when we apply in this way the words *cause* and *power*, we attach no other meaning to the terms than what he has explained. By the word *cause*, we mean no more than that in this instance the spark falling is the event immediately prior to the explosion: including the belief that in all cases hitherto, when a spark has fallen on gunpowder, (of course, supposing other circumstances the same), the gunpowder has kindled; and that whenever a spark shall again so fall, the grains will again take fire. The present immediate priority and the past and future invariable sequence of the one event upon the other, are all the ideas that the mind can have in view in speaking of the event in that instance as a cause;—and in speaking of the power in the spark to produce this effect, we mean merely to express the invariableness with which this has happened and will happen.

“This is the doctrine; and the author submits it to this test:—‘Let any one,’ he says, ‘ask himself what it is which he means by the term “power,” and without contenting himself with a few phrases that

signify nothing, reflect before he give his answer,— and he will find that he means nothing more than that, in all similar circumstances, the explosion of gunpowder will be the immediate and uniform consequence of the application of a spark.’

“This test, indeed, is the only one to which the question can be brought. For the question does not regard causes themselves, but solely the ideas of cause, in the human mind. If, therefore, every one to whom this analysis of the idea that is in his mind when he speaks of a cause, is proposed, finds, on comparing it with what passed in his mind, that this is a complete and full account of his conception, there is nothing more to be said, and the point is made good. By that sole possible test the analysis is, in such a case, established. If, on the contrary, when this analysis is proposed, as containing all the ideas which we annex to the words cause and power, the minds of most men cannot satisfy themselves that it is complete, but are still possessed with a strong suspicion that there is something more, which is not here accounted for,—then the analysis is not yet established, and it becomes necessary to inquire, by additional examination of the subject, what that more may be.

“Let us then apply the test by which Dr Brown proposes that the truth of his views shall be tried. Let us ask ourselves, what we mean when we say, that the spark has power to kindle the gunpowder,—that the powder is susceptible of being kindled by the spark. Do we mean only that whenever they come together this will happen? Do we merely predict this simple and certain futurity?

“We do not fear to say, that when we speak of a power in one substance to produce a change in another,

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and of a susceptibility of such change in that other, we express more than our belief that the change has taken and will take place. There is more in our mind than a conviction of the past and a foresight of the future. There is, besides this, the conception included of a fixed constitution of their nature, which determines the event,—a constitution, which, while it lasts, makes the event a necessary consequence of the situation in which the objects are placed. We should say then, that there are included in these terms, ‘power,’ and ‘susceptibility of change,’ two ideas which are not expressed in Dr Brown’s analysis,—one of necessity, and the other of a constitution of things, in which that necessity is established. That these two ideas are not expressed in the terms of Dr Brown’s analysis, is seen by quoting again his words:—‘He will find that he means nothing more than that, in all similar circumstances, the explosion of gunpowder will be the immediate and uniform consequence of the application of a spark.’

“It is certain, from the whole tenor of his work, that Dr Brown has designed to exclude the idea of necessity from his analysis.”<sup>a</sup>

Fundamen-  
tal defect  
in Brown's  
theory

Now this admirably expresses what I have always felt is the grand and fundamental defect in Dr Brown’s theory,—a defect which renders that theory *ab initio* worthless. Brown professes to explain the phænomenon of causality, but, previously to explanation, he evacuates the phænomenon of all that desiderates explanation. What remains in the phænomenon, after the quality of necessity is thrown, or rather silently allowed to drop out, is only accidental,—only a consequence of the essential circumstance

<sup>a</sup> Professor Wilson, in *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. xl p. 122 et seq.

The opinions in regard to the nature and origin of the principle of Causality, in so far as that principle is viewed as a subjective phænomenon,—as a judgment of the human mind,—fall into two great categories. The first category (A) comprehends those theories which consider this principle as Empirical or *a posteriori*, that is, as derived from experience; the other (B) comprehends those which view it as Pure or *a priori*, that is, as a condition of intelligence itself. These two primary genera are, however, severally subdivided into various subordinate classes.

The former category (A), under which this principle is regarded as the result of experience, contains two classes, inasmuch as the causal judgment may be supposed founded either (a) on an Original, or (b) on a Derivative, cognition. Each of these again is divided into two, according as the principle is supposed to have an objective, or a subjective, origin. In the former case, that is, where the cognition is supposed to be original and underived, it is Objective, or rather Objectivo-Objective, when held to consist in an immediate perception of the power or efficacy of causes in the external and internal worlds (1), and Subjective, or rather Objectivo-Subjective, when viewed as given in a self-consciousness alone of the power or efficacy of our own volitions (2). In the latter case, that is, where the cognition is supposed to be derivative, if objective, it is viewed as a product of Induction and Generalisation (3); if subjective, of Association and Custom (4).

In like manner, the latter category (B), under which the causal principle is considered not as a result, but as a condition, of experience, is variously divided and subdivided. In the first place, the opinions under

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this category fall into two classes, inasmuch as some regard the causal judgment (c) as an Ultimate or Primary law of mind, while others regard it (d) as a Secondary or Derived. Those who hold the former doctrine, in viewing it as a simple original principle, hold likewise that it is a positive act,—an affirmative datum, of intelligence. This class is finally subdivided into two opinions. For some hold that the causal judgment, as necessary, is given in what they call “the principle of Causality,” that is, the principle which declares that everything which begins to be, must have its cause (5); whilst at least one philosopher, without explicitly denying that the causal judgment is necessary, would identify it with the principle of our “Expectation of the Constancy of nature” (6).

Those who hold that it can be analysed into a higher principle, also hold that it is not of a positive but of a negative character. These, however, are divided into two classes. By some it has been maintained, that the principle of Causality can be resolved into the principle of Contradiction (7), which, as I formerly stated to you, ought in propriety to be called the principle of Non-Contradiction. On the other hand, it may be, (though it never has been), argued, that the judgment of Causality can be analysed into what I called the principle of the Conditioned,—the principle of Relativity (8). To one or other of these eight heads, all the doctrines that have been actually maintained in regard to the origin of the principle in question may be referred; and the classification is the better worthy of your attention, as in no work will you find any attempt at even an enumeration of the various theories, actual and possible, on this subject.

The following is a tabular view of the theories in regard to the principle of Causality .—

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Judgment of Causality as	A. A Posteriori	a Original or Primitive	1	Objectivo-objective and Objectivo-subjective,—Perception of Causal Efficiency, external and internal.
			2	Objectivo-subjective, — Perception of Causal Efficiency, internal.
		b Derivative or Secondary	3	Objective,—Induction, Generalisation
			4	Subjective, — Association, Custom, Habit.
	B A Priori	c. Original or Primitive.	5.	Necessary A Special Principle of Intelligence
			6	Contingent Expectation of the Constancy of Nature
		d. Derivative or Secondary.	7	From the Law of Contradiction (i.e. Non-Contradiction)
			8	From the Law of the Conditioned.

An adequate discussion of these several heads, and a special consideration of the differences of the individual opinions which they comprehend, would far exceed our limits. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a few observations on the value of these eight doctrines in general, without descending to the particular modifications under which they have been maintained by particular philosophers

These eight  
doctrines  
considered  
in general



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I. Objec-  
tive Objec-  
tive and  
Objective-  
Subjective  
Percep-  
tion of  
causal effi-  
ciency, ex-  
ternal and  
internal  
Refuted  
on two  
grounds

Of these, the first,—that which asserts that we have a perception of the causal agency, as we have a perception of the existence of external objects,—this opinion has been always held in combination with the second,—that which maintains that we are self-conscious of efficiency; though the second has been frequently held by philosophers who have abandoned the first as untenable.

Considering them together, that is, as forming the opinion that we directly and immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes, both external and internal,—this opinion is refuted by two objections. The first is, that we have no such apprehension,—no such knowledge; the second, that if we had, this being merely empirical,—merely conversant with individual instances, could never account for the quality of necessity and universality, which accompanies the judgment of causality. In regard to the first of these objections, it is now universally admitted that we have no perception of the connection of cause and effect in the external world. For example, when one billiard-ball is seen to strike another, we perceive only that the impulse of the one is followed by the motion of the other, but have no perception of any force or efficiency in the first, by which it is connected with the second, in the relation of causality. Hume was the philosopher who decided the opinion of the world on this point. He was not, however, the first who stated the fact, or even the reasoner who stated it most clearly. He, however, believed himself, or would induce us to believe, that in this he was original. Speaking of this point, "I am sensible," he says, "that of all the paradoxes, which I have had, or shall hereafter have, occasion to advance, in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that it is merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope

That we  
have no  
perception  
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cause and  
effect in the  
external  
world,—  
maintained  
by Hume

it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind. Before we are reconciled to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connection betwixt them; that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes anything in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces: that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceived externally in bodies? "a

I could adduce to you a whole army of philosophers previous to Hume, who had announced and illustrated the fact.<sup>b</sup> As far as I have been able to trace it, this doctrine was first promulgated towards the commencement of the twelfth century, at Bagdad, by Algazel, (El Gazeli), a pious Mahomedan philosopher, who not undeservedly obtained the title of Imaun of the World. Algazel did not deny the reality of causation, but he maintained that God was the only efficient cause in nature,<sup>γ</sup> and that second causes were not properly causes, but only occasions, of the effect. That we have no perception of any real agency of one body on an-

And, before him, by many philosophers

Algazel,—probably the first

a *Treatise of Human Nature*, b i. part iii § 14, vol. 1. p. 291, orig. edit.  
β Cf. Sturm, *Physica Electiva*, c. iv. p. 163 (edit. 1697). Stewart, *Elements*, 1, *Works*, ii. Note C, p. 476. *Elements*, ii, *Works*, iii. Note O, p. 389.—Ed. [See Le Clerc, *Ontologia*, c. x § 3-4. *Opera Phil.*, i p. 318. Chev. Ramsay, *Philos. Prin. of Natural and Revealed Religion*, p. 109, Glasgow, 1748. That Aristotle did not acknowledge that sense had any perception of the causal connec-

tion, is shown by his denying sense as principle of science, 1 c. *δύοτα*, (see *Post. An.*, 1. c. 31, and *ibi*, Zabarella), and by his denying that sense is principle of wisdom, as ignorant of cause, (see *Met.*, 1. c. 1, and *ibi*, Fonseca. See also Cominbricensis, *In Org.*, ii p. 436.)]

γ See Averroes, *Destructio Destructiois, Aristotelis Opera*, Venet. 1550, vol. ix p. 56. Quoted by Tennemann, *Gesch. der Phil.*, vol. viii p. 405.—Ed.

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XXIXMussulman  
doctorsThe School-  
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branche.II Objec-  
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Perception  
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other, is a truth which has not more clearly been stated or illustrated by any subsequent philosopher than by him who first proclaimed it. The doctrine of Algazel was adopted by that great sect among the Mussulman doctors, who were styled *those speaking in the law*, (*loquentes in lege*), that is, the law of Mahommed. From the Eastern Schools the opinion passed to those of the West; and we find it a problem which divided the scholastic philosophers, whether God were the only efficient, or whether causation could be attributed to created existences.<sup>a</sup> After the revival of letters, the opinion of Algazel was maintained by many individual thinkers, though it no longer retained the same prominence in the schools. It was held, for example, by Malebranche,<sup>b</sup> and his illustration from the collision of two billiard-balls is likewise that of Hume, who probably borrowed from Malebranche both the opinion and the example.

But there are many philosophers who surrender the external perception, and maintain our internal consciousness, of causation or power. This opinion was, in one chapter of his *Essay*,<sup>c</sup> advanced by Locke, and, at a very recent date, it has been amplified and enforced with distinguished ability by the late M. Maine de Biran,<sup>d</sup>—one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. On this doctrine, the notion of cause is not given to us by the observation of external phænomena,

<sup>a</sup> [See Biel, *In Sent*, lib iv. dist 1, q 1 D'Ailly, *Ibid*, dist 2, q 23, referred to by Scheibler, *Opera Metaphysica*, lib ii c. iii tit 19, p 124 (edit 1665) See also Sturm, *Phys Elect*, c iv p 128 et seq. Poiret, *Economia Divina*, l. vi § 6, p 68 et seq (edit. 1705)]

<sup>b</sup> [*Recherche de la Vérité*, liv vi. part ii c iii]

<sup>c</sup> Book ii c. xxi § 5 —Ed.

<sup>d</sup> See *Examen des Leçons de Philosophie*, § viii, *Nouvelles Considérations*, p 241, and *Réponses aux Arguments contre l'Appréhension Immédiate d'une Inaction Causale entre le Vouloir et la Motion*, &c., *Nouv Con*, p 363 (edit 1834). Cf. Préface, by M Cousin, p 34, and *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie* (xviii<sup>e</sup> Siècle), t. ii. lec xix p 231 (edit 1829) —Ed.

which, as considered only by the senses, manifest no causal efficiency, and appear to us only as successive; it is given to us within, in reflection, in the consciousness of our operations and of the power which exerts them,—viz., the will. I make an effort to move my arm, and I move it. When we analyse attentively the phænomenon of effort, which M de Biran considers as the type of the phænomena of volition, the following are the results.—1°, The consciousness of an act of will; 2°, The consciousness of a motion produced, 3°, A relation of the motion to the volition. And what is this relation? Not a simple relation of succession. The will is not for us a pure act without efficiency,—it is a productive energy; so that in a volition there is given to us the notion of cause, and this notion we subsequently transport,—project out from our internal activities, into the changes of the external world.

"This reasoning, in so far as regards the mere empirical fact of our consciousness of causality, in the relation of our will as moving and of our limbs as moved, is refuted by the consideration, that between the overt fact of corporeal movement of which we are cognisant, and the internal act of mental determination of which we are also cognisant, there intervenes a numerous series of intermediate agencies, of which we have no knowledge, and, consequently, that we can have no consciousness of any causal connection between the extreme links of this chain,—the volition to move and the limb moving, as this hypothesis asserts. No one is immediately conscious, for example, of moving his arm through his volition. Previously to this ultimate movement, muscles, nerves, a multitude of solid and fluid parts, must be set in motion by the will, but of

Shown to  
be unten-  
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1 No con-  
sciousness  
of causal  
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between  
volition  
and motion

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this motion we know, from consciousness, absolutely nothing. A person struck with paralysis is conscious of no inability in his limb to fulfil the determinations of his will; and it is only after having willed and finding that his limbs do not obey his volition that he learns by this experience, that the external movement does not follow the internal act. But as the paralytic learns after the volition that his limbs do not obey his mind; so it is only after volition that the man in health learns, that his limbs do obey the mandates of his will.

2 And even if this admitted, fails to account for the judgment of Causality.

But, independently of all this, the second objection above mentioned is fatal to the theory which would found the judgment of causality on any empirical cognition, whether of the phenomena of mind or of the phenomena of matter. Admitting that causation were cognisable, and that perception and self-consciousness were competent to its apprehension, still as these faculties could only take note of individual causations, we should be wholly unable, out of such empirical acts, to evolve the quality of necessity and universality, by which this notion is distinguished. Admitting that we had really observed the agency of any number of causes, still this would not explain to us, how we are unable to think a manifestation of existence without thinking it as an effect. Our internal experience, especially in the relation of our volitions to their effects, may be useful in giving us a clearer notion of causality; but it is altogether incompetent to account for what in it there is of the quality of necessity. So much for the two theories at the head of the Table

As the first and second opinions have been usually associated, so also have the third and fourth,—that is, the doctrine that our notion of causality is the offspring

of the objective principle of Induction or Generalisation, and the doctrine, that it is the offspring of the subjective principle of Association or Custom.

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In regard to the former (the third), it is plain that the observation, that certain phænomena are found to succeed certain other phænomena, and the generalisation consequent thereon, that these are reciprocally causes and effects, could never of itself have engendered not only the strong but the irresistible belief, that every event must have its cause. Each of these observations is contingent; and any number of observed contingencies will never impose upon us the feeling of necessity,—of our inability to think the opposite. Nay more; this theory evolves the absolute notion of causality out of the observation of a certain number of uniform consecutions among phænomena. But we find no difficulty whatever in conceiving the reverse of all or any of the consecutions we have observed; and yet the general notion of causality, which, *ex hypothesi*, is their result, we cannot possibly think as possibly unreal. We have always seen a stone fall to the ground, when thrown into the air, but we find no difficulty in representing to ourselves the possibility of one or all stones gravitating from the earth; only we cannot conceive the possibility of this, or any other event, happening without a cause.

III. Objective—Induction Generalisation

Nor does the latter (the fourth) theory,—that of Custom or Association,—afford a better solution. The attribute of necessity cannot be derived from custom. Allow the force of custom to be great as may be, still it is always limited to the customary, and the customary has nothing whatever in it of the necessary. But we have here to account not for a strong, but for an absolutely irresistible, belief. On this theory, also, the

IV Subjective—Association

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causal judgment, when association is recent, should be weak, and should only gradually acquire its full force in proportion as custom becomes inveterate. But do we find that the causal judgment is weaker in the young, stronger in the old? There is no difference. In either case there is no less and more; the necessity in both is absolute. Mr Hume patronised the opinion, that the notion of causality is the offspring of experience engendered upon custom.<sup>a</sup> But those have a sorry insight into the philosophy of that great thinker, who suppose that this was a dogmatic theory of his own. On the contrary, in his hands, it was a mere reduction of dogmatism to absurdity by showing the inconsistency of its results. To the Lockian sensualism, Hume proposed the problem,—to account for the phenomenon of necessity in our notion of the causal nexus. That philosophy afforded no other principle through which even the attempt at a solution could be made;—and the principle of custom, Hume shows, could not furnish a real necessity. The alternative was plain. Either the doctrine of sensualism is false, or our nature is a delusion. Shallow thinkers adopted the latter alternative, and were lost; profound thinkers, on the contrary, were determined to lay a deeper foundation of philosophy than that of the superficial edifice of Locke; and thus it is that Hume became the cause or the occasion of all that is of principal value in our more recent metaphysics. Hume is the parent of the philosophy of Kant, and, through Kant, of the whole philosophy of Germany; he is the parent of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart in Scotland, and of all that is of pre-eminent note in the metaphysics of France and Italy.—But to return.

<sup>a</sup> [On Hume's theory, see Platner, *Phil. Arch.*, i. § 550, p. 485-6, edit. 1793]

I now come to the second category (B), and to the first of the four particular heads which it likewise contains,—the opinion, namely, that the judgment, that everything that begins to be must have a cause, is a simple primary datum, a positive revelation of intelligence. To this head are to be referred the theories on causality of Descartes, Leibnitz, Reid, Stewart, Kant, Fichte, Cousin, and the majority of recent philosophers. This is the fifth theory in order.

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V A special principle of intelligence

Dr Brown has promulgated a doctrine of Causality, which may be numbered as the sixth ; though perhaps it is hardly deserving of distinct enumeration. He actually identifies the causal judgment, which to us is necessary, with the principle by which we are merely inclined to believe in the uniformity of nature's operations

VI Expectation of the constancy of nature

Superseding any articulate consideration of this opinion, and reverting to the fifth, much might be said in relation to the several modifications of this opinion as held by different philosophers ; but I must content myself with a brief criticism of the doctrine in reference to its most general features.

Now it is manifest, that, against the assumption of a special principle, which this doctrine makes, there exists a primary presumption of philosophy. This is the law of Parsimony, which forbids, without necessity, the multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or causes ; above all, the postulation of an unknown force, where a known impotence can account for the effect. We are, therefore, entitled to apply Occam's razor to this theory of causality, unless it be proved impossible to explain the causal judgment at a lower rate, by deriving it from a higher and that a higher origin. On a doctrine like the present is that the

Fifth opinion criticised  
Primary presumption of philosophy as unnecessary of special principle



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of the various laws or categories of thought, to make you fully understand the grounds and bearings of this opinion. In attempting to explain, you must, therefore, allow me to take for granted certain laws of thought, to which I have only been able incidentally to allude. Those, however, which I postulate, are such as are now generally admitted by all philosophers who allow the mind itself to be a source of cognitions; and the only one which has not been recognised by them, but which, as I endeavoured briefly to prove to you in my last Lecture, must likewise be taken into account, is the Law of the Conditioned,—the law that the conceivable has always two opposite extremes, and that these extremes are equally inconceivable. That the conditioned is to be viewed, not as a power, but as a powerlessness, of mind, is evinced by this,—that the two extremes are contradictories, and, as contradictories, though neither alternative can be conceived,—thought as possible, one or other must be admitted to be necessary.

Judgment  
of Causal-  
ity, how  
deduced  
from this  
law

Categories  
of thought  
Existence

Philosophers, who allow a native principle to the mind at all, allow that Existence is such a principle. I shall, therefore, take for granted Existence as the highest category or condition of thought. As I noticed to you in my last Lecture,<sup>a</sup> no thought is possible except under this category. All that we perceive or imagine as different from us, we perceive or imagine as objectively existent. All that we are conscious of as an act or modification of self, we are conscious of only as subjectively existent. All thought, therefore, implies the thought of existence; and this is the veritable exposition of the enthymeme of Descartes,—*Cogito ergo sum*. I cannot think that I think, without thinking that I exist,—I cannot be

conscious, without being conscious that I am. Let existence, then, be laid down as a necessary form of thought. As a second category or subjective condition of thought, I postulate that of Time. This, likewise, cannot be denied me. It is the necessary condition of every conscious act, thought is only realised to us as in succession, and succession is only conceived by us under the concept of time. Existence and existence in time is thus an elementary form of our intelligence.

But we do not conceive existence in time absolutely or infinitely,—we conceive it only as conditioned in time; and Existence Conditioned in Time expresses at once and in relation, the three categories of thought, which afford us in combination the principle of Causality. This requires some explanation.

When we perceive or imagine an object, we perceive or imagine it—1°, As existent, and, 2°, As in Time; Existence and Time being categories of all thought. But what is meant by saying, I perceive, or imagine, or, in general, think, an object only as I perceive, or imagine, or, in general, think it to exist? Simply this,—that, as thinking it, I cannot but think it to exist, in other words, that I cannot annihilate it in thought. I may think away from it, I may turn to other things; and I can thus exclude it from my consciousness, but, actually thinking it, I cannot think it as non-existent, for as it is thought, so is it thought existent.

But a thing is thought to exist, only as it is thought to exist in time. Time is present, past, and future. We cannot think an object of thought as non-existent *de presenti*,—as not actually an object of thought. But can we think that quantum of existence of which an object, real or ideal, is the complement, as non-exist-

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Time

The Condi-  
tionedExistence  
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principle of  
Causality

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ent, either in time past, or in time future? Make the experiment. Try to think the object of your thought as non-existent in the moment before the present.—You cannot. Try it in the moment before that.—You cannot. Nor can you annihilate it by carrying it back to any moment, however distant in the past. You may conceive the parts of which this complement of existence is composed, as separated; if a material object, you can think it as shivered to atoms, sublimated into æther; but not one iota of existence can you conceive as annihilated, which subsequently you thought to exist. In like manner try the future,—try to conceive the prospective annihilation of any present object,—of any atom of any present object.—You cannot. All this may be possible, but of it we cannot think the possibility. But if you can thus conceive neither the absolute commencement nor the absolute termination of anything that is once thought to exist, try, on the other hand, if you can conceive the opposite alternative of infinite non-commencement, of infinite non-termination. To this you are equally impotent. This is the category of the Conditioned, as applied to the category of Existence under the category of Time.

But in this application is the principle of Causality not given? Why, what is the law of Causality? Simply this,—that when an object is presented phænomennally as commencing, we cannot but suppose that the complement of existence, which it now contains, has previously been;—in other words, that all that we at present come to know as an effect must previously have existed in its causes; though what these causes are we may perhaps be altogether unable even to surmise.

## LECTURE XL.

THE REGULATIVE FACULTY —LAW OF THE CONDITIONED,  
IN ITS APPLICATIONS.—CAUSALITY.

OUR last Lecture was principally occupied in giving a systematic view and a summary criticism of the various opinions of philosophers, regarding the origin of that inevitable necessity of our nature, which compels us to refuse any real commencement of existence to the phænomena which arise in and around us ; in other words, that necessity of our nature, under which we cannot but conceive everything that occurs, to be an effect, that is, to be something consequent, which, as wholly derived from, may be wholly refunded into something antecedent. The opinions of philosophers with regard to the genealogy of this claim of thought, may be divided into two *summa genera* or categories ; as all opinions on this point view the Causal Judgment either, 1°, As resting immediately or mediately on experience, or, 2°, As resting immediately or mediately on a native principle of the mind itself ;—in short, all theories of causality either make it *a posteriori* or Empirical, or make it *a priori* or Pure

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Recapitulation

I shall not again enumerate the various subordinate doctrines into which the former category is subdivided ; and, in relation to all of these, it is enough to say that they are one and all wholly worthless, as wholly in-

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capable of accounting for the quality of necessity, by which we are conscious that the causal judgment is characterised.

The opinions which fall under the second category are not obnoxious to this sweeping objection, (except Brown's), as they are all equally competent to save the phænomenon of a subjective necessity. Of the three opinions, (I discount Brown's), under this head, one supposes that the law of Causality is a positive affirmation, and a primary fact of thought, incapable of all further analysis. The other two, on the contrary, view it as a negative principle, and as capable of resolution into a higher law.

Of these, the first opinion (the sixth) is opposed *in limine*, by the presumption of philosophy against the multiplication of special principles. By the law of Parcimony, the assumption of a special principle can only be legitimated by its necessity; and that necessity only emerges if the phænomenon to be explained can be explained by no known and ordinary causes. The possible validity of this theory, therefore, depends on the two others being actually found incompetent. As postulating no special, no new, no positive principle, and professing to account for the phænomenon upon a common and a negative ground, they possess a primary presumption in their favour; and if one or other be found to afford us a possible solution of the problem, we need not, nay, we are not entitled, to look beyond.

Of these two theories, the one (the seventh) attempts to analyse the principle of Causality into the principle of Contradiction; the other (the eighth), into the principle of the Conditioned. The former has been long exploded, and is now universally aban-

doned. The attempt to demonstrate that a negation of causes involves an affirmation of two contradictory propositions, has been shown to be delusive, as the demonstration only proceeds on a virtual assumption of the point in question. The field, therefore, is left open for the last (the eighth), which endeavours to analyse the mental law of Causality into the mental law of the Conditioned. This theory, which has not hitherto been proposed, is recommended by its extreme simplicity. It postulates no new, no special, no positive principle. It only supposes that the mind is limited; and the law of limitation, the law of the Conditioned, in one of its applications, constitutes the law of Causality. The mind is necessitated to think certain forms, and, under these forms, thought is only possible in the interval between two contradictory extremes, both of which are absolutely inconceivable, but one of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, is necessarily true. In reference to the present subject, it is only requisite to specify two of these forms,—Existence and Time. I showed you that thought is only possible under the native conceptions,—the *a priori* forms,—of existence and time; in other words, the notions of existence and time are essential elements of every act of intelligence. But while the mind is thus astucted to certain necessary modes or forms of thought, in these forms it can only think under certain conditions. Thus, while obliged to think under the thought of time, it cannot conceive, on the one hand, the absolute commencement of time, and it cannot conceive, on the other, the infinite non-commencement of time; in like manner, on the one hand, it cannot conceive an absolute minimum of time, nor yet, on the other, can it conceive the infinite

The law of  
Causality  
constituted  
by the law  
of the Con-  
ditioned

The law of  
the Condi-  
tioned

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divisibility of time. Yet these form two pairs of contradictories, that is, of counter-propositions, which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, but of which, on the same authority, one necessarily must be true. This proves: 1°, That it is not competent to argue, that what cannot be comprehended as possible by us, is impossible in reality; and, 2°, That the necessities of thought are not always positive powers of cognition, but often negative inabilities to know. The law of mind, that all that is positively conceivable, lies in the interval between two inconceivable extremes, and which, however palpable when stated, has never been generalised, as far as I know, by any philosopher, I call the Law or Principle of the Conditioned.

This law in its application to a thing thought under Existence and Time, affords the phenomenon of Causality

Thus, the whole phænomenon of causality seems to me to be nothing more than the law of the Conditioned, in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of Existence, and under the form or mental category of Time. We cannot know, we cannot think, a thing, except as existing, that is, under the category of existence; and we cannot know or think a thing as existing, except in time. Now the application of the law of the conditioned to any object, thought as existent, and thought as in time, will give us at once the phænomenon of causality. And thus.—An object is given us, either by sense or suggestion,—imagination. As known, we cannot but think it existent, and in time. But to say that we cannot but think it to exist, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent, that is, that we are unable to annihilate it in thought. And this we cannot do. We may turn aside from it, we may occupy our attention with other objects; and we

may thus exclude it from our thoughts. This is certain: we need not think it; but it is equally certain, that thinking it, we cannot think it not to exist. This will be at once admitted of the present; but it may possibly be denied of the past and future. But if we make the experiment, we shall find the mental annihilation of an object equally impossible under time past, present, or future. To obviate misapprehension, however, I must make a very simple observation. When I say that it is impossible to annihilate an object in thought,—in other words, to conceive it as non-existent,—it is of course not meant that it is impossible to imagine the object wholly changed in form. We can figure to ourselves the elements of which it is composed, distributed and arranged and modified in ten thousand forms,—we can imagine anything of it short of annihilation. But the complement, the quantum, of existence, which is realised in any object,—that we cannot represent to ourselves, either as increased, without abstraction from other bodies, or as diminished, without addition to them. In short, we are unable to construe it in thought, that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or an atom absolutely taken away from, existence in general. Make the experiment. Form to yourselves a notion of the universe, now, can you conceive that the quantity of existence, of which the universe is the sum, is either amplified or diminished? You can conceive the creation of a world as lightly as you can conceive the creation of an atom. But what is a creation? It is not the springing of nothing into something. Far from it:—it is conceived, and is by us conceivable, merely as the evolution of a new form of existence, by the fiat of the

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tion and  
Creation,—  
as conceiv-  
ed by us



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Deity. Let us suppose the very crisis of creation. Can we realise it to ourselves, in thought, that, the moment after the universe came into manifested being, there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than there was, the moment before, in the Deity himself alone? This we cannot imagine. What I have now said of our conceptions of creation, holds true of our conceptions of annihilation. We can conceive no real annihilation,—no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by us only as an exertion of divine power, so annihilation is only to be conceived by us as a withdrawal of the divine support. All that there is now actually of existence in the universe, we conceive as having virtually existed, prior to creation, in the Creator; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated by its Author, we can only imagine this, as the retraction of an outward energy into power. All this shows how impossible it is for the human mind to think aught that it thinks, as non-existent either in time past or in time future.

Our inability to think aught as extruded from Space gives the law of Ultimate Incompressibility.

[<sup>a</sup> Our inability to think, what we have once conceived existent in Time, as in time becoming non-existent, corresponds with our inability to think, what we have conceived existent in Space, as in space becoming non-existent. We cannot realise it to thought, that a thing should be extruded, either from the one quantity or the other. Hence, under extension, the law of Ultimate Incompressibility; under protension, the law of Cause and Effect.]

We have been hitherto speaking only of one inconceivable extreme of the conditioned, in its application

<sup>a</sup> Supplied from *Discussions*, p. 620 —ED

to the category of existence in the category of time, —the extreme of absolute commencement; the other is equally incomprehensible, that is, the extreme of infinite regress or non-commencement. With this latter we have, however, at present nothing to do. [“ Indeed, as not obtrusive, the Infinite figures far less in the theatre of mind, and exerts a far inferior influence in the modification of thought than the Absolute. It is, in fact, both distant and deltescent; and in place of meeting us at every turn, it requires some exertion on our part to seek it out ] It is the former alone,—it is the inability we experience of annihilating in thought an existence in time past, in other words, our utter impotence of conceiving its absolute commencement, that constitutes and explains the whole phænomenon of causality. An object is presented to our observation which has phænomenally begun to be. Well, we cannot realise it in thought that the object, that is, this determinate complement of existence, had really no being at any past moment; because this supposes that, once thinking it as existent, we could again think it as non-existent, which is for us impossible. What, then, can we do? That the phænomenon presented to us began, as a phænomenon, to be,—this we know by experience; but that the elements of its existence only began, when the phænomenon they constitute came into being,—this we are wholly unable to represent in thought. In these circumstances, how do we proceed?—How must we proceed? There is only one possible mode. We are compelled to believe that the object, (that is, a certain *quale* and *quantum* of being), whose phænomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist, prior to this rise,

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The infinite regress of Time no less inconceivable than its absolute commencement

Our inability to conceive existence as absolutely beginning in time, constitutes the phenomenon of causality

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Of Second  
Causes  
there must  
be at least  
a concu-  
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two, to  
constitute  
an effect.

under other forms; [<sup>a</sup> and by *form*, be it observed, I mean any mode of existence, conceivable by us or not]. But to say that a thing previously existed under different forms, is only in other words to say, that a thing had causes. I have already noticed to you the error of philosophers in supposing that anything can have a single cause. Of course, I speak only of Second Causes. Of the causation of the Deity we can form no possible conception. Of second causes, I say, there must always be at least a concurrence of two to constitute an effect. Take the example of vapour. Here to say that heat is the cause of evaporation, is a very inaccurate,—at least a very inadequate, expression. Water is as much the cause of evaporation as heat. But heat and water together are the causes of the phænomenon. Nay, there is a third concause which we have forgot,—the atmosphere. Now, a cloud is the result of these three concurrent causes or constituents; and, knowing this, we find no difficulty in carrying back the complement of existence, which it contains prior to its appearance. But on the hypothesis, that we are not aware what are the real constituents or causes of the cloud, the human mind must still perforce suppose some unknown, some hypothetical, antecedents, into which it mentally refunds all the existence which the cloud is thought to contain.

To suppose  
that the  
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is elicited  
only by  
objects in  
uniform  
consecu-  
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erroneous

Nothing can be a greater error in itself, or a more fertile cause of delusion, than the common doctrine, that the causal judgment is elicited only when we apprehend objects in consecution, and uniform consecution. Of course, the observation of such succession prompts and enables us to assign particular causes to particular effects. But this consideration ought to

<sup>a</sup> Supplied from *Discussions*, p. 621 —Ed

be carefully distinguished from the law of Causality, absolutely, which consists not in the empirical attribution of this phænomenon, as cause, to that phænomenon, as effect, but in the universal necessity of which we are conscious, to think causes for every event, whether that event stand isolated by itself, and be by us referable to no other, or whether it be one in a series of successive phænomena, which, as it were, spontaneously arrange themselves under the relation of effect and cause. [“Of no phænomenon, as observed, need we think *the* cause; but of every phænomenon must we think *a* cause. The former we may learn through a process of induction and generalisation; the latter we must always and at once admit, constrained by the condition of Relativity. On this, not sunken rock, Dr Brown and others have been shipwrecked ]

This doctrine of Causality seems to me preferable to any other for the following, among other, reasons.—

In the first place, to explain the phænomenon of the Causal Judgment, it postulates no new, no extraordinary, no express principle. It does not even found upon a positive power; for, while it shows that the phænomenon in question is only one of a class, it assigns, as their common cause, only a negative impotence. In this, it stands advantageously contrasted with the one other theory which saves the phænomenon, but which saves it only by the hypothesis of a special principle, expressly devised to account for this phænomenon alone. Nature never works by more, and more complex, instruments than are necessary;—*μηδὲν περιστῶς*; and to assume a particular force, to perform what can be better explained by a

The author's doctrine of Causality, to be preferred.  
1° From its simplicity.

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general imbecility, is contrary to every rule of philosophy.

2<sup>d</sup> Avert-  
ing scepti-  
cism

But, in the second place, if there be postulated an express and positive affirmation of intelligence to account for the fact, that existence cannot absolutely commence, we must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, positive and express, to explain the counter fact, that existence cannot infinitely not commence. The one necessity of mind is equally strong as the other ; and if the one be a positive doctrine, an express testimony of intelligence, so also must be the other. But they are contradictories ; and, as contradictories, they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, the root of our nature is a lie ! By the doctrine, on the contrary, which I propose, these contradictory phænomena are carried up into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties. Intelligence is shown to be feeble but not false ; our nature is, thus, not a lie, nor the Author of our nature a deceiver.

3<sup>d</sup> Avoid-  
ing the al-  
ternatives  
of fatalism  
or incon-  
sistency

In the third place, this simpler and easier doctrine avoids a serious inconvenience, which attaches to the more difficult and complex. It is this :—To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to suppose, that there is expressly revealed to us, through intelligence, the fact that there is no free causation, that is, that there is no cause which is not itself merely an effect ; existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents. But this is an assertion of Fatalism. Such, however, most of the patrons of that doctrine will not admit. The assertion of absolute necessity, they are aware, is virtually the negation of a moral universe, consequently of the Moral Governor of a moral universe,—in a word, Athe-

ism. Fatalism and Atheism are, indeed, convertible terms. The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature;<sup>a</sup> consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of necessity it is, every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated also. Aware of this, some of those who make the judgment of causality a special principle,—a positive dictate of intelligence,—find themselves compelled, in order to escape from the consequences of their doctrine, to deny that this dictate, though universal in its deliverance, should be allowed to hold universally true, and, accordingly, they would exempt from it the facts of volition. Will, they hold to be a free cause, that is, a cause which is not an effect; in other words, they attribute to will the power of absolute origination. But here their own principle of causality is too strong for them. They say that it is unconditionally given, as a special and positive law of intelligence, that every origination is only an apparent, not a real, commencement. Now, to exempt certain phænomena from this law, for the sake of our moral consciousness, cannot validly be done. For, in the first place, this would be to admit that the mind is a complement of contradictory revelations. If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.” Absolute scepticism is hence the legitimate conclusion. But, in the second place, waiving this conclusion, what right have we, on this doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to our consciousness of moral liberty, —what right have we, for the interest of the latter, to

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect II, vol. I p. 25 *et seq.* —ED

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derogate from the universality of the former? We have none. If both are equally positive, we have no right to sacrifice to the other the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon.

Advantages  
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trine fur-  
ther shown

But the doctrine which I propose is not exposed to these difficulties. It does not suppose that the judgment of Causality is founded on a power of the mind to recognise as necessary in thought what is necessary in the universe of existence; it, on the contrary, founds this judgment merely on the impotence of the mind to conceive either of two contradictories, and, as one or other of two contradictories must be true, though both cannot, it shows that there is no ground for inferring from the inability of the mind to conceive an alternative as possible, that such alternative is really impossible. At the same time, if the causal judgment be not an affirmation of mind, but merely an incapacity of positively thinking the contrary, it follows that such a negative judgment cannot stand in opposition to the positive consciousness,—the affirmative deliverance, that we are truly the authors,—the responsible originators, of our actions, and not merely links in the adamant series of effects and causes. It appears to me that it is only on this doctrine that we can philosophically vindicate the liberty of the will,—that we can rationally assert to man a “*fatis avolsa voluntas*” How the will can possibly be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We cannot conceive absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. But as little can we conceive the alternative on which liberty is denied, on which necessity is affirmed. And in favour of our moral nature, the fact that we are free, is given us in the

consciousness of an uncompromising law of Duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the doctrine of the Conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, that something may, nay must, be true, of which the mind is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility; whilst it shows that the objection of incomprehensibility applies no less to the doctrine of fatalism than to the doctrine of moral freedom. If the deduction, therefore, of the Causal Judgment, which I have attempted, should speculatively prove correct, it will, I think, afford a securer and more satisfactory foundation for our practical interests, than any other which has ever yet been promulgated.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Here, in the manuscript, occurs the following sentence, with mark of deletion — "But of this we shall have to speak, when we consider the question of the Liberty or Necessity of our Volitions, under the Third Great Class of the Mental Phænomena,—the Conative." The author does not, however, resume the consideration of this question in these Lectures. It will also be observed that Sir W. Hamilton does not pursue the application of the Law of the Conditioned to the principle of Substance and Phænomenon, as proposed at the outset of the discussion. See above, p. 376. This defect is, however, partially supplied in the completed edition of *Reid's Works*. Note H, p. 935. On Causality, and on Liberty and Necessity, see further in *Discussions*, p. 625 *et seq.*, and Appendix IV.—ED



## LECTURE XLI.

SECOND GREAT CLASS OF MENTAL PHÆNOMENA,—  
THE FEELINGS. THEIR CHARACTER AND RELATION  
TO THE COGNITIONS AND CONATIONS.

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Second  
Great Class  
of mental  
phenom-  
ena—the  
Feelings

Two pre-  
liminary  
questions  
regarding  
the Feel-  
ings

HAVING concluded our consideration of the First Great Class of the Phænomena revealed to us by consciousness,—the phænomena of Knowledge,—we are now to enter on the Second of these Classes,—the class which comprehends the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain, or, in a single word, the phænomena of Feeling.<sup>a</sup> Before, however, proceeding to a discussion of this class of mental appearances, considered in themselves, there are several questions of a preliminary character, which it is proper to dispose of. Of these, two naturally present themselves in the very threshold of our inquiry. The first is,—Do the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain constitute a distinct order of internal states, so that we are warranted in establishing the capacity of Feeling as one of the fundamental powers of the human mind?

The second is,—In what position do the Feelings stand by reference to the Cognitions and the Conations; and, in particular, whether ought the Feelings or the Conations to be considered first, in the order of science?

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. xi, vol. i. p. 182.—Ed

Of these questions, the former is by no means one that can be either superseded or lightly dismissed. This is shown, both by the very modern date at which the analysis of the Feelings into a separate class of phænomena was proposed, and by the controversy to which this analysis has given birth.

Until a very recent epoch, the feelings were not recognised by any philosopher as the manifestations of any fundamental power. The distinction taken in the Peripatetic School, by which the mental modifications were divided into Gnostic or Cognitive, and Orectic or Appetent, and the consequent reduction of all the faculties to the *Facultas cognoscendi* and the *Facultas appetendi*, was the distinction which was long most universally prevalent, though under various, but usually less appropriate, denominations. For example, the modern distribution of the mental powers into those of the Understanding and those of the Will, or into Powers Speculative and Powers Active, —these are only very inadequate, and very incorrect, versions of the Peripatetic analysis, which, as far as it went, was laudable for its conception, and still more laudable for its expression. But this Aristotelic division of the internal states, into the two categories of Cognitions and of Appetencies, is exclusive of the Feelings, as a class co-ordinate with the two other genera ; nor was there, in antiquity, any other philosophy which accorded to the feelings the rank denied to them in the analysis of the Peripatetic school. An attempt has, indeed, been made to show that, by Plato, the capacity of Feeling was regarded as one of the three fundamental powers ; but it is only by a total perversion of Plato's language, by a total reversal of the whole analogy of his psychology, that any

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Recogni-  
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Sulzer  
Mendels-  
sohn  
Kästner  
Meiners  
Eberhard  
Platner

Kant,—the  
first to es-  
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trichotomy  
of the men-  
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colour can be given to this opinion. Kant, as I have formerly observed, was the philosopher to whom we owe this tri-logical classification. But it ought to be stated, that Kant only placed the keystone in the arch, which had been raised by previous philosophers among his countrymen. The phænomena of Feeling had, for thirty years prior to the reduction of Kant, attracted the attention of the German psychologists, and had by them been considered as a separate class of mental states. This had been done by Sulzer<sup>a</sup> in 1751, by Mendelssohn<sup>b</sup> in 1763, by Kästner<sup>c</sup> in 1763 (?), by Meiners<sup>d</sup> in 1773, by Eberhard<sup>e</sup> in 1776, and by Platner<sup>f</sup> in 1780 (?). It remained, however, for Kant to establish, by his authority, the decisive trichotomy of the mental powers. In his *Critique of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*), and, likewise, in his *Anthropology*, he treats of the capacities of Feeling apart from, and along with, the faculties of Cognition and Conation.<sup>g</sup> At the same time, he called

<sup>a</sup> See *Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen*, first published in the Memoirs of the Berlin Academy, in 1751 and 1752 See *Vermischte philosophische Schriften*, 1 p 1 Leipsic, 1800 Cf his *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, 1771 —ED [For a summary and criticism of the former work, see Reinhold, *Über die bisherigen Begriffe vom Vergnügen*. *Vermischte Schriften*, 1 p 296 Jena, 1796]

<sup>b</sup> *Briefe über die Empfindungen*, 1755 —ED

<sup>c</sup> See *Nouvelle Theorie des Plaisirs*, par M. Sulzer, avec des Réflexions sur l'Origine du Plaisir, par M. Kästner, de l'Académie Royale de Berlin, 1767, first published in the Memoirs of the Academy in 1749 See below, p 461.—ED.

<sup>d</sup> See *Abriss der Psychologie*, 1773 —ED

<sup>e</sup> See *Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens*, read before the Royal Society of Berlin in 1776, new edit 1786 Cf *Theorie der schönen Wissenschaften*, 2d edit. Halle, 1786. —ED

<sup>f</sup> The threefold division of the mental phænomena forms the basis of the psychological part of Platner's *Neue Anthropologie*, 1790, see book II The first edition (*Anthropologie*) appeared in 1772-4 Cf *Phil Aphorismen*, vol. 1. b 1 § 27-43, edit. 1793 Kant's *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* was first published in 1790, the *Anthropologie*, though written before it, was only first published in 1798 —ED

<sup>g</sup> See above, Lect xi, vol. 1 p 186 —ED.

attention to their great importance in the philosophy of mind, and more precisely and more explicitly than any of his predecessors did he refer them to a particular power,—a power which constituted one of the three fundamental phænomena of mind.

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This important innovation necessarily gave rise to controversy. It is true that the Kantian reduction was admitted, not only by the great majority of those who followed the impulsion which Kant had given to philosophy, but, likewise, by the great majority of the psychologists of Germany, who ranged themselves in hostile opposition to the principles of the Critical School. A reaction was, however, inevitable; and while, on the one hand, the greater number were disposed to recognise the Feelings in their new rank, as one of the three grand classes of the mental phænomena; a smaller number,—but among them some philosophers of no mean account,—endeavoured, however violent the procedure, to reannex them, as secondary manifestations, to one or other of the two co-ordinate classes,—the Cognitions and the Conations.

Kant's doctrine controverted by some philosophers of note.

Before proceeding to consider the objections to the classification in question, it is proper to premise a word in reference to the meaning of the term by which the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain are designated,—the term *Feeling*; for this is an ambiguous expression, and on the accident of its ambiguity have been founded some of the reasons against the establishment of the class of phænomena, which it is employed to denote.

Meaning of the term Feeling

It is easy to convey a clear and distinct knowledge of what is meant by a word, when that word denotes some object which has an existence external to the mind. I have only to point out the object, and to

Easy to convey a clear knowledge of the meaning of words which de-

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Not so with  
respect to  
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the mind

say, that such or such a thing is signified by such or such a name; for example, this is called a *house*, that a *rainbow*, this a *horse*, that an *ox*, and so forth. In these cases, the exhibition of the reality is tantamount to a definition; or, as an old logician expresses it, "Cognitio omnis intuitiva est definitiva."<sup>a</sup> The same, however, does not hold in regard to an object which lies within the mind itself. What was easy in the one case becomes difficult in the other. For although he to whom I would explain the meaning of a term, by pointing out the object which it is intended to express, has, at least may have, that very object present in his mind, still I cannot lay my finger on it,—I cannot give it to examine by the eye,—to smell, to taste, to handle. Thus it is that misunderstandings frequently occur in reference to this class of objects, inasmuch as one attaches a different meaning to the word from that in which another uses it; and we ought not to be surprised that, in the nomenclature of our mental phænomena, it has come to pass, that, in all languages, one term has become the sign of a plurality of notions, while at the same time a single notion is designated by a plurality of terms. This vacillation in the application and employment of language, as it originates in the impossibility, anterior to its institution, of approximating different minds to a common cognition of the same internal object; so this ambiguity, when once established, reacts powerfully in perpetuating the same difficulty; insomuch that a principal, if not the very greatest, impediment in the progress of the philosopher of mind, is the vagueness and uncertainty of the instrument of thought itself. A remarkable ex-

<sup>a</sup> Cf Melanchthon, *Erotemata Dialectices*, lib i., Pr *De Definitione*, who quotes it as an old saying. "Vetus enim dictum est, et dignum memo-

ria Omnis intuitiva notitia est definitio"—Ed [Cf Keckermann, *Opera*, t. i. p 198 Facciolati, *Institutiones Logicæ*, pars i. c. iii. note 5.

ample of this, and one extending to all languages, is seen in the words most nearly correspondent to the very indeterminate expression *feeling*. In English, this, like all others of a psychological application, was primarily of a purely physical relation, being originally employed to denote the sensations we experience through the sense of Touch, and in this meaning it still continues to be employed. From this, its original relation to matter and the corporeal sensibility, it came, by a very natural analogy, to express our conscious states of mind in general, but particularly in relation to the qualities of pleasure and pain, by which they are characterised. Such is the fortune of the term in English; and precisely similar is that of the cognate term *Gefühl* in German. The same, at least a similar, history might be given of the Greek term *αἴσθησις*, and of the Latin *sensus*, *sensatio*, with their immediate and mediate derivatives in the different Romanic dialects of modern Europe,—the Italian, Spanish, French, and English dialects. In applying the term *feeling* to the mental states, strictly in so far as these manifest the phænomena of pleasure and pain, it is, therefore, hardly necessary to observe, that the word is used, not in all the meanings in which it can be employed, but in a certain definite relation, were it not that a very unfair advantage has been taken of this ambiguity of the expression. *Feeling*, in one meaning, is manifestly a cognition; but this affords no ground for the argument, that *feeling*, in every signification, is also a cognition. This reasoning has, however, been proposed, and that by a philosopher from whom so paltry a sophism was assuredly not to be expected.

It being, therefore, understood that the word is ambiguous, and that it is only used because no pre-

LECT  
XLIFeeling,  
Gefühl,  
Αἴσθησις,—  
ambiguous

LECT  
XII.

Can we discriminate in consciousness certain states which cannot be reduced to those of Cognition or Conation? This question decided in the affirmative by an appeal to experience

ferable can be found, the question must be determined by the proof or disproof of the affirmation,—that I am able to discriminate in consciousness certain states, certain qualities of mind, which cannot be reduced to those either of Cognition or Conation; and that I can enable others, in like manner, to place themselves in a similar position, and observe for themselves these states or qualities, which I call *Feelings*. Let us take an example. In reading the story of Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans at Thermopylæ, what do we experience? Is there nothing in the state of mind, which the narrative occasions, other than such as can be referred either to the cognition or to will and desire? Our faculties of knowledge are called certainly into exercise; for this is, indeed, a condition of every other state. But is the exultation which we feel at this spectacle of human virtue, the joy which we experience at the temporary success, and the sorrow at the final destruction of this glorious band,—are these affections to be reduced to states either of cognition or of conation in either form? Are they not feelings,—feelings partly of pleasure, partly of pain?

Take another, and a very familiar instance. You are all probably acquainted with the old ballad of *Chevy Chase*, and you probably recollect the fine verse of the original edition, so lamentably spoiled in the more modern versions:—

“ For Widdrington my soul is sad,  
That ever he slain should be,  
For when his legs were stricken off,  
He kneeled and fought on his knee ” <sup>a</sup>

---

a “ For Wetharryngton my harte was wo, That ever he slayne shulde be, For when both his leggis wear hewyne in to,	He knyled and fought on hys kne ” —Original Version, in Percy's <i>Re- liquies</i> —Ed
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Now, I ask you again, is it possible by any process of legitimate analysis, to carry up the mingled feelings, some pleasurable, some painful, which are called up by this simple picture, into anything bearing the character of a knowledge, or a volition, or a desire? If we cannot do this, and if we cannot deny the reality of such feelings, we are compelled to recognise them as belonging to an order of phænomena, which, as they cannot be resolved into either of the other classes, must be allowed to constitute a third class by themselves.

But it is idle to multiply examples, and I shall now proceed to consider the grounds on which some philosophers, and among these, what is remarkable, a distinguished champion of the Kantian system, have endeavoured to discredit the validity of the classification.

Grounds on which objection has been taken to the Kantian classification of the mental phenomena

Passing over the arguments which have been urged against the power of Feeling as a fundamental capacity of mind, in so far as these proceed merely on the ambiguities of language, I shall consider only the principal objections from the nature of the phænomena themselves, which have been urged by the three principal opponents of the classification in question,—Carus, Weiss, and Krug. The last of these is the philosopher by whom these objections have been urged most explicitly, and with greatest force. I shall, therefore, chiefly confine myself to a consideration of the difficulties which he proposes for solution.

I may premise that this philosopher (Krug), admitting only two fundamental classes of psychological phænomena,—the Cognitions and the Conations,—goes so far as not only to maintain, that what have obtained, from other psychologists, the name of *Feelings*, constitute no distinct and separate class of



LECT  
XII.Krug  
quoted

mental functions ; but that the very supposition is absurd and even impossible. "That such a power of feeling," he argues,<sup>a</sup> "is not even conceivable, if by such is understood a power essentially different from the powers of Cognition and Conation," (thus I translate *Vorstellungs = und Bestrebungsvermögen*), "is manifest from the following consideration. . . . The powers of cognition and the powers of conation are, in propriety, to be regarded as two different fundamental powers, only because the operation of our mind exhibits a twofold direction of its whole activity, —one inwards, another outwards ; in consequence of which we are constrained to distinguish, on the one hand, an Immanent, ideal or theoretical, and, on the other, a Transeunt, real or practical, activity. Now, should it become necessary to interpolate between these two powers, a third ; consequently, to convert the original duplicity of our activity into a triplicity ; in this case, it would be requisite to attribute to the third power a third species of activity, the product of which would be, in fact, the Feelings. Now this activity of feeling must necessarily have either a direction inwards, or a direction outwards, or both directions at once, or finally neither of the two, that is, no direction at all ; for apart from the directions inwards and outwards, there is no direction conceivable. But, in the first case, the activity of feeling would not be different from the cognitive activity, at least not essentially ; in the second case, there is nothing but a certain appetency manifested under the

<sup>a</sup> This objection is given in substance, though not exactly in language, in Krug's *Philosophisches Lexikon*, art *Seelenkräfte*. The author, in the same work, art *Gefühl*, refers to his *Grundlage zu einer neuen The-*

*orie der Gefühle und des sogenannten Gefühlsvermögens*, Königsberg, 1823, for a fuller discussion of the question. See also above, Lect XII., vol. 1 p 187 —ED

form of a feeling ; in the third, the activity of feeling would be only a combination of theoretical and practical activity ; consequently, there remains only the supposition that it has no direction. We confess, however, that an hypothetical activity of such a kind we cannot imagine to ourselves as a real activity. An activity without any determinate direction, would be in fact directed upon nothing, and a power conceived as the source of an activity, directed upon nothing, appears nothing better than a powerless power,—a wholly inoperative force,—in a word, a nothing.”—So far our objectionist.

In answer to this reasoning, I would observe, that its cogency depends on this,—that the suppositions which it makes, and afterwards excludes, are exhaustive and complete. But this is not the case. “ For, in place of two energies, an immanent and a transeunt, we may competently suppose three,—an ineunt, an immanent, and a transeunt. 1°, The Ineunt energy might be considered as an act of mind, directed upon objects in order to know them,—to bring them within the sphere of consciousness,—mentally to appropriate them, 2°, The Immanent energy might be considered as a kind of internal fluctuation about the objects, which had been brought to representation and thought,—a pleasurable or a painful affection caused by them,—in a word, a feeling, and 3°, The Transeunt energy might be considered as an act tending towards the object in order to reach it, or to escape from it. This hypothesis is quite as allowable as that in opposition to which it is devised, and were it not merely in relation to an hypothesis, which rests on no valid foundation, it would be better to consider the feelings not as immanent activities, but as immanent passivities

Criticised  
1 The sup-  
positions  
on which  
the reason-  
ing pro-  
ceeds, are  
not ex-  
haustive

We may  
suppose  
three kinds  
of energy,  
—Ineunt,  
Immanent,  
and Tran-  
seunt

LECT  
XLI.

2 But we are not warranted to ascribe to the mental powers a direction either outwards or inwards.

“ But, in point of fact, we are not warranted, by any analogy of our spiritual nature, to ascribe to the mental powers a direction either outwards or inwards; on the contrary, they are rather the principles of our internal states, of which we can only improperly predicate a direction, and this only by relation to the objects of the states themselves. For directions are relations and situations of external things; but of such there are none to be met with in the internal world, except by analogy to outer objects. In our Senses, which have reference to the external world, there is an outward direction when we perceive, or when we act on external things; whereas, we may be said to turn inwards, when we occupy ourselves with what is contained within the mind itself, be this in order to compass a knowledge of our proper nature, or to elevate ourselves to other objects still more worthy of a moral intelligence. Rigorously considered, the feelings are in this meaning so many directions,—so many turnings of the mind on objects, internal or external; turnings towards those objects which determine the feelings, and which please or displease us. Take, for example, the respect, the reverence, we feel in the contemplation of the higher virtues of human nature; this feeling is an immanent conversion on its object.

3. The argument founded on the hypothesis, that what is true of inanimate, is true of animated nature, and would leave no will or desire in the universe.

“ The argument of the objectors is founded on the hypothesis, that as in the external world, all is action and reaction,—all is working and counter-working,—all is attraction and repulsion; so in the internal world, there is only one operation of objects on the mind, and one operation of the mind on objects; the former must consist in cognition, the latter in conation. But when this hypothesis is subjected to a scrutiny, it is at once apparent how treacherous is the rea-

soning which infers of animated, what is true of inanimate, nature; for, to say nothing of aught else that militates against it, this analogy would in truth leave no will or desire in the universe at all; for action and reaction are already compensated in cognition, or, to speak more correctly, in sensitive Perception itself."<sup>a</sup>

Such is a specimen of the only argument of any moment, against the establishment of the Feelings as an ultimate class of mental phænomena.

I pass on to the second question,—What is the position of the Feelings by reference to the two other classes;—and, in particular, should the consideration of the Feelings precede, or follow, that of the Conations?<sup>II</sup>

What is the position of the Feelings by reference to the two other classes of mental phænomena?

The answer to the second part of this question, will be given in the determination of the first part, for Psychology proposes to exhibit the mental phænomena in their natural consecution, that is, as they condition and suppose each other. A system which did not accomplish this, could make no pretension to be a veritable exposition of our internal life.

“To resolve this problem let us take an example. A person is fond of cards. In a company where he beholds a game in progress, there arises a desire to join in it. Now the desire is here manifestly kindled by the pleasure, which the person had, and has, in the play. The feeling thus connects the cognition of the play with the desire to join in it, it forms the bridge, and contains the motive, by which we are roused from mere knowledge to appetency,—to conation, by reference to which we move ourselves so as to attain the end in view.

Resolved by an example

“Thus we find, in actual life, the Feelings intermediate between the Cognitions and the Conations. And

The Feelings intermediate

<sup>a</sup> Biunde, *Versuch der empirischen Psychologie*, II. § 207, p. 54 56 —ED

LECT  
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between  
the Cogni-  
tions and  
Conations

this relative position of these several powers is necessary; without the previous cognition, there could be neither feeling nor conation; and without the previous feeling there could be no conation. Without some kind or another of complacency with an object, there could be no tendency, no protension of the mind to attain this object as an end; and we could, therefore, determine ourselves to no overt action. The mere cognition leaves us cold and unexcited; the awakened feeling infuses warmth and life into us and our action; it supplies action with an interest, and, without an interest, there is for us no voluntary action possible. Without the intervention of feeling, the cognition stands divorced from the conation, and, apart from feeling, all conscious endeavour after anything would be altogether incomprehensible.

That the  
Conative  
Powers are  
determined  
by the  
Feelings  
further  
shown

Mere cog-  
nition not  
sufficient  
to rouse  
Conation

1 Because  
all objects  
known in  
the same  
manner and  
degree, are  
not equal  
objects of  
desire or  
will

2 Because  
different  
individuals  
are desirous  
of different  
objects

“That the manifestations of the Conative Powers are determined by the Feelings, is also apparent from the following reflection. The volition or desire tends towards a something, and this something is only given us in and through some faculty or other of cognition. Now, were the mere cognition of a thing sufficient of itself to rouse our conation, in that case, all that was known in the same manner and in the same degree, would become an equal object of desire or will. But we covet one thing; we eschew another. On the supposition, likewise, that our conation was only regulated by our cognition, it behoved that every other individual besides should be desirous of the object which I desire, and be desirous of it also so long as the cognition of the object remained the same. But one person pursues what another person flies, the same person now yearns after something which anon he loathes. And why? It is manifest that here there

lies hid some very variable quantity, which, when united with the cognition, is capable of rousing the powers of conation into activity. But such a quantity is given, and only given, in the feelings, that is, in our consciousness of the agreeable and disagreeable. If we take this element,—this influence,—this quantity,—into account, the whole anomalies are solved. We are able at once to understand why all that is thought or cognised with equal intensity, does not, with equal intensity, affect the desires or the will; why different individuals, with the same knowledge of the same objects, are not similarly attracted or repelled, and why the same individual does not always pursue or fly the same object. This is all explained by the fact, that a thing may please one person and displease another; and may now be pleasurable, now painful, and now indifferent to the same person.

“From these interests for different objects, and from these opposite interests which the same object determines in our different powers, are we alone enabled to render comprehensible the change and conflict of our desires, the vacillations of our volitions, the warfare of the sensual principle with the rational,—of the flesh with the spirit; so that, if the nature and influence of the feelings be misunderstood, the problems most important for man are reduced to insoluble riddles.

Importance  
of a correct  
under-  
standing  
of the na-  
ture and  
influence of  
the Feel-  
ings

“According to this doctrine, the Feelings, placed in the midst between the powers of Cognition and the powers of Conation, perform the function of connecting principles to these two extremes; and thus the objection that has been urged against the feelings, as a class co-ordinate with the cognitions and the conations,—on the ground that they afford no principle

LECT.  
XII.Place of  
the theory  
of the Feel-  
ings in the  
science of  
mind.

of mediation,—is of all objections the most futile and erroneous. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that as, in our actual existence, the feelings find their place after the cognitions, and before the conations,—so, in the science of mind, the theory of the Feelings ought to follow that of our faculties of Knowledge, and to precede that of our faculties of Will and Desire.”<sup>a</sup> Notwithstanding this, various even of these psychologists who have adopted the Kantian trichotomy, have departed from the order which Kant had correctly indicated, and have inverted it in every possible manner,—some treating of the feelings in the last place, while others have considered them in the first.

III Into  
what sub-  
divisions  
are the  
Feelings  
to be dis-  
tributed?

The last preliminary question which presents itself is,—Into what subdivisions are the feelings themselves to be distributed? In considering this question, I shall first state some of the divisions which have been proposed by those philosophers, who have recognised the capacity of feeling as an ultimate, a fundamental, phænomenon of mind. This statement will be necessarily limited to the distributions adopted by the psychologists of Germany; for, strange to say, the Kantian reduction, though prevalent in the Empire, has remained either unknown to, or disregarded by, those who have speculated on the mind in France, Italy, and Great Britain.

Kant.

To commence with Kant himself In the *Critique of Judgment*,<sup>β</sup> he enumerates three specifically different kinds of complacency, the objects of which are severally the Agreeable (*das Angenehm*), the Beautiful, and the Good. In his treatise of *Anthropology*,<sup>γ</sup> subsequently published, he divides the feel-

<sup>a</sup> Bunde, *Versuch der empirischen Psychologie*, II. § 208, p 60-64 —Ed

<sup>β</sup> § 5 *Werke*, IV p 53 —Ed  
<sup>γ</sup> B II *Werke*, VII p 143 —Ed

ings of pleasure and pain into two great classes ;—  
1°, The Sensuous ; 2°, The Intellectual. The former  
of these classes is again subdivided into two subor-  
dinate kinds, inasmuch as the feeling arises either  
through the Senses (Sensual Pleasures), or through  
the Imagination (Pleasures of Taste.) The latter of  
these classes is also subdivided into subordinate kinds ;  
for our Intellectual Feelings are connected either with  
the notions of the Understanding, or with the ideas of  
Reason. I may notice, that in his published manual  
of *Anthropology* the Intellectual Feelings of the first  
subdivision,—the feelings of the Understanding,—are  
not treated of in detail.

Gottlob Schulze,<sup>a</sup> though a decided antagonist of Schulze  
the Kantian philosophy in general, adopts the three-  
fold classification into the Cognitions, the Feelings,  
and the Conations ; but he has preferred a division of  
the Feelings different from that of the philosopher of  
Konigsberg. These he distributes into two classes,—  
the Corporeal and the Spiritual, to which he annexes  
a third class made up of these in combination,—the  
Mixed Feelings.

Hillebrand<sup>β</sup> divides the Feelings, in a threefold Hillebrand  
manner, into those of States, those of Cognitions, and  
those of Appetency, (will and desire) ; and again into  
Real, Sympathetic, and Ideal.

Herbart<sup>γ</sup> distributes them into three classes ;—1°, Herbart  
Feelings which are determined by the character of the  
thing felt ; 2°, Feelings which depend on the disposi-

<sup>a</sup> *Anthropologie*, § 144-146, p 295  
et seq, 3d edit 1826 —ED

<sup>β</sup> *Anthropologie*, II. 283 —ED

<sup>γ</sup> *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, § 98  
*Werke*, vol v p 72 On the divi-  
sions of the Feelings mentioned in

the text, see Brunde, *Versuch einer  
systematischen Behandlung der em-  
pirischen Psychologie*, II. § 210, p 74,  
edit. 1831 Cf Scheidler, *Psycholo-  
gie*, § 64, p 443, edit. 1833 —ED



LECT  
XIII

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tion of the feeling mind ; 3°, Feelings which are intermediate and mixed.

Carus.

Carus<sup>a</sup> (of Leipzig,—the late Carus) thus distributes them. “Pure feeling,” he says, “has relation either to Reason, and in this case we obtain the Intellectual Feelings ; or it has relation to Desire and Will, and in this case we have the Moral Feelings ” Between these two classes, the Intellectual and the Moral Feelings, there are placed the *Æsthetic Feelings*, or Feelings of Taste, to which he also adds a fourth class, that of the Religious Feelings.

Such are a few of the more illustrious divisions of the Feelings into their primary classes It is needless to enter at present into any discussion of the merits and demerits of these distributions I shall hereafter endeavour to show you, that they may be divided, in the first place, into two great classes,—the Higher and the Lower,—the Mental and the Corporeal,—in a word, into Sentiments and Sensations.

<sup>a</sup> *Psychologie, Werke*, i. 428, edit. Leipsic, 1808 — Ed

## LECTURE XLII.

## THE FEELINGS.—THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

IN our last Lecture, we commenced the consideration of the Second Great Class of the Mental Phænomena, —the phænomena of Feeling,—the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain.

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XLII

The Feel-  
ings

Though manifestations of the same indivisible subject, and themselves only possible through each other, the three classes of mental phænomena still admit of a valid discrimination in theory, and require severally a separate consideration in the philosophy of mind. I formerly stated to you, that though knowledge, though consciousness, be the necessary condition not only of the phænomena of Cognition, but of the phænomena of Feeling, and of Conation, yet the attempts of philosophers to reduce the two latter classes to the first, and thus to constitute the faculty of Cognition into the one fundamental power of mind, had been necessarily unsuccessful; because, though the phænomena of Feeling and of Conation appear only as they appear in consciousness, and, therefore, in cognition; yet consciousness shows us in these phænomena certain qualities, which are not contained, either explicitly or implicitly, in the phænomena of Cognition itself. The characters by which these three classes are reciprocally discriminated are the following —In

Cognitions,  
Feelings,  
and Con-  
ation,—  
their essen-  
tial peculi-  
arities

LECT.  
XIII  
Cognition

the phænomena of Cognition, consciousness distinguishes an object known from the subject knowing. This object may be of two kinds :—it may either be the quality of something different from the ego ; or it may be a modification of the ego or subject itself. In the former case, the object, which may be called for the sake of discrimination the *object-object*, is given as something different from the percipient subject. In the latter case, the object, which may be called the *subject-object*, is given as really identical with the conscious ego, but still consciousness distinguishes it as an accident, from the ego,—as the subject of that accident, it projects, as it were, this subjective phænomenon from itself,—views it at a distance,—in a word, objectifies it. This discrimination of self from self,—this objectification,—is the quality which constitutes the essential peculiarity of Cognition.

Feeling,—  
how dis-  
criminated  
from Cog-  
nition.

In the phænomena of Feeling,—the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain,—on the contrary, consciousness does not place the mental modification or state before itself ; it does not contemplate it apart,—as separate from itself, but is, as it were, fused into one. The peculiarity of Feeling, therefore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively subjective ; there is no object different from self,—no objectification of any mode of self. We are, indeed, able to constitute our states of pain and pleasure into objects of reflection, but in so far as they are objects of reflection, they are not feelings, but only reflex cognitions of feelings.

Conation,  
—how dis-  
criminated  
from Cog-  
nition.

In the phænomena of Conation,—the phænomena of Desire and Will,—there is, as in those of Cognition, an object, and this object is also an object of knowledge. Will and desire are only possible through knowledge, —“*Ignoti nulla cupido.*” But though

both cognition and conation bear relation to an object, they are discriminated by the difference of this relation itself. In cognition, there exists no want, and the object, whether objective or subjective, is not sought for, nor avoided; whereas in conation, there is a want, and a tendency supposed, which results in an endeavour, either to obtain the object, when the cognitive faculties represent it as fitted to afford the fruition of the want; or to ward off the object, if these faculties represent it as calculated to frustrate the tendency, of its accomplishment.

The feelings of Pleasure and Pain and the Conations are, thus, though so frequently confounded by psychologists, easily distinguished. It is, for example, altogether different to feel hunger and thirst, as states of pain, and to desire or will their appeasement; and still more different is it to desire or will their appeasement, and to enjoy the pleasure afforded in the act of this appeasement itself. Pain and pleasure, as feelings, belong exclusively to the present; whereas conation has reference only to the future, for conation is a longing,—a striving, either to maintain the continuance of the present state, or to exchange it for another. Thus, conation is not the feeling of pleasure and pain, but the power of overt activity, which pain and pleasure set in motion.

Conation,  
—how dis-  
criminated  
from Feel-  
ing

But although, in theory, the Feelings are thus to be discriminated from the Desires and Volitions, they are, as I have frequently observed, not to be considered as really divided. Both are conditions of perhaps all our mental states; and while the Cognitions go principally to determine our speculative sphere of existence, the Feelings and the Conations more especially concur in regulating our practical.

LECT  
XIII

What are  
the general  
conditions  
which de-  
termine the  
existence of  
Pleasure  
and Pain?

Order of  
discussion.

In my last Lecture, I stated the grounds on which it is expedient to consider the phænomena of Feeling prior to discussing those of Conation;—but before entering on the consideration of the several feelings, and before stating under what heads, and in what order, these are to be arranged, I think it proper, in the first place, to take up the general question,—What are the general conditions which determine the existence of Pleasure and Pain; for pleasure and pain are the phænomena which constitute the essential attribute of feeling, under all its modifications?

In the consideration of this question, I shall pursue the following order—I shall, first of all, state the abstract Theory of Pleasure and Pain, in other words, enounce the fundamental law by which these phænomena are governed, in all their manifestations I shall, then, take an historical retrospect of the opinions of philosophers in regard to this subject, in order to show in what relation the doctrine I would support stands to previous speculations. This being accomplished, we shall then be prepared to inquire, how far the theory in question is borne out by the special modifications of Feeling, and how far it affords us a common principle on which to account for the phænomena of Pleasure and Pain, under every accidental form they may assume.

I The  
theory of  
Pleasure  
and Pain,  
—stated  
in the  
abstract

I proceed, therefore, to deliver in somewhat abstruse formulæ, the theory of pleasure The meaning of these formulæ I cannot expect should be fully apprehended, in the first instance,—far less can I expect that the validity of the theory should be recognised, before the universality of its application shall be illustrated in examples

I. Man exists only as he lives; as an intelligent

and sensible being, he consciously lives, but this only as he consciously energises. Human existence is only a more general expression for human life, and human life only a more general expression for the sum of energies, in which that life is realised, and through which it is manifested in consciousness. In a word, life is energy, and conscious energy is conscious life.<sup>a</sup>

LECT  
XLIIFirst mo  
mentum

In explanation of this paragraph, and of those which are to follow, I may observe, that the term *energy*, which is equivalent to *act*, *activity*, or *operation*, is here used to comprehend also all the mixed states of action and passion, of which we are conscious; for, inasmuch as we are conscious of any modification of mind, there is necessarily more than a mere passivity of the subject; consciousness itself implying at least a reaction. Be this, however, as it may, the nouns *energy*, *act*, *activity*, *operation*, with the correspondent verbs, are to be understood to denote, indifferently and in general, all the processes of our higher and our lower life, of which we are conscious.<sup>β</sup> This being premised, I proceed to the second proposition.

Compre-  
hension of  
the term  
energy

II. Human existence, human life, human energy, is not unlimited, but, on the contrary, determined to a certain number of modes, through which alone it can possibly be exerted. These different modes of action are called, in different relations, *powers*, *faculties*, *capacities*, *dispositions*, *habits*.

Second

In reference to this paragraph, it is only necessary to recall to your attention, that *power* denotes either

<sup>a</sup> Cf Aristotle, *Eth Nic.*, iv 9, x 4 —Ed Lossius, *Lexikon*, v *Vergnügen*, theory of cessation and activity, makes partly active, partly passive, partly tending to rest, partly to action —*Memorandum*

<sup>β</sup> Here a written interpolation, — *Occupation*, *exercise*, perhaps better [expressions than energy, as applying equally to all mental processes, whether active or passive] See below, p 466 —Ed

LECT.  
XIIIExplication  
of terms,—  
power,  
faculty, &c

a faculty or a capacity; *faculty* denotes a power of acting, *capacity* a power of being acted upon or suffering; *disposition*, a natural, and *habit*, an acquired, tendency to act or suffer.<sup>a</sup> In reference to habit, it ought however to be observed, that an acquired necessarily supposes a natural tendency. Habit, therefore, comprehends a disposition and something supervening on a disposition. The disposition, which, at first, was a feebler tendency, becomes, in the end, by custom, that is, by a frequent repetition of exerted energy, a stronger tendency. Disposition is the rude original, habit is the perfect consummation

Third

III. Man, as he consciously exists, is the subject of pleasure and pain; and these of various kinds: but as man only consciously exists in and through the exertion of certain determinate powers, so it is only through the exertion of these powers that he becomes the subject of pleasure and pain; each power being in itself at once the faculty of a specific energy, and a capacity of an appropriate pleasure or pain, as the concomitant of that energy.

Fourth

IV. The energy of each power of conscious existence having, as its reflex or concomitant, an appropriate pleasure or pain, and no pain or pleasure being competent to man, except as the concomitant of some determinate energy of life, the all-important question arises,—What is the general law under which these counter-phænomena arise, in all their special manifestations?

Pleasure  
and Pain  
opposed as  
contraries,  
not as  
contradictories

In reference to this proposition, I would observe that pleasure and pain are opposed to each other as contraries, not as contradictories, that is, the affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other, but

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect x, vol i p 177 —ED

the negation of the one does not infer the affirmation of the other; for there may be a third or intermediate state, which is neither one of pleasure nor one of pain, but one of indifference. Whether such a state of indifference do ever actually exist; or whether, if it do, it be not a complex state in which are blended an equal complement of pains and pleasures, it is not necessary, at this stage of our progress, to inquire. It is sufficient, in considering the quality of pleasure as one opposed to the quality of pain, to inquire, what are the proximate causes which determine them · or, if this cannot be answered, what is the general fact or law which regulates their counter-manifestations; and if such a law can be discovered for the one, it is evident that it will enable us also to explain the other, for the science of contraries is one. I now proceed to the fifth proposition

V. The answer to the question proposed is —the Fifth more perfect, the more pleasurable, the energy; the more imperfect, the more painful.

In reference to this proposition, it is to be observed that the answer here given is precise, but inexplicit: it is the enunciation of the law in its most abstract form, and requires at once development and explanation. This I shall endeavour to give in the following propositions

VI. The perfection of an energy is twofold; 1°, By Sixth relation to the power of which it is the exertion, and, 2°, By relation to the object about which it is conversant. The former relation affords what may be called its *subjective*, the latter what may be called its *objective*, condition

The explanation and development of the preceding proposition is given in the following



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Seventh

VII. By relation to its power:—An energy is perfect, when it is tantamount to the full, and not to more than the full, complement of free or spontaneous energy, which the power is capable of exerting; an energy is imperfect, either, 1°, When the power is restrained from putting forth the whole amount of energy it would otherwise tend to do, or, 2°, When it is stimulated to put forth a larger amount than that to which it is spontaneously disposed. The amount or quantum of energy in the case of a single power is of two kinds,—1°, An intensive, and, 2°, A protensive; the former expressing the higher degree, the latter the longer duration, of the exertion. A perfect energy is, therefore, that which is evolved by a power, both in the degree and for the continuance to which it is competent without straining; an imperfect energy, that which is evolved by a power, in a lower or in a higher degree, for a shorter or for a longer continuance, than, if left to itself, it would freely exert. There are, thus, two elements of the perfection, and, consequently, two elements of the pleasure, of a simple energy:—its adequate degree and its adequate duration; and four ways in which such an energy may be imperfect, and, consequently, painful; inasmuch as its degree may be either too high or too low; its duration either too long or too short.

When we do not limit our consideration to the simple energies of individual powers, but look to complex states, in which a plurality of powers may be called simultaneously into action, we have, besides the intensive and protensive quantities of energy, a third kind, to wit, the extensive quantity. A state is said to contain a greater amount of extensive energy, in proportion as it forms the complement of a greater

number of simultaneously co-operating powers. This complement, it is evident, may be conceived as made up either of energies all intensively and protensively perfect and pleasurable, or of energies all intensively and protensively imperfect and painful, or of energies partly perfect, partly imperfect, and this in every combination afforded by the various perfections and imperfections of the intensive and protensive quantities. It may be here noticed, that the intensive and the two other quantities stand always in an inverse ratio to each other; that is, the higher the degree of any energy, the shorter is its continuance, and, during its continuance, the more completely does it constitute the whole mental state,—does it engross the whole disposable consciousness of the mind. The maximum of intensity is thus the minimum of continuance and of extension. So much for the perfection, and proportional pleasure, of an energy or state of energies, by relation to the power out of which it is elicited. This paragraph requires, I think, no commentary.

VIII. By relation to the object, (and by the term *Eighth.* *object*, be it observed, is here denoted every objective cause by which a power is determined to activity), about which it is conversant, an energy is perfect, when this object is of such a character as to afford to its power the condition requisite to let it spring to full spontaneous activity; imperfect, when the object is of such a character as either, on the one hand, to stimulate the power to a degree, or to a continuance, of activity beyond its maximum of free exertion, or, on the other hand, to thwart it in its tendency towards this its natural limit. An object is, consequently, pleasurable or painful, inasmuch as it thus determines a power to perfect or to imperfect energy.

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But an object, or complement of objects simultaneously presented, may not only determine one but a plurality of powers into coactivity. The complex state, which thus arises, is pleasurable, in proportion as its constitutive energies are severally more perfect; painful, in proportion as these are more imperfect; and in proportion as an object, or a complement of objects, occasions the average perfection or the average imperfection of the complex state, is it, in like manner, pleasurable or painful.

Ninth  
Definitions  
of Pleasure  
and Pain

IX Pleasure is, thus, the result of certain harmonious relations,—of certain agreements; pain, on the contrary, the effect of certain unharmonious relations,—of certain disagreements. The pleasurable is, therefore, not inappropriately called *the agreeable*, the painful *the disagreeable*, and, in conformity to this doctrine, pleasure and pain may be thus defined:—

Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious.<sup>a</sup> Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power.

The defini-  
tion of  
Pleasure  
illustrated

1 Pleasure  
the reflex  
of energy

I shall say a word in illustration of these definitions. Taking pleasure,—pleasure is defined to be the reflex of energy and of perfect energy, and not to be either energy or the perfection of energy itself,—and why? It is not simply defined an energy, exertion, or act, because some energies are not pleasurable,—being either painful or indifferent. It is not simply

<sup>a</sup> This is substantially the definition of Aristotle, whose doctrine, as expounded in the 10th book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is more fully stated below, p 450. In the less accurate dissertation, which occurs

in the 7th book of the same treatise, and which perhaps properly belongs to the *Eudemian Ethics*, the pleasure is identified with the energy itself —Ed

defined the perfection of an energy, because we can easily separate in thought the perfection of an act, a conscious act, from any feeling of pleasure in its performance. The same holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the definition of pain, as a reflex of imperfect energy.

Again, pleasure is defined the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded,—of the free and unimpeded, exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. Here the term *spontaneous* refers to the subjective, the term *unimpeded* to the objective, perfection. Touching the term *spontaneous*, every power, all conditions being supplied, and all impediments being removed, tends, of its proper nature and without effort, to put forth a certain determinate maximum, intensive and protensive, of free energy. This determinate maximum of free energy, it, therefore, exerts spontaneously if a less amount than this be actually put forth, a certain quantity of tendency has been forcibly repressed; whereas, if a greater than this has been actually exerted, a certain amount of *nisus* has been forcibly stimulated in the power. The term *spontaneously*, therefore, provides that the exertion of the power has not been constrained beyond the proper limit,—the natural maximum, to which, if left to itself, it freely springs.

2 Spontaneous and unimpeded

Again, in regard to the term *unimpeded*,—this stipulates that the power should not be checked in the spring it would thus spontaneously make to its maximum of energy, that is, it is supposed that the conditions requisite to allow this spring have been supplied, and that all impediments to it have been removed. This postulates of course the presence of an object. The definition further states, that the exertion must be

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that of a power of whose energy we are conscious. This requires no illustration. There are powers in man, the activities of which lie beyond the sphere of consciousness. But it is of the very essence of pleasure and pain to be felt and there is no feeling out of consciousness. What has now been said of the terms used in the definition of pleasure, renders all comment superfluous on the parallel expressions employed in that of pain.

Pleasure—  
Positive  
and Neg-  
ative

On this doctrine it is to be observed, that there are given different kinds of pleasure, and different kinds of pain. In the first place, these are twofold, inasmuch as each is either Positive and Absolute, or Negative and Relative. In regard to the former, the mere negation of pain does, by relation to pain, constitute a state of pleasure. Thus, the removal of the toothache replaces us in a state which, though one really of indifference, is, by contrast to our previous agony, felt as pleasurable. This is negative or relative pleasure. Positive or absolute pleasure, on the contrary, is all that pleasure which we feel above a state of indifference, and which is, therefore, prized as a good in itself, and not simply as the removal of an evil.

Pain—  
Positive  
and Neg-  
ative  
Pleasure  
Positive  
and Neg-  
ative

On the same principle, pain is also divided into Positive or Absolute, and into Negative or Relative. But, in the second place, there is, moreover, a subdivision of positive pain into that which accompanies a repression of the spontaneous energy of a power, and that which is conjoined with its effort, when stimulated to over-activity.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>c</sup> [With the foregoing theory compare Hutcheson, *System of Moral Philosophy*, l. i. c. 11. § 11. 1742. Edin. 1814. [Bentham, *Essai Analytique sur l'Idée, Chap. VII. III. Regu-Principles*, l. i. c. 11. § 11. 1742. Edin. 1814. [Bentham, *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, part II. c. i. § 2—Edin. 1814. Ed.]

I proceed now to state certain corollaries, which flow immediately from the preceding doctrine.

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In the first place, as the powers which, in an individual, are either preponderantly strong by nature, or have become preponderantly strong by habit, have comparatively more perfect energies, so the pleasures which accompany these will be proportionally intense and enduring. But this being the case, the individual will be disposed principally, if not exclusively, to exercise these more vigorous powers, for their energies afford him the largest complement of purest pleasure "Trahit sua quemque voluptas," <sup>a</sup> each has his ruling passion.

Corollaries  
from pre-  
ceding doc-  
trine1 The in-  
dividual  
will be dis-  
posed to  
exercise  
his more  
vigorous  
powers

But, in the second place, as the exercise of a power is the only mean by which it is invigorated, but as, at the same time, this exercise, until the development be accomplished, elicits imperfect, and, therefore, painful, or at least less pleasurable, energy,—it follows that those faculties which stand the most in need of cultivation, are precisely those which the least secure it; while, on the contrary, those which are already more fully developed, are precisely those which present the strongest inducements for their still higher invigoration.

2 Those  
faculties  
which most  
need cul-  
tivation,  
the least  
secure it

<sup>a</sup> Virgil, *Ecl* ii. 65 —ED

## LECTURE XLIII.

THE FEELINGS.—HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THEORIES  
OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.LECT  
XLIII

Recapitulation.

General  
historical  
notices of  
Theories of  
the Pleas-  
urable

IN my last Lecture, I gave an abstract statement of that theory of Pleasure and Pain, which, I think, is competent, and exclusively competent, to explain the whole multiform phænomena of our Feelings,—a theory, consequently, which those whole phænomena concur in establishing. It is, in truth, nothing but a generalisation of what is essential in the concrete facts themselves. Before, however, proceeding to show, by its application to particular cases, that this theory affords us a simple principle, on which to account for the most complicated and perplexing phænomena of Feeling, I shall attempt to give you a slight survey of the most remarkable opinions on this point. To do this, however imperfectly, is of the more importance, as there is no work in which any such historical deduction is attempted; but principally, because the various theories of philosophers on the doctrine of the pleasurable, are found, when viewed in connection, all to concur in manifesting the truth of that one which I have proposed to you,—a theory, in fact, which is the resumption and complement of them all. In attempting this survey, I by no means propose to furnish even an indication of all the opinions that have been held in regard to the pleasurable in general, nor even

of all the doctrines on this subject that have been advanced by the authors to whom I specially refer. I can only afford to speak of the more remarkable theories, and, in these, only of the more essential particulars. But, in point of fact, though there is no end of what has been written upon pleasure and pain, considered in their moral relations and effects, the speculations in regard to their psychological causes and conditions are comparatively few. In general, I may also premise that there is apparent a remarkable gravitation in the various doctrines promulgated on this point, towards a common centre; and, however one-sided and insufficient the several opinions may appear, they are all substantially grounded upon truth, being usually right in what they affirm, and wrong only in what they deny; all are reflections, but only partial reflections, of the truth. These opinions, I may further remark, fall into two great classes, and at the head of each there is found one of the two great philosophers of antiquity,—Plato being the founder of the one general theory, Aristotle of the other. But though the distinction of these classes pervades the whole history of the doctrines, I do not deem it necessary to follow this classification in the following observations, but shall content myself with a chronological arrangement.

These theories fall into two grand classes,—the Platonic and the Aristotelic

Plato is the first philosopher who can be said to have attempted the generalisation of a law which regulates the manifestation of pleasure and pain; and it is but scanty justice to acknowledge that no subsequent philosopher has handled the subject with greater ingenuity and acuteness. For though the theory of Aristotle be more fully developed, and, as I am convinced, upon the whole the most complete and accu-

Plato the first to attempt the generalisation of a law of Pleasure and Pain



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rate which we possess, it is but fair to add, that he borrowed a considerable portion of it from Plato, whose doctrine he corrected and enlarged.

Plato's  
theory,—  
that a state  
of pleasure  
is always  
preceded  
by a state  
of pain

The opinion of Plato regarding the source of pleasure is contained in the *Philebus*, and in the ninth book of the *Republic*, with incidental allusions to his theory in other dialogues. Thus, in the opening of the *Phædo*,<sup>a</sup> we have the following statement of its distinguishing principle,—that a state of pleasure is always preceded by a state of pain. Phædo, in describing the conduct of Socrates in the prison and on the eve of death, narrates, that “sitting upright on the bed he (Socrates) drew up his leg, and stroking it with his hand, said at the same time,—‘What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call the pleasant and agreeable! and how wonderful a relation does it bear by nature to that which seems to be its contrary, the painful! For they are unwilling to be present with us both together; and yet, if any person pursues and obtains the one, he is almost always under a necessity of accepting also the other, as if both of them depended from a single summit. And it seems to me’ (he continues), ‘that if Æsop had perceived this, he would have written a fable upon it, and have told us that the Deity, being willing to reconcile the conflictive natures, but at the same time unable to accomplish this design, conjoined their summits in an existence one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass that whoever partakes of the one, is soon after compelled to participate in the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at present; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the stricture of the fetter, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation.’”

The following extract from the *Philebus*<sup>a</sup> will, however, show more fully the purport and grounds of his opinion :—

“*Socrates*. I say then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its constitution, and, at the same time, rise is given to pains. Quotation from the Philebus

“*Protarchus* You say what is highly probable.

“*Soc*. But when the harmony is restored, and the breach is healed, we should say that then pleasure is produced ; if points of so great importance may be despatched at once in so few words.

“*Prot*. In my opinion, O Socrates, you say what is very true ; but let us try if we can show these truths in a light still clearer.

“*Soc*. Are not such things as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us all, the most easy to be understood ?

“*Prot*. What things do you mean ?

“*Soc*. Want of food makes a breach in the animal system, and, at the same time, gives the pain of hunger.

“*Prot*. True.

“*Soc*. And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleasure

“*Prot*. Right.

“*Soc*. Want of drink, also, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humours, brings on us corruption together with the pain of thirst but the virtue of a liquid in moistening and replenishing the parts dried up, yields a pleasure. In like manner, unnatural suffocating heat, in dissolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful sensation ; but a cooling again, a

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refreshment agreeable to nature, affects us with a sense of pleasure.

*Prot.* Most certainly.

*Soc.* And the concretion of the animal humours through cold, contrary to their nature, occasions pain; but a return to their pristine state of fluidity, and a restoring of the natural circulation, produce pleasure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiss. concerning that sort of being which I said was composed of indefinite and definite,—that, when by nature any beings of that sort become animated with soul, their passage into corruption, or a total dissolution, is accompanied with pain; and their entrance into existence, the assembling of all those particles which compose the nature of such a being, is attended with a sense of pleasure.

*Prot.* I admit your account of this whole matter; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the stamp of truth."

And in a subsequent part of the dialogue, Socrates is made to approve of the doctrine of the Eleatic School, in regard to the unreality of pleasure, as a thing always in generation, that is, always in progress towards existence, but never absolutely existent.

*Soc.* But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it said concerning pleasure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and which, having no stability of being, cannot properly be said to be at all? For some ingenious persons there are, who endeavour to show us that such is the nature of pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it." <sup>c</sup>

Then, after an expository discourse on the Eleatic

doctrine, Socrates proceeds "—" "Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this argumentation, we are much obliged to the persons who have given us this account of pleasure,—that the essence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain that these persons would laugh at a man who asserted, that pleasure and good were the same thing.

"*Prot.* Certainly they would

"*Soc.* And these very persons would undoubtedly laugh at those men, wherever they met with them, who place their chief good and end in a becoming,—an approximation to existence?

"*Prot.* How? what sort of men do you mean?

"*Soc.* Such as, in freeing themselves from hunger or thirst, or any of the uneasinesses from which they are freed by generation,—by tending towards being, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those uneasinesses, as to declare they would not choose to live without suffering thirst and hunger, nor without feeling all those other sensations which may be said to follow from such kinds of uneasiness."

The sum of Plato's doctrine on this subject is this, —that pleasure is nothing absolute, nothing positive, but a mere relation to, a mere negation of, pain. Pain is the root, the condition, the antecedent of pleasure, and the latter is only a restoration of the feeling subject, from a state contrary to nature to a state conformable with nature. Pleasure is the mere replenishing of a vacuum,—the mere satisfying of a want. With this principal doctrine,—that pleasure is only the negation of pain, Plato connects sundry collateral opinions in conformity to his general system. That

Sum of  
Plato's doc-  
trine of the  
Pleasur-  
able

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pleasure, for example, is not a good, and that it is nothing real or existent, but something only in the progress towards existence,—never being, ever becoming (ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον, οὐδέποτε ὄν).

The doctrine of Aristotle proposed to correct and supplement the Platonic

Aristotle saw the partiality and imperfection of this theory, and himself proposed another, which should supply its deficiencies. His speculations concerning the pleasurable are to be found in his *Ethical Treatises*, and, to say nothing of the two lesser works, the *Magna Moralia* and the *Eudemean Ethics*,<sup>a</sup> you will find the subject fully discussed in the seventh and tenth Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I shall say nothing of Aristotle's arguments against Eudoxus, as to whether pleasure be the chief good, and against Plato, as to whether it be a good at all,—these are only ethical questions; I shall confine my observations to the psychological problem touching the law which governs its manifestation. Aristotle, in the first place, refutes the Platonic theory,—that pleasure is only the removal of a pain. "Since it is asserted," he says,<sup>β</sup> "that pain is a want, an indigence (ἐνδεια) contrary to nature, pleasure will be a repletion, a filling up (ἀναπλήρωσις) of that want in conformity to nature. But want and its repletion are corporeal affections. Now if pleasure be the repletion of a want contrary to nature, that which contains the repletion will contain the pleasure, and the faculty of being pleased. But the want and its repletion are in the body; the body, therefore, will be pleased,—the body will be the subject of this feeling. But the feeling of pleasure is

Aristotle refutes the Platonic doctrine,—that pleasure is only the removal of a pain

<sup>a</sup> The genuineness of these two works is questionable. The chapters on pleasure in the *Eudemean Ethics* are identical with those in the 7th book of the *Nicomachean*, being part of the three books which are common to both treatises.—Ed.  
<sup>β</sup> *Eth Nic*, x, 3.—Ed.

an affection of the soul. Pleasure, therefore, cannot be merely a repletion. True it is, that pleasure is consequent on the repletion of a want, as pain is consequent on the want itself. For we are pleased when our wants are satisfied; pained when this is prevented.

"It appears," proceeds the Stagirite, "that this opinion has originated in an exclusive consideration of our bodily pains and pleasures, and more especially those relative to food. For when inanition has taken place, and we have felt the pains of hunger, we experience pleasure in its repletion. But the same does not hold good in reference to all our pleasures. For the pleasure we find, for example, in mathematical contemplations, and even in some of the senses, is wholly unaccompanied with pain. Thus the gratification we derive from the energies of hearing, smell, and sight, is not consequent on any foregone pain, and in them there is, therefore, no repletion of a want. Moreover, hope, and the recollection of past good, are pleasing, but are the pleasures from these a repletion? This cannot be maintained; for in them there is no want preceding, which could admit of repletion. Hence it is manifest, that pleasure is not the negation of a pain."

Having disposed of Plato's theory, Aristotle proposes his own; and his doctrine, in as far as it goes, is altogether conformable to that I have given to you, as the one which appears to me the true.

The theory  
of Aris-  
totle

Pleasure is maintained by Aristotle to be the concomitant of energy,—of perfect energy, whether of the functions of Sense or Intellect; and perfect energy he describes as that which proceeds from a power in health and vigour, and exercised upon an object rela-

Pleasure,  
according  
to Aristo-  
tle, is the  
concomi-  
tant of the  
unimpeded  
energy of a  
power.

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quoted

tively excellent, that is, suited to call forth the power into unimpeded activity. Pleasure, though the result, —the concomitant of perfect action, he distinguishes from the perfect action itself. It is not the action, it is not the perfection, though it be consequent on action, and a necessary efflorescence of its perfection. Pleasure is thus defined by Aristotle to be the concomitant of the unimpeded energy of a natural power, faculty, or acquired habit.<sup>a</sup> “Thus when a sense, for example, is in perfect health, and it is presented with a suitable object of the most perfect kind, there is elicited the most perfect energy, which, at every instant of its continuance, is accompanied with pleasure. The same holds good with the function of Imagination, Thought, &c. Pleasure is the concomitant in every case where powers and objects are in themselves perfect, and between which there subsists a suitable relation. Hence arises the pleasure of novelty. For on the first presentation of a new object, the energy of cognition is intensely directed upon it, and the pleasure high; whereas when the object is again and again presented, the energy relaxes, and the pleasure declines. But pleasure is not merely the consequent of the most perfect exertion of power; for it reacts upon the power itself, by raising, invigorating, and perfecting its development. For we make no progress in a study, except we feel a pleasure in its pursuit.

“Every different power has its peculiar pleasure and its peculiar pain; and each power is as much corrupted by its appropriate pain as it is perfected by its appropriate pleasure. Pleasure is not something that arises,—that comes into existence, part after part;

<sup>a</sup> See above, p 440 — Ed

it is, on the contrary, complete at every indivisible instant of its continuance. It is not, therefore, as Plato holds, a change, a motion, a generation (*γένεσις*, *κίνησις*), which exists piecemeal as it were, and successively in time, and only complete after a certain term of endurance; but on the contrary something instantaneous, and, from moment to moment, perfect." <sup>a</sup>

Such were the two theories touching the law of pleasure and pain, propounded by the two principal thinkers of antiquity. To their doctrines on this point we find nothing added, worthy of commemoration, by the succeeding philosophers of Greece and Rome, nay, we do not find that in antiquity these doctrines received any farther development or confirmation. Among the ancients, however, the Aristotelic theory seems to have soon superseded the Platonic; for, even among the lower Platonists themselves, there is no attempt to vindicate the doctrine of their master, in so far as to assert that all pleasure is only a relief from pain. Their sole endeavour is to reconcile Plato's opinion with that of Aristotle, by showing that the former did not mean to extend the principle in question to pleasure in general, but applied it only to the pleasures of certain of the senses. And in truth, various passages in the *Philebus* and in the ninth book of the *Republic*, afford countenance to this interpretation <sup>β</sup>. Be this, however, as it may, it

Nothing added in antiquity to the two theories of Plato and Aristotle

<sup>a</sup> See *Eth. Nic.*, x. 4, 5 — Ed. [On Aristotle's doctrine of the Pleasurable, see Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, iii. p. 200.]

<sup>β</sup> [Plato, as well as Aristotle, seems to have made pleasure consist in a harmonious, pain in a disharmonious,

energy. Every energy, both of Sense and Intellect, is, according to Plato, accompanied with a sensation of pleasure and pain. *Republic*, ix. p. 557. *Philebus*, p. 211, edit. Bipont. See Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, ii. p. 290.]



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was only in more recent times that the Platonic doctrine, in all its exclusive rigour, was again revived; and that too by philosophers who seem not to have been aware of the venerable authority in favour of the paradox which they proposed as new. I may add that the philosophers, who in modern times have speculated upon the conditions of the pleasurable, seem, in general, unaware of what had been attempted on this problem by the ancients; and it is indeed this circumstance alone that enables us to explain, why the modern theories on this subject, in principle the same with that of Aristotle, have remained so inferior to his in the great virtues of a theory,—comprehension and simplicity.

The theories of  
Plato and  
Aristotle  
reduced to  
unity

Before, however, proceeding to the consideration of subsequent opinions, it may be proper to observe that the theories of Plato and Aristotle, however opposite in appearance, may easily be reduced to unity, and the theory of which I have given you the general expression, will be found to be the consummated complement of both. The two doctrines differ only essentially in this:—that the one makes a previous pain the universal condition of pleasure; while the other denies this condition as a general law, and holds that pleasure is a positive reality, and more than the mere alternative of pain. Now, in regard to this difference, it must be admitted, on the one hand, that in so far as the instances are concerned, on which Plato attempts to establish his principle, Aristotle is successful in showing, that these are only special cases, and do not warrant the unlimited conclusion in support of which they are adduced.

But, on the other hand, it must be confessed that Aristotle has not shown the principle to be false,—

that all pleasure is an escape from pain. He shows, indeed, that the analogy of hunger, thirst, and other bodily affections, cannot be extended to the gratification we experience from the energies of intellect,—cannot be extended even to that which we experience in the exercise of the higher senses. It is true, that the pleasure I experience in this particular act of vision, cannot be explained from the pain I had felt in another particular act of vision, immediately preceding, and if this example were enough, it would certainly be made out that pleasure is not merely the negation of a foregoing pain. But let us ascend a step higher and inquire,—would it not be painful if the faculty of vision, (to take the same example), were wholly restrained from operation? Now it will not be denied, that the repression of any power in its natural *nisus*,—*conatus*, to action, is positively painful; and, therefore, that the exertion of a power, if it afforded only a negation of that positive pain, and were, in its own nature, absolutely indifferent, would, by relation to the pain from which it yields us a relief, appear to us a real pleasure. We may, therefore, I think, maintain, with perfect truth, that as the holding back of any power from exercise is positively painful, so its passing into energy is, were it only the removal of that painful repression, negatively pleasurable; on this ground, consequently, and to this extent, we may rightly hold with Plato,—that every state of pleasure and free energy is, in fact, the escape from an alternative state of pain and compulsory inaction.

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sense the  
Platonic  
dogma is  
true

So far we are warranted in going. But we should be wrong were we to constitute this partial truth into an unlimited,—an exclusive principle, that is, were we to maintain that the whole pleasure we derive

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The doctrine that the whole pleasure of activity arises from the negation of the pain of forced in-ertion,—erroneous

After compulsory in-ertion, pleasure higher than in ordinary circumstances,—explained

from the exercise of our powers, is nothing more than a negation of the pain we experience from their forced in-ertion. This I say would be an erroneous, because an absolute, conclusion. For the pleasure we find in the free play of our faculties is, as we are most fully conscious, far more than simply a superseding of pain. That philosophy, indeed, would only provoke a smile which would maintain, that all pleasure is in itself a zero,—a nothing, which becomes a something only by relation to the reality of pain which it annuls. It is true, indeed, that after a compulsory in-ertion, our pleasure, in the first exertion of our faculties, is frequently far higher than that which we experience in their ordinary exercise, when left at liberty. But this does not, at least does not exclusively, arise from the contrast of the previous and subsequent states of pain and pleasure, but principally because the powers are in excessive vigour,—at least in excessive erethism or excitation, and have thus a greater complement of intenser energy suddenly to expend. On the principle, therefore, that the degree of pleasure is always in the ratio of the degree of spontaneous activity, the pleasure immediately consequent on the emancipation of a power from thralldom, would, if the power remain uninjured by the constraint, be naturally greater, because the energy would in that case be, for a season, more intense. At the same time, the state of pleasure would in this case appear to be higher than what it absolutely is; because it would be set off by proximate contrast with a previous state of pain. Thus it is that a basin of water of ordinary blood heat, appears hot, if we plunge in it a hand which had previously been dipped in snow; and cold, if we immerse in it another which had previously been placed in water of

a still higher temperature. But it is unfair to apply this magnifying effect of contrast to the one relative and not to the other; and any argument drawn from it against the positive reality of pleasure, applies equally to disprove the positive reality of pain. The true doctrine I hold to be this,—that pain and pleasure are, as I have said, each to be considered both as Absolute and as Relative.—absolute, that is, each is something real, and would exist were the other taken out of being; relative, that is, each is felt as greater or less by immediate contrast to the other. I may illustrate this by the analogy of a scale. Let the state of indifference,—that is, the negation of both pain and pleasure,—be marked as zero, let the degrees of pain be denoted by a descending series of numbers below zero, and the degrees of pleasure by an ascending series of numbers above zero. Now, suppose the degree of pain we feel from a certain state of hunger, to be six below zero; in this case our feeling, in the act of eating, will not merely rise to zero, that is, to the mere negation of pain, as the Platonic theory holds, but to some degree of positive pleasure, say six. And here I may observe, that, were the insufficiency of the Platonic theory shown by nothing else, this would be done by the absurd consequences it implies, in relation to the function of nutrition alone; for if its principle be true, then would our gratification from the appeasement of hunger, be equally great by one kind of viand as by another.

Thus, then, the counter-theories of Plato and Aristotle are, as I have said, right in what they affirm, wrong in what they deny; each contains the truth, but not the whole truth. By supplying, therefore, to either that in which it was defective, we reduce their

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Unfair to apply the magnifying effect of contrast to disprove the positive reality of pleasure more than of pain  
Pleasure and pain both Absolute and Relative

The counter-theories of Plato and Aristotle the partial expressions of the true

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apparent discord to real harmony, and show that they are severally the partial expressions of a theory which comprehends and consummates them both. But to proceed in our historical survey.

Historical  
notices of  
theories of  
the Plea-  
surable re-  
sumed.

Cardan,—  
held a  
theory  
identical  
with  
Plato's

Passing over a host of commentators in the Lower Empire, and during the middle ages, who were content to repeat the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato; in modern times, the first original philosopher I am aware of, who seems to have turned his attention upon the phænomena of pain and pleasure, is the celebrated Cardan; and the result of his observation was a theory identical with Plato's, though of Plato's speculation he does not seem to have been aware. In the sixth chapter of his very curious autobiography, *De Vita Propria Liber*, he tells us that it was his wont to anticipate the causes of disease, because he was of opinion that pleasure consisted in the appeasement of a pre-existent pain, (*quod arbiträrer voluptatem consistere in dolore præcedenti sedato*). But in the thirteenth book of his great work *De Subtilitate*, this theory is formally propounded. This, however, was not done in the earlier editions of the work; and the theory was, therefore, not canvassed by the ingenuity of his critic, the elder Scaliger, whose *Exercitationes contra Cardanum* are totally silent on the subject. It is only in the editions of the *De Subtilitate* of Cardan, subsequent to the year 1560, that a statement of the theory in question is to be found. The following is a summary of his reasoning:—"All pleasure has its root in a preceding pain. Thus it is that we find pleasure in rest after hard labour; in meat and drink after hunger and thirst; in the sweet after the bitter; in light after darkness; in harmony after discord. Such are the

Summary  
of his doc-  
trine

facts in confirmation of this doctrine, which simple experience affords. But philosophy supplies, likewise, a reason from the nature of things themselves. Pleasure and pain exist only as they are states of feeling; but feeling is a change, and change always proceeds from one contrary to another; consequently, either from the good to the bad, or from the bad to the good. The former of these alternatives is painful, and, therefore, the other, when it takes place, is pleasing; a state of pain must thus always precede a state of pleasure." Such are the grounds on which Cardan thinks himself entitled to reject the Aristotelic theory of pleasure, and to substitute in its place the Platonic. It does not, however, appear from anything he says, that he was aware of the relative speculations of these two philosophers.

But the reasoning of Cardan is incompetent. for if it proves anything, it proves too much, seeing that it would follow from his premises, that a pleasurable feeling cannot gradually, continually, uninterruptedly, rise in intensity; for it behoves that every new degree of pleasure should be separated from the preceding by an intermediate state of higher pain, a conclusion which is contradicted by the most ordinary and manifest experience. This theory remained, therefore, in Cardan's, as in Plato's, hands, destitute of the necessary proof.

His theory  
criticised

The same doctrine,—that pleasure is only the alternation and consequent of pain,—was adopted, likewise, by Montaigne. In the famous twelfth chapter of the second book of his *Essays*, he says —“Our states of pleasure are only the privation of our states of pain;” but this universal inference he, like his predecessors, deduces only from the special phænomena given in certain of the senses.

Montaigne,  
—held a  
similar  
doctrine

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Descartes

The philosopher next in order is Descartes;<sup>a</sup> and his opinion is deserving of attention, not so much from its intrinsic value, as from the influence it has exerted upon those who have subsequently speculated upon the causes of pleasure. These philosophers seem to have been totally ignorant of the far profounder theories of the ancients; and while the regular discussions of the subject by Aristotle and Plato were, for our modern psychologists, as if they had never been, the incidental allusion to the matter by Descartes, originated a series of speculations which is still in progress.

His doctrine of the pleasurable

Descartes' philosophy of the pleasurable is promulgated in one short sentence of the sixth letter of the First Part of his *Epistles*, which is addressed to the Princess Elizabeth. It is as follows:—"All our pleasure is nothing more than the consciousness of some one or other of our perfections"—"Tota nostra voluptas posita est tantum in perfectionis alicujus nostræ conscientia." It is curious to hear the praises that have been lavished upon this definition of the pleasurable. It has been lauded for its novelty; it has been lauded for its importance. "Descartes," says Mendelssohn in his *Letters on the Sensations*, (*Briefe über die Empfindungen*), "was the first who made the attempt to give a real explanation of the pleasurable"<sup>β</sup> The celebrated Kæstner thus opens

<sup>a</sup> Before Descartes, Vives held a positive theory of the pleasurable. His definition of pleasure and its illustration, are worthy of a passing notice. "Delectatio sita est in congruentia, quam invenire non est sine proportionis ratione aliqua inter facultatem et objectum, ut quædam sit quasi similitudo inter illa; tum ne notabiliter sit majus, quod adfert de-

lectionem. nec notabiliter minus, quam ea vis quæ recipit voluptatem, ea utique parte qua recipitur. Ideo mediocris lux gratior est oculis, quam ingens; et subobscura gratiora sunt hebeti visu eundem in modum de sonis." *De Anima*, lib. iii. p. 202, edit. 1555.—Ed.

<sup>β</sup> Anmerkung, 6.—Ed.

Groundlessly lauded for its novelty and importance.

his *Réflexions sur l'Origine du Plaisir*:<sup>a</sup>—"I shall not pretend decidedly to assert that no one before Descartes has said that pleasure consisted in the feeling of some one of our perfections. I confess, however, that I have not found this definition in any of the dissertations, sometimes tiresome, and frequently uninformative, of the ancient philosophers on the nature and effects of pleasure. I am, therefore, disposed to attribute a discovery which has occasioned so many controversies, to that felicitous genius, which has disencumbered metaphysics of the confused chaos of disputes, as unintelligible as vain, in order to render it the solid and instructive science of God and of the human soul." And M. Bertrand, another very intelligent philosopher, in his *Essai sur le Plaisir*,<sup>b</sup> says, "Descartes is probably the first who has enounced, that all pleasure consists in the inward feeling we have of some of our perfections, and, in these few words, he has unfolded a series of great truths."

Now what is the originality, what is the importance, of this celebrated definition? This is easily answered, —in so far as it has any meaning, it is only a statement, in vague and general terms, of the truth which Aristotle had promulgated, in precise and proximate expressions. Descartes says, that pleasure is the consciousness of one or other of our perfections. This is not false; but it is not instructive. We are not conscious of any perfection of our nature, except in so far as this is the perfection of one or other of our powers; and we are not conscious of a power at all,

The doctrine of Descartes, a vague version of that of Aristotle

<sup>a</sup> The *Réflexions sur l'Origine du Plaisir*, is appended to the *Nouvelle Théorie des Plaisirs*, par M. Sulzer (1767) The *Nouvelle Théorie* is a French version of Sulzer's treatise, *Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen* See above, p 416 —Ed  
<sup>b</sup> Sect 1 ch 1 p 3 Neuchâtel, 1777 —Ed



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far less of its perfection, except in so far as we are conscious of its operation. It, therefore, behoved Descartes to have brought down his definition of pleasure from the vague generality of a consciousness of perfection, to the precise and proximate declaration, that pleasure is a consciousness of the perfect energy of a power. But this improvement of his definition would have stripped it of all novelty. It would then have appeared to be, what it truly is, only a version, and an inadequate version, of Aristotle's. These are not the only objections that could be taken to the Cartesian definition; but for our present purpose it would be idle to advance them.

Leibnitz,—  
adopted  
both the  
counter-  
theories

Leibnitz is the next philosopher to whose opinion I shall refer, and this you will find stated in his *Nouveaux Essais*,<sup>a</sup> and other works latterly published. Like Descartes, he defines pleasure the feeling of a perfection, pain the feeling of an imperfection; and, in another part of the work,<sup>b</sup> he adopts the Platonic theory, that all pleasure is grounded in pain, which he ingeniously connects with his own doctrine of latent modifications, or, as he calls them, obscure perceptions. As this work, however, was not published till long after not only his own death, but that of his great disciple Wolf, the indication, (for it is nothing more), of his opinion on this point had little influence on subsequent speculations; indeed I do not remember to have seen the doctrine of Leibnitz upon pleasure even alluded to by any of his countrymen.

Wolf

Wolf, with whose doctrine that of Baumgarten<sup>γ</sup> nearly coincides, defines pleasure, the intuitive cog-

<sup>a</sup> LIV II ch. XXI § 41. *Opera*, ed Erdmann, p 261 —ED

<sup>β</sup> LIV II ch XX § 6 *Opera*, ed Erdmann, p 248 —ED.

<sup>γ</sup> See his *Metaphysik*, § 482 et seq, p 283, edit. 1783 Cf Platner, *Phil Aphorismen*, II § 365, p 218 —ED.

nition, (that is, in our language, the perception or imagination), of any perfection whatever, either true or apparent. — “Voluptas est intuitus, seu cognitio intuitiva, perfectionis cujuscunque, sive veræ sive apparentis.”<sup>a</sup> His doctrine you will find detailed in his *Psychologia Empirica*, and in his *Horæ Subsecivæ*. It was manifestly the offspring, but the degenerate offspring, of the doctrine of Descartes, which, as we have seen, was itself only a corruption of that of Aristotle. Descartes rightly considered pleasure as a quality of the subject, in defining it a consciousness of some perfection in ourselves. Wolf, on the contrary, wrongly considers pleasure more as an attribute of the object, in defining it a cognition of any perfection whatever. Now in their definitions of pleasure, as Descartes was inferior to Aristotle, so Wolf falls far below Descartes, and in the same quality,—in want of precision and proximity.

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His doctrine criticised

1 Wrongly considers pleasure as an attribute of the object

Pleasure is a feeling, and a feeling is a merely subjective state, that is, a state which has no reference to anything beyond itself,—which exists only as we are conscious of its existence. Now, then, the perfection or imperfection of an object, considered in itself, and as out of relation to our subjective states, is thought,—is judged, but is not felt; and this judgment is not pleasure or pain, but approbation or disapprobation, that is, an act of the cognitive faculties, but not an affection of the capacities of feeling. In this point of view, therefore, the definition of pleasure, as the cognition of any sort of perfection, is erroneous. It may, indeed, be true that the perfection of an object can determine the cognitive faculty to a perfect energy;

<sup>a</sup> *Psychologic Empirica*, § 511, cartes as the author of the definition where he expressly refers to Des. —ED

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and the concomitant of this perfect energy will be a feeling of pleasure. But, in this case, the objective perfection, as cognised, is not itself the pleasure; but the pleasure is the feeling which we have of the perfection, that is, of the state of vigorous and unimpeded energy of the cognitive faculty, as exercised on that perfection. Wolf ought, therefore, to have limited his definition, like Descartes, to the consciousness of subjective perfection; as Descartes should have explicated his consciousness of subjective perfection into the consciousness of full, spontaneous, and unimpeded activity.

2 Limits  
pleasure to  
the cog-  
nition of  
perfection  
by the In-  
tuitive Fa-  
culties

This part  
of Wolf's  
doctrine  
assailed by  
Mendels-  
sohn

But there is another defect in the Wolfian definition:—it limits the pleasure from the cognition of perfection to the Intuitive Faculties, that is, to Sense and Imagination, denying it to the Understanding,—the faculty of Relations,—Thought Proper. This part of his theory was, accordingly, assailed by Moses Mendelssohn,—one of the best writers and most ingenious philosophers of the last century,—who, in other respects, however, remained faithful to the objective point of view, from whence Wolf had contemplated the phænomenon of pleasure. This was done in his *Briefe über die Empfindungen*, 1755.<sup>a</sup> A reaction was, however, inevitable; and other German philosophers were soon found who returned to the subjective point of view, from which Wolf, Baumgarten, and Mendelssohn had departed.

Du Bos and  
Ponilly,—  
considered  
pleasure in  
its subjec-  
tive aspect

But before passing to these, it would be improper to overlook the doctrine of two French philosophers, who had already explained pleasure in its subjective aspect, and who prepared the way for the profounder

<sup>a</sup> See Anmerkung, 6, and Reinhold, *Über die bisherigen Begriffe vom Vergnügen*, § 2, — *Vermischte Schriften*, 1. p. 281 et seq — Ed

theories of the German speculators,—I mean Du Bos and Pouilly. As their doctrines nearly coincide, I shall consider them as one. The former treats of this subject in his *Réflexions Critiques sur la Peinture*,<sup>a</sup> &c.; the latter in his *Théorie des Sentimens Agréables*.<sup>β</sup> The following are the principal momenta of their inquiries —

“1. Considering pleasure only in relation to the subject, the question they propose to answer is, What takes place in the state which we call pleasurable? Their theory stated

“2. The gratification of a want causes pleasure. If the want be natural, the result is a natural pleasure, and an unnatural pleasure, if the want be unnatural.

“3. The fundamental want,—the want to which all others may be reduced,—is the occupation of the mind. All that we know of the mind is that it is a thinking, a knowing power. We desire objects only for the sake of intellectual occupation.

“4 The activity of mind is either occupied or occupies itself. The matters which afford the objects of our faculties of knowledge are either sensible impressions, which are delivered over to the understanding—this is the case in perception of sense; or this matter is furnished by the cognitive faculty itself—as is the case in thinking.

<sup>a</sup> See tom 1 partie 1 §§ 1, 2. First published in 1719, Paris — Ed

<sup>β</sup> See chaps 1 in iv v. First published in 1743. To these should be added the valuable treatise of the Pere André,—the *Essai sur le Beau*, which was first published in 1741. There is also, previously to Sulzer, another French æsthetical writer of merit,—Batteux, whose treatise, *Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même Principe*, first appeared in 1746. This work, along with two relative treatises,

was republished in 1774, under the title of *Principes de la Littérature*.

All these authors consider pleasure, more or less, from the subjective point of view, and are, in principle, Aristotelic. For a collection of treatises, in whole and part, on pleasure in its psychological and moral aspects, see *Le Temple du Bonheur, ou Recueil des plus Excellens Traités sur le Bonheur*, in 4 vols. New edition, 1770 — Ed.

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" 5. If this activity meets with impediments in its prosecution,—be this in the functions either of thought or sense,—there results a feeling of restraint ; and this of two kinds, positive and negative.

" 6. When the activity, whether in perception or thinking, is prevented from being brought to its conclusion, there emerges the feeling of straining,—of effort,—the feeling of positive limitation of our powers. This is painful.

" 7. If the mind be occupied less than usual in all its functions, there arises a feeling of unsatisfied want ; this constitutes that state of negative restraint,—the state of ennui, of tedium. This is painful.

" 8. The stronger and at the same time the easier the activity of mind in any of its functions, the more agreeable." <sup>a</sup>

This theory is evidently only that of Aristotle ; to whom, however, the French philosophers make no allusion. What they call *occupation* or *exercise*, he calls *energy*. The former expressions are, perhaps, preferable on this account, that they apply equally well to the mental processes, whether active or passive, whereas the terms *energy*, *act*, *activity*, *operation*, &c , only properly denote these processes as they are considered in the former character.

Subsequently to the French philosophers, and as a reaction against the partial views of the school of Wolf, there appeared the theory of Sulzer, the Academician of Berlin,—a theory which was first promulgated in his *Enquiry into the Origin of our Agreeable and Disagreeable Feelings*,<sup>b</sup> in 1752. This is

<sup>a</sup> Abridged from Reinhold, *Über die bisherigen Begriffe vom Vergnügen*, § 1. *Vermischte Schriften*, p 275 —Ed.

<sup>b</sup> *Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen* Published in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of

one of the ablest discussions upon the question, and though partial, like the others, it concurs in establishing the truth of that doctrine of which Aristotle has left, in a short compass, the most complete and satisfactory exposition. The following are the leading principles of Sulzer's theory :—

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“ 1. We must penetrate to the essence of the soul, His theory, stated if we would discover the primary source of pleasure.

“ 2. The essence of the soul consists in its natural activity, and this activity again consists in the production of ideas.” [By that he means the faculty in general of Cognition or Thought I may here observe, by the way, that he adopts the opinion that the faculty of thought or cognition is the one fundamental power of mind ; and in this he coincides with Wolf, whose theory of pleasure, however, he rejects.]

“ 3. In this essential tendency to activity are grounded all our pleasurable and painful feelings.

“ 4. If this natural activity of the soul, or this ceaseless tendency to think, encounters an impediment, pain is the result ; whereas if it be excited to a lively activity, the result is pleasure.

“ 5. There are two conditions which regulate the degree of capacity and incapacity in the soul for pleasurable and painful feelings, the habitude of reflection, and the natural vivacity of thought ; and both together constitute the perfect activity of mind.

“ 6. Pleasurable feelings consequently, can only be excited by objects which at once comprise a variety of constituent qualities or characters and in which these characters are so connected that the mind recognises in them materials for its essential activity. An object

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which presents to the mental activity no exercise, remains altogether indifferent.

“7. No object which moves the mind in a pleasurable or in a painful manner is simple,“ it is necessarily composite or multiplex. The difference between agreeable and disagreeable objects can only lie in the connection of the parts of this multiplicity. Is there order in this connection, the object is agreeable; is there disorder, it is painful.

“8 Beauty is the manifold, the various, recalled to unity. The mere multitude of parts does not constitute an object beautiful; for there is required that an object should have at once such multiplicity and connection as to form a whole.

“9. This is the case in intellectual beauty; that is, in the beauty of those objects which the understanding contemplates in distinct notions. The beauty of geometrical theorems, of algebraic formulæ, of scientific principles, of comprehensive systems, consists no less than the beauty of objects of Imagination and Sense, in the unity of the manifold, and rises in proportion to the quantity of the multiplicity and the unity.

“10. All these objects present a multitude of constituent characters,—of elementary ideas, at once; and these are so connected, so bound together by a principle of unity, that the mind is, in consequence thereof, enabled to unfold and then to bring back the different parts to a common centre, that is, reduce them to unity,—to totality,—to system.

“11. From this it is evident, that the Beautiful only causes pleasure through the principle of activity. Unity, multiplicity, correspondence of parts, render

an object agreeable to us, only inasmuch as they stand in a favourable relation to the active power of the mind.

“12. The relation in which beauty stands to the mind is thus necessary, and, consequently, immutable. A single condition is alone required in order that what is in itself beautiful should operate on us; it is necessary that we should know it; and to know it, it is necessary that, to a certain extent, we be conversant with the kind to which it belongs; for otherwise we should not be competent to apprehend the beauty of an object. (!)

“13. A difference of tastes is found only among the ignorant or the half-learned; and taste is a necessary consequence of knowledge.”<sup>a</sup>

I shall not pursue this theory in the explanation it attempts of the pleasures of the Senses and of the Moral Powers, in which it is far less successful than in those of the Intellect. This was to be expected in consequence of the one-sided view Sulzer had taken of the mental phænomena, in assuming the Cognitive Faculty as the elementary power out of which the Feelings and Conations are evolved.<sup>β</sup>

The theory of Sulzer is manifestly only a one-sided modification of the Aristotelic, but it does not appear that he was himself aware how completely he had been anticipated by the Stagirite. “On the contrary, he once and again denominates his explanation of the pleasurable a discovery. This can, however, hardly be allowed him, even were the Aristotelic theory out of the question; for it required no mighty ingenuity

The theory  
of Sulzer  
criticised

<sup>a</sup> See Reinhold [*Über die bisherigen Begriffe vom Vergnügen*, § 3 *Verm. Schriften*, p 296 *et seq* —Ed]

<sup>β</sup> For Sulzer's doctrines on these points, see Reinhold, as above, p 301 *et seq* —Ed



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for a philosopher who was well acquainted with the works of his immediate predecessors, in France and Germany, by whom pleasure had been explained as the vigorous and easy exercise of the faculties,—as the feeling of perfection in ourselves, and as the apprehension of perfection in other things, that is, their unity in variety:—I say, after these opinions of his precursors, it required no such uncommon effort of invention to hit upon the thought,—that pleasure is determined when the variety in the object calls forth the activity of the subject, and when this activity is rendered easy by the unity in which the variety is contained. His explanation is more explicit, but except a change of expression, it is not easy to see what Sulzer added to Du Bos and Pouilly, to say nothing of Wolf and Mendelssohn. . . . .

Summary  
of the  
theory

“The theory of Sulzer is summed up in the following result:—Every variety of pleasure may, subjectively considered, be carried up into the prompt and vigorous activity of the cognitive faculty, and, objectively considered, be explained as the product of objects which, in consequence of their variety in unity, intensely occupy the mind without fatiguing it. The

Its merit

peculiar merit of the theory of Sulzer, in contrast to those of his immediate predecessors, is that it combines both the subjective and objective points of view.

Its defect

In this respect, it is favourably contrasted with the opinion of Wolf and Mendelssohn. But it takes a one-sided view of the character of the subject. In the first place, the essence of the mind in general, and the essence of the cognitive faculty in particular, does not consist of activity exclusively, but of activity and receptivity in correlation. But receptivity is a passive power, not an active, and thus the theory in its

fundamental position is only half true. This one-sided view by Sulzer, in which regard is had to the active or intellectual element of our constitution to the exclusion of the passive or sensual, is precisely the opposite to that other, and equally one-sided, view which was taken by Helvetius<sup>a</sup> and the modern Epicureans and Materialists; but their theory of the pleasurable may be passed over as altogether without philosophical importance. In the second place, it is erroneous to assert that pleasure is nothing else than the consciousness of the unimpeded activity of mind. The activity of mind is manifested principally in thinking, whereas the state of pleasure consists wholly of a consciousness of feeling. In the enjoyment of pleasure we do not think, but feel; and in an intenser enjoyment there is almost a suspension of thought.”<sup>β</sup>

It is not necessary to say much of the speculations upon pleasure subsequent to Sulzer, and prior to Kant. In Italy I find that two philosophers of the last century had adopted the Platonic opinion,—of pleasure being always an escape from pain,—Genovesi and Verri; the former in a chapter of his *Metaphysics*,<sup>γ</sup> the latter in a chapter of his *Dissertation on the Nature of Pleasure and Pain*.<sup>δ</sup> This opinion, however, reacquires importance from having been adopted from Verri by the philosopher of Konisberg. In his *Manual of Anthropology*, Kant briefly and generally states his doctrine on this point; but in

Genovesi  
and Verri  
adopted the  
Platonic  
theory

Kant  
adopted the  
Platonic  
theory

<sup>a</sup> *De l'Esprit*, disc 1 ch 1. Cf *De l'Homme*, sect 11 ch. x.—Ed

<sup>β</sup> See Reinhold, as above, pp 308, 315, 317 —Ed

<sup>γ</sup> Cap vi t. 11 p 213, edit 1753 —Ed.

<sup>δ</sup> *Discorso sull' Indole del Piacere, e del Dolor*, §§ 111 114 *Opere Filosofiche*, 1 p 20 et seq, edit 1784 This treatise is translated into German by Meiners,—*Gedanken über die Natur des Vergnügens*. Leipzig, 1777 —Ed

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the notes which have been recently printed of his Lectures on this subject, we have a more detailed view of the character and grounds of his opinion. The Kantian doctrine is as follows:—

“Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance, (*Beförderung*), pain of the hindrance of life. Under pleasure is not to be understood the feeling of life; for in pain we feel life no less than in pleasure, nay, even perhaps more strongly. In a state of pain, life appears long, in a state of pleasure it seems brief; it is only, therefore, the feeling of the promotion,—the furtherance, of life, which constitutes pleasure. On the other hand, it is not the mere hindrance of life which constitutes pain; the hindrance must not only exist, it must be felt to exist.” (Before proceeding further, I may observe, that these definitions of pleasure and pain are virtually identical with those of Aristotle, only far less clear and explicit.)

But to proceed—“If pleasure be a feeling of the promotion of life, this presupposes a hindrance of life: for there can be no promotion, if there be no foregoing hindrance to overcome. Since, therefore, the hindrance of life is pain, pleasure must presuppose pain . . . .

“If we intend our vital powers above their ordinary degree, in order to go out of the state of indifference or equality, we induce an opposite state; and when we intend the vital powers above the suitable degree we occasion a hindrance, a pain. The vital force has a degree along with which a state exists, which is one neither of pleasure nor of pain, but of content, of comfort. (*das Wohlbefinden*). When this state is reduced to a lower pitch by any hindrance, then, a promotion,—a furtherance, of life is useful in order to over-

His doc-  
trine  
stated.

come this impediment. Pleasure is thus always a consequent of pain. When we cast our eyes on the progress of things, we discover in ourselves a ceaseless tendency to escape from our present state. To this we are compelled by a physical stimulus, which sets animals, and man, as an animal, into activity. But in the intellectual nature of man, there is also a stimulus, which operates to the same end. In thought, man is always dissatisfied with the actual, he is ever looking forward from the present to the future, he is incessantly in a state of transition from one state to another, and is unable to continue in the same. But what is it that thus constrains us to be always passing from one state to another, but pain? And that it is not a pleasure which entices us to this, but a kind of discontent with present suffering, is shown by the fact that we are always seeking for some object of pleasure, without knowing what that object is, merely as an aid against the disquiet,—against the complement of petty pains, which in a moment irritate and annoy us. It is thus apparent that man is urged on by a necessity of his nature to go out of the present as a state of pain, in order to find in the future one less irksome. Man thus finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature. Our lot is so cast that there is nothing enduring for us, but pain; some indeed have less, others more, but all, at all times, have their share; and our enjoyments at best are only slight alleviations of pain. Pleasure is nothing positive, it is only a liberation of pain, and, therefore, only something negative. Hence it follows, that we never begin with pleasure but always with pain; for while pleasure is only an emancipation from pain, it cannot precede that

is only a negation. Moreover, pleasure cannot endure in an unbroken continuity, but must be associated with pain, in order to be always suddenly breaking through this pain,—in order to realise itself. Pain, on the contrary, may subsist without interruption in one pain, and be only removed through a gradual remission; in this case, we have no consciousness of pleasure. It is the sudden,—the instantaneous, removal of the pain, which determines all that we can call a veritable pleasure. We find ourselves constantly immersed, as it were, in an ocean of nameless pains, which we style disquietudes or desires, and the greater the vigour of life an individual is endowed with, the more keenly is he sensible to the pain. Without being in a state of determinate corporeal suffering, the mind is harassed by a multitude of obscure uneasinesses, and it acts, without being compelled to act, for the mere sake of changing its condition. Thus men run from solitude to society, and from society to solitude, without having much preference for either, in order merely, by the change of impressions, to obtain a suspension of their pain. It is from this cause that so many have become tired of their existence, and the greater number of such melancholic subjects have been urged to the act of suicide in consequence of the continual goading of pain,—of pain from which they found no other means of escape.<sup>a</sup>

“It is certainly the intention of Providence that, by the alternation of pain, we should be urged on to activity. No one can find pleasure in the continual enjoyment of delights; these soon pall upon us,—pall upon us in fact the sooner, the more intense was their enjoyment. There is no permanent pleasure to be

<sup>a</sup> Cf *Anthropologie*, § 60 —ED

reaped except in labour alone. The pleasure of toil consists in a reaction against the pain to which we should be a victim, did we not exert a force to resist it. Labour is irksome, labour has its annoyances, but these are fewer than those we should experience were we without labour. As man, therefore, must seek even his recreation in toil itself, his life is at best one of vexation and sorrow; and as all his means of dissipation afford no alleviation, he is left always in a state of disquietude, which incessantly urges him to escape from the state in which he actually is." [This is the doom of man,—to be born to sorrow as the sparks fly upwards, and to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow.]

"Men think that it is ungrateful to the Creator to say, that it is the design of Providence to keep us in a state of constant pain; but this is a wise provision in order to urge human nature on to exertion. Were our joys permanent, we should never leave the state in which we are, we should never undertake aught new. That life we may call happy, which is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome; we have in fact no other conception of human happiness. Contentment is when a man thinks of continuing in the state in which he is, and renounces all means of pleasure; but this disposition we find in no man."<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Menschenkunde*, p. 248 *et seq.*, part II p. 144 —ED [For further published by Starke, 1831. This is historical notices of theories of the not included in Kant's collected Pleasurable, see Lossius, *Lezionen*, v works by Rosenkranz and Schubert *Vergnügen*.] Cf *Anthropologie*, § 59. *Werke*, VII.

## LECTURE XLIV.

THE FEELINGS—APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF  
PLEASURE AND PAIN TO THE PHÆNOMENALECT.  
XLIVFeelings,—  
their prin-  
ciple of  
classifica-  
tion inter-  
nal.Admit of a  
twofold  
classifica-  
tion,—as  
Causes and  
as Effects

THE Feelings being mere subjective states, involving no cognition or thought, and, consequently, no reference to any object, it follows, that they cannot be classified by relation to aught beyond themselves. The differences in which we must found all divisions of the Feelings into genera and species, must be wholly internal, and must be sought for and found exclusively in the states of Feeling themselves. Now, in considering these states, it appears to me, that they admit of a classification in two different points of view;—we may consider these states either as Causes or as Effects. As causes, they are viewed in relation to their product,—their product either of pleasure or of pain. As effects, they are viewed as themselves products,—products of the action of our different constitutive functions. In the former of these points of view, our states of Feeling will be divided simply into the three classes—1°, The Pleasurable; 2°, The Painful; and, 3°, The partly Pleasurable partly Painful,—without considering what kind of pleasure and what kind of pain it is which they involve; and here, it only behoves us to inquire,—what are the general conditions which determine in a feeling one or other of these

counter qualities. In the latter of these points of view, our states of Feeling will be divided according as the energy, of which they are concomitant, be that of a power of one kind or of another,—a distinction, which affords a division of our pleasures and pains, taken together into various sorts. I shall take these points of view in their order.

In the former point of view, these feelings are distributed simply into the Pleasurable and the Painful ; and it remains, on the theory I have proposed, to explain, in general, the causes of these opposite affections, without descending to their special kinds. Now, it has been stated, that a feeling of pleasure is experienced, when any power is consciously exerted in a suitable manner ; that is, when we are neither, on the one hand, conscious of any restraint upon the energy which it is disposed spontaneously to put forth, nor, on the other, conscious of any effort in it, to put forth an amount of energy greater, either in degree or in continuance, than what it is disposed freely to exert. In other words, we feel positive pleasure, in proportion as our powers are exercised, but not over-exercised ; we feel positive pain, in proportion as they are compelled either not to operate, or to operate too much. All pleasure, thus, arises from the free play of our faculties and capacities ; all pain from their compulsory repression or compulsory activity.

The doctrine meets with no contradiction from the facts of actual life ; for the contradictions which, at first sight, these seem to offer, prove, when examined, to be real confirmations. Thus it might be thought, that the aversion from exercise,—the love of idleness,—in a word, the *dolce far niente*,—is a proof that the inactivity, rather than the exertion, of our powers, is

The Feelings as Causes,—divided into Pleasurable and Painful.

Application of foregoing theory to explain in general the causes of Pleasurable and Painful feeling

Apparent contradictions of the doctrine prove real confirmations

The *dolce far niente*



LECT  
XLIV

the condition of our pleasurable feelings. This objection, from a natural proneness to inaction in man, is superficial; and the very examples on which it proceeds, refute it, and in refuting it, concur in establishing our theory of pleasure and pain. Now, is the *far niente*,—is that doing nothing, in which so many find so sincere a gratification, in reality a negation of activity, and not in truth itself an activity intense and varied? To do nothing in this sense, is simply to do nothing irksome,—nothing difficult,—nothing fatiguing;—especially to do no outward work. But is the mind internally, the while, unoccupied and inert? This, on the contrary, may be vividly alive,—may be intently engaged in the spontaneous play of imagination; and so far, therefore, in this case, from pleasure being the concomitant of inactivity, the activity is, on the contrary, at once vigorous and unimpeded; and such, accordingly, as, on our theory, would be accompanied by a high degree of pleasure.<sup>a</sup>

Ennui is the state in which we find nothing on which to exercise our powers; but ennui is a state of pain. We must recollect, that all energy, all occupation, is either play or labour. In the former, the energy appears as free or spontaneous; in the latter, as either compulsorily put forth, or its exertion so impeded by difficulties, that it is only continued by a forced and painful effort, in order to accomplish certain ulterior ends. Under certain circumstances, indeed, play may become a labour, and labour may become a play. A play is, in fact, a labour, until we have acquired the dexterity requisite to allow the faculties exerted to operate with ease; and, on the other hand, a labour is said to become a play, when a person has by nature,

This not a  
negation of  
activity,  
but the  
opposite

Ennui—  
what

All occupa-  
tion either  
play or  
labour

<sup>a</sup> [See Krug, *Geschmackslehre oder Aesthetik*, p. 89, note.]

or has acquired by custom, such a facility in the relative operations, as to energise at once vigorously and freely.<sup>a</sup> In point of fact, as man by his nature is determined to pursue happiness, (happiness is only another name for a complement of pleasures), he is determined to that spontaneous activity of his faculties, in which pleasure consists. The love of action is, indeed, signalised, as a fact in human nature, by all who have made man an object of observation, though few of them have been able to explain its true rationale.

The love of action signalised as a fact in human nature by all observers

“The necessity of action,” says Samuel Johnson,<sup>β</sup> “is not only demonstrable from the fabric of the body, but evident from observation of the universal practice of mankind, who, for the preservation of health,” (he should have said for pleasure), “in those whose rank or wealth exempts them from the necessity of lucrative labour, have invented sports and diversions, which, though not of equal use to the world with manual trades, are yet of equal fatigue to those who practise them.”

Samuel Johnson

It is finely observed by another eloquent philosopher,<sup>γ</sup> in accounting, on natural principles, for man’s love of war:—“Every animal is made to delight in the exercise of his natural talents and forces: the lion and the tiger sport with the paw; the horse delights to commit his mane to the wind, and forgets his pasture to try his speed in the field; the bull, even before his brow is armed, and the lamb, while yet an emblem of innocence, have a disposition to strike with the forehead, and anticipate in play the conflicts they are doomed to sustain. Man, too, is disposed to opposition, and to employ the forces of his nature

Adam Ferguson

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Krug, *Geschmackslehre oder Aesthetik*, § 21, pp 89, 90.—ED.  
<sup>β</sup> *Rambler*, No 85.—ED.

<sup>γ</sup> Adam Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, part 1 section iv —ED.

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against an equal antagonist; he loves to bring his reason, his eloquence, his courage, even his bodily strength, to the proof. His sports are frequently an image of war; sweat and blood are freely expended in play; and fractures or death are often made to terminate the pastime of idleness and festivity. He was not made to live for ever, and even his love of amusement has opened a way to the grave."

Paley

"The young of all animals," says Paley,<sup>a</sup> "appear to me to receive pleasure simply from the exercise of their limbs and bodily faculties, without reference to any end to be attained, or any use to be answered by the exertion. A child, without knowing anything of the use of language, is in a high degree delighted with being able to speak. Its incessant repetition of a few articulate sounds, or, perhaps, of the single word which it has learnt to pronounce, proves this point clearly. Nor is it less pleased with its first successful endeavours to walk, or rather to run, (which precedes walking), although entirely ignorant of the importance of the attainment to its future life, and even without applying it to any present purpose. A child is delighted with speaking, without having anything to say, and with walking, without knowing where to go. And, prior to both these, I am disposed to believe, that the waking hours of infancy are agreeably taken up with the exercise of vision, or perhaps, more properly speaking, with learning to see.

"But it is not for youth alone that the great Parent of creation hath provided. Happiness is found with the purring cat, no less than with the playful kitten; in the arm-chair of dozing age, as well as in either the sprightliness of the dance, or the animation of the

<sup>a</sup> *Natural Theology Works*, vol. IV chap. XLVI. p. 359.

chase. To novelty, to acuteness of sensation, to hope, to ardour of pursuit, succeeds, what is, in no inconsiderable degree, an equivalent for them all, 'perception of ease.' Herein is the exact difference between the young and the old. The young are not happy, but when enjoying pleasure; the old are happy, when free from pain. And this constitution suits with the degrees of animal power which they respectively possess. The vigour of youth was to be stimulated to action by impatience of rest; whilst to the imbecility of age, quietness and repose become positive gratifications. In one important respect, the advantage is with the old. A state of ease is, generally speaking, more attainable than a state of pleasure. A constitution, therefore, which can enjoy ease, is preferable to that which can taste only pleasure. This same perception of ease oftentimes renders old age a condition of great comfort, especially when riding at its anchor after a busy or tempestuous life"

A strong confirmation of the doctrine, that all pleasure is a reflex of activity, and that the free energy of every power is pleasurable, is derived from the phænomena presented by those affections which we emphatically denominate the Painful. This fact is too striking, from its apparent inconsistency, not to have soon attracted attention.—

The theory confirmed by the phænomena presented by the Painful Affections

"Non tantum sanctis instructæ legibus urbes,  
Tectaque divitis luxuriosa suis  
Mortalem alliciunt pulchra ad spectacula visum,  
Sed placet annoso squalida terra situ  
Oblectat pavor ipse animum, sunt gaudia curis,  
Et stupuisse juvat, quem doluisse piget" <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Virgilius Cæsarinus [*Pœmata in Septem Illustrum Virorum Pœmata* in *Septem Illustrum Virorum Pœmata* Amstelodami, apud Dan Opt Max Cubiculo Præfecti Printed Elzevirium, 1672, p 465 —Ed ]

LECT  
XLIVGrief accompanied  
with pleasureNoticed by  
Pliny

Ovid.

Take, for example, in the first place, the affection of Grief,—the sorrow we feel in the loss of a beloved object. Is this affection unaccompanied with pleasure? So far is this from being the case, that the pleasure so greatly predominates over the pain as to produce a mixed emotion, which is far more pleasurable than any other of which the wounded heart is susceptible. It is expressly stated by the younger Pliny, in a passage which commences with these words —“*Est quædam etiam dolendi voluptas,*” &c.” This has also been frequently signalised by the poets.—

Thus Ovid <sup>β</sup> —

“*Fleque meos casus est quædam flere voluptas,  
Expletur lacrymis egeriturque dolor*”

Lucan

Thus Lucan <sup>γ</sup>; of Cornelia after the murder of Pompey —

“*Caput ferali obduxit amictu,  
Decrevitque pati tenebras, puppisque cavernis  
Delituit sævumque arcte complexa dolorem,  
Perfruitur lachrymis, et amat pro conjuge luctum.*”

Statius

Thus Statius <sup>δ</sup>.—

“*Nemo vetat, satiare malis; ægrumque dolorem  
Libertate doma, jam flendi expleta voluptas*”

Seneca.

Thus Seneca, the tragedian <sup>ε</sup>.—

“*Mœror lacrymas amat assuetas,  
Flendi miseris dira cupido est*”

Petrarch

Thus Petrarch <sup>ζ</sup>.—

“*Non omnia terræ  
Obruta, vivit amor, vivit dolor; ora negatur  
Regia conspicerè, at flere et meminisse relictum est*”

<sup>α</sup> Lib viii. ep 16 “*Est quædam etiam dolendi voluptas, præsertim si in amici sinu defleas, apud quem lacrymis tuis vel laus sit parata, vel vena.*”—Ed

<sup>β</sup> *Tristia*, iv iii 37 —Ed

<sup>γ</sup> *Pharsalia*, iv 108 —Ed

<sup>δ</sup> *Sylvæ*, ii l. 14 —Ed.

<sup>ε</sup> *Thyestes*, l. 952 —Ed

<sup>ζ</sup> *Epist* lib 1, *Barbato Sulmonensi* —Ed.

Thus Shenstone <sup>a</sup> :—

“Heu quanto minus est cum reliquis versari, quam tuu meminisse”

Finally, Lord Pembroke <sup>β</sup> :—

“I would not give my dead son for the best living son in Christendom.”

LECT  
XLIV

Shenstone  
Lord Pem-  
broke

In like manner, Fear is not simply painful. It is a natural disposition ; has a tendency to act ; and there is, consequently, along with its essential pain, a certain pleasure, as the reflex of its energy. This is finely expressed by Akenside <sup>γ</sup> .—

Fear, not  
simply  
painful.

Akenside  
quoted

“Hence, finally, by night  
The village matron round the blazing hearth  
Suspends the infant audience with her tales,  
Breathing astonishment<sup>1</sup> of witching rhymes,  
And evil spirits, of the deathbed call  
Of him who robb'd the widow, and devour'd  
The orphan's portion ; of unquiet souls  
Ris'n from the grave to ease the heavy guilt  
Of deeds in life conceal'd ; of shapes that walk  
At dead of night and clank their chains, and wave  
The torch of Hell around the murd'rer's bed.  
At every solemn pause, the crowd recoil,  
Gazing each other speechless, and congeal'd  
With shiv'ring sighs till, eager for th' event,  
Around the beldame all erect they hang,  
Each trembling heart with grateful terrors quell'd.”

In like manner, Pity, which, being a sympathetic Pity passion, implies a participation in sorrow, is yet confessedly agreeable. The poet even accords to the energy of this benevolent affection a preference over the enjoyments of an exclusive selfishness .—

“The broadest mirth unfeeling folly wears,  
Is not so sweet as virtue's very tears” <sup>δ</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Inscription on an urn See the story of the Duke of Ormond, but Dodsley's *Description of the Leasowes*, as in the text —ED  
in Shenstone's *Works*, (1777), vol II <sup>γ</sup> *Pleasures of Imagination*, b 1  
p 307 —ED 255 —ED

<sup>β</sup> The anecdote is told in a somewhat different form of the Duke of Ormond See Carte's *Life*, b viii Anno 1680. Hume, chap lxxix, tells <sup>δ</sup> Pope, *Essay on Man*, iv 319 The correct reading of the second line is,—  
“Less pleasing far than virtue's very tears —ED.

LECT  
XLIV.Energetic  
emotions  
painful in  
themselves  
still plea-  
surableIllustrated  
in the case  
of St Au-  
gustinAlso in the  
case of his  
friend Aly-  
piusGeneral  
Causes  
which con-  
tribute to  
raise or

On the same principle is to be explained the enjoyment which men have in spectacles of suffering,—in the combats of animals and men, in executions, in tragedies, &c.,—a disposition which not unfrequently becomes an irresistible habit, not only for individuals, but for nations. The excitation of energetic emotions painful in themselves is, however, also pleasurable. St Austin affords curious examples of this in his own case, and in that of his friend Alypius. Speaking of himself in his *Confessions*,<sup>a</sup> he says:—"Theatrical spectacles were to me irresistible, replete as they were with the images of my own miseries, and the fuel of my own fire. What is the cause why a man chooses to grieve at scenes of tragic suffering, which he would have the utmost aversion himself to endure? And yet the spectator wishes to derive grief from these; in fact, the grief itself constitutes his pleasure. For he is attracted to the theatre, not to succour, but only to condole."

In another part of the same work,<sup>b</sup> he gives the following account of his friend Alypius, who had been carried by his fellow-students, much against his inclination, to the amphitheatre, where there was to be a combat of gladiators. At first, unable to regard the atrocious spectacle, he closed his eyes, but to give you the result of the story in the words of St Austin, "Abstulit inde secum insaniam qua stimularetur redire, non tantum cum illis a quibus prius abstractus est, sed etiam præ illis, et alios trahens."

I now proceed to consider the General Causes which contribute to raise or to lower the intensity of our energies, and, consequently, to determine the correspond-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iii. cap. 2.—Ed<sup>b</sup> *Confessions*, lib. vi. cap. 8.—Ed[See Purchot, *Physica*, pars iii. § iii.c v. *Institut Phil*, iii. p. 416.]

ing degree of pleasure or pain. These may be reduced to Four; for an object rouses the activity of our powers, 1°, In proportion as it is New or Unexpected; 2°, In proportion as it stands in a relation of Contrast; 3°, In proportion as it stands in a relation of Harmony; and, 4°, In proportion as it is Associated with more, or more interesting objects.

LECT.  
XLIVlower the  
intensity of  
our ener-  
gies

I. The principle on which Novelty determines a higher energy, and, consequently, a higher feeling of pleasure, is twofold; and of these the one may be called the Subjective, the other the Objective.

I Novelty

In a subjective relation,—the new is pleasurable, inasmuch as this supposes that the mind is determined to a mode of action, either from inactivity, or from another state of energy. In the former case, energy, (the condition of pleasure), is caused: in the latter, a change of energy is afforded, which is also pleasurable; for powers energise less vigorously in proportion to the continuance of the same exertion, consequently, a new activity being determined, this replaces a strained or expiring exercise, that is, it replaces a painful, indifferent, or unpleasurable feeling, by one of comparatively vivid enjoyment. Hence all that the poets, from Homer downward, have said of the satiety consequent on our enjoyments, and of the charms of variety and change; but if I began to give quotations on these heads there would be no end. In an objective relation,—a novel object is pleasing, because it affords a gratification to our desire of knowledge; for to learn, as Aristotle has observed,<sup>a</sup> is to man naturally pleasing. But the old is already known,—it has been learned,—has been referred to its place, and, therefore, no longer occupies the cognitive faculties;

Twofold,—  
subjective  
and objec-  
tive



LECT  
XLIV

whereas, the new, as new, is still unknown, and rouses to energy the powers by which it is to be brought within the system of our knowledge

II. Con-  
trast

II. The second general principle is Contrast. Contrast operates in two ways; for it has the effect both of enhancing the real or absolute intensity of a feeling, and of enhancing the apparent or relative. As an instance of the former, the unkindness of a person from whom we expect kindness, rouses to a far higher pitch the emotions consequent on injury. As an instance of the latter, the pleasure of eating appears proportionally great, when it is immediately connected and contrasted with the removal of the pangs of hunger. It is on this principle, that the recollection of our past suffering is agreeable,—“*hæc olim meminisse juvabit.*”<sup>a</sup> To the same purport Seneca,<sup>β</sup> the tragedian.—

Subordi-  
nate appli-  
cations of  
this prin-  
ciple

1 Recollec-  
tion of past  
suffering

“*Quæ fuit durum pati  
Meminisse dulce est*”

Cowley

And Cowley γ:—

“Things which offend, when present, and affright,  
In memory, well painted, move delight.”

Whereas the remembrance of a former happiness only augments the feeling of a present misery.

Southern

“Could I forget  
What I have been, I might the better bear  
What I am destin’d to I’m not the first  
That have been wretched . but to think how much  
I have been happier” δ

It is, likewise, on this principle, that whatever recalls

<sup>a</sup> Virgil, *Æneid*, 1 203 —Ed

tion —Ed

<sup>β</sup> *Hercules Furens*, act III 656 —  
Ed

<sup>δ</sup> Southern, *Innocent Adultery*, act  
II.

<sup>γ</sup> *Ode upon his Majesty's Restora-*

us to a vivid consciousness of our own felicity, by contrasting it with the wretchedness of others, is, though not unaccompanied with sympathetic pain, still predominantly pleasurable. Hence, in part, but in part only, the enjoyment we feel from all representations of ideal suffering. Hence, also in part, even the pleasure we have in witnessing real suffering :—

LECT  
XLIV

2 Con-  
sciousness  
of our own  
felicity as  
contrasted  
with  
wretched-  
ness of  
others

" Suave, mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis,  
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem :  
Non quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas,  
Sed quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est  
Suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri  
Per campos instructa, tua sine parte perich " <sup>a</sup>

Lucretius  
quoted.

But on this, and other subjects, I can only touch.

III Har-  
mony and  
Discord.

III. The third general principle on which our powers are roused to a perfect and pleasurable, or to an imperfect and painful energy, is the relation of Harmony, or Discord, in which one coexistent activity stands to another.

It is sufficient merely to indicate this principle, for its influence is manifest. At different times, we exist in different complex states of feeling, and these states are made up of a number of constituent thoughts and affections. At one time,—say during a sacred solemnity,—we are in a very different frame of mind from what we are at another,—say during the representation of a comedy. Now, then, in such a state of mind, if anything occurs to awaken to activity a power previously unoccupied, or to occupy a power previously in energy in a different manner, this new mode of activity is either of the same general character and tendency with the other constituent elements of the complex state, or it is not. In the former case, the new energy

Illustrated

LECT.  
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chimes in with the old ; each operates without impediment from the other, and the general harmony of feeling is not violated : in the latter case, the new energy jars with the old, and each severally counteracts and impedes the other. Thus, in the sacred solemnity, and when our minds are brought to a state of serious contemplation, everything that operates in unison with that state,—say a pious discourse, or a strain of solemn music,—will have a greater effect, because all the powers which are thus determined to exertion, go to constitute one total complement of harmonious energy. But suppose that, instead of the pious discourse or the strain of solemn music, we are treated to a merry tune or a witty address ;—these, though at another season they might afford us considerable pleasure, would, under the circumstances, cause only pain ; because the energies they elicited, would be impeded by those others with which the mind was already engrossed, while those others would, in like manner, be impeded by them. But, as we have seen, pleasure is the concomitant of unimpeded energy.

IV. Association.

Its nature.

IV. The fourth and last general principle by which the activity of our powers is determined to pleasurable or painful activity, is Association. With the nature and influence of association you are familiar, and are aware that, a determinate object being present in consciousness with its proper thought, feeling, or desire, it is not present, isolated and alone, but may draw after it the representation of other objects, with their respective feelings and desires.

And influence

Now it is evident, in the first place, that one object, considered simply and in itself, will be more pleasing than another, in proportion as it, of its proper nature, determines the exertion of a greater amount of free

energy. But, in the second place, the amount of free energy which an object may itself elicit, is small, when compared to the amount that may be elicited by its train of associated representations. Thus, it is evident, that the object which in itself would otherwise be pleasing, may, through the accident of association, be the occasion of pain; and, on the contrary, that an object naturally indifferent or even painful may, by the same contingency, be productive of pleasure.

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This principle of Association accounts for a great many of the phænomena of our intellectual pleasures and pains; but it is far from accounting for everything. In fact, it supposes, as its condition, that there are pains and pleasures not founded on Association. Association is a principle of pleasure and pain, only as it is a principle of energy of one character or another; and the attempts that have been made to resolve all our mental pleasures and pains into Association, are guilty of a twofold vice. For, in the first place, they convert a partial into an exclusive law; and, in the second, they elevate a subordinate into a supreme principle. The influence of Association, by which Mr Alison<sup>a</sup> and Lord Jeffrey,<sup>β</sup> among others, have attempted to explain the whole phænomena of our intellectual pleasures, was more properly, I think, appreciated by Hutcheson,—a philosopher whose works are deserving of more attention than has latterly been paid to them. “We shall see hereafter,” he says, and Aristotle said the same thing, “that associations of ideas make objects pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such pleasures; and, in the same way, the casual

Association  
supposes as  
its condition  
pains  
and pleasures  
not  
founded  
on itself

The attempt to  
resolve all  
our pleasures  
and pains into  
Association,  
vicious in a  
twofold  
way

Hutcheson  
more properly  
appreciated  
the influence  
of Association.

<sup>a</sup> See his *Essays on Taste* 6th edit. Edinburgh, 1825 —Ed

<sup>β</sup> See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. *Beauty*, 7th edit, p 487 —Ed

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conjunction of ideas may give a disgust where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself. And this is the occasion of many fantastic aversions to figures of some animals, and to some other forms. Thus swine, serpents of all kinds, and some insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with aversion, by many people who have got some accidental ideas associated with them. And for distastes of this kind no other account can be given.”<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Inquiry into the Origin of our* i. sect vi., 4th edition, p 73 —  
*Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, treatise ED

## LECTURE XLV.

## THE FEELINGS.—THEIR CLASSES.

HAVING thus terminated the consideration of the Feelings considered as Causes,—causes of Pleasure and Pain,—I proceed to consider them as Effects,—as products of the action of our different powers. Now, it is evident, that, since all Feeling is the state in which we are conscious of some of the energies or processes of life, as these energies or processes differ, so will the correlative feelings. In a word, there will be as many different feelings as there are distinct modes of mental activity. In the Lecture in which I commenced the discussion of the Feelings, I stated to you various distributions of these states by different philosophers.<sup>a</sup> To these I do not think it necessary again to recur, and shall simply state to you the grounds of the division I shall adopt.

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ings,—con-  
sidered as  
EffectsAs many  
different  
feelings as  
there are  
distinct  
modes of  
mental ac-  
tivity

As the Feelings, then, are not primitive and independent states, but merely states which accompany the exertion of our faculties, or the excitation of our capacities, they must, as I have said, take their differences from the differences of the powers which they attend. Now, though all consciousness and all feeling be only mental, and, consequently, to say that any feeling is corporeal, would, in one point of view, be inaccurate, still it is manifest that there is a consider-

Two grand  
classes of  
Feelings .  
I Sensa-  
tions<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect xli, vol. ii p 429 —ED

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II. Sentiments.

Sensations

Two classes—

1. Of the Five Senses

2. Of the Sensus Vagus.

The first class considered.

able number of mental functions, cognitive as well as appetent, clearly marked out as in proximate relation to the body; and to these functions we give the name of *Sensitive*, *Sensible*, *Sensuous*, or *Sensual*. Now, the feelings which accompany the exertion of these Sensitive or Corporeal Powers, whether cognitive or appetent, will constitute a distinct class, and to these we may, with great propriety, give the name of *Sensations*; whereas, on the Feelings which accompany the energies of all our higher powers of mind, we may, with equal propriety, bestow the name of *Sentiments*. The first grand distribution of our feelings will, therefore, be into the Sensations,—that is, the Sensitive or External Feelings; and into the Sentiments,—that is, the Mental or Internal Feelings. Of these in their order.

I. Of the Sensations.—The Sensations may be divided into two classes. The first class will contain those which accompany our perceptions through the five determinate senses,—of Touch, Taste, Smell, Hearing, and Sight,—the *Sensus Fixus*. The second class will comprise those sensations which are included under what has been called the *Cænæsthesis* or *Sensus Communis*,—the *Common Sense*,—*Vital Sense*,—*Sensus Vagus*,—such as the feelings of Heat and Cold, of Shuddering, the feeling of Health, of Muscular Tension and Lassitude, of Hunger and Thirst, the Visceral Sensations, &c, &c.<sup>a</sup>

In regard to the determinate senses, each of these organs has its specific action, and its appropriate pleasure and pain; for there is a pleasure experienced in each of these, when an object is presented which determines it to suitable activity; and a pain or dis-

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. xxvii., vol. II. p. 157.—ED

satisfaction experienced, when the energy elicited is either inordinately vehement or too remiss. This pleasure and pain, which is that alone belonging to the action of the living organ, and which, therefore, may be styled *organic*, we must distinguish from that higher feeling, which, perhaps, results from the exercise of Imagination and Intellect upon the phænomena delivered by the senses. Thus, I would call *organic* the pleasure we feel in the perception of green or blue, and the pain we feel in the perception of a dazzling white; but I would be, perhaps, disposed to refer to some other power than the External Sense, the enjoyment we experience in the harmony of colours, and certainly that which we find in the proportions of figure. The same observation applies to Hearing. I would call *organic* the pleasure we have in single sounds; whereas the satisfaction we receive from the harmony, and, still more, from the melody of tones, seems to require a higher faculty. This, however, is a very obscure and difficult problem; but, in whatever manner it be determined, the Aristotelic theory of pleasure and pain is still the only one which can account for the phænomena. Limiting, however, the organic pleasure of which a sense is capable, to that from the activity determined in it by its elementary objects,—this will be competent to every sense, but in very different degrees. In treating of the Cognitive Powers, I formerly noticed that in all the senses we could discriminate two phænomena,—the phænomenon of Perception Proper, and the phænomenon of Sensation Proper.<sup>a</sup> By *perception* is understood the objective relation of the sense, that is, the information obtained through it of the qualities of external

The degree  
of organic  
pleasure  
determined  
by the ob-  
jectivity  
and subjec-  
tivity of  
the Sense

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect XLIV, vol. II. p. 98 —ED.



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existences in their action on the organ; by *sensation* is understood the subjective relation of the sense, that is, our consciousness of the affection of the organ itself, as acted on,—as affected by an object. I stated that these phænomena were in an inverse ratio to each other,—that is, the greater the perception the less always the sensation, the greater the sensation the less always the perception. I further observed, that, of the senses, some were more objective, others more subjective;—that in some the phænomenon of perception predominated, in others the phænomenon of sensation; that is, some gave us much information in regard to the qualities of their object and little in regard to their own affection in the act; whereas the information we received from others, was almost limited exclusively to their own modification, when at work. Thus the two higher senses of Sight and Hearing might be considered as pre-eminently objective, the two lower senses of Taste and Smell might be considered as pre-eminently subjective; while the sense of Touch might be viewed as that in which the two phænomena are, as it were, *in æquilibrio*. Now, according to this doctrine, we ought to find the organic pleasure and pain in the two higher senses comparatively feeble, in the two lower, comparatively strong. And so it is. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction we receive from certain single colours and certain single sounds, in determining the organs of Sight and Hearing to perfect or imperfect activity, is small in proportion to the pleasure or the displeasure we are conscious of from the application of certain single objects to the organs of Taste and Smell.

So far we may safely go. But when it is required of us to explain, particularly and in detail, why the

Sight and Hearing objective, Taste and Smell subjective, hence in the two former, organic pleasure and pain feeble, in the two latter, strong

How far  
the theory  
of pleasure  
and pain  
affords an  
explanation  
of the  
phænomena.

rose, for example, produces this sensation of smell, assafoetida that other, and so forth, and to say in what peculiar action does the perfect or pleasurable, and the imperfect or painful, activity of an organ consist, we must at once profess our ignorance. But it is the same with all our attempts at explaining any of the ultimate phænomena of creation. In general, we may account for much; in detail, we can rarely account for anything; for we soon remount to facts which lie beyond our powers of analysis and observation.

All that we can say in explanation of the agreeable in sensation is, that, on the general analogy of our being, when the impression of an object on a sense is in harmony with its amount of power, and thus allows it the condition of springing to full spontaneous energy, the result is pleasure; whereas, when the impression is out of harmony with the amount of power, and thus either represses it or stimulates it to over-activity, the result is pain.

The same explanation, drawn from the observation of the phænomena within our reach, must be applied to the sensations which belong to the Vital Sense, but in regard to these it is not necessary to say anything in detail.

The theory  
applicable  
to the Vital  
Sense

II. The Mental or Internal Feelings,—the Sentiments,—may be divided into Contemplative and Practical. The former are the concomitants of our Cognitive Powers, the latter of our Powers of Conation. Of these in their order.

II Sentiments,—  
divided  
into Contemplative  
and Practical

The Contemplative Feelings are again distributed into two classes,—into those of the Subsidiary Faculties, and those of the Elaborative; and the Feelings accompanying the subsidiary faculties may be again subdivided into those of Self-Consciousness or

Contemplative Feelings  
divided into  
those of the Subsidiary  
Faculties,  
and of the Elaborative.

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The first  
class divid-  
ed into  
those of  
Self-Con-  
sciousness,  
and of Ima-  
gination

2. Senti-  
ments at-  
tending  
Self-con-  
sciousness

Tedium or  
Ennui

Arises from  
a repressed  
tendency  
to action.

Internal Perception, and into those of Imagination,—  
*Imagination* being here employed to comprehend its  
relative faculty, the faculty of Reproduction. Of  
these in their order; and first of the Feelings or Sen-  
timents attending the faculty of Reflex Perception or  
Self-Consciousness.

By this faculty we become aware of our internal  
states; that is, in other words, that we live. Now we  
are conscious of our life only as we are conscious of  
our activity, and we are conscious of activity only as  
we are conscious of a change of state,—for all activity  
is the going out of one state into another; while, at  
the same time, we are only conscious of one state by  
contrast to, or as discriminated from, a preceding  
state. Now pleasure, we have also seen, is the consciousness  
of a vigorous and unimpeded energy; pain, the con-  
sciousness of repressed or impeded tendency to action.  
This being the case, if there be nothing which presents  
to our faculties the objects on which they may exert  
their activity, in other words, if there be no cause  
whereby our actual state may be made to pass into  
another, there results a peculiar irksome feeling of a  
want of excitement, which we denominate *tedium* or  
*ennui*. This feeling is like that of being unable to  
die, and not being allowed to live; and sometimes  
becomes so oppressive that it leads to suicide or  
madness.

The pain we experience in the feeling of Tedium,  
arises from the feeling of a repressed tendency to  
action; and it is intense in proportion as this feeling  
is lively and vigorous. An inability to thought is a  
security against this feeling, and, therefore, *tedium* is  
far less felt by the uncultivated than by the educated.  
The more varied the objects presented to our thought,

—the more varied and vivacious our activity, the intenser will be our consciousness of living, and the more rapidly will the time appear to fly. But when we look back upon the series of thoughts, with which our mind was occupied the while, we marvel at the apparent length of its duration. Thus it is that, in travelling, a month seems to pass more rapidly than a week; but cast a retrospect upon what has occurred, and occupied our attention during the interval, and the month appears to lengthen to a year. Hence we explain why we call our easy occupations *pastimes*; and why play is so engaging when it is at all deep. Games of hazard determine a continual change,—now we hope, and now we fear; while in games of skill, we experience also the pleasure which arises from the activity of the understanding, in carrying through our own, and in frustrating the plan of our antagonist.

All that relieves tedium, by affording a change and an easy exercise for our thoughts, causes pleasure. The best cure of tedium is some occupation which, by concentrating our attention on external objects, shall divert it from a retortion on ourselves. All occupation is either labour or play; labour when there is some end ulterior to the activity, play when the activity is for its own sake alone. In both, however, there must be ever and anon a change of object, or both will soon grow tiresome. Labour is thus the best preventive of tedium, for it has an external motive which holds us steadfast to the work; while after the completion of our task, the feeling of repose, as the change from the feeling of a constrained to that of a spontaneous state, affords a vivid and peculiar pleasure. Labour must alternate with repose, or we shall never know what is the true enjoyment of life.

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The more varied and vivacious our activity, the intenser our consciousness of life, and the more rapidly does time appear to fly.

Pastimes

Games of chance and skill.

Tedium, how cured

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of our  
percep-  
tions and  
thoughts to  
be pleasing  
must not be  
too rapid.

Giddiness

Thus it appears that a uniform continuity in our internal states is painful, and that pleasure is the result of their commutation. It is, however, to be observed, that the change of our perceptions and thoughts to be pleasing must not be too rapid; for as the intervals, when too long, produce the feeling of Tedium, so, when too short, they cause that of Giddiness or Vertigo. The too rapid passing, for example, of visible objects or of tones before the Senses, of images before the Phantasy, of thoughts before the Understanding, occasions the disagreeable feeling of confusion or stupefaction, which, in individuals of very sensitive temperament, results in Nausea,—Sickness <sup>a</sup>

Nausea

b. Senti-  
ments con-  
comitant of  
Imagina-  
tion

I proceed now to the Speculative Feelings which accompany the energies of Imagination. It has already been frequently stated, that whatever affords to a power the mean of full spontaneous energy is a cause of pleasure; and that whatever either represses the free exertion of a power, or stimulates it into strained activity, is the cause of pain.

Condition  
of the plea-  
surable ap-  
plicable to  
Imagina-  
tion, both  
as Repro-  
ductive  
and as  
Plastic

I shall now apply this law to the Imagination. Whatever, in general, facilitates the play of the Imagination is felt as pleasing; whatever renders it more difficult is felt as displeasing. And this applies equally to Imagination considered as merely reproductive of the objects presented by sense or as combining these in the phantastic forms of its own productive, or rather plastic, activity. Considering the Phantasy merely as reproductive, we are pleased with the portrait of a person whose face we know, if like, because it enables us to recall the features into consciousness easily and freely; and we are displeased with it if

As Repro-  
ductive<sup>a</sup> See Marcus Herz, *Über den Schwindel*, 1791.

unlike, because it not only does not assist, but thwarts us in our endeavour to recall them ; while after this has been accomplished, we are still farther pained by the disharmony we experience between the portrait on the canvass and the representation in our own imagination. A short and characteristic description of things which we have seen, pleases us, because, without exacting a protracted effort of attention, and through a few striking traits, it enables the imagination to place the objects vividly before it. On the same principle, whatever facilitates the reproduction of the objects which have been consigned to memory, is pleasurable ; as for example, resemblances, contrasts, other associations with the passing thought, metre, rhyme, symmetry, appropriate designations, &c. To realise an act of imagination, it is necessary that we grasp up,—that we comprehend, the manifold as a single whole : an object, therefore, which does not allow itself, without difficulty, to be thus represented in unity, occasions pain ; whereas an object which can easily be recalled to system, is the cause of pleasure. The former is the case when the object is too large or too complex to be perceived at once ; when the parts are not prominent enough to be distinctly impressed upon the memory. Order and symmetry facilitate the acts of Reproduction and Representation, and, consequently, afford us a proportional gratification. But, on the other hand, as pleasure is in proportion to the amount of free energy, an object which gives no impediment to the comprehensive energy of Imagination, may not be pleasurable, if it be so simple as not to afford to this faculty a sufficient exercise. Hence it is, that not variety alone, and not unity alone, but variety combined with unity, is that

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An act of Imagination involves the comprehension of the manifold as a single whole.

The Beautiful in objects constituted by variety in unity

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quality in objects, which we emphatically denominate *beautiful*.

Office of  
the Plastic  
Imagination  
to re-construct  
and re-arrange.

As to what is called the Productive or Creative Imagination,—this is dependent for its materials on the Senses and on the Reproductive Imagination. The Imagination produces, the Imagination creates, nothing; it only rearranges parts,—it only builds up old materials into new forms; and in reference to this act, it ought, therefore, to be called, not the *productive* or *creative*, but the *plastic*.<sup>a</sup> Now this reconstruction of materials by the Plastic Imagination is twofold; for it either arranges them in one representation, or in a series of representations. Of the pleasure we receive from single representations, I have already spoken; it, therefore, only remains to consider the enjoyment we find in the activity of imagination, in so far as this is excited in concatenating a series of representations. I do not at present speak of any pleasure or pain which the contents of these concatenated representations may produce; these are not feelings of imagination, but of appetency or conation; I have here exclusively in view the feelings which accompany the facilitated, or impeded, energy of this function of the phantasy. Now it is manifest that a series of representations are pleasing.—1°, In proportion as they severally call up in us a more varied and harmonious image; and, 2°, In proportion as they stand to each other in a logical dependence. This latter is, however, a condition not of the Imagination, but of the Understanding or Elaborative Faculty; and, therefore, before speaking of those feelings which accompany the joint energies of these faculties, it will be proper to consider those which arise from the opera-

This reconstruction  
twofold.

Conditions  
of the pleasurable,  
as regards the  
Understanding

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. xxxiii., vol. ii. p. 262.—Ed

tions of the Understanding by itself. To these, therefore, I now pass on.

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The function of the Understanding may, in general, be said to bestow on the cognitions which it elaborates, the greatest possible compass, (comprehension and extension), the greatest possible clearness and distinctness, the greatest possible certainty and systematic order; and in as much as we approximate to the accomplishment of these ends, we experience pleasure, in as much as we meet with hindrances in our attempts, we experience pain. The tendency, the desire we have, to amplify the limits of our knowledge, is one of the strongest principles of human nature. To learn is thus pleasurable, to be frustrated in our attempted knowledge, painful.

Function of  
the Under-  
standing

Obscurity and confusion in our cognitions we feel as disagreeable; whereas their clearness and distinctness afford us sincere gratification. We are pained by a hazy and perplexed discourse; but rejoice in one perspicuous and profound. Hence the pleasure we experience in having the cognitions we possessed but darkling and confused, explicated into life and order; and, on this account, there is hardly a more pleasing object than a tabular conspectus of any complex whole. We are soothed by the solution of a riddle; and the wit which, like a flash of lightning, discovers similarities between objects which seemed contradictory, affords a still intenser enjoyment.

Obscure  
and con-  
fused cog-  
nitions,—  
how dis-  
agreeable

Wit,—how  
pleasing

Our cognitions may be divided into two classes,—the Empirical or Historical, and the Rational. In the former, we only apprehend the fact that they are; in the latter, we comprehend the reason why they are. The Understanding, therefore, does not for each demand the same kind or degree of knowledge; but

Cognitions  
divided  
into two  
classes,—  
Empirical  
and Ra-  
tional.



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in each, if its demand be successful, we are pleased ;  
if unsuccessful, we are chagrined.

Sentiment  
of Truth.—  
What and  
how pleas-  
urable.

From the tendency of men towards knowledge and certainty, there arises a peculiar feeling which is commonly called the Feeling or Sentiment of Truth, but might be more correctly styled the Feeling or Sentiment of Conviction. For we must not mistake this feeling for the faculty by which we discriminate truth from error ; this feeling, as merely subjective, can determine nothing in regard to truth and error, which are, on the contrary, of an objective relation ; and there are found as many examples of men who have died the confessors of an error they mistook for truth, as of men who have laid down their lives in testimony of the real truth. “Every opinion,” says Montaigne, “is strong enough to have had its martyrs.” Be this, however, as it may, the feeling of conviction is a pleasurable sentiment, because it accompanies the consciousness of an unimpeded energy ; whereas the counter-feeling,—that of doubt or uncertainty, is a painful sentiment, because it attends a consciousness of a thwarted activity. The uneasy feeling which is thus the concomitant of doubt, is a powerful stimulus to the extension and perfecting of our knowledge.

Generalisa-  
tion and  
Specifica-  
tion.—How  
pleasur-  
able.

The multitude,—the multifarious character, of the objects presented to our observation, stands in signal contrast with the very limited capacity of the human intellect. This disproportion constrains us to classify ; that is, by a comparison of the objects of sense to reduce these to notions ; on these primary notions we repeat the comparison, and thus carry them up into higher, and these higher into highest notions. This

process is performed by that function of the Understanding, which apprehends resemblances ; and hence originate *species* and *genera* in all their gradations. In this detection of the similarities between different objects, an energy of the understanding is fully and freely exerted ; and hence results a pleasure. But as in these classes,—these general notions, the knowledge of individual existences loses in precision and completeness, we again endeavour to find out differences in the things which stand under a notion, to the end that we may be able to specify and individualise them. This counter-process is performed by that function of the Understanding, which apprehends dissimilarities between resembling objects, and in the full and free exertion of this energy there is a feeling of pleasure.

The Intellect further tends to reduce the piecemeal and fragmentary cognitions it possesses, to a systematic whole, in other words, to elevate them to a Science ; hence the pleasure we derive from all that enables us with ease and rapidity to survey the relation of complex parts, as constituting the members of one organic whole.

Science,—  
how pleasing.

The Intellect, from the necessity it has of thinking everything as the result of some higher reason, is thus determined to attempt the deduction of every object of cognition from a simple principle. When, therefore, we succeed or seem to succeed in the discovery of such a principle, we feel a pleasure ; as we feel a pain, when the intellect is frustrated in this endeavour.

Deduction  
from first  
principles

To the feelings of pleasure which are afforded by the unimpeded energies of the Understanding, belongs, likewise, the gratification we find in the apprehension

Apprehension of  
adaptation  
of Means  
to Ends,—

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how pleasurable.

Ends of  
two kinds,  
—external  
and internal.  
Hence  
the Useful  
and the  
Perfect.

of external or internal adaptation of Means to Ends Human intelligence is naturally determined to propose to itself an end ; and, in the consideration of objects, it thus necessarily thinks them under this relation. If an object, viewed as a mean, be fitted to effect its end, this end is either an external, that is, one which lies beyond the thing itself, in some other existence ; or an internal, that is, one which lies within the thing itself, and consummates its own existence. If the end be external, an object suited to accomplish it is said to be *useful*. If, again, the end be internal, and all the parts of the object be viewed in relation to their whole as to their end, an object, as suited to effect this end, is said to be *perfect*. If, therefore, we consider an object in reference either to an external or to an internal end, and if this object be recognised to fulfil the conditions which this relation implies, the act of thought in which this is accomplished is an unimpeded, and, consequently, pleasurable, energy ; whereas the act of cognising that these conditions are wanting, and the object therefore ill adapted to its end, is a thwarted, and therefore a painful, energy of thought.

## LECTURE XLVI.

THE FEELINGS.—THEIR CLASSES.—THE BEAUTIFUL  
AND SUBLIME.

AFTER terminating the consideration of the Feelings viewed as Causes,—causes of Pleasure and Pain, we entered, in our last Lecture, on their discussion regarded as Effects,—effects of the various processes of conscious life. In this latter relation, I divided them into two great classes,—the Sensations and the Sentiments. The Sensations are those feelings which accompany the vital processes more immediately connected with the corporeal organism. The Sentiments are those feelings which accompany the mental processes, which, if not wholly inorganic, are at least less immediately dependent on the conditions of the nervous system. The Sensations I again subdivided into two orders,—into those which accompany the action of the five Determinate Senses, and into those which accompany, or, in fact, constitute the manifestations of the Indeterminate or Vital Sense. After a slight consideration of the Sensations, I passed on to the Sentiments. These I also subdivided into two orders, according as they accompany the energies of the Cognitive, or the energies of the Conative, Powers. The former of these I called the Contemplative,—the latter, the Practical Feelings or Sentiments. Taking the former,—the Contemplative,—into discussion, I further subdivided

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Recapitulation

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these into two classes, according as they are the concomitants of the lower or Subsidiary, or of the higher or Elaborative, Faculty of Cognition. The sentiments which accompany the lower or Subsidiary Faculties, by a final subdivision, I distributed into those of the Faculty of Self-consciousness and into those of the Imagination,—referring to the Imagination the relative faculty of Reproduction. I ought also to have observed, that, as the Imagination always co-operates in every act of complex perception, and, in fact, bestows on such a cognition its whole unity, under the Feelings of Imagination (or of Imagination and the Understanding in conjunction) would fall to be considered those sentiments of pleasure which, in the perceptions of sense, we receive from the relations of the objects presented. Under the Feelings connected with the Energies of the Elaborative Faculty or Understanding, I comprehended those which arise from the gratification of the Regulative Faculty,—Reason or Intelligence,—because it is only through the operations of the former that the laws of the latter are carried into effect. In relation to Feelings, the two faculties may, therefore, be regarded as one. I then proceeded to treat of the several kinds of Contemplative Feeling in detail; and, before the conclusion of the Lecture, had run rapidly through those of Self-consciousness, those of Imagination, considered apart from the Understanding, and those of the Understanding, considered apart from Imagination. We have now, therefore, in the first place, to consider the feelings which arise from the acts of Imagination and Understanding in conjunction.

Feelings  
that arise  
from the  
Imagination  
and  
Under-  
standing in  
conjunction

Beauty and  
Sublimity

The feelings of satisfaction which result from the joint energy of the Understanding and Phantasy, are

principally those of Beauty and Sublimity; and the judgments which pronounce an object to be *sublime*, *beautiful*, &c., are called, by a metaphorical expression, *Judgments of Taste*. These have also been styled *Æsthetical Judgments*; and the term *æsthetical* has now, especially among the philosophers of Germany, nearly superseded the term *taste*. Both terms are unsatisfactory.

The gratification we feel in the beautiful, the sublime, the picturesque, &c., is purely contemplative, that is, the feeling of pleasure which we then experience, arises solely from the consideration of the object, and altogether apart from any desire of, or satisfaction in, its possession. In the following observations, it is almost needless to observe, that I can make no attempt at more than a simple indication of the origin of the pleasure we derive from the contemplation of those objects, which, from the character of the feelings they determine, are called *beautiful*, *sublime*, &c.

In relation to the Beautiful, this has been distinguished into the Free or Absolute, and into the Dependent or Relative <sup>a</sup> In the former case, it is not necessary to have a notion of what the object ought to be, before we pronounce it beautiful or not; in the latter case, such a previous notion is required. Flowers, shells, arabesques, &c., are freely or absolutely beautiful. We judge, for example, a flower to be beautiful, though unaware of its destination, and that it contains a complex apparatus of organs all admirably adapted to the propagation of the plant. When we are made cognisant of this, we obtain, indeed, an additional gratification, but one wholly different from that which we experience in the contemplation of the flower itself,

Beauty distinguished  
as Absolute  
and Relative

<sup>a</sup> See Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, treatise 1 sects 2, 4 — ED

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This distinction  
unsound.

The Useful  
and the  
Beautiful  
distinct

St Augustin's doctrine on this point superior to the modern.

apart from all consideration of its adaptations A house, a pillar, a piece of furniture, are dependently or relatively beautiful; for here the object is judged beautiful by reference to a certain end, for the sake of which it exists This distinction, which is taken by Kant<sup>a</sup> and others, appears to me unsound. For Relative Beauty is only the confusion of two elements, which ought to have been kept distinct. There is no doubt, I think, that certain objects please us directly and of themselves, that is, no reference being had to aught beyond the form itself which they exhibit. These are things of themselves beautiful. Other things, again, please us not directly and of themselves; that is, their form presents nothing, the cognition of which results in an agreeable feeling. But these same things may please indirectly and by relation; that is, when we are informed that they have a purpose, and are made aware of their adaptation to its accomplishment, we may derive a pleasure from the admirable relation which here subsists between the end and means. These are things Useful. But the pleasure which results from the contemplation of the useful, is wholly different from that which results from the contemplation of the beautiful, and, therefore, they ought not to be confounded. It may, indeed, happen that the same object is such as affords us both kinds of pleasure, and it may at once be beautiful and useful. But why, on such a ground, establish a second series of beauty? In this respect, St Augustin shows himself superior to our great modern analyst. In his *Confessions*, he informs us that he had written a book, (unfortunately lost),

<sup>a</sup> Partially, perhaps, see *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, §§ 6, 10 But adaptation to an End, though he refers both to the faculty of Judgment — Ed.

addressed to Hierius, the Roman rhetorician, under the title *De Apto et Pulcro*, in which he maintained, that the beautiful is that which pleases absolutely and of itself, the well-adapted that which pleases from its accommodation to something else,—“*Pulcrum esse, quod per se ipsum; aptum, autem, quod ad aliquid accommodatum deceret.*”<sup>a</sup>

Now what has been distinguished as Dependent or Relative Beauty, is nothing more than a beautiful utility, or a utilised beauty. For example, a pillar taken by itself and apart from all consideration of any purpose it has to serve, is a beautiful object; and a person of good taste, and ignorant of its relations, would at once pronounce it so. But when he is informed that it is also a mean towards an end, he will then find an additional satisfaction in the observation of its perfect adaptation to its purpose; and he will no longer consider the pillar as something beautiful and useless; his taste will desiderate its application, and will be shocked at seeing, as we so often see, a set of columns stuck on upon a building, and supporting nothing.

Be this, however, as it may, our pleasure, in both cases, arises from a free and full play being allowed to our cognitive faculties. In the case of Beauty,—Free Beauty,—both the Imagination and the Understanding find occupation; and the pleasure we experience from such an object, is in proportion as it affords to these faculties the opportunity of exerting fully and freely their respective energies. Now, it is the principal function of the Understanding, out of the multifarious presented to it, to form a whole. Its entire activity is, in fact, a tendency towards unity; and it is only satisfied when this object is so constituted as to afford

LECT.  
XLVIRelative  
Beauty is  
only a  
beautified  
utility, or  
utilised  
beautyThe theory  
of Free or  
Absolute  
Beauty



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the opportunity of an easy and perfect performance of this its function. In this case, the object is judged beautiful or pleasing.

The greater the number of the parts of any object given by the Imagination, which the Understanding has to bind up into a whole, and the shorter the time in which it is able to bring this process to its issue, the more fully and the more easily does the Understanding energise, and, consequently, the greater will be the pleasure afforded as the reflex of its energy <sup>a</sup>

This theory explains the differences of individuals in the apprehension of the Beautiful

This not only affords us the rationale of what the Beautiful is, but it also enables us to explain the differences of different individuals in the apprehension of the beautiful. The function of the Understanding is in all men the same; and the understanding of every man binds up what is given as plural and multifarious into the unity of a whole. But as it is only the full and facile accomplishment of this function, which has pleasure for its concomitant, it depends wholly on the capacity of the individual understanding, whether this condition shall be fulfilled. If an understanding, by natural constitution, by cultivation and exercise, be vigorous enough to think up rapidly into a whole what is presented in complexity,—multiplicity,—the individual has an enjoyment in the exertion, and he regards the object as beautiful; whereas, if an intellect perform this function slowly and with effort, if it succeed in accomplishing the end at all, the individual can feel no pleasure, (if he does not experience pain), and the object must to him appear as one destitute of beauty, if not positively ugly. Hence it is that children, boors, in a word, persons of

<sup>a</sup> [Cf. Mendelssohn, *Philosophische Lettre sur la Sculpture*, *Œuvres Philosophiques*, II. p. 74 Hemsterhuis, *losophiques*, t. I. p. 12 ]

a weak or uncultivated mind, may find the parts of a building beautiful, while unable to comprehend the beauty of it as a whole. On the other hand, we may also explain why the pleasure we have in the contemplation of an object is lessened, if not wholly annihilated, if we mentally analyse it into its parts. The fairest human head would lose its beauty were we to sunder it in thought, and consider how it is made up of integuments, of cellular tissue, of muscular fibres, of bones, of brain, of blood-vessels, &c. It is no longer a whole; it is the multifarious without unity. In reference to Taste, it is quite a different thing to sunder a whole into its parts, and a whole into its lesser wholes. In the one case, we separate only to separate, and not again to connect. In the other, we look to the parts, in order to be able in a shorter time more perfectly to survey the whole. This must enhance the gratification, and it is a process always requisite when the whole comprises a more multiplex plurality than our understanding is competent to embrace at the first attempt. When a whole head is found too complex to be judged at once, out of the brow, eyes, nose, cheeks, mouth, &c., we make so many lesser wholes, in order, in the first place, to comprehend them by the intellect as wholes together; we then bind up these petty wholes into one great whole, which, in a shorter or longer time, we overlook, and award to it, accordingly, a greater or a less amount of beauty.

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And affords the reason why our pleasure in the contemplation of an object is lessened, when we analyse it into its parts.

Difference between sundering a whole into its parts, and into its lesser wholes

In the case of Relative or Dependent Beauty, we must distinguish the pleasure we receive into two. combined indeed, but not identical. The one of these pleasures is that from the beauty which the object contains, and the principle of which we have been

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just considering. The other of these pleasures is that which, in our last Lecture, we showed was attached to a perfect energy of the Understanding, in thinking an object under the notion of conformity as a mean adapted to an end.

Judgments  
of Taste  
either Pure  
or Mixed.

A judgment of Taste may be called *pure*, when the pleasure it enounces is one exclusively derived from the Beautiful, and *mixed*, when with this pleasure there are conjoined feelings of pain or pleasure from other sources. Such, for example, are the organic excitations of particular colours, tones, &c., emotions, the moral feeling, the feeling of pleasure from the sublime, &c. It requires a high cultivation of the taste in order to find gratification in a pure beauty, and also to separate from our judgment of an object, in this respect, all that is foreign to this source of pleasure. The uncultivated man at first finds gratification only in those qualities which stimulate his organs; and it is only gradually that he can be educated to pay attention to the form of objects, and to find pleasure in what lightly exercises his faculties of Imagination and Thought,—the Beautiful. The result, then, of what has now been said is, that a thing beautiful is one whose form occupies the Imagination and Understanding in a free and full, and, consequently, in an agreeable, activity: and to this definition of the Beautiful all others may without difficulty be reduced; for these, like the definitions of the pleasurable, are never absolutely false, but, in general, only partial expressions of the truth. On these it is, however, at present impossible to touch.

The Beautiful  
defined.

The Sublime,—the  
feeling  
partly  
pleasur-  
able

The feeling of pleasure in the Sublime is essentially different from our feeling of pleasure in the Beautiful. The beautiful awakens the mind to a soothing con-

temptation; the sublime rouses it to strong emotion. The beautiful attracts without repelling; whereas the sublime at once does both; the beautiful affords us a feeling of unmingled pleasure, in the full and unimpeded activity of our cognitive powers; whereas our feeling of sublimity is a mingled one of pleasure and pain,—of pleasure in the consciousness of the strong energy, of pain in the consciousness that this energy is vain <sup>a</sup>

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painful

But as the amount of pleasure in the sublime is greater than the amount of pain, it follows, that the free energy it elicits must be greater than the free energy it repels. The beautiful has reference to the form of an object, and the facility with which it is comprehended. For beauty, magnitude is thus an impediment. Sublimity, on the contrary, requires magnitude as its condition; and the formless is not unfrequently sublime. That we are at once attracted and repelled by sublimity, arises from the circumstance that the object which we call *sublime*, is proportioned to one of our faculties, and disproportioned to another; but as the degree of pleasure transcends the degree of pain, the power whose energy is promoted must be superior to that power whose energy is repressed.

Theory of  
the Sub-  
lime

The Sublime has been divided into two kinds, the Theoretical and the Practical, or, as they are also called, the Mathematical and the Dynamical <sup>β</sup> A preferable division would be according to the three quantities,—into the sublime of Extension, the sublime of

The Sub-  
lime,—  
divided  
into that  
of Extension,  
Pro-  
tension,  
and Inten-  
sion

<sup>a</sup> [That the sublime has a painful feeling with it, see Fracastorius, *De Sympathia et Antipathia*, c. xx, *Opera* (edit. 1584), f. 73 b, Mendelssohn, *Recherches sur les Sentiments Moraux*, traduit par M. Abbt (1764), p. 6 et seq; Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 23, Burke, *On the Sublime and Beautiful*, part i. § 7, part ii. §§ 1, 2, part iii. § 27, part iv. § 5-8] <sup>β</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 24 et seq.—ED

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These divisions illustrated.

The sublime of Extension and Protension

Protension, and the sublime of Intension ; or, what comes to the same thing,—the sublime of Space, the sublime of Time, and the sublime of Power. In the two former the cognitive, in the last the conative, powers come into play. An object is extensively, or protensively sublime, when it comprises so great a multitude of parts that the Imagination sinks under the attempt to represent it in an image, and the Understanding to measure it by reference to other quantities. Baffled in the attempt to reduce the object within the limits of the faculties by which it must be comprehended, the mind at once desists from the ineffectual effort, and conceives the object not by a positive, but by a negative, notion ; it conceives it as inconceivable, and falls back into repose, which is felt as pleasing by contrast to the continuance of a forced and impeded energy. Examples of the sublime,—of this sudden effort, and of this instantaneous desisting from the attempt, are manifested in the extensive sublime of Space, and in the protensive sublime of Eternity.

The sublime of Intension

An object is intensively sublime, when it involves such a degree of force or power that the Imagination cannot at once represent, and the Understanding cannot bring under measure, the quantum of this force ; and when, from the nature of the object, the inability of the mind is made at once apparent, so that it does not proceed in the ineffectual effort, but at once calls back its energies from the attempt. It is thus manifest that the feeling of the sublime will be one of mingled pain and pleasure ; pleasure, from the vigorous exertion and from the instantaneous repose ; pain, from the consciousness of limited and frustrated activity. This mixed feeling in the contemplation of a

sublime object is finely expressed by Lucretius when he says:—

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“Me quædam divina voluptas,  
Percipit atque horror” *a*

I do not know a better example of the sublime, in all its three forms, than in the following passage of Kant: *b*—

“Two things there are, which, the oftener and the more steadfastly we consider them, fill the mind with an ever new, an ever rising admiration and reverence; —the STARRY HEAVEN *above*, the MORAL LAW *within*. Of neither am I compelled to seek out the reality, as veiled in darkness, or only to conjecture the possibility, as beyond the hemisphere of my knowledge. Both I contemplate lying clear before me, and connect both immediately with my consciousness of existence. The one departs from the place I occupy in the outer world of sense; expands beyond the bounds of imagi-

The sub-  
lime, in  
its three  
forms, ex-  
emplified in  
a passage  
from Kant.

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planet—itself an atom in the universe—on which it grew. The aspect of the other, on the contrary, elevates my worth as an *intelligence* even without limit; and this through my personality, in which the moral law reveals a faculty of life independent of my animal nature, nay, of the whole material world:—at least, if it be permitted to infer as much from the regulation of my being, which a conformity with that law exacts; proposing, as it does, my moral worth for the absolute end of my activity, conceding no compromise of its imperative to a necessitation of nature, and spurning, in its infinity, the conditions and boundaries of my present transitory life.”

“Spirat enim majora animus seque altius effert  
Sideribus, transitque vias et nubila fati.  
Et momenta premit pedibus quæcumque putantur  
Figere propositam natali tempore sortem.”<sup>a</sup>

Here we have the extensive sublime in the heavens and their interminable space, the protensive sublime in their illimitable duration, and the intensive sublime in the omnipotence of the human will, as manifested in the unconditional imperative of the moral law.

The Picturesque—  
viewed as it  
concerns,  
and how  
it differs  
from the  
Sublime  
and Beau-  
tiful.

The Picturesque, however opposite to the Sublime, seems, in my opinion, to stand to the Beautiful in a somewhat similar relation. An object is positively ugly, when it is of such a form that the Imagination and Understanding cannot help attempting to think it up into unity, and yet their energies are still so impeded that they either fail in the endeavour, or accomplish it only imperfectly, after time and toil. The cause of this continuance of effort is, that the object does not present such an appearance of incon-

gruous variety as at once to compel the mind to desist from the attempt of reducing it to unity ; but, on the contrary, leads it on to attempt what it is yet unable to perform,—its reduction to a whole. But variety,—variety even apart from unity,—is pleasing ; and if the mind be made content to expatiate freely and easily in this variety, without attempting painfully to reduce it to unity, it will derive no inconsiderable pleasure from this exertion of its powers. Now a picturesque object is precisely of such a character. It is so determinately varied and so abrupt in its variety, it presents so complete a negation of all rounded contour, and so regular an irregularity of broken lines and angles, that every attempt at reducing it to an harmonious whole is at once found to be impossible. The mind, therefore, which must forego the energy of representing and thinking the object as a unity, surrenders itself at once to the energies which deal with it only in detail.

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I proceed now to those feelings which I denominated Practical,—those, namely, which have their root in the powers of Conation, and thus have reference to overt action.

The Prac-  
tical Feel-  
ings

The Conative, like the Cognitive, powers are divided into a higher and a lower order, as they either are, or are not, immediately relative to our bodily condition. The former may be called the Pathological, the latter the Moral. Neglecting this distribution, the Practical Feelings are relative either—1°, To our Self-preservation ; or, 2°, To the Enjoyment of our Existence, or, 3°, To the Preservation of the Species ; or, 4°, To our Tendency towards Development and Perfection ; or, 5°, To the Moral Law. Of these in their order.

Their divi-  
sions



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Those rela-  
tive—I To  
Self-pre-  
servation.

In the first place, of the feelings relative to Self-preservation:—these are the feelings of Hunger and Thirst, of Loathing, of Sorrow, of Bodily Pain, of Repose, of Fear at danger, of Anxiety, of Shuddering, of Alarm, of Composure, of Security, and the nameless feeling at the Representation of Death. Several of these feelings are corporeal, and may be considered, with equal propriety, as modifications of the Vital Sense.

2 Enjoy-  
ment of  
existence.

In the second place, man is determined not only to exist, but to exist well; he is, therefore, determined also to desire whatever tends to render life agreeable, and to eschew whatever tends to render it disagreeable. All, therefore, that appears to contribute to the former, causes in him the feeling of Joy; whereas all that seems to threaten the latter, excites in him the repressed feelings of Fear, Anxiety, Sorrow, &c., which we have already mentioned.

3 Preser-  
vation of  
the species

In the third place, man is determined, not only to preserve himself, but to preserve the species to which he belongs, and with this tendency various feelings are associated. To this head belong the feelings of Sexual Love; and the sentiment of Parental Affection. But the human affections are not limited to family connections. “Man,” says Aristotle, “is the sweetest thing to man.”<sup>a</sup> “Man is more political than any bee or ant.”<sup>β</sup> We have thus a tendency to social intercourse, and society is at once the necessary condition of our happiness and our perfection. “The solitary,” says Aristotle again, “is either above or below humanity; he is either a god or a beast.”<sup>γ</sup>

Sympathy

In conformity with his tendency to social existence,

<sup>a</sup> *Eth. Eud.*, vii 2, 25 —ED

<sup>γ</sup> *Polit.*, i. 2, 9, 14 —ED

<sup>β</sup> *Polit.*, i. 2, 10 —ED

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man is endowed with a Sympathetic Feeling, that is, he rejoices with those that rejoice, and grieves with those that grieve. Compassion,—Pity,—is the name given to the latter modification of sympathy; the former is without a definite name. Besides sympathetic sorrow and sympathetic joy, there are a variety of feelings which have reference to our existence in a social relation. Of these there is that connected with Vanity, or the wish to please others from the desire of being respected by them; with Shame, or the fear and sorrow at incurring their disrespect; with Pride, or the overweening sentiment of our own worth. To the same class we may refer the feelings connected with Indignation, Resentment, Anger, Scorn, &c.

In the fourth place, there is in man implanted a desire of developing his powers,—there is a tendency towards perfection. In virtue of this, the consciousness of all comparative inability causes pain; the consciousness of all comparative power causes pleasure. To this class belong the feelings which accompany Emulation,—the desire of rising superior to others; and Envy,—the desire of reducing others beneath ourselves.

In the fifth place, we are conscious that there is in man a Moral Law,—a Law of Duty, which unconditionally commands the fulfilment of its behests. This supposes that we are able to fulfil them, or our nature is a lie: and the liberty of human action is there, independently of all direct consciousness, involved in the datum of the Law of Duty. Inasmuch, also, as Moral Intelligence unconditionally commands us to perform what we are conscious to be our duty, there is ascribed to man an absolute worth,—an absolute dignity. The feeling which the manifestation of this

worth excites, is called Respect. With the consciousness of the lofty nature of our moral tendencies, and our ability to fulfil what the law of duty prescribes, there is connected the feeling of Self-respect; whereas, from a consciousness of the contrast between what we ought to do, and what we actually perform, there arises the feeling of Self-abasement. The sentiment of respect for the law of duty is the Moral Feeling, which has by some been improperly denominated the Moral Sense; for through this feeling we do not take cognisance whether anything be morally good or morally evil, but when, by our intelligence, we recognise aught to be of such a character, there is herewith associated a feeling of pain or pleasure, which is nothing more than our state in reference to the fulfilment or violation of the law.

Man, as conscious of his liberty to act, and of the law by which his actions ought to be regulated, recognises his personal accountability, and calls himself before the internal tribunal which we denominate Conscience. Here he is either acquitted or condemned. The acquittal is connected with a peculiar feeling of pleasurable exultation, as the condemnation with a peculiar feeling of painful humiliation,—Remorse.

## A P P E N D I X.

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### I PERCEPTION —FRAGMENTS —(See Vol. II p. 29 )

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART On Desk, May 1856 , written Autumn 1855 —ED )

THERE are three considerations which seem to have been principally effective in promoting the theory of a Mediate or Representative Perception, and by *perception* is meant the apprehension, through sense, of external things These might operate severally or together

The first is, that such a hypothesis is necessary to render possible the perception of distant objects It was taken as granted that certain material realities, (as a sun, stars, &c), not immediately present to sense, were cognised in a perceptive act These realities could not be known immediately, or in themselves, unless known as they existed, and they existed only as they existed in their place in space If, therefore, the perceptive mind did not sally out to them, (which, with the exception of one or two theorists, was scouted as an impossible hypothesis), an immediate perception behoved to be abandoned, and the sensitive cognition we have of them must be vicarious , that is, not of the realities themselves, as present to our organs, and presented to apprehension, but of something different from the realities externally existing, through which, however, they are mediately represented Various theories in regard to the nature of this medium or vicarious object may be entertained , but these may be overpassed This first consideration alone was principally effectual among materialists on them the second had no influence.

A second consideration was the opposite and apparently inconsistent nature of the object and subject of cognition , for here the reality to be known is material, whereas the mind knowing is immaterial , while it was long generally believed, that what is

known must be of an analogous essence, (the same or similar), to what knows. In consequence of this persuasion, it was deemed impossible that the immaterial unextended mind could apprehend in itself, as extended, a material reality. To explain the fact of sensitive perception, it was therefore supposed requisite to attenuate,—to immaterialise the immediate object of perception, by dividing the object known from the reality existing. Perception thus became a vicarious or mediate cognition, in which the corporeal was said to be represented by the incorporeal.

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#### PERCEPTION—POSITIVE RESULT

1. We perceive only through the senses.
2. The senses are corporeal instruments,—parts of our bodily organism.
3. We are, therefore, percipient only through, or by means of, the body. In other words, material and external things are to us only not as zero, inasmuch as they are apprehended by the mind in their relation with the material organ which it animates, and with which it is united.
4. An external existence, and an organ of sense, as both material, can stand in relation only according to the laws of matter. According to these laws, things related,—connected, must act and be acted on; but a thing can act only where it is. Therefore the thing perceived, and the percipient organ, must meet in place,—must be contiguous. The consequence of this doctrine is a complete simplification of the theory of perception, and a return to the most ancient speculation on the point. All sensible cognition is, in a certain acceptation, reduced to touch, and this is the very conclusion maintained by the venerable authority of Democritus.

According to this doctrine, it is erroneous, in the first place, to affirm that we are percipient of distant, &c. objects.

It is erroneous, in the second place, to say that we perceive external things in themselves, in the signification that we perceive them as existing in their own nature, and not in relation to the living organ. The real, the total, the only object perceived has, as a relative, two phases. It may be described either as the idiopathic affection of the sense, (*i. e.* the sense in relation to an

external reality), or as the quality of a thing actually determining such or such an affection of the sentient organ, (*i.e.* an external reality in correlation to the sense).

A corollary of the same doctrine is, that what have been denominated the Primary Qualities of body, are only perceived through the Secondary, in fact, Perception Proper cannot be realised except through Sensation Proper But synchronous

The object of perception is an affection, not of the mind as apart from body, not of the body as apart from mind, but of the composite formed by union of the two, that is, of the animated or living organism (Aristotle)

In the process of perception there is required both an act of the conscious mind and a passion of the affected body; the one without the other is null. Galen has, therefore, well said, "Sensitive perception is not a mere passive or affective change, but the discrimination of an effective change" <sup>a</sup> (Aristotle,—judgment)

Perception supposes Consciousness, and Consciousness supposes Memory and Judgment; for, abstract Consciousness, and there is no Perception, abstract Memory, or Judgment, and Consciousness is abolished. (Hobbes,—Memory; Aristotle,—Judgment of Sense) Memory, Recollection, for change is necessary to Consciousness, and change is only to be apprehended through the faculty of Remembrance Hobbes has, therefore, truly said of Perception,—"*Sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt*" <sup>β</sup> But there could be no discriminative apprehension, supposing always memory without an act whereby difference was affirmed or sameness denied, that is, without an act of judgment Aristotle <sup>γ</sup> is, therefore, right in making Perception a Judgment

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## II LAWS OF THOUGHT —(See Vol II p 368)

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART On Desk, May 1856, written Autumn 1855 —ED)

The doctrine of Contradiction, or of Contradictories, (*ἀξίωμα της ἀντιφάσεως*), that Affirmation or Negation is a necessity of

<sup>a</sup> See *Reid's Works*, p 878 —ED

<sup>β</sup> See *Ibid* —ED

<sup>γ</sup> See *Ibid* —ED

thought, whilst Affirmation and Negation are incompatible, is developed into three sides or phases, each of which implies both the others,—phases which may obtain, and actually have received, severally, the name of *Law*, *Principle*, or *Axiom*. Neglecting the historical order in which these were scientifically named and articulately developed, they are:—

1°, The Law, Principle, or Axiom, of *Identity*, which, in regard to the same thing, immediately or directly enjoins the affirmation of it with itself, and mediately or indirectly prohibits its negation. (*A is A*).

2°, The Law, &c of *Contradiction*, (properly *Non-contradiction*), which, in regard to contradictories, explicitly enjoining their reciprocal negation, implicitly prohibits their reciprocal affirmation. (*A is not Not-A*) In other words, contradictories are thought as existences incompatible at the same time,—as at once mutually exclusive.

3°, The Law, &c of *Excluded Middle* or *Third*, which declares that, whilst contradictories are only two, everything, if explicitly thought, must be thought as of these either the one or the other. (*A is either B or Not-B*) In different terms —Affirmation and Negation of the same thing, in the same respect, have no conceivable medium, whilst anything actually may, and virtually must, be either affirmed or denied of anything. In other words —Every predicate is true or false of every subject, or, contradictories are thought as impossible, but, at the same time, the one or the other as necessary. The argument from Contradiction is omnipotent within its sphere, but that sphere is narrow. It has the following limitations:—

1°, It is negative, not positive, it may refute, but it is incompetent to establish. It may show what is not, but never, of itself, what is. It is exclusively Logical or Formal, not Metaphysical or Real, it proceeds on a necessity of thought, but never issues in an Ontology or knowledge of existence.

2°, It is dependent, to act it presupposes a counter-proposition to act from.

3°, It is explicative, not ampliative, it analyses what is given, but does not originate information, or add anything, through itself, to our stock of knowledge.

4°, But, what is its principal defect, it is partial, not thorough-

going It leaves many of the most important problems of our knowledge out of its determination, and is, therefore, all too narrow in its application as a universal criterion or instrument of judgment For were we left, in our reasonings, to a dependence on the principle of Contradiction, we should be unable competently to attempt any argument with regard to some of the most interesting and important questions For there are many problems in the philosophy of mind where the solution necessarily lies between what are, to us, the one or the other of two counter and, therefore, incompatible alternatives, neither of which are we able to conceive as possible, but of which, by the very conditions of thought, we are compelled to acknowledge that the one or the other cannot but be, and it is as supplying this deficiency, that what has been called the argument from Common Sense becomes principally useful.

The principle of Contradiction, or rather of Non-Contradiction, appears in two forms, and each of these has a different application

In the first place, (what may be called the *Logical* application), it declares that, of Contradictories, two only are possible in thought, and that of these alternatives the one or the other, exclusively, is thought as necessarily true. This phasis of the law is unilateral; for it is with a consciousness or cognition that the one contradictory is necessarily true, and the other contradictory necessarily false This, the logical phasis of the law, is well known, and has been fully developed

In the second place, (what may be called the *Psychological* application), while it necessarily declares that, of contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be, still bilaterally admits that we may be unable positively to think the possibility of either alternative. This, the psychological phasis of the law, is comparatively unknown, and has been generally neglected Thus, *Existence* we cannot but think,—cannot but attribute in thought, nevertheless we can actually conceive neither of these contradictory alternatives,—the absolute commencement, the infinite non-commencement, of being As it is with Existence, so it is with *Time* We cannot think time beginning, we cannot think time not beginning So also with *Space* We are unable to conceive an existence out of space, yet we are equally unable



to compass the notion of illimitable or infinite space. Our capacity of thought is thus peremptorily proved incompetent to what we necessarily think about, for, whilst what we think about must be thought to Exist,—to exist in Time,—to exist in Space,—we are unable to realise the counter-notions of Existence commencing or not commencing, whether in Time or in Space. And thus, whilst Existence, Time, and Space, are the indispensable conditions, forms, or categories of actual thought, still are we unable to conceive either of the counter-alternatives, in one or other of which we cannot but admit that they exist. These and such like impotences of positive thought have, however, as I have stated, been strangely overlooked.

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### III. THE CONDITIONED

(a) KANT'S ANALYSIS OF JUDGMENTS —(See Vol. II. p. 375)

(Fragment from Early Papers, probably before 1836.—ED.)

Kant analysed judgments (*a priori*) into *analytic* or *identical* [or *explicative*], and *synthetical*, or [*ampliative, non-identical*] Great fame from this. But he omitted a third kind,—those that the mind is compelled to form by a law of its nature, but which can neither be reduced to analytic judgments, because they cannot be subordinated to the law of Contradiction, nor to synthetical, because they do not seem to spring from a positive power of mind, but only arise from the inability of the mind to conceive the contrary.

In analytic judgments, — (principle of contradiction), — we conceive the one alternative as necessary, and the other as impossible. In synthetic judgments, we conceive the affirmative as necessary, but not [its negation as self-contradictory]

Would it not be better to make the synthetic of two kinds, — a positive and negative? Had Kant tried whether his synthetic judgments *a priori* were positive or negative, he would have reached the law of the Conditioned, which would have given a totally new aspect to his critique, — simplified, abolished the distinction of *Verstand* and *Vernunft*, which only positive and

negative, (at least as a faculty conceiving the Unconditioned, and left it only, as with Jacobi, the *Noûs*, the *locus principiorum*,—the faculty,—revelation of the primitive facts or faiths of consciousness,—the Common Sense of Reid), the distinction of *Begriffe* and *Ideen*, and have reduced his whole Categories and Ideas to the category of the Conditioned and its subordinates

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(1853, November)—There are three degrees or epochs which we must distinguish in philosophical speculation touching the Necessary

In the first, which we may call the Aristotelic or Platonico-Aristotelic, the Necessary was regarded, if not exclusively, principally and primarily, in an objective relation;—at least the objective and subjective were not discriminated, and it was defined that of which the existence of the opposite,—contrary,—is impossible,—what could not but be

In the second, which we may call the Leibnitian or Leibnitio-Kantian, the Necessary was regarded primarily in a subjective respect, and it was defined that of which the thought of the opposite,—contrary,—is impossible,—what we cannot but think. It was taken for granted, that what we cannot think, cannot be, and what we must think, must be; and from hence there was also inferred, without qualification, that this subjective necessity affords the discriminating criterion of our native or *a priori* cognitions,—notions and judgments

But a third discrimination was requisite, for the necessity of thought behoved to be again distinguished into two kinds—(See *Discussions*, 2d edit, Addenda)

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(b) CONTRADICTIONS PROVING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE  
CONDITIONED —(July 1852)

1 Finite cannot comprehend, contain the Infinite—Yet an inch or minute, say, are finites, and are divisible *ad infinitum*, that is, their terminated division incogitable

2 Infinite cannot be terminated or begun—Yet eternity *ab ante* ends *now*, and eternity *a post* begins *now*—So apply to Space.

3. There cannot be two infinite maxima — Yet eternity *ab ante* and *a post* are two infinite maxima of time

4. Infinite maximum if cut into two, the halves cannot be each infinite, for nothing can be greater than infinite, and thus they could not be parts, nor finite, for thus two finite halves would make an infinite whole.

quantities

5 What contains infinite extensions, protensions, intensions cannot be passed through,—come to an end. An inch, a minute, a degree contains these, *ergo*, &c. Take a minute. This contains an infinitude of protended quantities, which must follow one after another; but an infinite series of successive protensions can, *ex termino*, never be ended; *ergo*, &c

6 An infinite maximum cannot but be all inclusive. Time *ab ante* and *a post* infinite and exclusive of each other; *ergo*, &c

7 An infinite number of quantities must make up either an infinite or a finite whole. I. The former.—But an inch, a minute, a degree, contain each an infinite number of quantities, therefore, an inch, a minute, a degree, are each infinite wholes, which is absurd. II. The latter.—An infinite number of quantities would thus make up a finite quantity, which is equally absurd.

8. If we take a finite quantity, (as an inch, a minute, a degree), it would appear equally that there are, and that there are not, an equal number of quantities between these and a greatest, and between these and a least <sup>a</sup>

9. An absolutely quickest motion is that which passes from one point to another in space in a minimum of time. But a quickest motion from one point to another, say a mile distance, and from one to another, say a million million of miles, is thought the same, which is absurd.

10. A wheel turned with quickest motion; if a spoke be prolonged, it will therefore be moved by a motion quicker than the quickest. The same may be shown using the rim and the nave <sup>β</sup>

11 Contradictory are Boscovich Points, which occupy space, and are unextended. <sup>γ</sup> Dynamism, therefore, inconceivable. *E contra*,

<sup>a</sup> See Boscovich on Stay, *Philosophia naturalis, Veritate, et Ideis* — Ed Recentior, 1 p 284, edit 1755

<sup>γ</sup> See Boscovich on Stay, as above,

<sup>β</sup> See Leibnitz, *Meditationes de Cog-* 1. p 304

12 Atomism also inconceivable, for this supposes atoms,—minima extended but indivisible.

13 A quantity, say a foot, has an infinity of parts Any part of this quantity, say an inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another Therefore, an inch is equal to a foot <sup>a</sup>

14. If two divaricating lines are produced *ad infinitum* from a point where they form an acute angle, like a pyramid, the base will be infinite and, at the same time, not infinite, 1°, Because terminated by two points, and, 2°, Because shorter than the sides <sup>β</sup>, 3°, Base could not be drawn, because sides infinitely long <sup>γ</sup>

15 An atom, as existent, must be able to be turned round But if turned round, it must have a right and left hand, &c, and these its sides must change their place, therefore, be extended <sup>δ</sup>

(c) PHILOSOPHY OF ABSOLUTE—DISTINCTIONS OF MODE OF REACHING IT.

I Some carry the absolute by assault,—by a single leap,—place themselves at once in the absolute,—take it as a datum, others climb to it by degrees,—mount to the absolute from the conditioned,—as a result.

Former—Plotinus, Schelling, latter—Hegel, Cousin, are examples

II Some place cognition of Absolute above, and in opposition to consciousness,—conception,—reflection, the conditions of which are difference, plurality, and, in a word, condition, limitation (Plotinus, Schelling) Others do not, but reach it through consciousness, &c—the consciousness of difference, contrast, &c; giving, when sifted, a cognition of Identity (absolute). (Hegel, Cousin)

<sup>a</sup> See Tellez, quoted by F Bonæ Spei, [*Physica*, pars 1 tract 111 disp 1 dub 4, p 154, edit 1652 —Ed] <sup>γ</sup> See Carleton, [*Philosophia, Universa, Auctore Thoma Comptono Carleton*, Antverpiæ, 1649, p 392 —Ed]

<sup>β</sup> See Bonæ Spei, *Physica*, [pars 1 tract 111 disp 1 dub 2, p 139 —Ed] <sup>δ</sup> See Kant, in King's *Metaphysik*, p 193

III. Some, to realise a cognition of Absolute, abolish the logical laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, (as Cusa, Schelling, Hegel. Plotinus is not explicit) Others do not, (as Cousin).

IV. Some explicitly hold that as the Absolute is absolutely one, cognition and existence must coincide,—to know the absolute is to be the absolute,—to know the absolute is to be God. Others do not explicitly assert this, but only hold the impersonality of reason,—a certain union with God, in holding that we are conscious of eternal truths as in the divine mind. (Augustin, Malebranche, Price, Cousin.)

V. Some carry up man into the Deity, (as Schelling) Others bring down the Deity to man; in whose philosophy the latter is the highest manifestation of the former,—man apex of Deity.

VI\*. Some think Absolute can be known as an object of knowledge,—a notion of absolute competent, others that to know the absolute we must *be* the absolute, (Schelling, Plotinus?)

\* Some [hold] that unconditioned is to be believed, not known, others that it can be known.<sup>a</sup>

(d) SIR W. HAMILTON TO MR HENRY CALDERWOOD.

MY DEAR SIR,

Cordale, 26th Sept. 1854

I received a few days ago your *Philosophy of the Infinite*, and beg leave to return you my best thanks, both for the present of the book itself, and for the courteous manner in which my opinions are therein controverted. The ingenuity with which your views are maintained, does great credit to your metaphysical ability; and however I may differ from them, it gives me great satisfaction to recognise the independence of thought by which they are distinguished, and to acknowledge the candid spirit in which you have written

At the same time, I regret that my doctrines, (briefly as they are promulgated on this abstract subject), have been, now again,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Discussions*, p 12 et seq —ED.

so much mistaken, more especially in their theological relations. In fact, it seems to me, that your admissions would, if adequately developed, result in establishing the very opinions which I maintain, and which you so earnestly set yourself to controvert.

In general, I do not think that you have taken sufficiently into account the following circumstances —

1°, That the Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as *in thought*, the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of belief, but not of knowledge. This consideration obviates many of your objections

2°, That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be, *believed*. This I have indeed anxiously evinced, both by reasoning and authority. When, therefore, you maintain, that in denying to man any positive cognisance of the Infinite, I virtually extenuate his belief in the infinitude of Deity, I must hold you to be wholly wrong, in respect both of my opinion and of the theological dogma itself

Assuredly, I maintain that an infinite God cannot be by us (positively) comprehended. But the Scriptures, and all theologians worthy of the name, assert the same. Some indeed of the latter, and, among them, some of the most illustrious Fathers, go the length of asserting, that “an understood God is no God at all,” and that, “if we maintain God to be as we can think that he is, we blaspheme” Hence the assertion of Augustin. “Deum potius ignorantia quam scientia attingi”

3°, That there is a fundamental difference between *The Infinite*, (τὸ Ἐν καὶ Πᾶν), and a relation to which we may apply the term *infinite*. Thus, Time and Space must be excluded from the supposed notion of *The Infinite*, for The Infinite, if positively thought it could be, must be thought as under neither Space nor Time

But I would remark specially on some essential points of your doctrine; and these I shall take up without order, as they present themselves to my recollection

You maintain (*passim*) that thought, conception, knowledge, is and must be finite, whilst the *object of thought*, etc., may be

infinite. This appears to me to be erroneous, and even contradictory. An existence can only be an object of thought, conception, knowledge, inasmuch as it is an object thought, conceived, known; as such only does it form a constituent of the circle of thought, conception, knowledge. A thing may be partly known, conceived, thought, partly unknown, &c. But that part of it only which is thought, can be an object of thought, &c; whereas the part of it not thought, &c., is, as far as thought, &c., is concerned, only tantamount to zero. The infinite, therefore, in this point of view, can be *no object* of thought, &c., for nothing can be more self-repugnant than the assertion, that we know the infinite through a finite notion, or have a finite knowledge of an infinite object of knowledge.

But you assert (*passim*) that we have a knowledge, a notion of the infinite, at the same time asserting (*passim*) that this knowledge or notion is "inadequate,"—"partial,"—"imperfect,"—"limited,"—"not in all its extent,"—"incomplete,"—"only to some extent,"—"in a certain sense,"—"indistinct," &c. &c.

Now, in the first place, this assertion is in contradiction of what you also maintain, that "the infinite is one and indivisible" (pp 25, 26, 226); that is, that having *no parts*, it cannot be *partially* known. But, in the second place, this also subverts the possibility of conceiving, of knowing, the Infinite, for, as partial, inadequate, not in all its extent, &c., our conception includes *some part* only of the object supposed infinite, and *does not include* the rest. Our knowledge is, therefore, by your own account, limited and finite; consequently, you implicitly admit that we have no knowledge, at least no positive knowledge, of the infinite.

Neither can I surmise how we should ever come to know that the object thus partially conceived *is* in itself infinite; seeing that we are denied the power of knowing it *as* infinite, that is, not partially, not inadequately, not in some parts only of its extent, &c., but totally, adequately, in its whole extent, &c.; in other words, under the criteria compatible with the supposition of infinitude. For, as you truly observe, "everything *short of* the infinite is limited" (p 223).

Again, as stated, you describe the infinite to be "one and indivisible." But, to conceive as inseparable into *parts*, an

entity which, not excluding, in fact includes, the worlds of mind and matter, is for the human intellect utterly improbable. And does not the infinite contain the finite? If it does, then it contains what has parts, and is divisible, if it does not, then is it exclusive, the finite is out of the infinite, and the infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted,—*finite*

You controvert, (p 233, *alibi*), my assertion, that to conceive a thing *in relation*, is, *ipso facto*, to conceive it as finite, and you maintain that the relative is not incompatible with infinity unless it be also restrictive. But restrictive I hold the relative always to be, and, therefore, incompatible with *The Infinite* in the more proper signification of the term, though infinity, in a looser signification, may be applied to it. My reasons for this are the following —A relation is always a *particular* point of view, consequently, the things thought as relative and correlative are always thought restrictively, in so far as the thought of the one discriminates and excludes the other, and likewise all things not conceived in the same special or relative point of view. Thus, if we think of Socrates and Xanthippe under the matrimonial relation, not only do the thoughts of Socrates and Xanthippe exclude each other as separate existences, and, *pro tanto*, therefore are restrictive, but thinking of Socrates *as husband*, this excludes our conception of him as citizen, &c &c Or, to take an example from higher relatives what is thought as the *object*, excludes what is viewed as the *subject*, of thought, and hence the necessity which compelled Schelling and other absolutists to place *The Absolute* in the indifference of subject and object, of knowledge and existence. Again we conceive God in the relation of Creator, and in so far as we merely conceive Him as Creator, we do not conceive Him as unconditioned, as infinite, for there are many other relations of the Deity under which we may conceive Him, but which are not included in the relation of Creator. In so far, therefore, as we conceive God only in this relation, our conception of Him is manifestly restrictive. Further, the created universe is, and you assert it to be, (pp 175, 180, 229), finite. The creation is, therefore, an act, of however great, of finite power; and the Creator is thus thought only in a finite capacity. God, in His own nature, is infinite, but we do not positively think Him as



infinite, in thinking Him under the relation of the Creator of a finite creation. Finally, let us suppose the created universe (which you do not), to be infinite; in that case we should be reduced to the dilemma of asserting *two* infinities, which is contradictory, or of asserting the supernal absurdity, that God the Creator is finite, and the universe created by Him is infinite.

In connection with this, you expressly deny Space and Time to be restrictions, whilst you admit them to be necessary conditions of thought (p. 103-117). I hold them both to be restrictive.

In the first place, take *Space*, or Extension. Now, what is conceived as extended, does it not exclude the unextended? Does it not include body, to the exclusion of mind? *Pro tanto*, therefore, space is a limitation, a restriction.

In the same way *Time*,—is it not restrictive in excluding the Deity, who must be held to exist above or beyond the condition of time or succession? This, His existence, we must believe as real, though we cannot positively think, conceive, understand its possibility. Time, like Space, thus involving limitation, both must be excluded, as has been done by Schelling, from the sphere,—from the supposed notion, of the infinite-absolute,—

“Whose kingdom is where Time and Space are not.”

You ask, if we had not a positive notion of the thing, how such a name as *Infinite* could be introduced into language (p. 58). The answer to this is easy. In the first place, the word Infinite, (*infinitum*, *ἄπειρον*), is negative, expressing the negation of limits; and I believe that this its negative character holds good in all languages. In the second place, the question is idle; for we have many words which, more directly and obtrusively expressing a negation of thought, are extant in every language, as *incogitable*, *unthinkable*, *incomprehensible*, *inconceivable*, *unimaginable*, *nonsense*, &c. &c.; whilst the term *infinite* directly denotes only the negation of limits, and only indirectly a negation of thought.

I may here notice what you animadvert on. (p. 60, 76). the application of the term *notion*, &c., to what cannot be positively conceived. At best this is merely a verbal objection against an abuse of language; but I hardly think it valid. The term

*notion* can, I think, be not improperly applied to what we are unable positively to construe in thought, and which we understand only by a problematic supposition. *A round square* cannot certainly be represented; but, understanding what is hypothetically required, the union of the attribute *round* with the attribute *square*, I may surely say, "the notion round-square is a representative impossibility"

You misrepresent, in truth reverse, my doctrine, in saying, (p 169), that I hold "God *cannot* act as a cause, for the unconditioned cannot exist in relation" I never denied, or dreamed of denying, that the Deity, though infinite, though unconditioned, *could* act in a finite relation I only denied, in opposition to Cousin, that so He *must* True it is, indeed, that in thinking God under relation, we do not *then* think Him, even negatively, as infinite, and in general, whilst always believing Him to be infinite, we are ever unable to construe to our minds,—positively to conceive,—His attribute itself of infinity. This is "unsearchable." This is "past finding out." What I have said as to the infinite being (subjectively) inconceivable, does not at all derogate from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, the main scope of my speculation is to show articulately, that we *must believe*, as actual, much that we are unable (positively) *to conceive*, as even possible

I should have wished to make some special observations on your seventh chapter, in relation to Causality, for I think your objections to my theory of causation might be easily obviated. Assuredly that theory applies equally to mind and matter These, however, I must omit But what can be more contradictory than your assertion, "that creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as *the origin of existence*, by the fiat of the Deity?" (p 156) Was the *Deity not existent before the creation?* or did the *non-existent Deity at the creation originate existence?* I do not dream of imputing to you such absurdities. But you must excuse me in saying, that there is infinitely less ground to wrest my language (as you seem to do), to the assertion of a material Pantheism, than to suppose you guilty of them

Before concluding, I may notice your denial, (p 108), of my statement, that time present is conceivable only as a line

in which the past and future limit each other As a position of time, (time is a protensive quantity), the present, if positively conceived, must have a certain duration, and that duration can be measured and stated. Now, does the present endure for an hour, a minute, a second, or for any part of a second? If you state what length of duration it contains, you are lost So true is the observation of St Augustin

These are but a few specimens of the mode in which I think your objections to my theory of the infinite may be met. But, however scanty and imperfect, I have tired myself in their dictation, and must, therefore, now leave them, without addition or improvement, to your candid consideration—Believe me, my dear sir, very truly yours,

(Signed) W. HAMILTON.

### (e) DOCTRINE OF RELATION

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART On Desk, May 1856, written Autumn 1855—ED)

1. Every Relation, (*Quod esse habet ad aliud*,—*unus accidens*,—*σχέσις*,—*respectivum*,—*ad aliquod*,—*ad aliud*,—*relatum*,—*comparatum*,—*sociale*), supposes at least two things, or, as they are called, terms thought as relative, that is, thought to exist only as thought to exist in reference to each other: in other words, Relatives, (*τὰ πρὸς τι σχέσιν ἔχοντα*,—*relativa sunt*, *quorum esse est ad aliud*), are, from the very notion of relativity, necessarily plural Hence Aristotle's definition is not of Relation but of things relative. Indeed, a relation of one term,—a relative not referred,—not related, (*πρὸς τι οὐ πρὸς τι*), is an overt contradiction,—a proclaimed absurdity The Absolute, (the one, the not-relative,—not-plural), is diametrically opposed to the relative,—these mutual negatives.

II. A relation is a unifying act,—a synthesis, but it is likewise an antithesis For even when it results in denoting agreement, it necessarily proceeds through a thought of difference, and thus relatives, however they may in reality coincide, are always mentally contrasted If it be allowed, even the relation of identity,—of the sameness of a thing to itself, in the formula  $A=A$ , involves the discrimination and opposition of the two

terms. Accordingly, in the process of relation, there is no conjunction of a plurality in the unity of a single notion, as in a process of generalisation, for in the relation there is always a division, always an antithesis of the several connected and constituent notions

III. Thus relatives are severally discriminated, inasmuch as the one is specially *what is referred*, the other specially *what is referred to*. The former, opening the relation, retains the generic name of the *Relative*, (and is sometimes called exclusively *the Subject*), whilst the latter, closing it, is denominated *the Correlative*, (and to this the word *Term*, is not unfrequently restricted) Accordingly, even the relation of the thing to itself in the affirmation of identity, distinguishes a Relative and a Correlative Thus in the judgment, "God is just," God is first posited as subject and Relative, and then enounced as predicate and Correlative.

IV The Relative and the Correlative are mutually referred, and can always be reciprocated or converted, (*πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεσθαι*,—*reciprocce, ad convertentiam dici*), that is, we can view in thought the Relative as the Correlative, and the Correlative as the Relative Thus, if we think the Father as the Relative of the Son as Correlative, we can also think the Son as Relative of the Father as Correlative But, in point of fact, there are here always, more or less obtrusive, two different, though not independent, relations for the relation, in which the Father is relative and the Son correlative, is that of Paternity, while the relation, in which the Son is relative and the Father correlative, is that of Filiation, relations, however, which mutually imply each other Thus, also, Cause and Effect may be either Relative or Correlative. But where Cause is made the Relative, the relation is properly styled *Causation*; whereas we ought to denominate it *Effectuation*, when the Effect becomes the relative term To speak of the relation of Knowledge, we have here Subject and Object, either of which we may consider as the Relative or as the Correlative. But, in rigid accuracy, under Knowledge, we ought to distinguish two reciprocal relations,—the relation of *knowing*, and the relation of *being known* In the former, the Subject, (that *known as knowing*), is the Relative, the Object, (that *known as being known*), is the Correlative, in the latter, the terms are just re

of God exerted or put forth into act, so the other is only the withdrawal of that exerted energy into power. We are able to think no complete annihilation,—no absolute ending of existence, (“*omnia mutantur, nihil interit*”), as we cannot think a creation from nothing, in the sense of an origination of being without a previously existing Creator,—a prior creative power. Causation is, therefore, necessarily *within* existence; for we cannot think of a change either from non-existence to existence, or from existence to non-existence. The thought of power, therefore, always precedes that of creation, and follows that of annihilation, and as the thought of power always involves the thought of existence, therefore, in so far as the thoughts of creation and annihilation go, the necessity of thinking a cause for these changes exemplifies the facts,—that change is only from one form of existence to another, and that causation is simply our inability to think an absolute commencement or an absolute termination of being. The sum of being (actual and potential) now extant in the mental and material worlds, together with that in their Creator, and the sum of being (actual and potential) in the Creator alone, before and after these worlds existed, is necessarily thought as precisely the same. Take the instance of a neutral salt. This is an effect, the product of various causes,—and all are necessarily powers. We have here, 1°, An acid involving its power (active or passive) of combining with the alkali, 2°, An alkali, involving its power (active or passive) of combining with the acid; 3°, (Since, as the chemical brocard has it, “*corpora non agunt nisi soluta*”), a fluid, say water, with its power of dissolving and holding in solution the acid and alkali, 4°, A translativè power, say the human hand, capable of bringing the acid, the alkali, and the water, into correlation, or within the sphere of mutual affinity. These, (and they might be subdivided), are all causes of the effect; for, abstract any one, and the salt is not produced. It wants a coefficient cause, and the concurrence of every cause is requisite for an effect <sup>a</sup>.

But all the causes or coefficient powers being brought into reciprocal relation, the salt is the result, for an effect is nothing but the actual union of its constituent entities,—concauses or coefficient powers. In thought, causes and effects are thus, *pro tanto*, tautological. an effect always pre-existed potentially in

<sup>a</sup> See above, Lect. III., vol. 1 p. 59 —Ed.

its causes ; and causes always continue actually to exist in their effects There is a change of the form, but we are compelled to think an identity in the elements of existence —

“ Omnia mutantur, nihil interit ”

And we might add,—“ Nihil incipit , ” for a creative power must always be conceived as pre-existent

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Mutation, Causation, Effectuation, are only the same thought in different respects ; they may, therefore, be regarded as virtually terms convertible. Every change is an effect , every effect is a change An effect is in truth just a change, of power into act , every effect being an actualisation of the potential.

But what is now considered as the cause may at another time be viewed as the effect , and *vice versa*. Thus, we can extract the acid or the alkali, as effect, out of the salt, as principal concause ; and the square which, as effect, is made up of two triangles in conjunction, may be viewed as cause when cut into these figures. In opposite views, Addition and Multiplication, Subtraction and Division, may be regarded as causes, or as effects

Power is an attribute or property of existence, but not co-extensive with it. for we may suppose (negatively think), things to exist which have no capacity of change, no capacity of appearing.

Creation is the existing subsequently in act of what previously existed in power ; annihilation, on the contrary, is the subsequent existence in power of what previously existed in act

Except the first and last causal agencies, (and these, as Divine operations, are by us incomprehensible), every other is conceived also as an effect ; therefore, every event is, in different relations, a power and an act Considered-as a cause, it is a power,—a power to co-operate an effect. Considered as an effect, it is an act,—an act co-operated by causes

Change (cause and effect) must be *within existence* ; it must be merely of phænomenal existence For change can be for us only as it appears to us,—only as it is known by us ; and we cannot know, we cannot even think a change either from non-existence to existence, or from existence to non-existence. The change must be from substance to substance ; but substances, apart from phænomena, are (positively) inconceivable, as phænomena are (positively) inconceivable apart from substances For thought requires as its condition the correlatives both of an appearing and of something that appears

And here I must observe that we are unable to think the Divine Attributes as in themselves they are, we cannot think God without impiety, unless we also implicitly confess our impotence to think Him worthily, and if we should assert that God is as we think or affirm Him to be, we actually blaspheme. For the Deity is adequately inconceivable, is adequately ineffable, since human thought and human language are equally incompetent to His Infinities.

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(b) THE QUESTION OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY AS VIEWED BY THE  
SCOTTISH SCHOOL.

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART. On  
Desk, May 1856 ; written Autumn 1855.—ED)

The Scottish School of Philosophy has much merit in regard to the problem of the Morality of human actions, but its success in the polemic which it has waged in this respect, consists rather in having intrenched the position maintained behind the common sense or natural convictions of mankind, than in having rendered the problem and the thesis adopted intelligible to the philosopher. This, indeed, could not be accomplished. It would, therefore, have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessity are both incomprehensible, as both beyond the limits of legitimate thought, but that though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, so neither can it be speculatively disproved ; while we may claim for it as a *fact* of real actuality,

though of inconceivable possibility, the testimony of consciousness,—that we are morally free, as we are morally accountable for our actions. In this manner, the whole question of free and bond-will is in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and all the moral interests of man entire.

Mr Stewart seems, indeed, disposed to acknowledge, against Reid, that, in certain respects, the problem is beyond the capacity of human thought, and to admit that all reasoning for, as all reasoning against, our liberty, is on that account invalid. Thus in reference to the arguments against human free-agency, drawn from the prescience of the Deity, he says, "In reviewing the arguments that have been advanced on the opposite sides of this question, I have hitherto taken no notice of those which the Necessitarians have founded on the prescience of the Deity, because I do not think these fairly applicable to the subject; inasmuch as they draw an inference from what is altogether *placed beyond the reach of our faculties*, against a fact for which every man has the evidence of his own consciousness" <sup>a</sup>

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(c) LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART On Desk, May 1856, written Autumn 1855.—Ed.)

The question of Liberty and Necessity may be dealt with in two ways.—

I The opposing parties may endeavour to show each that his thesis is distinct, intelligible, and consistent, whereas that the anti-thesis of his opponent is indistinct, unintelligible, and contradictory.

II An opposing party may endeavour to show that the thesis of either side is unthinkable, and thus abolish logically the whole problem, as, on both alternatives, beyond the limits of human thought, it being, however, open to him to argue that, though unthinkable, his thesis is not annihilated, there being contradictory opposites, one of which must consequently be held as true, though we be unable to think the possibility of either opposite,

<sup>a</sup> *Active and Moral Powers*, vol. 1. *Works*, vol. vi. p. 396



whilst he may be able to appeal to a direct or indirect declaration of our conscious nature in favour of the alternative which he maintains.

The former of these modes of arguing has been the one exclusively employed in this controversy. The Libertarian, indeed, has often endeavoured to strengthen his position by calling in a deliverance of consciousness; the Necessitarian, on the contrary, has no such deliverance to appeal to, and he has only attempted, at best, to deprive his adversary of this ground of argumentation by denying the fact or extenuating the authority of the deliverance.

The latter of these lines of argumentation, I may also observe, was, I believe, for the first time employed, or, at least, for the first time legitimately employed, by myself. for Kant could not consistently defer to the authority of Reason in its practical relations, after having shown that Reason in its speculative operations resulted only in a complexus of antilogies. On the contrary, I have endeavoured to show that Reason,—that Consciousness within its legitimate limits, is always veracious,—that in generating its antinomies, Kant's Reason transcended its limits, violated its laws,—that Consciousness, in fact, is never spontaneously false, and that Reason is only self-contradictory when driven beyond its legitimate bounds. We are, therefore, warranted to rely on a deliverance of Consciousness, when that deliverance is *that* a thing is, though we may be unable to think *how* it can be.

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